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PREFACE
This dissertation is an examination of the struggle to 
desegregate the public schools of Virginia from 1954 to 1972. 
The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education attacked the 
social foundation of eleven southern states when it declared 
that racially segregated schools were "inherently unequal." 
Brown I,, in fact, was one of many controversial decisions made 
by the Supreme Court as it reflected the egalitarian spirit 
of the 1950's and 1960's. By 1970, however, a growing list 
of legal scholars questioned the wisdom and effectivemess of 
the Warren Court's judicial activism. A major target of this 
criticism was the Brown decision. In 19 70, when I began my 
research, it was apparent that the school desegregation deci­
sion was in deep trouble. My major objective was to trace the 
tortuous path of the school cases in one southern state in 
order to determine the most significant forces in slowing or 
advancing the implementation of the Brown decision. I chose 
Virginia since it was and continues to be a key state in the 
school litigation.
In addition to examining the politics of school deseg­
regation, I investigated the roles of the federal and state 
courts in interpreting Brown I as well as the performance of 
Virginia's Negro leadership in pressing for school integra­
tion. My study of Virginia discusses the tremendous resources
iii
available to a state intent on thwarting a Supreme Court 
ruling. My dissertation supports the thesis that the Supreme 
Court's ability to oversee a social revolution, without the full 
support of Congress and the President, is limited and sometimes 
counter-productive.
In the course of my research and writing I incurred 
numerous debts. Professor Alfred H. Kelly, who directed this 
dissertation, offered many constructive suggestions. Pro­
fessor Richard Miles read the entire dissertation and added 
several valuable observations. My wife Claudia not only pro­
vided encouragement but also typed much of the dissertation. 
Finally, the librarians and archivists at Wayne State Univer­
sity, the University of Virginia, and the Virginia State 
Library were generous in offering their services.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 17, 195 4, the United States Supreme Court in 
Brown v. Board of Education declared that segregated schools 
were inherently unequal.^ The Court held that the laws which 
either required or permitted separate schools in seventeen 
states violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The decision marked a watershed in the long 
struggle of the American Negro to destroy all vestiges of 
second-class citizenship. The Negro triumph, in part, was an 
indication of .growing concern in the United States about the 
obvious inequities in American society which had been made 
especially apparent by the egalitarian rhetoric of World 
War II and the Cold War. It also symbolized the Negro's in­
creasing economic and political power which could no longer 
be overlooked by the leaders of the United States. Finally, 
victory before the Supreme Court was an important source of 
black pride, since it was the result of a well-conceived legal 
strategy devised by a band of skillful black lawyers.^
For the eleven Southern states, by contrast, May 17, 
1954, was referred to as "Black Monday." The Brown decision
1347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2Alfred H. Kelly, "The School Desegregation Case," in 
Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution, ed. by John A. 
Garraty (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) , pp. 244-54.
1
2had a double meaning for the South. For, as C. Vann Woodward
has written: "It reversed a constitutional trend started long
before Plessy v. Ferguson, and it marked the beginning of the
3
end of Jim Crow." The immediate reaction of the South, de­
pending on the region, varied from hysteria or disbelief to a 
grudging reluctance to accept the "law of the land." Bewil­
derment evolved into a policy of massive resistance whereby 
southern political leaders attempted to organize both state 
and regional defiance to the Brown decision. At the root of 
southern defiance was the commitment to a hierarchical society 
based on white supremacy and a belief in Negro inferiority.
This neo-Bourbon political tradition was buttressed by small, 
manageable electorates and malapportioned state legislatures.^
A fundamental aspect of the South's resistance was di­
rectly related to Chief Justice Earl Warren's opinion in the 
Brown decision. Southern conservatives charged that the 
Supreme Court had departed from the law, and, in effect, had 
amended the Constitution on the strength of certain findings 
in psychology and sociology. Resistance was justified, in 
part, on the claim that nine new justices would reverse the 
Brown decision. Theoretically, the South's criticism of the 
Brown decision was not without foundation. Justice Warren
3
C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 
(London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1966),
p. 147.
4Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance:
Race and Politics in the South During the 1950's (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1969), pp. 237-50.
3himself had dismissed the historical evidence as "inconclu­
sive." While he cited the decisions involving the desegre­
gation of graduate schools, his application of them to the 
case at hand was not convincing even to legal scholars sym­
pathetic to the decision. A survey of the legal journals 
indicates that most "friendly critics" would agree with Robert 
Harris' observations that "...the decision in the Segregation
Cases was a great decision. The opinion, on the other hand,
< • 3was not a great opinion." The technical plausibility of the 
South's case helped to shift the argument from vulgar racism 
to a point in constitutional law. By focusing on legal points 
massive resisters were able to win the support of citizens re­
luctant to be identified with the extremists. As the Warren 
Court made other controversial decisions, especially in the 
area of federal-state relations, the South hoped to gain 
greater support in its campaign to reverse the Brown decision.
The Supreme Court and the lawyers of the National Asso­
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People recognized that 
the task, of implementing the school decision would be formi­
dable. From the NAACP's point of view, the anticipation of
5Robert J. Harris "The Constitution, Education and 
Segregation," Temple Law Quarterly, XXIX (Summer, 1956), 
p. 432. For a discussion of the friendly critics see Ira M. 
Heyman, "The Chief Justice, Racial Segregation and the Frien­
dly Critics," California Law Review XLIX (March, 1961), 104- 
25. Heyman's article includes a discussion of Herbert Wech- 
sler's influencial analysis, "Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law," in the Harvard Law Review, 73 (November, 
1959), p. 35. A defense of the Supreme Court is found in 
Charles L. Black Jr. "The Lawfulness of the Segregation De­
cisions," Yale Law Journal LXIX (January, 1960), pp. 421-30.
resistance accounted for the Supreme Court's delay in deline­
ating the principles for implementation until May 31, 1955, in 
the second Brown decision. From the NAACP's point of view, 
Virginia, on the surface, offered several advantages as a 
starting point for a successful campaign to desegregate the 
schools of the South. Among these were a relatively small 
Negro population (22.2 per cent in 1950), regional variety, 
and a tradition of non-violent race relations. Equally signi­
ficant, the Virginia Conference of the NAACP was the largest 
of any Southern state at the time of the decision. The organ­
ization had formed its own legal counsel under the able direc­
tion of Oliver W. Hill. Virginia, instead, chose to assume 
the lead in the South's defiance of the Brown decision.
Since 1954, Virginia has passed through essentially 
three stages in its efforts to defy or to cope with the Brown 
decision. The first stage, and by far the most controversial, 
was the period of massive resistance between 1954 and 1959. 
During these years, Virginia refused to comply with the Brown 
decision. Instead, it adopted legislation which ultimately 
closed the schools in three school districts. Today, men 
prominently associated with the policy defend it as basically 
constructive. The legislation and litigation, according to 
their explanation, bought time which permitted Virginians to 
adjust to the revolution in race relations. Thus, this inter­
pretation concludes, when Virginia's schools opened their
^Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294
C1955) .
5doors to Negroes for the first time in February of 1959, there 
7
was. no violence. This interpretation has been contested. In 
a recently published study of Virginia politics, J. Harvie Wil­
kinson questioned whether the rhetoric of massive resistance 
actually had the cooling effect which its proponents later 
claimed for it. Taking issue with another basic tenet of the 
massive resisters, Wilkinson concluded: "Massive resistance
O
was more a calculated maneuver than an emotional imperative."
In 1959 Virginia passed into the second phase of the 
school struggle which lasted until 1968. This period was dom­
inated by time-consuming litigation, a bitter feud in Prince 
Edward County, and finally the active participation of the 
federal government in the desegregation process following the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The most significant 
legal development during this period was the Supreme Court's 
qualified rejection of the freedom of choice assignment plan. 
Racially neutral on its face, freedom of choice, in practice, 
was a clever scheme for perpetuating segregated schools. In
9
Green v. County Board of New Kent County (196 8), the Supreme 
Court held that a freedom of choice assignment plan was unac­
ceptable unless it led to desegregated schools. The Green de-
^Interviews.
o
J. Harvie Wilkinson III. Harry Byrd and the Changing 
Face of Virginia Politics, 1945-1966'! (Charlottesville: The
University of Virginia Press, 19 68), p. 151.
9391 U.S. 430 (1968).
cision meant that the test of subsequent school plans was 
their capacity to achieve school integration.
Following the Green decision, Virginia entered a third 
stage of the desegregation controversy which has aroused emo­
tions recalling the frenzy of massive resistance. In 
Virginia, the new phase of the school debate was centered in 
those cities where relatively large Negro populations and 
racially separated neighborhoods stand as formidable obstacles 
to desegregation. Although the Supreme Court accepted busing 
as a tool of integration in Swann v. Charlotte-Meeklenburg 
(1971),^ in 1972 the future of the school desegregation ex­
periment was still unclear. The emergence of busing as a 
national political issue, resegregation in America's urban 
areas and an apparent decline in enthusiasm for integration 
among whites and Negroes led; one constitutional expert, Alex­
ander Bickel, to suggest that "the desegregation movement 
stands at the point where it may be abandoned." ^
The wavering of the public mood on integration, in 
turn, seemed to encourage a limited retreat on the part of the 
Supreme Court. Although it accepted busing as a desegregation 
tool, the Court, in Swann, criticized racial balancing and 
wrote that school systems with racially identifiable schools
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1 (19 71)”. ~
^Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea 
of Progress (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper and
Row, 19 70), pp. 150-51.
712were not necessarily objectionable. In 19 72, the Court's 
conclusions were not encouraging to advocates of unconventional 
plans for achieving integration such as the crossing of poli­
tical boundaries.
The purpose of my dissertation is to trace the segre­
gation cases in Virginia from Brown to consolidation. In so 
doing my research was guided by several questions: Why did
Virginia choose massive resistance? What were the most impor­
tant factors in determining the pace of implementation after 
massive resistance? How did the federal district judges re­
spond to their role in implementing the Brown decision? My 
major conclusion is that massive resistance was avoidable. 
Although Virginians were not integrationists, initially many 
able leaders thought that a local option plan would work in 
Virginia. The switch to masjsive resistance was made possible 
by the extraordinary influence of black belt legislators in 
the Virginia Democratic party, the editorial skill of James 
J. Kilpatrick and the prestige of Virginia's senior Senator, 
Harry F. Byrd. Although the resort to race politics enabled 
the Byrd Organization to defeat the Republican party in 195 7, 
the moderate and conservative wings parted company with the 
failure of massive resistance. In 1960 Virginia turned to 
local option and until 1966 was very successful in limiting 
desegregation to token numbers. Despite an active legal cam­
paign by the Virginia NAACP, real progress toward desegrega­
^Swann, 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971).
ting public schools was not realized until NAACP lawyers were 
reinforced by the federal government following the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. However, this linkage between desegrega­
tion and the leadership of the federal government was 
threatened as busing and consolidation became national issues 
Furthermore, after eighteen years black Virginians as well as 
white were divided as to the wisdom of maintaining the strug­
gle to integrate Virginia's schools.
PART I. VIRGINIA AND THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE
CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND
In 1954, Virginia possessed the potential for compli­
ance as well as resistance to the Brown decision. Two char­
acteristics of the Old Dominion suggested the possibility of 
a policy of gradual adjustment to the Brown ruling. One was 
its relatively small Negro population, and the other was its 
social and economic diversity.^
The total population of the Commonwealth in 1950 was
23,318,680, of which approximately 22.2 percent was black.
Of even greater significance; was the uneven distribution of 
the Negro population. In thirty-two counties, all except 
three located in the western portion of the state, Negroes did 
not exceed ten percent of the white population. The ratio of 
Negroes to whites ranged from ten to forty percent in thirty- 
five counties centered in the central Piedmont. However, 
twenty-seven of these counties contained Negro populations 
below thirty percent. Only thirty-one Southside and Tidewater
^■Robbins Gates, The Making of Massive Resistance: 
Virginia's Politics of Public School Desegregation, 1954-1956 
(.Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press, 1962), pp. 1-2; Benjamin
Muse, Virginia's Massive Resistance (Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1961) pp. 1-2.
^Gates, p. 12.
10
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counties had populations where the Negro ratio exceeded forty 
percent. Of the thirty-two independent cities, twenty-four 
registered Negro populations under thirty percent.
If one accepted the theory that the obstacles to deseg­
regation were reduced when the number of Negroes was small, a 
desegregation scheme which made accommodations for regional 
differences seemed quite plausible. In fact, in some of the 
southwestern counties which bused their sparse numbers of Negro
children to regional high schools, desegregation appeared to
4
be an administrative necessity.
There were other regional variations that worked to 
erode the notion of a monolithic Virginia. Foremost among 
these was the growth of the state's urban areas, especially in 
suburban Washington, D.C. and around Hampton Roads. Here Vir­
ginia's racial orthodoxy already had been severely tested.
The Arlington-Fairfax area, the state's fastest growing re­
gion, was heavily populated by employees of the federal govern­
ment, who often migrated from other states. This made the 
Tenth Congressional District more cosmopolitan and somewhat of
a political enigma. On local and state levels, it elected
^Ibid., pp. 1-12.
^Doxey A. Wilkerson, "Some Correlates of Recent Pro­
gress Toward Equalizing White and Negro Schools in Virginia"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1958), 
pp. 233-67. The author described several southwestern coun­
ties which had such small Negro populations that the school 
children were bused to a regional Negro high school. Economi­
cally, desegregation of white schools was less expensive than 
building a Negro school.
12
relatively liberal candidates, but in national elections, it 
tended to support conservatives.
The area around Hampton Roads, including the cities of 
Norfolk and Newport News, was dominated by the United States 
Navy and the shipping industry. Economically linked to the 
federal government and housing a large population of military 
personnel, it was not surprising that the area demonstrated a 
greater willingness to co-operate with national policies. Nor 
was it surprising that three of the first five desegregation 
suits in the state were filed in Arlington, in Norfolk and in 
Newport News.
The Ninth Congressional District, in the southwestern 
corner of Virginia, was another political maverick. Known 
as the "Fightin1 Ninth," it was the only region in the Old 
Dominion where the two-party: system had remained viable for 
the first half of the twentieth century. Its uniqueness was 
attributed to the negligible role the Negro played in its his­
tory, to a diversified economy which included the troubled 
raining industry of its far western counties and, finally, to 
its distance from Richmond, Virginia's capital.
Northwest of the "Ninth" sprawled the Shenandoah 
Valley. Basically rural, the Sixth and especially the Seventh 
Congressional Districts could be expected to support the state 
Democratic party.
To the east rested the Piedmont, wedged between the 
Blue Ridge Mountains and the Tidewater. With the exception of 
the industrialization around the Richmond-Petersburg-Hopewell
13
area, it was basically rural and politically conservative. 
Unlike Arlington or Norfolk, Richmond had powerful links with 
Virginia's past. Its beautiful capitol and monuments to 
Confederate war heroes were an ever-present reminder of Rich­
mond's and Virginia's history. The city's two daily news­
papers, the Richmond Times-Dispatch and the Richmond News 
Leader, were especially influential in affecting state poli­
tical policy. They were the principal newspapers read by 
state officials and legislators when the General Assembly was 
in session. Their advantage was augmented by the prestige and 
skill of their editors, Virginus Dabney of the Times-Dispatch,
and, especially after 1954, James Jackson Kilpatrick of the 
5
News Leader.
Although there were fresh political breezes in Vir­
ginia, the most salient feature of its politics for the first 
half-century was its impressive consensus. Much of this was 
due to the skillful organization of the Democratic party, 
which in the 1950's was guided by its aging patriarch, Senator 
Harry Flood Byrd. The strength of the Democratic party was in 
rural Virginia, where it appealed to the rustic virtues of 
hard work, individualism and integrity.
The party's political base lay principally in the black 
belt, where the most potent issue was race. As expected, the
c:
James Latimer, "Virginia Politics, 1950-1960"
(Richmond: unpublished manuscript, 1961), pp. 12-17.
Mr. Latimer is the highly regarded political writer for the 
Richmond Times-Dispatch. The paragraphs describing Virginia's 
demographic differences were drawn from his manuscript which 
he permitted me to read.
14
greatest resistance to the Brown decision came from the South- 
side, the name given to the region where most of the black 
belt counties are found. In these tobacco and peanut coun­
ties, the pattern of Negro subordination had its roots in 
ante-bellum Virginia. From the "great fear" produced by Nat 
Turner's rebellion, through Reconstruction, and down to the 
present, the region’s politics concentrated on perpetuating 
white supremacy. Race relations here were characterized by 
paternalism, a sense of place and reportedly a lack of vio- 
lence. Behind the veneer of its plantation past, one Vir­
ginian has described the Southside as a "bleak country of red 
clay and scrub pine; of somnolent small towns; of marginal,
7
worked-out farms; of much poverty, ignorance, and prejudice."
The poverty which prevailed in these counties weighed 
more heavily on its Negroes, who suffered from poor schools 
and little economic opportunity. The well-known violation of 
the "separate-but-equal" doctrine was especially flagrant in 
the Southside. Even after 1941, as Virginia made steady pro­
gress toward equalizing its schools, these counties lagged be­
hind the remainder of the state. Desegregation was opposed on 
the theory that it threatened white civilization with the spec-
Q
ter of racial amalgamation.
^Wilkinson, pp. 9-22.
^Cabel Phillips, "Virginia— The State and the State 
of Mind," New York Times Magazine, July 28, 19 57, p. 49, 
quoted in Wilkinson, p. 10.
^Wilkerson, pp. 74-80.
15
The Southside wielded political power far in excess of 
its actual population. In this respect, its influence com-
9
pared favorably to the black belts of other Southern states. 
Several factors combined to give the Southside an ascendant 
role in Virginia politics. First, in a state where the popu­
lar vote in general elections had been steadily declining 
since 1900, the proportion of Southsiders voting continually 
exceeded the remainder of the state. Second, the uniform an­
tipathy to Federal spending, to "big" government in general 
and to the Supreme Court's civil rights decisions meant that 
the vote would be overwhelmingly conservative. Third, because 
of the consensus, the Southside's representatives in the 
General Assembly enjoyed greater longevity. As a result, they 
usually received the best committee assignments and chaired 
the strategic committees.^  Their privileged position in the 
General Assembly was furthered by a slight overrepresentation 
in the Southside's favor.^ Finally, the interests of the 
black belt were well represented in the hierarchy of the Demo­
cratic party. For example, during the school struggle major 
roles were played by the congressional representatives of the
QV. O. Key, Jr. and Alexander Heard, Southern Politics 
In State and Nation (New York: Vintage Books, A Division of
Random House, 19 59), pp. 5-10.
"^Wilkinson, pp. 51-52.
Gates, p» 26o
16
Fourth and Fifth Congressional Districts, Watkins Abbitt and 
William "Bill" Tuck.
The response to the school cases was to be determined 
by the consensus achieved in the Democratic organization. The 
organization was a perpetuation of oligarchical rule which had 
its roots in colonial Virginia. Until recently, the tradition 
had been interrupted only by Reconstruction and the Readjustor 
movement. During this brief interlude, Virginia had witnessed 
greater mass participation in government, as well as an effort 
to institute certain democratic reforms. At the same time, 
the Old Dominion had been racked by corruption associated with 
railroad politics and ballot box stuffing. At the turn of the 
century, during the progressive era, conservative Virginians 
were able to regain power on a platform aimed at restoring in­
tegrity to government. A series of cautious reforms, includ­
ing the strengthening of the State Corporation Commission,
12were achieved at the expense of popular democracy.
A key to the new organization's success was its ability 
to limit the size of the electorate to a "manageable" number.
A major step in restricting the size of the electorate was 
taken in the Constitutional Convention of 1902. Ostensibly 
aimed at eliminating the Negro from the state's political 
life, the poll tax and "understanding" tests drafted by this
12Raymond H. Pulley, Old Virginia Restored: An In­
terpretation of the Progressive Impulse, 1870-1930 (Charlottes­
ville: The University Press of Virginia, 1968), pp. 34-42,
104-08.
17
assembly were also aimed at disfranchising poor whites in po­
litically insecure counties. The subsequent provision for a 
Democratic party primary and skillful organization completed
the political foundation which thereafter endured for some
• a. 13sixty years.
In the 1920's a youthful Harry Byrd managed to take 
charge of the organization at the point when age had caught up 
with the Old Guard. In Raymond H. Pulley's view, the young 
politician admirably satisfied the tradition of Virginia poli­
tics. A descendant of the first William Byrd and a self-made 
success in business, he was Horatio Alger wrapped in a pedi­
gree. In 1926, at the age of thirty-eight, Harry Byrd was 
elected governor. During his four year tenure, by liberally
applying the techniques of business, he won much acclaim for
14consolidating the administration of the state's government.
Byrd also strengthened the governor's office by expanding his 
appointive power through shortening the ballot. He described 
this reform as "a reactionary step, for it reaffirms the wis­
dom of our fathers and admits that they knew what they were
about," since from "1776 to 1852, not a single State official
15was elected by direct vote of the people." Also, as gover­
nor, he so successfully committed Virginia to a policy of "pay 
as you go" regarding the financing of highways, that the program
"^Ibid. , pp. 69-91, 126-31. 
14Ibid., pp. 177-78. 
15Quoted in Ibid.,p. 179.
18
became, until recently, an unassailable tenet of the Common-
16wealth's fiscal policy. Moving to the United States Senate 
in 19 33, Byrd continued to oversee Virginia politics, while
17he jousted with the economic programs of the welfare state.
As the 1950's opened, Senator Byrd still loosely guided the 
organization which V. 0. Key aptly described as "a political 
museum piece. 1 ^
The explanation for the organization's longevity was 
not limited to electoral advantages. Among leading Virgin­
ians, a remarkable consensus existed concerning the operation 
and purpose of government. J. Lindsay Almond once likened it
to "a club" or "a loosely knit association" composed of men
19"who share the philosophy of Senator Byrd." Following this 
analogy, Byrd's role was more like chairman of the board than 
political boss.
The first priority of the "club" was to provide honest 
and efficient government. The organization's honesty, as its
16Ibid., pp. 180-81. Virginia’s reputation as a 
low-tax state was based on the absence of a general sales tax. 
Consequently urban areas were hit hard since they contributed 
a larger share of state revenue from corporate and individual 
income taxes while also bearing the burden of local services 
(Wilkinson, pp. 41-43).
1 7
Latimer, pp. 26-27. Ironically Senator Byrd and 
Franklin D. Roosevelt were sworn into office on the same day, 
March 4, 1933 . Byrd apparently enjoyed referring to himself 
as "one of the last of the old New Dealers." He claimed that 
his political philosophy had not budged from the Democratic 
platform written in 19 32.
18 v n ,Key, p. 19.
1 Q . . .Time, September 22 , 1958 , p. 16, quoted in Wilkinson,
p. 16.
19
frugality, was legendary. A sense of noblesse oblige, already 
centuries old, accompanied the responsibility to provide good 
government. The notion of government service as the duty of a 
gentleman was bolstered by the token salary received by a mem­
ber of the General Assembly. A tradition of government by an
elite extended into the 1960's, but has been eroded by such
20reforms as reapportionment and the repeal of the poll tax.
While a consensus existed, all was not left to chance. 
The success of the organization was also related to an almost 
mysterious ability to impose a certain uniformity on political 
activity. Although unstructured, methods existed for evalu­
ating, elevating and possibly disciplining ambitious politi­
cians who desired to move from the courthouse to the top of 
the heap. Usually, the State Compensation Board and the cir­
cuit court judges were singled out by observers as helping to 
insure regularity. The former, chaired for many years by 
E.. R. Combs, a Byrd lieutenant, set the salaries and office 
expenses of locally elected officials who also handled state 
business. The Board was a perennial target of anti­
organization Democrats and Republicans, who charged it with 
using its power to advance the fortunes of the Democratic
2 0Invariably organization men reminded me during 
interviews that no legislator could be "paid off." Even 
critics of the organization attested to its honesty.
20
• j • 2 1organization.
Virginia's forty circuit judges were elected by the 
General Assembly for eight year terms and were delegated broad 
appointive powers, including the naming of the Electoral 
Board, the Welfare Board and the School Trustee Electoral 
Board. Since the local legislators recommended, and the Demo­
cratic caucus nominated circuit court judges, the election was 
perfunctory. Although often little was known about the judge,
it could be safely predicted that his politics were ortho- 
22dox. Because the School Trustee Electoral Board appointed 
the school boards in most counties, the circuit judge could 
indirectly influence school policy.
Also contributing to the organization's stability was 
the provision for a certain amount of competition within the 
ranks. Nevertheless, when several men sought the same office 
the "nod" from Byrd usually tipped the balance in favor of the 
Senator's candidate.
The path of a Virginian who sought a career in politics 
usually followed a familiar pattern. An aspiring politician 
often earned a law degree, preferably at the University of
21Wilkinson, pp. 31-35, 52-53. Investigations of 
the State Compensation Board have never proven foul play.
9 9Ibid., Circuit judges in Virginia have a good repu­
tation in Virginia. Not until the recent 1971 session of the 
General Assembly has the routine of electing judges been al­
tered. Now prospective judges are invited, but not required, 
to answer questions in a public hearing before the Courts of 
Justice Committees of both houses of the General Assembly.
See Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 28, 19 71, p. A-l.
21
Virginia. He then practiced law, often with an eye on the po­
sition of commonwealth's attorney for some locality. After he 
established a local reputation, election to the General Assem­
bly or Congress could follow. If a politician passed these 
hurdles and proved to be capable and reliable, he hoped for 
the organization hierarchy's support for the governorship. 
Nevertheless, an ambitious man who had successfully cultivated 
the courthouse clique could win the organization's endorsement 
without being the hierarchy's first choice. Such was the case
of J. Lindsay Almond, who was governor during the collapse of
• 4.' 23massive resistance.
Finally, the organization's political successes meant 
that the development of political opposition was difficult to 
mount. The anti-Byrd Democrats were badly organized, poorly 
financed, and without an electoral base. Anti-organization 
Democrats supported the national Democratic party, urged pub­
lic reforms and attempted to expose organization double- 
24dealing. Despite their weaknesses, in the 1949 Democratic 
primary, Francis Pickens Miller almost stole the Party's nomi­
nation for governor away from John Battle, the organization
candidate. The narrow margin of victory was viewed as a sign
25of disillusionment with the organization's frugality.
In 1949, the state Republican party held its first pri-
22Ibid., p. 24.
2^Key, pp. 27-34. 
2“*Wilkinson, pp. 91-98.
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mary in the history of Virginia. A major obstacle to the 
G.O.P.'s success was that ideologically paany Republicans were 
in agreement with Byrd democrats. Thus, some political obser­
vers believed that Battle's victory over the more liberal 
Miller was due to Republicans who "crossed-over" to vote in
2 g
the Democratic primary.
By 1954, the organization was still in command, but its 
mastery of Virginia politics was no longer as effortless as it 
had been in the past. In the 1953 gubernatorial race, the Re­
publicans almost defeated the Democratic candidate. The or­
ganization standard bearer in this campaign was Thomas B. 
Stanley, a colorless but dedicated Byrd democrat. Stanley had 
served his time as a state delegate for sixteen years before 
going to Congress where he sat from 19 46 to 195 3. A country 
boy, Stanley, with initial help from his father-in-law, had 
earlier become a wealthy furniture manufacturer. Both he and 
his wife, Anne Bassett Stanley, had been generous contributors 
to the organization's campaign chests. The nomination of this 
easy-going businessman appeared to be a reward for dedicated 
service. Either unwilling or unable to speak on major issues, 
Stanley quickly acquired the sobriquet, "Mr. No Comment."
While Stanley was a fumbling speaker, his opponent, state Sena­
tor Ted Dalton, was an articulate and sophisticated campaigner. 
The Radford Republican attacked the state's electoral laws, 
the power of the circuit judges and the state's effort in pro-
26Latimer, pp. 34-35.
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viding public services. Apparently, Dalton was defeating 
Stanley until he suggested financing highway improvements 
through revenue bonds. The breach of "pay-as-you-go" per­
mitted Senator Byrd to enter the campaign and to rescue the 
outclassed Stanley. Though defeated, Dalton polled 182,887 
votes to Stanley's 225,87 8, the best showing of any Republican 
candidate in the twentieth century. The Dalton vote very 
likely indicated his great personal appeal as well as the 
growing demand of Virginians for a more progressive and ener­
getic government. Otherwise, the Republican party fared badly 
as indicated by the election of only five Republicans to the
27House of Delegates, a loss of one from the previous Assembly.
Governor Stanley's poor election showing left many con­
cerned about his ability to handle the duties of the Govern­
or's office. Among organization men apprehension turned into 
temporary fury following Stanley's Inaugural Address. Contra­
dicting one of his few campaign promises, the Governor pro­
posed a penny increase in the gasoline tax. During the 1954
2 8General Assembly, the proposal died a quiet death.
Already troubled, Stanley also faced an uprising in the 
organization from a group of relatively young and ambitious 
Democrats nicknamed "Young Turks". The primary goal of the 
"Turks" was to reform the organization without upsetting its 
structure. One major objection to organization policy was its
^ Ibid. , pp. 54-62 . 
^^Ibid., p. 6 3.
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poor record in providing public services. According to 
national statistics, Virginia ranked near the bottom in public 
education, health and welfare. The "Turks" were also disen­
chanted with the hierarchy's reluctance to advance younger 
members into positions of power. The group was especially 
distressed with the manner in which committee assignments were
distributed by the Speaker of the House, E. Blackburn Moore, a
29confidant of Senator Byrd.
Intra-organization feuding surfaced in a fierce debate 
to suspend state Senator Harry Byrd, Jr.'s Tax Credit Act of 
1950. The law provided for a rebate to taxpayers of general 
funds collected in excess of budget estimates. The "Turks" 
revolted at the end of the 1954 session of the General Assem­
bly when it was announced that $7,000,000 was to be returned 
to the taxpayers. Believing that the money should be used to 
aid the needy public school system, they formed a coalition in 
the House, suspended the Byrd law and amended the budget to 
increase its appropriation by $7,000,000 for public services. 
Foiled in the more conservative Senate, a compromise was 
worked out in which a third of the money was added to the bud­
get. The press generally regarded the concession as a signi­
ficant victory for the "Turks," and predicted that the organi­
zation thereafter would have to pay greater attention to its
30younger members and the issues they raised.
^ Ibid., p. 64. 
^Ibid. , pp. 64-65.
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Prior to Brown v. Board of Education, Governor Stanley
had gotten off to a bad start. The organization was still in
command, but political victories now were achieved with
greater difficulty. The tradition of the organization, with
its "adding machine mentality," clashed increasingly with the
31growing demand for public services. The Supreme Court's 
decision offered the organization a new opportunity to exploit 
the race issue, in order to thwart the "Young Turks" and to 
demolish the Republican party. Yet the school decision posed 
a dilemma, since one wing of the organization, if pushed to 
the brink, preferred social and economic progress to loyalty 
to Senator Byrd. Ultimately the organization was destroyed by 
the school issue, since the conservative wing was to refuse to 
retreat, once massive resistance was demonstrated to be a 
bankrupt policy.
31The phrase is borrowed from Key, p. 27.
CHAPTER II
REACTION TO BROWN I
Before 1950, the Negro struggle for equal educational 
opportunity in Virginia focused on a legal campaign to in­
crease the salaries of Negro teachers, to improve the student- 
teacher ratio in black classrooms, and to equalize the value 
of black and white school facilities.^ The difference in the 
value of black and white school property, in particular, 
demonstrated the sham of the "separate but equal" doctrine in 
Virginia. In 1947, the per capita value of Negro school 
property was still only 47.3 percent of white school property. 
However, as a tesult of a flurry of equalization suits
directed by black lawyers, by 1951 the relative value of Negro
2school property jumped to 64.9 percent. Successes m  Surry, 
Gloucester, and King George counties led one unnamed Negro 
lawyer to observe that "between 1948 and 1950, half of the 
counties with large Negro populations were ready for suits--
3
if we had had the money to handle them." Black lawyers were 
so successful in federal courts that G. Tyler Miller, the
^Wilker son, pp. 76-78 , 149-91, 248-54.
^Ibid♦, p. 7 8
^Quoted in Ibid., p. 267.
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State Superintendent of Schools, asked them to be more 
patient. He justified this request by arguing "that the 
quality of the education program depends more upon the teacher 
than upon the buildings or any other factors."^
In September of 1950 the NAACP Legal Defense and Edu­
cational Fund decided to change its legal strategy. Instead
of pursuing equalization suits, the NAACP chose to concentrate
5
its entire legal effort on abolishing segregated schools.
For the black lawyers of the Virginia NAACP, now organized 
into a legal staff under the able direction of Oliver W. Hill, 
the transition from equalization to desegregation suits was 
easy. In northern and southwestern counties the case for de­
segregated schools was strong, since Negro children were 
forced to leave their own counties to receive an education in 
regional Negro schools.^ Also, Negro lawyers were convinced 
that an equal education could not be obtained in segregated 
black schools, even in those counties where equalization suits 
had been won. They were persuaded that the equalization of 
physical plants was not capable of destroying the white com­
munity's view that black schools and their graduates were in-
7
ferior. Thus one attorney actively involved in these cases
4
Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 19, 19 48, quoted 
in Wilkerson, p. 267.
5
Kelly, "The School Desegregation Case," p. 257. 
^Wilkerson, p. 268.
7
Interview, Oliver W. Hill.
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recalled: "We were careful never to affirm the validity of
segregation. We looked forward to the time when an integration
Q
case would emerge."
On May 23, 1951, the Virginia NAACP filed a desegrega­
tion suit against the school board of Prince Edward County.
When one considered the leading role played by the Virginia 
NAACP in the equalization suits, a desegregation case originat­
ing in Virginia was no surprise. However, the decision to 
initiate proceedings in Prince Edward County was quite acci­
dental and ultimately unfortunate. The legal counsel appar­
ently had planned to test the Plessy precedent in Pulaski 
County, where no Negro schools existed. However, on April 23, 
1951, the Negro high school students of Prince Edward County 
organized a strike to protest the dreadful conditions pre­
vailing in the black high school. Lacking guidance, the stu­
dents sought the advice of two black Richmond lawyers, Oliver 
Hill and Spotswood Robinson, III. Both men were understanda­
bly cautious in approaching a case in a Southside county. 
Traditionally, Southside Negroes were less militant, and 
therefore less disposed to accept the rigors of a lengthy law 
suit. Furthermore, in rural areas, the Negro was more exposed 
to all forms of community harassment. Finally, Hill and 
Robinson knew that the greatest opposition to desegregation 
would come in the Southside. Despite such liabilities, the 
NAACP, according to Hill, decided to handle the case because
^Wilkerson, p. 268.
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of the dedication exhibited by the students. The only condi­
tions of the NAACP, subsequently accepted, were that the
parents agree to authorize and support a suit aimed at deseg-
9
regation rather than equalization.
The change in the NAACP1s legal strategy had an ironic 
but not unexpected effect as Virginia proceeded with even 
greater haste to bridge the gap between Negro and white school 
facilities. In 1950, Governor John Battle inaugurated a pro­
gressive program for financing public school construction in 
Virginia. Historically the localities were responsible for 
bearing the cost of school construction. But under Battle's 
prodding, the 1950 General Assembly appropriated $45,000,000 
for school construction grants to the localities and promised 
another $30,000,000 when it met in 1952.^ Although the so- 
called Battle Funds were designed to upgrade all schools, 
generous grants were made to Southside counties for the con­
struction of new black schools. For example, $300,000 of the 
Battle money was used to help construct the new Negro high 
school in Prince Edward County and another $400,000 was ear­
marked to assist in the construction of a black school in
11Dinwiddie County. A civic leader in the latter county ob-
^Bob Smith, They Closed Their Schools (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1965), pp. 42-69. The or­
iginal case was Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
County, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. 1952)".
■^Wilkerson, pp. 98-99 .
^Ibid. , p. 2 82.
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served: "Before the Prince Edward case, nothing happened in
12Dmwiddie County." By achieving actual equality, state 
officials hoped to ameliorate conditions prevailing in Vir­
ginia's Negro schools and also to improve their case for pre­
serving segregated schools. A superintendent of schools in 
the Hampton Roads area recalled: " It was believed, especially
by people, that if we equalized we wouldn't have to inte-
X. ,,13grate.
The net effect of the integration suit on equalization
was dramatic. The per capita value of Negro school property
jumped from 64.9 percent in 1951 to 86.2 percent of white 
14schools in 1954. After the Brown decision, despite efforts 
of Governor Stanley, the value of Negro property dipped to 
78.1 percent. The reasons for the decline are numerous. Some 
school districts, no doubt,, saw cutting back funds as a way of 
penalizing Negroes for their stubborn commitment to desegre­
gation. Other districts did not want to build new Negro
schools until the effect of the Brown decision and Virginia's
15response was clarified. No doubt a number of Negroes would 
have preferred equalization to the strained race relations re­
sulting from the Brown decision. However, one minister voiced 
the opinion of many Virginia blacks who fought for integrated
"^Quoted in Ibid. , p. 282.
13T, .Ibid.
Ibid.. , p. 78 .
~^Ibid., pp. 283-86.
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schools when he said: "Before the integration cases, they
(white leaders) were patronizing; we had 'good relations,1 no
problems. They thought of us as children. Now they have to
16respect us whether they like us or not."
The immediate impact of the 1954 decision was somewhat
softened when the Supreme Court postponed issuing any specific
orders for implementation until the states had opportunity, in
further argument, to make suggestions regarding implementa- 
17tion. The decision to postpone the decree led to the unusual 
situation where the Supreme Court delayed the enforcement of 
a constitutional right. Fear of widespread evasion of an 
immediate order plus some sympathy for the difficulty in
18changing traditional racial patterns accounted for the delay.
In Virginia the initial response to the Brown decision 
was mild. On May 18, 1954, Governor Stanley made a brief but 
statesmanlike comment to the press. He counseled Virginians 
to respond "calmly and take time to carefully and dispassion­
ately consider the situation before coming to conclusions on 
steps which should be taken." Rather than acting hastily, 
Stanley promised to call on representatives of state and local
■^Quoted in Ibid. , p. 285.
^Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495
(1954) .
18Albert P. Blaustein and Clarence Clyde Ferguson,
Jr., Desegregation and The Law: The Meaning of the School Se­
gregation Cases (New York : Vintage Books, 1962)", pp. 160-62 .
government to devise a plan which would be "acceptable to our 
citizens and in keeping with the edict of the court." Aston­
ishingly the statement concluded that the "views of leaders of 
both races will be invited in the course of these studies.
The intent of the speech was to leave the Governor a maximum 
amount of flexibility. He had not committed the state to any 
program except a further study of the situation. The state­
ment was made without the aid of organization advice. Ob­
viously, the Governor intended to move cautiously until the 
"word" came in from the organization.
Stanley's reference to biracial cooperation was a slip 
for which he later received some criticism from anti­
organization sources. Has Stanley ever seriously considered 
working with black leaders? The answer was provided on May 2 4 
when five Negro leaders, including Oliver Hill, were invited 
to the Governor's office. Stanley congratulated the leaders 
on their legal triumph, but requested that they accept volun­
tary segregation. To a man this proposal was rejected. The 
Negro delegates recognized that desegregation could not be 
achieved immediately throughout the state. Nevertheless, they 
urged the Governor to make a start toward desegregation. The 
meeting was a failure and marked the end of any significant 
interaction on the school issue between the leaders of both 
races for the next six years.^
19Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 18, 1954, p. 1.
2 0 1Gates, p. 30; interview with Oliver Hill.
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The reaction of the Governor was not unexpected.
Whereas Virginia's Negroes had been relatively well treated, 
they had nevertheless been considered wards of the state.
After 1954 white Virginians reminded the state's black citi­
zens that white money paid for Negro schools. By creating
ill will, the warning continued, Negroes only jeopardized 
21black education. The refusal of Virginia's Negroes to sub­
mit to such a threat marked a new stage of activism among 
black leaders which would be manifested in Virginia's poli­
tics during the 1960's.
Initially Virginia's elected officers and opinion 
makers seemed to believe that the solution to the school 
crisis was through a policy of local option supplemented by 
private education. Writing to the powerful state senator from 
the Southside, Garland Gray, Stanley said: "I do not agree
with the decision but I believe defiance of the Court would 
tend to aggravate the situation and deprive us of the chance 
of coming to some understanding that would minimize the ef-
22fects of the ruling on our social and educational systems."
One month after the Brown decision, Attorney General J. Lind­
say Almond told Virginus Dabney that according to reports,
21Report of the Commission on Public Education to 
the Governor of Virginia, Garland Gray, Chairman, (Commonwealth 
of Virginia: Division of Purchase and Printing, 1955), p. 7.
Subsequently cited as the Gray Report.
2 2Letter, Thomas B. Stanley to Garland Gray, May 24,
1954, Virginia State Library Archives, Stanley Letter File. 
Local option would permit a school district to decide whether 
it wished to desegregate. If a locality voted against inte­
gration, some provision for easing the transition to private 
education was expected.
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northern and southwestern counties would "let the Negroes into
white schools and eliminate colored teachers." Almond thought
a solution could be worked out for the Southside counties but
cautioned Dabney that "there is a lot of politics in this
thing." The Attorney General noted certain politicians were
already "sounding off about being 'unalterably' opposed to any
2 3integration at all for the benefit of the voters." James
Jackson Kilpatrick, editor of the Richmond News Leader, also
subscribed to local option and private education as a suitable
solution to the school problem. In addition, he thought that
"Given enough time, a great part of the problem--especially in
the cities--could be handled by the re-location of school
2 4buildings, and the gerrymandering of enrollment lines."
Newspaper editorials, with their emphasis on the prob­
lems and possibilities of a gradual approach, reflected the 
ideas expressed in private correspondence. Postponement of 
the enforcement order was interpreted as evidence that the 
Supreme Court recognized the complexities of school desegre­
gation. The Richmond Times-Dispatch also referred to the sig­
nificance of the decision for Negro teachers. The paper 
pointed out that white parents would not readily allow their
Letter, Virginus Dabney to D. Tennant Bryan, June 
23, 1954, University of Virginia Archives, Dabney Letter File.
^Letter, James J„ Kilpatrick to Harry F. Byrd, May 
20, 1954, University of Virginia Archives, Kilpatrick Letter 
File.
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children to be taught by Negroes and suggested, for this
25reason, that caution was needed.
Although Stanley and Almond seemed to lean toward local 
option, the men who were generally regarded as the organiza­
tion's top hierarchy never subscribed to any policy that could 
be represented as compliance. They were massive resisters be­
fore the phrase was coined. Foremost among this group were 
Senator Byrd and Congressmen Howard W. Smith, Watkins Abbitt 
and William Tuck. Smith was the powerful chairman of the 
House Rules Committee, while the latter two represented the 
Fourth and Fifth Congressional Districts in Virginia's South- 
side. In the General Assembly, E. Blackburn Moore, Speaker of
the House, and Garland Gray were usually considered part of the 
2 6inner circle. They viewed the Supreme Court's decision to 
postpone implementation as an opportunity to build up opposi­
tion to its ruling. The view was expressed by Gray in a 
letter to Stanley in which the former warned the Governor 
about the consequences of any delay by Virginia's leaders in 
expressing their indignation with the Brown decision. The re­
sult, he said, would be that "our people may be slowly pushed 
into a position of accepting the decision of the Supreme 
Court." The stake in the issue for the Southside, he contin­
ued, was "our culture and racial purity," since desegregation
27would lead "to intermarriage between the races."
25Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 18, 1954, p. 1.
n c
Identification through interviews.
27Letter, Garland Gray to Thomas B. Stanley, May 20,
1954, Virginia State Library, Archives, Stanley Letter File.
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The organization, of course, could place great pressure
on Stanley and Almond. The Governor's administration had not
started well, and if he mishandled the school issue, would be
viewed eventually as a disaster. Stanley readily accepted the
advice of the organization hierarchy, and especially that of
Senator Byrd, who had saved him in 1953, While recognizing
that the governorship was a tough spot for any man at this
time, Byrd exhibited some concern over Stanley's ability to
handle the situation. He wrote to Kilpatrick that Stanley
2 8"will need all the assistance and advice he can get."
Though strong-willed and considered a good lawyer, 
Attorney General Almond's freedom of action was restricted by 
his personal political ambitions. Because of his unpredicta­
bility and independent streak, Almond had never been fully ac­
cepted by the organization^ hierarchy. However, by 1954 , the 
Attorney General had won statewide recognition for his defense 
of Virginia in the Prince Edward case. Almond intended to use 
this fame as a springboard to the governorship. In fact, in 
1948, he had left a seat in Congress for the office of attor­
ney general with the belief "that the new position would put 
me on a direct route to the governorship." Acting on this as­
sumption, Almond sought Byrd's approval for his candidacy in
1953. Unsuccessful in this bid, the Attorney General later 
said:
n o
Letter, Harry F. Byrd to Jack Kilpatrick, May 19,
1954, University of Virginia, Archives, Kilpatrick Letter 
File.
I saw that I had reached the end of the political 
road unless I went out on my own . . .  I began cautiously 
laying the foundation that would be my approach to the 
governorship in 1957. I accepted nearly every oppor­
tunity to speak on public issues, and at considerable 
sacrifice, I kept myself before the p e o p l e . 29
As part of his strategy, Almond acted discreetly at high level
policy meetings where he was confronted with politically
loaded questions. Almond himself stated: "I was very careful
30to stay m  my place as legal adviser." He did not want to 
be identified with an unpopular position or to be tagged as an 
integrationist.
While the Attorney General later emphasized his differ­
ences with the organization, they appear to have been exagge­
rated. He shared with other Virginia political leaders a 
strong commitment to states' rights and racial separation.
Even in 1964, Almond admitted that while he accepted the de­
segregation of graduate schools, he was opposed to the
31"throwing together" of tender, adolescent children. Per­
haps the crucial difference was that Almond always recognized 
that if the federal government exerted its power, the states 
would have to submit. Yet this realization was easily subor­
dinated to his political aspirations. As was demonstrated by
7 QLuther J. Carter "Inside Byrd's Organization",
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, June 7, 1964, p. 1. On June 7, 8 and 
9, Almond permitted an interview in which he discussed his 
role in massive resistance. By 1964 he was considered the 
martyr of massive resistance.
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his subsequent gubernatorial campaign, Almond was, above all,
an opportunist.
By early June, it was apparent that the organization
was going to use the grace period provided by the Supreme
Court to build a case against desegregation. On June 1,
Governor Stanley announced that of five hundred letters which
he had received, practically all opposed desegregation. Nine
days later, he suggested that most Negroes preferred separate-
32but-equal education. The announcement was followed on 
June 20 by a defiant resolution signed by twenty state legis­
lators from Virginia's Fourth Congressional District. The
Southsiders pledged their "unalterable opposition to the prin-
33ciple of integration of the races m  the schools."
More ominously, on June 26, Governor Stanley asked for 
the repeal of Section 129 of; the Virginia Constitution which 
provided that the General Assembly "shall establish and main­
tain an efficient system of public free schools throughout the 
state." The operation, Stanley explained, would give the 
General Assembly the power to eliminate the public schools in 
any or all parts of Virginia. Finally, the Governor pledged
to "use every legal means at my command to continue segregated
34schools in Virginia."
3 2Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 2, 1954, p. 1, June 
11, 1954, p. 13.
33Ibid., June 21, 1954, p. 1.
3^Ibid., June ,27, 1954, p. 1.
39
While asking for the repeal of Section 129, Stanley 
said that he had no intention of abolishing the public school 
system. Anti-organization Democrats and Republicans were not 
satisfied with this qualification. Delegate Robert Whitehead, 
a respected anti-Byrd Democrat, recalled that among certain 
legislators there existed a strong aversion to public educa­
tion. He feared that the repeal of Section 129 could evolve 
into a wholesale abandonment of public education. Assuring 
the people of the Old Dominion that he was no integrationist, 
Whitehead urged Virginia to chart a course between "the 
leadership of the radical elements of the NAACP, rabid for in­
tegration at any cost, and that of the Tories whose concern
for the public school system has never been more than skin 
35deep." Whitehead spoke for a substantial minority of Vir­
ginians who believed that the state's progress depended more 
on maintaining education than maintaining segregation. As 
Whitehead's speech indicated, the greatest threat to the ef­
fectiveness of moderate segregationists was that they would 
become identified with the NAACP and integraitionists.
The reluctance of moderate political leaders to become 
too closely associated with the Virginia NAACP meant that the 
Negro position would not be represented at all in the politi­
cal forum. Furthermore, the NAACP position was distorted as 
Virginia's leaders subjected the Negro organization to a bar­
rage of derogatory epithets. In August, Attorney General
35Ibid., June '29, 1954, p. 10.
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Almond charged that the Negro organization would be better
named the "National Association for the Agitation of Colored
People." He promised that the NAACP was "not going to write
3 6the ticket in Virginia."
On August 28, Stanley announced the appointment of 
thirty-two legislators to study the school problem. The ab­
sence of Negroes, businessmen or educators on the Commission 
on Public Education represented a triumph for the irreconci- 
lables. Earlier, while Stanley had been pondering the compo­
sition of his committee, Gray advised him that "I do not have
much confidence in any solution that might be suggested by
3 7professional educators, clergymen or negroes [sic]." In a
letter to a constituent which found its way to Howard Smith's
desk, Representative Tuck wrote that the worst aspect of a bi-
racial commission was that it "would endeavor to find ways of
integrating. My view is that we should study ways how not to 
3 8integrate." Some newspapers and religious organizations had 
attempted to influence Stanley to stick to his earlier promise 
of a more broadly based commission but had obviously
o c
Ibid., August 20, 1954, p. 1; August 26, 1954,
p. 1.
37Ibid.; Letter, Garland Gray to Thomas B. Stanley,
May 20, 1954, Virginia State Library, Archives, Stanley Letter 
File.
38Letter, William M. Tuck to Harry E. Cassidy,
June 29, 1954, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter 
File.
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failed. The Governor justified his departure by explaining 
that any problem relating to public education must first pass 
the General Assembly. "The more first-hand information mem­
bers of the Legislature can obtain, the better equipped they 
will be to deal with the problem.
If Southsiders were happy with the decision to limit
the commission to legislators, they were overjoyed with
Stanley's appointments. While there were at least two members
from each congressional district, nineteen came from districts
which had black belt counties. The Fourth (Southside) had six
representatives, while the more populous Second (Norfolk-
Princess Anne) and the Tenth (Arlington-Fairfax) had only
five. On the important eleven-man executive committee, the
Ninth was not represented. The absence of Ted Dalton, the
leading state Republican, along with Robert Whitehead and
Armistead Boothe, prominent anti-organization Democrats, was 
41significant.
39Gates, pp. 31-3 2. The Lynchburg News and Norfolk 
Virginian-Pilot were critical of Stanley while the News Leader 
came to his defense. Bill Tuck backed up Stanley by~wrTtTng 
that "you are one hundred per cent right, in my opinion, in 
not appointing a bi-racial commission." Letter, William M. 
Tuck to Thomas B. Stanley, August 30, 1954, Virginia State 
Library, Archives, Stanley Letter File.
^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 29 , 1954 , p. 1,
^Gates, pp. 34-36. Organization men defended the 
distribution of the Gray Commission with the argument that 
since the problem was in the black belt, legislators from this 
region should have the most to say about the problem.
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When the commission held its first meeting on Septem­
ber 13, Governor Stanley set the tone for its work by reasser­
ting the view that "public sentiment" and the "best interests" 
of Virginia demanded segregation. Stanley reiterated the po­
sition that his major goal was to "use every legal means at my
4 2command to preserve segregated schools in Virginia." The 
influence of the conservatives on the commission was demon­
strated immediately by the selection of State Senator Garland
43Gray as chairman. Thus, the Gray commission was hardly a 
fact-finding body of the best talent in Virginia. Although 
Governor Stanley had suggested that the Commission conduct 
hearings throughout the state, the only public session was 
held in Richmond on November 15, 1954. In fact, between 
Stanley's announcement and the Commission's report on 
November 11, 1955, a cloud of secrecy hung over the body.
What took place in these private meetings? Basically a 
split existed between the Southsiders and legislators who be­
lieved that some accommodation would have to be made with the 
Brown decision. Southsiders urged that Virginia completely 
disregard the Brown decision. Fearing the precedent of even 
token desegregation in any part of the state, the irreconci- 
lables demanded that Virginia assume a state-wide posture of 
resistance. This position was expressed by Robert Y. Button,
42Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 14, 1954, p. 1. 
^Ibid., August 29, 1954 , p. 1,
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a state senator from Culpeper, to Howard Smith. "I realize the 
appeal in giving the utmost freedom to the local school boards 
in the operation of the schools/1 Button wrote, "but I am 
afraid if this is done there will be integration in certain 
counties where the problem is not very acute/' Senator Button 
believed that the basis for opposing desegregation in the 
Southside would be damaged if after "a reasonable number of 
years a considerable portion of the State would have inte­
grated schools, o o /' The Culpeper Senator predicted that the 
Southside might abandon its public schools rather than inte­
grate. He preferred "a statewide plan that would prevent any
integration . . . even though certain counties might prefer to
44integrate immediately."
Politically, the black belt politicians argued that 
their public careers were finished if they were "soft" on in­
tegration. At the same time, Southsiders recognized the ad­
vantages of using the school issue to enhance their political 
careers. Garland Gray, for example, in early October, pub-
lically said, "I don't intend to have my grandchildren go to
45school with them/’ Consequently, if another politician took
^Letter, Robert Button to Howard W. Smith, July 20, 
1954, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File. 
Culpeper County is in the northern Piedmont, and in 19 50, it 
had a Negro population estimated at 27.9 percent. Senator 
Button was a reliable organization man and served on the Gray 
Commission.
4 5Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 6, 19 54, p. 1.
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a more compromising position in the black belt, he opened him­
self up to the charge that he was an "integrationist."
During the secret meetings of the Gray Commission, a 
substantial number of men believed that some accommodation had 
to be made with the Brown decision. This group, composed of 
legislators outside the black belt, was equally shocked by the 
Supreme Court's ruling and also preferred segregated schools. 
While sensitive to the Southside's problem, the accommodation- 
ists, many of them lawyers, argued that, however disagreeable, 
the Brown decision was the "law of the land." When the South- 
siders suggested that either the Governor or the General 
Assembly assume control of the schools, the accommodationists, 
aided by the advice of counsel David J. Mays, suggested that 
such a move was legally impossible. Mays was of the opinion 
that Virginia could not hide, behind the Eleventh Amendment's 
provision prohibiting suits against a state. Having a good 
legal argument and aware that some areas could tolerate token 
desegregation, the accommodationists eventually urged a policy 
of local option. Permitting the individual localities to de­
cide whether they wished to desegregate, the accommodationists
argued, would satisfy the Supreme Court as well as the South- 
4 fiside. While the accommodationists had certain immediate ad­
vantages, time was on the side of the resisters. The hiatus
A C  .
A description of the meetings came from interviews 
with members of the Gray Commission. The minutes of the 
meetings are still unavailable. David J. Mays was a prominent 
Richmond lawyer who also won a Pulitzer Prize for his bio­
graphy of Edmund Pendleton.
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between Brown I and Brown II offered the resisters an oppor­
tunity to summon arguments for defying the Supreme Court.
While the Gray Commission was meeting, other important 
developments, both private and public, took place. Of immense 
importance to Virginia's response was the position taken by 
Senator Harry Byrd. Following the Brown decision, the Senator 
had briefly commented that Brown was "the most serious blow
that has been struck against the rights of the States in a
4 7matter vitally affecting their authority and welfare." How 
deeply Senator Byrd would involve himself in this problem was 
at first unknown. While he had interceded in the 1953 guber­
natorial election, the Senator wrote Kilpatrick that Washington
responsibilities were making it difficult for him to devote
48much attention to Virginia affairs. However, by August, 
Senator Byrd seemed actively involved in an attempt to direct 
Virginia policy.
Unknown to the public, the Senator tried unsuccessfully 
to persuade Stanley and Almond to withdraw from the school de­
segregation cases. By August, however, Almond wrote to Byrd: 
"It is my understanding from reliable sources that some are 
endeavoring to prevail upon the Governor that Virginia should 
withdraw from any further connection with the case." The
^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 18 , 1954, p. 1.
4 8Letter, Harry F. Byrd to James J. Kilpatrick, May 12, 
1954, University of Virginia, Archives, Kilpatrick Letter File.
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Attorney General opposed the strategy and was concerned about 
the political ramifications,, "That which we have known and 
believed in, sometimes called the 'organization,! might well 
founder in the event of the absence of thinking and a coura­
geous and constructive program with reference to this explosive 
subject." The Attorney General hoped "that certain forces in 
Virginia will not be permitted to kick this subject around 
as a political football." If the public sensed a difference 
of opinion, Almond predicted that it "could prove fatal.
Clea.rly Senator Byrd was among those pressing Stanley 
to pull out of the case. On August 30, Byrd sent a copy of 
the Almond letter to Howard Smith, and indicated his displea­
sure with the Attorney General's "irrevocable decision to
appear before the Supreme Court even though he is not author-
50ized to do so by the Governojr." Several days later, the 
Senator wrote Smith that he could not understand why the 
Governor "changed his mind" on the Supreme Court strategy.
Byrd added that he had invited Almond to visit him in Wash­
ington for a discussion of the issue. Yet, Byrd thought, "it 
would be futile." Momentarily frustrated, he concluded:
"It appears to me the whole matter is being handled very
4 9Letter, J. Lindsay Almond Jr. to Harry F. Byrd,
August 16, 195 4, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Let­
ter Files.
5 0Letter, Harry F. Byrd to Howard Smith, August 30,
1954, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File.
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S 1injudiciously, but I do not know what we can do." Almond
sidestepped a meeting with Byrd by writing that prior speak-
52ing engagements made this impossible. Most likely the 
encounter would have been uncomfortable for both men. Governor 
Stanley apparently considered pulling out of the case, but 
had been persuaded by Almond against this course.
Why had Senator Byrd urged Virginia to withdraw from 
the Brown case? The exchange of letters indicated that Byrd 
believed that withdrawal would emphasize Virginia's unwilling­
ness to recognize the Supreme Court's authority over state 
education. Furthermore, Byrd and others may have thought 
that they could argue that the enforcement decree did not 
apply to Virginia, if the state did not participate in the 
suit. Support for this interpretation is suggested by the
fact that Alabama, Georgia and Mississippi refused to enter,
, . . . . 53for similar reasons, amici curiae arguments.
Among irreconcilables local option and continued par­
ticipation in the Brown case were opposed, because they were 
considered to be signs of compliance with the Supreme Court's 
decision. The major goal of the resisters was to convince 
the public that no justification for compliance existed.
51Letter, Harry F. Byrd to Howard W. Smith, September 2, 
1954, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File.
52Letter, J. Lindsay Almond Jr. to Harry F. Byrd, 
September 2, 1954, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith 
Letter File.
5 3Blaustein and Ferguson, Jr., p. 159.
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To accomplish this objective, organization speakers lashed 
out at the Supreme Court. Representative Tuck, in a typical 
fire-eating speech, charged that the Supreme Court was a 
"super legislature," and that it played into the hands of the 
Communists by splitting the races. In referring to the sup­
posed advantages won by the "Communists in Moscow," Tuck 
hoped to counter the argument that segregation harmed Ameri­
can foreign policy in the developing Asian and African 
nations. Furthermore, by implication, Tuck introduced the 
conspiracy thesis as a possible explanation for the Brown 
decision. Besides the Communist conspiracy, Tuck fretted over
the clerical conspiracy. The former Governor assured Vir-
. . . 54ginians that segregation was not un-Christian.
Attorney General Almond, a tub-thumping orator from 
the old school, joined Tuck in attacking the Warren Court.
The Brown decision, he charged, defied the Constitution by 
amending the Fourteenth Amendment and repealing the Tenth 
Amendment. Emphasizing that education was the exclusive 
right of the states, Almond declared that he would defend 
this right to the end of his public life. Speaking to a 
group which had just passed a resolution opposing integra­
tion, the Attorney General promised: "In Virginia, we
cannot and we will not have colored teachers to teach white 
55children." Although he was the chief law officer of the 
5 4Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 15, 1954, p. 1.
5 5Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 27, 1954, p. 1.
49
state, Almond seemed to encourage evasion of Virginia's com­
pulsory attendance law. The Attorney General doubted whether 
any "Commonwealth's Attorney would dare to prosecute" a vio­
lation of the school law. If such a case developed, he believed 
that "no jury will convict on charges of non-attendance in 
integrated schools.
The organization also attempted to speak for Virginia's 
Negroes. Political leaders asserted that the Brown decision 
and not white Virginians were responsible for the apparent 
differences between the races. Almond explained that the 
Brown ruling not only undermined "the concepts, principles
and mores of the South," but "cares nothing for the welfare
57of the Negro race." The races, Congressman Tuck explained, 
"understand each other's problems and we have been able to 
maintain mutual respect." He predicted that "we will contin­
ue to coexist on the same sort of basis despite the handicaps
5 8put upon us by this decision." Governor Stanley also sug­
gested that Negroes actually preferred separate schools. 
Furthermore, the Governor thought that desegregation would be
upsetting psychologically for Negro children at the bottom of 
59white classes.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, October 28, 1954, p. 1.
5 7Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 26, 1954, p. 4.
^Ibid., October 15 , 1954 , p. 1.
C Q
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, June 11, 1954, p. 12.
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In addition to speeches, the resisters helped to or­
ganize "spontaneous" demonstrations of public indignation with 
the Brown decision. The irreconcilables who met in Petersburg 
on June 20, for example, initiated a letter-writing campaign 
to the Governor. As a result, sixty-one localities submitted
fi Dresolutions supporting segregated schools.
More significant was the creation of an organized 
interest group, the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Indivi­
dual Liberties, committed to protecting segregation. Though 
more responsible, the Defenders played a role in Virginia 
similar to the White Citizens Councils of other states. 
Chartered by the State Corporation Commission on October 26, 
1954, the Defenders was organized in Virginia's Southside. 
Among the founders of the group was J. Barrye Wall, editor 
and publisher of the Farmville Herald in Prince Edward 
County. Wall's newspaper subsequently became a mouthpiece 
for the Defenders. The officers of the organization included 
respected businessmen and public servants.^ Consistent with 
Virginia's general policy, Defenders' objectives empha­
sized respectability. A concerted effort was made to avoid 
any association with extremist groups like the Klu Klux Klan. 
The Defenders recognized that its credibility as a respect­
able organization rested on support from state political 
leaders. Racial violence would have jeopardized such a
^Smith, p. 88. 
^Gates, pp. 36-38.
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6 2favorable association. The group's certificate of incor­
poration indicated that its goal was to foster states' 
rights. All applicants signed a statement which contained a
provision that "segregation of the races is a right of the
6 3state government."
The founders of the Defenders emphasized that one of 
its purposes was to maintain peace by channeling discontent. 
However, one observer wrote that the group concentrated on 
encouraging "a spirit of legal rebellion." A symbiotic rela­
tionship seemed to exist between Byrd Democrats and the 
Defenders. The former provided speakers who lent respecta­
bility, whereas the latter provided "grass roots" opposition
6 A
to the Brown decision.
The Gray Commission, emotional speeches and the de­
velopment of a "grass roots'- organization were designed to 
develop state-wide conformity to the Democratic organization's 
viewpoint. However, in the fall of 1954, an alternative ap­
proach was submitted by sources outside the organization's 
hierarchy. Heading the opposition was Armistead L. Boothe, a 
state delegate from Alexandria, identified with the Young 
Turks. Boothe was alarmed by Stanley's recommendation of
65June 25, to revoke Section 129 of the Virginia Constitution.
^Smith, pp. 98-99 .
63Gates, p. 37.
^Smith, p. 88.
Supra, p. 29.
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Fearing the consequences of an amendment, Boothe sent a 
"Turkey-gram" to members of the General Assembly. In the 
circular, he indicated that Stanley's proposal was a threat to 
public education which could seriously divide the Democratic 
party. He urged the assembly to search for a solution which 
conformed with the Brown decision.^ Boothe followed the 
memorandum with a questionnaire which polled the legislators 
regarding their attitudes on desegregation, Section 129, and 
related questions. The results, which were made public, in­
dicated an almost unamimous opposition to forced desegregation.
In the face of the Brown decision, however, most legislators
& 7seemed to prefer a policy of local option.
All the signs indicated that Boothe's efforts would 
carry little weight with Governor Stanley and his advisers. 
State Senator Button, before: filling out the questionnaire, 
requested the advice of Howard Smith. The wily old Democrat 
recommended that Button ignore the questionnaire. "Frankly,
I do not think the Governor is going to pay very much atten­
tion to Armistead's representation.
Following the appointments of the Gray Commission, 
Delegate Boothe persisted in his efforts to influence public
6 6A copy of the Turkey-gram is m  the Smith Letter 
File. Though undated, it must have followed Stanley's state­
ment of June 25th.
^Southern School Mews, Vol. 1, No. 2 (October, 1954),
p. 14.
f i RLetter, Robert Button to Howard W. Smith, July 13, 
1954, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File.
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opinion. He recommended that Virginia should present an im­
plementation scheme to the Supreme Court when the case was 
69reargued. In October, Boothe publically endorsed a plan of 
local option. By eliminating discrimination and segregation 
wherever no social problem is created by it, Boothe argued,
Virginia would be demonstrating "good faith" as well as rec-
. . 70ognizmg regional differences. In fact, however, the Alex­
andria Democrat was no rabid integrationist, even with respect 
to areas with relatively small Negro populations. In these 
localities Negro enrollment would be limited to "outstanding 
Negro students who have all the mental, moral and physical 
qualities to attend and pass through any school of their 
choice whether it be white or colored if they are in their 
proper geographical districts." The result of such careful 
selection, Boothe predicted, would mean "that a predominantly
white school may have a limited number of qualified Negro
71students who want to go there."
The Boothe plan won the public support of only a few 
prominent politicians, among them anti-organization Democrat 
Robert Whitehead. Whitehead proposed "...a solution that 
will be within the law as finally interpreted by the highest 
court in the land, and yet with the least possible disloca-
6 9Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 25, 1954, p. 1. 
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, October 21, 1954, p. 1. 
^Ibid., October 23 , 1954, p. 6.
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tion of our present system* This is not the time for dema­
gogic harangues by persons in or out of public office* Our 
present situation should not be used as a vote-getting
7 2springboard on which to inflame the voters of Virginia."
In turn, Whitehead was denounced by Representative 
Tuck for his endorsement of local option. The imflammable
Tuck charged that Whitehead was a "double-crosser" and an
73"integrationist." Several days later the Norfolk
Virginian-Pilot, which supported both Boothe and Whitehead,
remarked that influential citizens seemed to be afraid to ex-
74press themselves. The Tuck-Whitehead exchange certainly
did not encourage dissent. Nevertheless, local option, be­
cause of its flexibility, was a very attractive solution to 
Virginia1s problem.
On November 15 , 1954., the Gray Commission held its 
only public hearing, in the Richmond Mosque. Some 2,000 
people gathered in the Richmond auditorium to listen to ap­
proximately 130 speakers deal with the question: "What
course should Virginia follow in light of the Supreme Court
75decision m  the segregation cases?" The hearing, m  part, 
was a necessary formality, since Stanley and the Gray Commis-
72Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 22, 1954, p. 1.
^ Ibid., October 23, 1954, October 25, 1954, p. 1.
7 4Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 1,
1954, p. 6 0 ~ ~
75The Richmond News Leader, November 16, 1954, p. 1.
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sion members had led the public to believe that the study 
commission would hold a number of state-wide fact-finding 
sessions. Rather than seeking information, the Richmond 
meeting was converted into another attempt to establish a 
point of view. By stating the question so loosely, the Gray 
Commission invited rabid segregationists to shout down the 
Brown decision. Recognizing the political possibilities of
the assembly, large delegations, especially in the Southside,
7 6were organized for a trip to Richmond. The Norfolk
Virginian-Pilot believed a false question had been raised,
since the commission permitted Virginians to perceive the
issue as a choice between integration versus segregation.
Virginia, the Norfolk newspaper stressed, should aevote its
energy to preserving the public school system by working out
77a reasonable accommodation with the Brown decision.
As expected, the Richmond hearing accomplished nothing.
Attitudes ranged from total noncompliance, to a dedicated
effort to conform to the Brown decision. A close correlation
between location, black belt or northern Virginia, and ex-
7 8pressions of defiance or compliance was observed. Perhaps 
the most significant result was that Virginians not ade-
^ Ibid. , November 5 , 1954 , p. 6.
7 7Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 5, 1954,
p. 6.
^Gates, pp. 39-41.
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quately represented on the Gray Commission prevented extreme 
segregationists from dominating the hearing. Following the 
ordeal, the Gray Commission announced that it had no plans
for further hearings. The Richmond meeting was never re-
79peated.
On November 15, Virginia submitted a brief to the Sup­
reme Court in preparation for oral arguments. Regarding the 
specific questions asked by the Court, Virginia opposed any 
deadline for ending segregation. Also, the Old Dominion pre­
ferred giving the lower courts jurisdiction over the cases 
rather than appointing a special body to supervise implemen­
tation. "Neither court decree nor executive order can force 
in those sections (where citizens have stated they will not 
consent to compulsory integration) a result so basically op­
posed by a majority," the brief defiantly stated. In issuing 
a decree, Virginia thought standards of health, housing and 
scholastic achievement must be taken into consideration. Re­
versing the NAACP argument, the Old Dominion contended that a 
final decree should be postponed until the effects of inte­
gration on students was documented. The Brown decision,Vir­
ginia warned, had raised the "spectre of impending education­
al chaos.
The NAACP's brief was more specific in its recommenda-
7 9Richmond Times-Dispatch., November 25, 1954, p. 1.
^Thld. , November 16, 1954, p. 1.
tions. The Negro lawyers wanted the Supreme Court to desig­
nate September, 1955 or September, 1956, as the date for 
opening schools on a desegregated basis. In response to
Virginia's defiant actions, the NAACP no longer trusted any
81 •gradual program of desegregation.
The note of defiance in Virginia's brief was struck 
again in a preliminary report submitted by the Gray Commis­
sion announcing that it intended to "explore avenues toward 
formulation of a progran, within the framework of the law, 
designed to prevent enforced integration of the races in the 
public schools of Virginia." The recommendation was based 
on an analysis of public opinion derived from the public hear­
ing, "communications" with the Governor, "conversations with 
the people," and "actions" taken by school boards and boards 
of supervisors. Not only were these "communications" unso­
phisticated as a measure of public opinion, they were also 
somewhat contrived. Most white Virginians, to be sure, oppo­
sed integration. Yet, in many parts of the state, gradual de- 
segration was apparently regarded as preferable to closing 
the public schools. The Gray Commission recognized this, since 
it contended that any desegregation plan depended on "local con 
ditions" as well as the support of the "majority of the people. 
While the Commission predicted school closures or the impair­
ment of public education in many areas of the state, it
81-ru ‘ ^Ibid.
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implicitly admitted that many sections could also adjust to the
8 2problem posed by the Brown decision.
The preliminary Gray Report amounted to a compromise 
between the Southsiders and the accommodationists. When com­
bined with the November 15 brief, the report also indicated 
that in parts of Virginia there would be total defiance of 
the Brown decision. Governor Stanley and Attorney General 
Almond approved of the report. However, the editors of a 
number of newspapers expressed dissatisfaction. Two newspa­
pers, the Newport News Daily Press and the Danville Bee, con­
sidered any plan premature until the Supreme Court had issued 
an implementating decree. Focusing on the virtual absence of 
public hearings, the Roanoke Times commented: "Doesn't the
commission trust the people or has it made up its mind about 
what it will do?" Even more, scathing was the Norfolk 
Virginian-Pilot which charged that the Gray Commission had 
perverted its purpose. The Commission, one editorial ex­
claimed, had not attempted to study methods by which the tra­
ditional system of education could be changed without harming 
public schools or race relations. Instead, the Commission
had concerned itself "with establishing a point of view in 
8 3Virginia." The preliminary report of the Gray Commission 
marked the end of the first phase of Virginia's response to
83Ibid. , January 20 , 1955, p. 1.
83Southern School News, Vol. 1, No. 6 (February, 1955),
p. 11.
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the Brown decision. The Gray Commission would now turn its 
attention to an examination of "legal methods" for circumven­
ting the Court’s ruling.
Thus while most Virginians were critical of the Sup­
reme Court's decision, large areas of Virginia were expected 
to conform with an implementation order. However, the hier­
archy of the Democratic organization, based in the Southside, 
never favored compliance with the Brown decision. Unable to 
secure a moratorium on desegregation from Virginia's Negro 
leaders, Governor Stanley dedicated himself to preserving 
segregated schools. The Governor's position reflected his 
personal convictions as well as the sentiments of the organi­
zation's leaders to whom Stanley was indebted.
The enormous influence of the black belt on Governor 
Stanley was indicated by the composition of the Gray Commis­
sion. In commission meetings, extreme segregationists could 
riot only protect their interests but detect individuals who 
were "soft" on integration. Attorney General Almond, ex­
tremely ambitious for the office of governor, was most sensi­
tive to the political implications of the school issue.
While recognizing that race politics would make an adjust­
ment to the Brown decision more difficult, he more than 
equaled Tuck and Gray in encouraging defiance. Almond real­
ized that without the Southside's support, he had no chance 
for the Democratic nomination.
Despite disproportionate representation on the Gray 
Commission, the diehard segregationists were unable to im-
60
pose a statewide defiance of the Brown decision. Any threat 
to public education, especially Section 129, would have im­
mediately ripped the organization apart. In order to be ac­
ceptable to all wings of the organization, a school plan 
would have had to preclude massive school closings. The 
drift toward local option represented a compromise between 
resisters and accommodationists. Nevertheless, the ingredi­
ents for a statewide policy of massive resistance lingered 
just below the surface. The organizational hierarchy was 
willing, and the enemies (the NAACP and the Supreme Court) 
had been identified. Only a catalyst was needed to generate 
an explosion.
CHAPTER III
FROM LOCAL OPTION TO INTERPOSITION
Following the preliminary Gray Report, Virginia began 
the search for a technique by which localities could subvert 
t i^e Brown decision. On February 25 , 1955 , the director of 
the State Department of Conservation and Development, Raymond 
V. Long, announced that Seashore State Park would be leased 
to a private operator. The decision had been prompted by a 
suit filed in 1951 by Negroes to use the park. According to 
Long, the lease was necessary to protect Virginia's invest­
ment by insuring the park's; continued use at the estimated 
average of 200,000 persons per year. Victor J. Ashe, a well- 
known Negro attorney in Norfolk, announced that he would at­
tempt to block the lease on the grounds that it was an il­
legal attempt to maintain a segregated facility.'*'
The Seashore case had a significant bearing on the 
school issue. If Virginia escaped an order to desegregate a 
public park by leasing the facility to a private operator, 
the same technique could possibly be used to "save" public 
schools ordered to desegregate. In the federal district 
court of Judge Walter E, Hoffman, the Negro plaintiffs asked
^Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 26, 1955, p. 1.
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for an order temporarily restraining the negotiation of the 
lease. Judge Hoffman, aware of the relationship between re­
creation and the school issue, asked Virginia's counsel: "If
the state of Virginia has authority to lease a State park, 
would it not be possible for a municipal corporation to lease 
its public schools to private individuals?" Henry T.
Wickham, special assistant to the Attorney General, answered 
2affirmatively. Believing that the lease could be a "fore­
runner" of other action, Hoffman granted the temporary in-
3junction sought by the Negroes.
On July 7, 1955, Judge Hoffman issued a permanent in­
junction prohibiting further exclusion from Seashore State 
Park by race and requiring a provision against discrimination 
in any lease negotiated with a private operator. The pro­
posed lease was unconstitutional, wrote Hoffman, because it 
proposed "to accomplish by indirection exactly what all
4
Courts have said cannot be done."
The significance of the Hoffman decision was not 
missed by the state press. A Richmond Times-Dispatch edi­
torial concluded that the ruling "put all plans to lease pub-
5
lie school property to private persons in grave jeopardy."
^Ibid., March 13, 1955, p. 1.
 ^Ibid..
^Tate v. Department of Conservation and Development, 
133 F. Supp. 53, 56 (E.d'7 Va. 1955).” "“ “
5
Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 9, 1955,
p. 8.
63
Criticizing state leadership, the Norfolk Virginia-Pilot 
wrote that Virginia gained nothing by endeavoring to avoid
C
integration by "short-cuts and circuitous routes." Fol­
lowing the park ruling, the state announced that Seashore
State Park would be closed, while the eight remaining parks
7
would be operated on a segregated basis.
Another measure directly related to the Brown deci­
sion was the announcement by the State Department of Educa­
tion of a major revision in teacher contracts. Instead of 
offering a nine month contract, school boards were allowed to 
insert a clause in a teacher's contract which permitted the 
board to terminate the contract after thirty days notice. 
Secondly, the new contracts would designate the name of the 
school to which the teacher was assigned, rather than merely 
the county or city. The change was made, according to the 
State Department of Education, to anticipate a decrease in 
enrollments in case the Supreme Court ordered an immediate 
end to racial segregation. However, the new provision would 
also apply to teachers whose classes suffered a decline in 
attendance. Some observers believed that the contract revi­
sion was intended to serve as an incentive to Negro teachers 
to persuade pupils to remain in Negro public schools. One
^Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, July 9, 1955,
p. 8.
7
Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 13, 1955,
p. 8.
^Ibid., April 6, 1965, p. 1.
paper suspected that the effect was to threaten Negro teach­
ers with unemployment if Negro children transferred to
white schools. Negro teachers would consequently be reduced
9
to "recruiting agents." The third district of the Negro 
Virginia Teacher's Association agreed with this analysis and 
denounced the thirty day rule as an evasive device which 
would drive teachers out of the profession.'*'^
While Virginia searched for methods of evading a de­
segregation order, the State's attorney made a final plea be­
fore the Supreme Court. During the oral argument, Virginia 
stressed several themes. One was that the effect of desegre­
gation on white children was unknown. Academically, satis- 
tics were cited which indicated the Negro scholastic 
achievement was well below that of white children. Virginia' 
lawyers suggested that desegregated classrooms would disrupt 
the normal education of white children. Moreover, the ef­
fects of mere physical contact with Negro children were un­
known. Records of tuberculosis, syphilis, gonorrhea and il­
legitimate births showed that their incidence was exceedingly 
high among the Negro population.'*''*' Archibald G. Robertson, 
counsel for Virginia, added that the record "of disease and
9
Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, April 20, 1955,
p. 6.
“^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 17, 1955, p. 1.
11Leon Friedman, ed., Argument; The Oral Argument Be- 
fore the Supreme Court (New York: Chelsea House Publishers,
1969), p. 428.
illegitimacy is just a drop in the bucket compared to the 
promiscuity." He concluded that "white parents at this time
would not appropriate the money to put their children among
12other children with that sort of background."
Secondly, the defendants argued that a statewide de­
cree was untenable, considering the regional differences in 
Virginia.. The "most powerful single influence on racial at­
titudes," Attorney General Almond submitted, was the ratio, 
of Negroes to whites in a county or city. Considering Vir­
ginia's various attitudes and traditions, Almond hoped that 
each locality would be free to deal with the school problem 
in its own way.'*‘3
Thirdly, Virginia warned the Court that the state 
faced "the bleak prospect of serious impairment or possible 
destruction of our public school system." Such an eventu­
ality, Almond contended, must be weighed against the Negro 
demand for immediate enforcement of the desegregation deci­
sion. In fashioning an order, the Attorney General reminded 
the Supreme Court that it dealt with "the warp and woof of 
their (Virginia's) mores of life..." The Attorney General 
recognized the power of the Supreme Court to enforce a grad­
ual adjustment of school policy, but added "that does not 
mean enforced integration to us in Virginia." In closing, 
Almond reminded the Court that the Eighteenth Amendment was
12Ibid.
13Ibid., pp. 428-35.
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repealed "because it affected the way of life of the American
i ..14 people.
The lawyers for the NAACP asked the Supreme Court for 
an entirely different decree. In their oral arguments, 
Spotswood Robinson, III, and Thurgood Marshall, for the 
plaintiffs, asked that the Court's order provide for the ini­
tiation of administrative steps preparatory to the assignment
of Negro children to desegregated schools in Prince Edward
15County m  September 1955 or 1956. The request was grounded
on the principle that the right to a desegregated education
was both "personal and present." To delay, the Negro lawyers
contended, would mean that some Negro children would lose
16forever rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The NAACP lawyers countered Virginia's arguments in
several ways. The discrepancy- in scholastic achievement,
they argued, proved that segregated schools were not equal.
Regarding educational problems caused by differences in
ability, Thurgood Marshall had a simple solution: "Put the
dumb colored children in with the dumb white children, and
put the smart colored children with the smart white children
17— that is no problem." Marshall also objected to a decree 
that took into consideration regional differences. The Negro
^ Ibi.d. , pp. 431-35.
15Ibi,d. , pp. 384, 394.
16rbi,d. , pp. 390-92, 394 , 409.
17Ibid., p. 402.
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attorney asserted "that there is no local option on the Four-
18teenth Amendment in the question of rights..." Finally, 
Marshall argued that the threat of closed schools was exag­
gerated. Although he admitted that white parents did not 
want their children attending schools with Negroes, Marshall
argued that these same parents would prefer desegregation to 
19closed schools.
On May 31, 1955, Chief Justice Earl Warren read the 
order implementing the 1954 ruling. The Supreme Court reman­
ded the cases to the lower courts, ordering them to work out 
solutions with, the local school officials based on "equitable 
principles." The guidelines established by the Supreme Court 
were very vague. District court judges were to consider 
local problems, but also require "a prompt and reasonable 
start toward full compliance." No deadline was set by the 
Supreme Court for the completion of the desegregation process 
except that it should be accomplished "with all deliberate 
speed.
Virginia enthusiastically endorsed the second Brown 
decision. The Richmond Times-Dispatch observed that the 
Supreme Court had responded to Southern opinion. An edito­
rial predicted decades of litigation, especially if subse-
18Ibid., pp. 399-400.
19Ibid., p. 399.
^9Rrown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 299-301
U9551 .
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quent school cases were not treated as "class actions." Ger­
rymandering, academic testing, repealing 129, modifying com­
pulsory assignment laws and local option were all suggested 
as possible tactics of evasion. The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot 
thought the Court's ruling was "a wise attempt to adjust 
constitutional principles and practical problems." Governor 
Stanley was urged by the Norfolk paper to take the lead in 
prompting "good faith compliance." A note of criticism came 
from the Lynchburg Daily Advance which pointed out that the 
Supreme Court had passed "the toughest part of what it
brought into being on the lower courts." District court
21judges would soon appreciate the observation.
Virginia's Negroes were disappointed with the second
Brown decision. During the year that had elapsed since the
first decision, the Democratic organization had indicated
that it would exploit every chance to evade the decision.
The loose language of the Brown decision only multiplied the
22opportunities for evasion.
Following the second Brown decision, Virginia contin­
ued its search for techniques to thwart desegregation. On 
June 10, the Gray Commission suggested to the Governor and 
State Board of Education that Virginia maintain segregated
21Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 1, 1955, 
p. 8; Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, June 1, 1955, p. 4; 
Southern School News, VoT^ 1, No. To" (June, 19 55)/ p. 8.
2 2Interview with Oliver Hill; Richmond Afro-American, 
June 4, 1955, p. 1.,
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schools for the 1955-1956 school year. Desegregation, accor­
ding to the recommendation, was not "practicable or feasible 
from an administrative standpoint or otherwise." A special 
session of the General Assembly was considered unwise until
the Commission on Public Education could submit a legislative
n 23 plan.
The Commission’s proposal worried the Norfolk 
Virginian-Pilot which preferred some sign of compliance. An 
editorial suggested that some school districts could "ini­
tiate a system designed to achieve an orderly equitable ad­
justment." Attacking the secret nature of the Gray Commis­
sion, the editorial observed; "The risk of doing nothing
grows the greater because the record of the Gray Commission
24suggests a purpose to do as little as possible." Whereas
the Richmond Times-Dispatch thought the Commission's position
was sound, the editor thought some desegregation could be in-
25iti.ated in southwest Virginia or the Shenandoah Valley.
The Gray Commission obviously feared local initiative. 
Though the June 10 policy declaration did not have the force 
of law, the Commission hoped that local school boards would 
follow a statewide policy. Two weeks later, Governor Stanley 
and the State Board of Education announced that they would
2 3Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 11, 1955, p. 1. 
^Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, June 12, 1955,
p. 6.
Editorial, 'Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 12, 1955,
p. 8.
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follow the advice of the Commission and make segregation in 
public schools the official policy of Virginia for the coming 
school year. Had a local school board attempted to desegre-
9 /•
gate, the Board would have been unsure of its response.
When faced with the same question, Stanley responded weakly
2 7that "he wouldn't like to answer." The school boards, 
fearful of making an unpopular decision, seemed to prefer 
shifting the responsibility for desegregating the schools to 
the state.
Virginia's leaders decided that they would not take 
any steps toward desegregation unless ordered to do so.
Since neither President Dwight D. Eisenhower nor Congress in­
dicated any eagerness to prod the South, the entire burden to 
force action rested on the lower courts. However, since the 
courts could not act until suits were filed, the ultimate re­
sponsibility for engineering desegregation rested with the 
NAACP. On June 4, 1955, an emergency meeting of NAACP offi­
cials from all the Southern states was held in Atlanta. In 
an eight-point directive, the NAACP promised legal action in 
the fall of 1955 against recalcitrant school districts. 
Litigation was to be preceded by petitions to school boards
with the hope of forcing compliance by enlisting the support
2 8of various community organizations.
Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 24, 1955, p. 1.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, June 26, 1955, pt.2, p. 1.
2 fi 1Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 5, 1955, p. 1.
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In Virginia, Oliver Hill summed up the NAACP philoso­
phy: "If no plans are announced or taken by the time the
school begins this fall, 1955, the time for law suits has ar­
rived... only in this way does the mandate of the Supreme
29Court...become fully operative." On June 30, 1955, W. Les­
ter Banks, Executive Secretary of the Virginia Conference, 
sent a directive to the state branches which stated: "It is
the immediate job of our branches to see to it that each 
school board begins to deal with the problem of providing 
non-discriminatory education." Along with this message,
Banks, sent petitions and instructions concerning their use. 
Anticipating future legal difficulties he cautioned: "The
signing of the petition by a parent or guardian may well be 
only the first step to an extended court fight. Therefore, 
discretion and care should :be exercised to secure petitioners 
who will—-if need be--go all the way. " 3 3
The NAACP effort to mount an effective campaign 
against segregated schools was to be described as an insidious 
campaign skirting the boundaries of the law. Almost immedi­
ately, Almond reviled the Negro organization as "drunk with
31power and hell-bent to preserve chaos." The Richmond
3^Ibid. , June 8, 1955 , p. 1.
^ Report of the Committee on Offenses Against the Ad­
ministration of Justice, "Appendix 12,w (Commonwealth of Vir­
ginia: Division of Purchase and Printing, 1957), p. 49.
3Southern School News, Vol. II, No. 2 (August, 1955),
p. 12.
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Times-Dispatch joined in this condemnation by attacking the
NAACP for its "aggressive insistence on complete integration
32m  every walk of life."
Virginia's decision to postpone any desegregation for 
a year while it searched for evasive measures was assisted by 
the action of several lower federal courts in the cases re­
manded to them by the Supreme Court. On July 15, 1955, a 
special three-judge district court ruled on the South Caro­
lina case, Briggs v. Elliott. The district court, in a per 
curiam opinion, enjoined the defendant school board from 
making racially discriminatory assignments, but only after it 
had made the necessary adjustments "with all deliberate 
speed." The court retained jurisdiction of the case, but the 
school board had won a delay. Because the three judges then 
decided to discuss the meaning of the Brown decision, the im­
pact of the Briggs ruling was far-reaching for the South. In 
a concise obiter dictum, the judges explained that the 
Supreme Court
has not decided that the federal courts are to take 
over or regulate the public schools of the states. It 
has not decided that the states must mix persons of 
different races in the schools or must require them to 
attend schools or must deprive them of the right of 
choosing the schools they attend. What it has decided, 
and all that it has decided, is that a state may not 
deny to any person on account of race the right to at­
tend any school that it maintains . . . .  The Constitu­
tion, in other words, does not require integration. It 
merely forbids discrimination. It does not forbid 
such segregation as occurs of voluntary action. It
32Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 16, 1955,
p . 12.
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merely forbids the use of government power to en­
force segregation.33
The Briggs dictum applied two prevailing ideas regard­
ing the Fourteenth Amendment to the Brown decision. First, 
the three judges recalled that historically courts had held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited state, but not pri­
vate, racial discrimination. Therefore, the three judges be­
lieved that the federal courts were not required to inter­
fere with the choice of white and Negro parents to send 
their children to segregated schools. Secondly, the dictum 
made use of the untested understanding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment imposed no positive obligation upon the States to 
achieve racial equality. If public schools remained segre­
gated after racially discriminatory policies were abolished, 
the federal courts were under no obligation to order the 
states to go further in achieving desegregation. The two 
ideas expressed in the Briggs opinion held out hope to the 
South that desegregation could be contained by either encour­
aging voluntary segregation or by devising assignment schemes
3 Jwhich ostensibly had no relation to race.
Much of the influence of the Briggs dictum has been 
attributed to the prestige of Judge John J. Parker of the 
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, who presided
^ Briggs v. Elliott, 13 2 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C.
1955).
^^Archibald Cox, The Warren Court: Constitutional De­
cision as an Instrument of Reform (Cambridge: Harvard Uni­
versity Press, 1968), p. 28.
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over the court which wrote the opinion. Judge Parker was
widely regarded as the premier jurist of the South. While
Briggs was a per curiam opinion, it was generally ascribed 
3 5to Judge Parker. Far into the 1960's, defiant school boards
and conservative federal judges cited the Briggs doctrine as
authority for opposing affirmative action to desegregate. For
Negro lawyers, Briggs proved to be a thorny obstacle in their
efforts to achieve actual desegregation.
On July 18, 19 55, another three-judge court ordered
Prince Edward County School Board to admit students without
regard to race "with all deliberate speed." As in the South
Carolina case, the court authorized a delay pending necessary
arrangements and retained jurisdiction over the case. The
court specifically stated that it was impossible to operate
3 6the school on a desegregated basis by September of 19 55. 
Governor Stanley concurred with the opinion, since the 
court's decision confirmed his earlier policy declaration.
He did not believe the opinion necessitated "any hurry-up or
unduly rushing into a special session of the General Assembly"
37 . . .to work out school problems. The Democratic organization
did not want a special session until the Gray Commission 
3 5Blaustein and Ferguson, Jr., Desegregation and the 
Law, pp. 178-79.
Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward Coun­
ty, I Race Rel. L. Rep. 82 (E.D. Va. 1955).
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, July 20, 1955, p. 1.
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could settle on a plan to prevent enforced integration.
Hints of Virginia's plans to deal with desegregation
came in September. On the twelfth, Stanley announced that he
planned to call a special session for November to consider
3 8legislation designed to prevent enforced integration. Two 
days later, the Governor announced th.at he would ask for a 
ruling on the constitutionality of Item 210 of the Appropri­
ations Act for 1954-56, which provided tuition grants- to any 
school for the children of servicemen killed or disabled. At 
issue was whether this appropriation, granted for twenty-six 
years, violated Section 141 of the Virginia Constitution 
which, prohibited appropriations of public funds for private 
schools. When State Comptroller Sidney C. Day, Jr., notified
Almond that he would stop all payments under Item 210, the
39stage was set for a "friendly suit." Virginia's newspapers 
recognized that there was a relationship between the suit and 
some sort of plan to finance private education on a large 
scale.^
While the Gray Commission delayed its report pending 
the suit, opposition to the proposed special session devel­
oped. Republican Ted Dalton argued that the school issue 
could be debated in the regular session on January 1956. A
3 8Richmond Times ^Dispatch., September 13, 1954 , p. 1. 
~^Ibid. , September 15 , 1955 , p. 1.
^Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, September 16, 
1955, p. 6? Editorial, Richmond TImei"-Dispa-1ch, September 18, 
1955, p. 2B.
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special assembly so close to the regular session, Dalton
feared, would invite steamroller tactics. Since the thirty-
two men of the Gray Commission would exert a great deal of
influence as so-called "experts," Dalton's anxiety was well- 
41founded. With, state elections in November of 1955, the
Virginian-Pilot also opposed giving lame duck legislators the 
opportunity to make decisions having an effect in 1956. The 
Norfolk newspaper hoped for the election of more Young Turks 
and suspected that Stanley was uneasy over the possibility.
A sampling of the General Assembly also demonstrated a pre­
ference for postponing action on the school problem until the
, . 42regular session.
Prior to the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals, the organization's hierarchy also made a public bid 
to influence the Gray Commission. In a letter to the Commis­
sion, Representatives Tuck and Abbitt announced that they 
favored a plan which made "public financial support of integ­
rated public schools dependent upon the will of the people of 
each county or city wherein integration of the races in the 
schools may take place." Closed schools were preferable to 
desegregated education, they argued, because "of the revul­
sion of the people to the forced integration thereof and
against their will."^ Speaking to the Defenders on the same
41Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, September 28, 1955, p. 6.
42Editorial, Ibid., September 14, 1955, p. 6; Edi­
torial, October 12, 1955, p. 6.
43Ibid., October 25, 1955, p. 1.
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day, Tuck promised to battle any attempt "to distort the 
minds, to pollute the education, to defile and make putrid 
the pure Anglo-Saxon blood that courses through the innocent 
veins of our helpless children." No room for compromise ex­
isted on the school issue, according to Tuck. "We are for
4 4integration or we are against it."
The Tuck-Abbitt version of local option actually pro­
vided three layers of defense against integration--the school 
board, the board of supervisors or governing body, and fin­
ally the people. As Tuck and Abbitt later explained to 
Governor Stanley:
The proposal does not envision extending to the 
voters of a county the right to bring about integra­
tion in such counties as Arlington and Charles City, 
but it does give the people in these counties the 
right to defeat integration after it has been put upon 
them by the school board and the governing bodies of 
the localities as a last; and final stop gap: In other
words, it is just one additional safeguard reserved to 
the people of the localities.45
Considering the procedure for appointing school board mem­
bers, the probability of placing the issue before the people 
in many communities would have been doubtful.
Senator Byrd indicated his approval of the Tuck-Abbitt
Ibid., p. 8. In June 1955, Tuck had suggested a 
plan whichTTneluded repealing Section 129, providing tuition 
grants, and withdrawing state appropriations from desegre­
gated schools. Letter, William M. Tuck to Thomas B. Stanley, 
June 22, 1955, Virginia State Library, Archives, Stanley Let­
ter File.
45Letter, William M. Tuck and Watkins M. Abbitt to 
Thomas B„ Stanley, May 10., 1956, University of Virginia, 
Archives, Smith Papers.
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plan, believing that "it in no wise conflict[ed] with the
Supreme Court decision." Significantly, he added that he was
not sure this was the final answer but warned that "Negro
children will suffer the most if some substitute school sys-
46tem is forced upon those localities."
After Attorney General Almond's action against Comp­
troller Day, the Gray Commission and the Governor remained 
silent regarding the proposed special session. The impetus 
and guidelines for further action were finally provided by 
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals on November 7, 1955, 
when it held the tuition grant program unconstitutional. In 
Almond v. Day, the Court ruled that Item 210 not only vio­
lated section 141 but also the provisions for separation of 
church, and state in the Constitutions of Virginia and the 
United States. Since private schools were not sufficiently 
endowed, tuition grants were described by the court as an ap­
propriation to a private school, "its very lifeblood." Fur­
thermore, the violation of the Constitution was not avoided 
by paying the grants to the parents or guardians of the chil­
dren, for they were "merely the conduit or channel through 
whom the aid from the State to the school is transmitted." 
Recognizing the relationship between its ruling and rumored 
school legislation, the Court observed:
To sustain the validity of Item 210 .. . would 
mean that by like appropriation the General Assembly 
might divert public funds to the support of a system
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 1, 1955, p. 1.
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of private schools which the Constitution now for­
bids. If that be a desirable end, it should be ac­
complished by amending our Constitution in a manner 
therein provided. It should not be done by judicial 
legislation.47
Pronouncing the decision to be "eminently correct,"
Attorney General Almond announced that Virginia could "now
48chart her course accordingly." Governor Stanley thought
the ruling would be helpful to the Gray Commission and the
49General Assembly.
Sounding a note of caution, the Norfolk Virginian- 
Pilot wondered whether a tuition grant plan would be consti­
tutional following an amendment of Section 141. An editorial 
expected that public support of private schools would violate 
the expanding concept of "state action" under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Above all, the editorial expressed a fear that
50Virginia's public school sy-stem was about to be uprooted.
On November 11, 1955, after approximately fifteen 
months of deliberation, the Gray Commission delivered a re­
port to Governor Stanley. The major recommendations of the 
Gray Plan called for a system of local assignments and tui­
tion grants plus "legislation to provide that no child be re­
quired to attend a school wherein both white and colored are
47Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 419, 427-431 C1955); 89 S.E. 
2d 851, 8lT!F59~(Va Sup. Ct. of App. 1955) .
4 8Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 8, 1955, p. 1.
^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 8, 1955 , p. 1.
50Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 9,
1955, p. 6.
taught . . . ." Because of Almond v. Day, the Commission
advised the Governor to summon a special session of the
General Assembly to initiate the process whereby Section 141
51could be amended.
The Gray plan represented a compromise between strong 
segregationists and accommodationists. To the satisfaction 
of the total resisters, the report stated in several places 
that one objective was to prevent "enforced integration." 
Moreover, a variety of suggestions were made with the inten­
tion of easing the transition from public schools to private 
schools. Included among these were provisions for educa­
tional levies or cash appropriations where schools were 
closed; expansion of the Virginia Supplemental Retirement 
Act to accommodate teachers who switched from public to pri­
vate schools; and the authorization of local school boards to 
shorten the school year in "an emergency situation." However 
the provision for pupil assignments by local school boards 
meant that localities with small Negro populations could move 
cautiously toward desegregation. A variety of "non-racial"
factors to guide school boards in making assignments ensured
52the prospect of token desegregation.
The recommendations of the Gray Report were also pre­
faced by a brief presentation of the Brown decision, and 
this became the official Virginia interpretation. The effect
51Gray Report, p. 8. 
52Ibid., pp. 9-12.
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of the analysis was to encourage disrespect for the Supreme 
Court's decision and to provide an excuse for ignoring it in 
the black belt. The Gray Report stated the Supreme Court had 
overturned a method of providing public education secured by 
history and earlier decisions such as Plessy v. Ferguson (163 
U.S. 537) and Gong Lum v. Rice C275 U.S. 78). However, the 
importance of the school decision, the Report emphasized, ex­
tended beyond public education to the nature of constituti­
onal democracy. The Brown decision meant "that the most 
fundamental of the rights of the states and of their citizens 
exist by the Court's sufferance and that the law of the land
is whatever the Court may determine it to be by the process
5 3of judicial legislation."
The Supreme Court's reliance on psychological and so­
ciological research in overturning legal precedent was 
stressed by the Commission. Of the scholars listed in the 
famous footnote, only Gunnar Myrdal was cited by name. He 
was described as "a European sociologist of slight experience 
in the United States" who suggested "that the adoption of the 
Constitution was in its inception a fraud upon the common 
people and that in his opinion it is now an outworn docu-
tr A
ment. The Gray Report thus seemed to officially substan­
tiate the impression given by extremists of a conspiracy as­
sociated with the Brown decision.
^ Ibido , p . 6 .
54Ibid.
The Gray Report won widespread approval in Virginia. 
The Richmond Times-Dispatch described it as halfway between
two extremes, with local option as its distinguishing fea-
55 . . .ture. The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot described the recommen-
56dations as an earnest attempt to solve Virginia's problems. 
However, the NAACP and the Defenders, on opposite poles of 
public opinion, expressed dissatisfaction with the Commis­
sion's report. The former described the proposals as "le­
gally indefensible, morally wrong and economically un- 
57sound." The Defenders, dissatisfied with the assignment
plan, thought the Gray Plan was a harbinger of desegrega- 
58tion.
On November 14, Governor Stanley announced that he 
would call for a special session of the General Assembly to 
meet on November 30, 1955. . The legislators were asked to ap­
prove a bill which would permit a popular referendum on the
question of calling a constitutional convention to amend
59Section 141 of the Virginia Constitution. Using the Con­
vention system of amending the Constitution, Section 141
55Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 13, 
1955, p. 6.
56Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 13, 
1955, p. 6.
5 7Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 14, 1955, p. 1. 
Ibid., November 13, 1955, p. 1.
Ibid., November 15, 1955, p. 1.
60could be altered in a matter of months.
The debate over the Gray Report, however, was not the 
only item on the minds of Virginians wrestling with the 
school issue. On November 21, 19 55, the Richmond News Leader 
entered the first of a series of editorials devoted to the 
theme of interposition. The enthusiastic response to the 
ideas associated with James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, John 
C.Calhoun and John Taylor of Caroline County turned the tide 
in favor of defiant segregationists who had reluctantly 
signed the Gray Report.
The leading figure in the Virginia campaign to pass a
resolution of interposition was James J. Kilpatrick. At the
age of thirty-one, Kilpatrick succeeded Douglas Southall
Freeman, the distinguished biographer of Robert E. Lee, as
61the editor of the Richmond News Leader. For Kilpatrick, 
the Brown decision marked a turning point in his career. His 
persuasive editorials not only played an important role in 
paving the way for massive resistance, but they also won a 
national reputation for their author. Once Virginia chose
^ Constitution of Virginia, Art. XV, Sec. 197. The 
Virginia Constitution provided an alternative method to the 
convention system for amending the Constitution. A majority 
vote for the proposed amendment in successive meetings of the 
General Assembly, followed by the ratification of a majority 
of the electorates made the amendment a part of the Constitu­
tion.
Muse, p. 20. Though born in Oklahoma, Muse observed
that Kilpatrick succeeded in becoming "more Virginian than
Virginia."
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massive resistance, he became the Old Dominion's most articu­
late defender of the South's social and political traditions. 
The Richmond editor's pungent writing style was admirably 
suited for sallies against the Supreme Court and the federal 
"octopus."
Kilpatrick's attraction to interposition apparently
was inspired by a short pamphlet on the subject written by
6 2William Old, an elderly country lawyer. As late as June 
1955, Kilpatrick seemed to see no option for Virginia other 
than to battle the Brown decision by time consuming litiga­
tion. "To defy the court openly would be to enter upon an­
archy; the logical end would be a second attempt at secession
from the Union. And though the idea is not without merit, it
6 3is impossible of execution. We tried that once before." 
Accepting the consequences:of local option in Southside Vir­
ginia, Kilpatrick believed that:
abandonment of public schools anywhere would be a tra­
gedy, it would be a bad thing, to be undertaken only 
as a last resort. But I also feel that there is one 
thing that would be even worse than abandonment, and 
that is the dire consequences of integration in those 
areas of heavy negro [sic] populations where the edu­
cation of both races would suffer thereby and the vi­
tality and integrity of our white society inevitably 
would be debased by the compulsory intimacy of
Southern School News, Vol. II, No. 9 (March, 1956), 
p. 14. William Old was subsequently made a circuit court 
judge as a reward for his contribution to massive resistance.
/* o
Editorial, Richmond News Leader, June 10, 1955*
p. 10.
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prolonged racial mixing.^
Yet, in principle, local option meant submitting to the Su­
preme Court, since some schools would be desegregated. Kil­
patrick hoped that Virginia's opposition to the Supreme Court 
would be more decisive and dramatic. By uniting Virginia's 
past with its present, interposition offered the Old Dominion 
a set of ready-made ideas, heroes, and symbols for a more de­
fiant stand.
Between November 1955 and February 1956, Kilpatrick 
persuaded, cajoled and generally directed Virginia's legis­
lators in the drafting of a resolution of interposition. 
Writing to Robert Whitehead, a staunch critic of interposi­
tion, Kilpatrick thought that "some approach could be found, 
through an eloquent Resolution of Interposition, that would 
elevate this whole controversy above the sorry level of 
racial segregation and put it on a high plane of fundamental 
principles^^ The fundamental principle or "transcendent 
issue" according to Kilpatrick, was spelled out by the Gray 
Commission's warning that with the Brown decision, the Con­
stitution could be altered at the whim of the Supreme Court. 
The Constitution, the Richmond editor asserted, had been
^Letter, James J. Kilpatrick to Robert Whitehead,
June 10, 1955, University of Virginia, Archives, Whitehead 
Letter File.
Letter, James J. Kilpatrick to Robert Whitehead,
November 24, 1955, University of Virginia, Archives, White­
head Letter File.
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amended without resort to the procedure outlined in Article V
6 6of the Constitution. Regardless of one's position on inte­
gration, Kilpatrick believed:
All Virginians, liberal and conservative alike, 
from the Tidewater or the Valley, are united in a 
devotion to the Constitution and a reverence for its 
proper administration. If we fail now to make at 
least an effort to preserve the Constitution from the 
greedy hands of the Supreme Court, bent upon shaping 
it as a thing of wax, we shall have failed as Ameri­
cans and Virginians in an hour of solemn c i r s i s . 6 7
Portraying the school issue as a grave constitutional 
crisis, Kilpatrick urged that Virginia's last resort was the 
"right of interposition." He defended interposition by re­
capitulating the theory of state sovereignty refined by John 
C. Calhoun. Kilpatrick explained to his readers that the 
Union was a compact of sovereign states who delegated certain 
specific powers to the central government. If the central 
government broke the compact in a "deliberate," "palpable" or 
"dangerous" way, interposition was the last resort of the 
states. The Civil War, an editorial explained, "in no way 
altered the basic structure of the compact." All the Civil 
War demonstrated was that "when one group of States is de­
termined by force to contest the effort of another group of 
States to withdraw from the Union, law and sovereign rights 
are blown to the four winds and the issue is resolved on
/- r*
Editorial, Richmond News Leader, November 21, 19 55,
p. 10.
^ Ibid„ , November 23, 1955, p. 10.
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6 8naked force alone."
For Kilpatrick the grievance was clear, and he urged 
the legislators to use the special session to pass a resolu­
tion of interposition. The editorial gave four reasons for 
immediate action. The first was that Virginia's policy, 
whatever the result, should be based on "fundamental prin­
ciples." The legislators who had descended upon Richmond 
were reminded: "This is our heritage. This is our tradi­
tion. This was the philosophy of the great men who walked in 
the halls of our own Capitol." Secondly, interposition ele­
vated the controversy from race to constitutionalism. "There 
is a tactical advantage in higher ground, and we would do 
well to seek it," the editor counseled. Thirdly, Virginia, 
by acting promptly might provide the spark to unite the South 
against the Supreme Court. 'Lastly, the Gray plan, while sup­
portable, was a policy of expediency rather than principle. 
Local assignment and tuition grants implied recognition of 
the Brown decision. "This newspaper would submit that Vir­
ginia can stand on fundamental principles, where on expedi-
6 9ency we must fall."
The enthusiasm for interposition came at a rather awk­
ward moment. Public attention had been focused on amending 
Section 141 of the Virginia Constitution since the decision
^ Ibid. , November 22, 1955, p. 10; November 23 , 195 5,
p. 10.
9Ibid., November 29, 1955, p. 12.
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of Almond v. Day. On the night of November 29, members of 
the Gray Commission reportedly debated the merits of interpo­
sition until after midnight. Officially they decided against 
pushing for interposition because of the "exigencies of time
and the understood conditions of the Assembly's special ses-
70sion made it impossible to develop the plan properly." 
Privately Kilpatrick told Tom Waring, editor of the Charles­
ton News and Courier, that the decision
was wholly a matter of political expediency, for mem­
bers of both the House and State Senate were wildly 
enthusiastic about the plan and might have gone off 
ill-prepared unless they had been restrained. The 
difficulty that finally caused us to put it off until 
January was our fear that many persons, whose votes 
we need in a State Referendum in January would feel 
that interposition had solved everything and would 
stay away from the polls. 7-1-
Delaying action on an interposition resolution was 
probably advised for two other reasons. First, since the 
special session had been called for the limited purpose of 
passing a bill to hold a referendum, interpositionists prob­
ably feared that altering the session's objective would hurt 
the chances of passing the bill with an emergency clause. 
Without a four-fifths vote in each house, the referendum bill 
would not become effective until ninety days after the ses­
sion's adjournment. Secondly, to win a decisive victory in 
the referendum, the total resisters recognized the need of
^^Ibid., December 1, 1955, p. 14.
71Letter, James J. Kilpatrick to Tom Waring, Decem­
ber 9, 1955, University of Virginia, Archives, Kilpatrick
Letter File.
89
winning the support of moderate organization men. For ex­
ample, ex-Governors Colgate Darden and John Battle could be 
expected to support the Gray Plan, but not interposition.
Thus, the General Assembly agreed to limit its action to the
referendum bill requested by Governor Stanley and to bills
7 2having the unanimous consent of the Assembly.
Despite the General Assembly's action, James Kilpatrick's 
editorials introduced the idea that Virginia's response 
to the Brown decision could be converted from a grudging, 
limited compliance to a glorious crusade to save the United 
States Constitution. A variety of words and phrases were 
associated with the crisis, such as: "superlegislature,"
"rape of the Constitution," "transcendent issue" and "funda­
mental principles." Thus, not only extreme segregationists 
but moderate segregationists were attracted by Kilpatrick's 
seemingly more sophisticated arguments. For example,
FitzGerald Bemiss, a moderate who later voted against the 
massive resistance laws, was, at first, attracted to the 
Kilpatrick editorials. After referring to the Gray Plan in a 
letter, he said, "But far more important is the solemn matter 
of these most fundamental principles which are covered in 
Jack Kilpatrick's editorial series . . . .  Jack has attracted 
a great deal of attention in the great public service of
7 2Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 1, 1955, p. 1.
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7 3developing this series."
As usual, opposition to the Kilpatrick editorials came 
from anti-organization sources. In a letter to Kilpatrick, 
Robert Whitehead wrote:
Frankly, I do not understand their [the editorials] 
purpose, and in all candor, I must say that I think they 
are serving no good purpose in the present troublesome 
period.
The doctrine of nullification and secession became 
obsolete at Appomattox in April, 1865. With their 
death, interposition also died.
I see no point in resurrecting the dead in order 
to vex the living. In my opinion, nothing but harm can 
come from it.
Before the House of Delegates, Whitehead continued his attack 
on those who advocated ignoring the Brown decision. The Nel­
son County Democrat reminded his colleagues that the "Con­
stitution, as construed by the Supreme Court, whether its con­
struction be right or wrong, is the supreme law of this land, 
and every member of this Assembly has taken an oath to sup­
port it." Whitehead wondered how the leaders of Virginia 
could "expect our people to obey the decision of our 
[Virginia] courts, if we incited them to ignore the decisions
7 3Letter, FitzGerald Bemiss to Prescott S. Bush, De­
cember 21, 1955, University of Virginia, Archives, Kilpatrick 
Letter File. Later Bemiss altered his position so that he 
never was identified with interposition enthusiasts. His dis­
satisfaction with interposition was prompted by a study of 
several books sent to him by a lawyer friend. Although 
Bemiss subsequently voted for the interposition resolution, 
he viewed his vote a mere protest against the Brown decision.
7 4Letter, Robert Whitehead to James J. Kilpatrick,
November 25, 1955, University of Virginia, Archives, White­
head Letter File.
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75of the highest court in the land." The Norfolk Virginian- 
Pilot supported Whitehead in his criticism of interposition. 
Such a "fantasy," an editorial charged, would only "encourage 
those who believe that quick and complete abandonment of the 
schools should be forced upon the State."
Thus during 1955, Virginia had concentrated its ef­
forts on devising a program for "preventing enforced integra­
tion" in the black belt countries. Not strong enough to force 
a state-wide plan, arch segregationists signed the Gray 
Report which permitted local option. Even school districts 
which chose to desegregate, following a court order, could 
erect a variety of obstacles which would either postpone or 
restrict desegregation to token members. Gradualism was en­
dorsed by the second Brown decision and an important dictum 
written in Briggs v. Elliott. Years of litigation were pre­
dicted before any meaningful desegregation would be achieved. 
Yet to many of the organization hierarchy, local option was 
the path of expediency and ultimately capitualation. How­
ever, no inspiring slogan, banner or mission had been found 
to unite Virginia. The gap was filled by worn-out state 
sovereignty arguments, forcefully written by a zealous cham­
pion of Virginia society, James J. Kilpatrick. In December,
7 5Remarks of Delegate Robert Whitehead of Nelson 
County before the House of Delegates of Virginia on Decem­
ber 1, 1955, pp. 2-3.
7 fiEditorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, December 1,
1955, p. 6.
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nevertheless, the role of interposition in Virginia's re­
sponse to the Gray Plan was unclear. Whether interposition 
would be used to replace the Gray Plan or be viewed as
77merely a "dignified protest" was yet to be determined.,
77Editorial, Richmond Times--Dispatch, December 2, 
1955, p„ 5. The editorial thought interposition would serve 
as a "dignified protest."
CHAPTER IV
REFERENDUM AND INTERPOSITION
As scheduled, the General Assembly met in special 
session on November 30, 1955, to consider legislation re­
quested by the Gray Commission and endorsed by Governor 
Stanley. The legislators were asked to pass a bill which 
would provide for a popular referendum on the question of 
calling a constitutional convention to amend Section 141 of 
Virginia's Constitution, prohibiting the appropriation of 
public funds for private schools. On December 2 the House 
of Delegates and the Senate- passed the referendum bill by 
virtually unanimous votes of 93 to 5 and 38 to 1. The fol­
lowing day, Governor Stanley set January 9 as the date of 
the referendum.^
The almost unanimous decision of the General Assembly 
was not an endorsement of total resistance to the Supreme 
Court. Legislators from districts outside the Southside 
accepted the Gray Commission's analysis that without tuition 
grants there would be no education in the black belt. Con­
sidering the example of Prince Edward County, the prospect
1Richniond Times-Dispatch, December 3, 1955, p. 1; 
December 4, 19 55, p.( 1.
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of massive school closures in the black belt could not be 
2denied. During a pub.Lie hearing, George H. Parker, Jr., 
Commonwealth's Attorney for Southampton County warned:
"There111 be no appropriations for schools by the Board of 
Supervisors . . .  if a single colored child enters a school
3
with whites." The same fear was expressed by J. Randolph 
Tucker, a Richmond delegate who served on the Gray Commission 
and subsequently voted against the massive resistance laws. 
Tucker argued "that localities with heavy Negro population 
would close their schools rather than integrate. Tuition 
grants make up the best method the commission could devise to 
assure education would continue in these localities. . . .
The idea that localities outside the Southside had a 
responsibility to help the black belt counties was also 
expressed by Robert Whitehead. In a speech before the House 
of Delegates, he stressed that he thought a local assignment 
plan would be a satisfactory solution to Virginia's problems. 
However, Whitehead reasoned that a rejection of the referendum 
bill might jeopardize the local assignment plan. Whitehead
2 . . .Gates, pp. 46-47. Anticipating a desegregation order,
a private educational corporation was formed in the spring of 
1955 in Prince Edward County. The board of supervisors was 
prepared to withhold public funds if the schools were desegre­
gated. In July of 1955, the district court granted a delay 
and the board of supervisors made appropriations on a monthly 
basis. Five other black belt counties followed Prince Edward's 
example and financed their public schools on a monthly basis.
3
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, December 1, 1955, p. 1.
^Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 2, 19 55, p. 1.
95
viewed the Gray Plan as a compromise and expected black belt
legislators to fight local assignment unless they were assured
tuition grants. Considering the tuition aid plan and pupil
assignment program as part of a "double-barrel approach,"
Whitehead announced that he would "vote to permit the people
to share in the decision as to the proposed change." He only
hoped that "the private schools which may come into existence
as the result of tuition grants for pupils from public funds
will not dangerously impair the functioning of our public 
5school system." The position of Tucker and Whitehead con­
vinced many legislators that by voting for the referendum bill 
public schools would not be destroyed.
From December 4 to January 9, Virginia politics were 
dominated by the referendum campaign. For Governor Stanley 
and the proponents of amending Section 141, a convincing 
referendum victory depended on capturing the uncommitted white 
voters outside of the black belt. The pro-amendment campaign 
concentrated on convincing the voters that an affirmative vote 
in no way damaged the future of public schools. To insure the 
credibility of their position, the pro-referendum forces 
utilized men and women prominently associated with education 
in organizing and explaining their position. Governor Stanley,
5
Remarks of Robert Whitehead of Nelson County before 
the House of Delegates of Virginia on December 1, 19 55, p. 1. 
Since he was considered a friend of public education, White­
head's endorsement of the referendum bill helped to win support 
from legislators who feared that tuition grants were a big 
step toward the disestablishment of public education.
for example, named Dr. Dabney Lancaster, former State Superin­
tendent of Public Instruction and president emeritus of Long- 
wood College, to direct the privately financed State Referendum
g
Information Center. Other prominent Virginians enlisted by 
the pro-referendum campaign included former Governor John S. 
Battle; Colgate Darden, the president of the University of 
Virginia and former Governor; Dowell J. Howard, the State 
Superintendent of Education; and Thomas C. Boushall, the pres­
ident of the Bank of Virginia and a member of the State Board 
of Education. In endorsing a vote for the amendment, a 
Times-Dispatch editorial stressed that such distinguished
friends of public education would not associate themselves with
7
a campaign to destroy Virginia's public school system.
Colgate Darden provided the most dramatic moment of the 
campaign. Among the most effective speakers for the referen­
dum, Darden paused in the middle of the campaign to urge the 
pro-amendment leaders to proclaim their commitment to Section 
129 of the Virginia Constitution which required the legisla-
g
ture to maintain "an effective system of free public schools."
The request raised two underlying fears held by Darden and his 
friends. First, they were concerned that defiant segregationists 
might use the referendum as a mandate for imposing a statewide
g
Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 10, 1955, p. 1. 
^Editorial, Ibid., December 15, 1955, p. 20.
o
Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 21, 1955, p. 1.
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policy of segregation. Secondly, they wanted some assurance 
that Negro public education would not be abandoned by bitter 
whites of the black belt. On the latter issue, the State 
Referendum Information Center did not rule out the closure of 
Negro schools. Regardless of the amendment, the Center ex-
g
plained, a locality could refuse to appropriate money.
Although pressed for an answer to Darden's question, 
Governor Stanley remained evasive. If Negro schools were 
closed, Stanley thought "the General Assembly undoubtedly will 
be given consideration to any further steps that should be 
t a k e n . T h e  Governor also believed that raising the issue 
of Section 129 would only confuse the people. ^  Finally, on 
December 28, Stanley relented and announced that he would 
"strongly recommend to the General Assembly that it exercise
its authority to see that the provision of Section 129 of the
12Constitution is fully carried out." The answer was still
vague enough to permit a locality to close its public schools.
Darden, however, expressed his satisfaction and made a strong
13appeal for the passage of the referendum.
Virginians opposed to the referendum formed the Virginia 
Society for Preservation of Public Education. A variety of
g
Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, December 18, 1955, 
p. 6; December 21, 1955, p^ 6 .
1^Quoted in Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, December 
21, 1955, p. 6 .
^^Ibid., December 23, 1955, p. 6.
1 2Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 29, 1955, p. 1.
^Ibid., December 31, 1955, p. 1.
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anti-organization Democrats and Young Turks, such as Armistead
Boothe and Stuart B. Carter, were associated with this group.
Their objections to the tuition grants were that they would
not work, were of doubtful constitutionality, and would under-
14mine the public schools. The emphasis on saving the public 
schools was consistent with Boothe's earlier endorsement of 
local option.
The anti-amendment campaign lacked organization, money 
and outstanding personalities. Furthermore, it did not win the 
support of important interest groups in the state. Two organi­
zations, the Virginia Federation of Labor and the Virginia 
Council on Human Relations, which opposed the amendment, did 
not have much influence among white voters. Ministers who spoke 
out against the amendment and favored compliance with the Su­
preme Court's decision were considered to have gone beyond
15their religious domain. The alleged threat posed by the
ministers to passage of the amendment was dismissed by the jest:
16"They may have the preachers, but we've got the congregations."
Finally, only two major daily newspapers, the Norfolk Virginian-
Pilot and the Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, opposed passage of the
17referendum bill.
^^Ibid., December 20, 1955, p. 1.
■^Gates, pp. 7 9-81.
^ Richmond Times-Pi spa tch, January 1, 1956 , p. 1.
■^Gates, p. 82.
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Ten days before the referendum, the State Referendum
Information Center released a major policy statement on the
Gray Plan. The statement emphasized that tuition grants and
local assignment were necessary to prevent forced integration
and that there was no obligation to integrate under the Brown
decision. "If you believe in local self-government by people
who know local customs and local needs, you should vote on
18January 9 for the Convention." The effect of this announce­
ment was to broaden the January 9 referendum beyond the limited 
question of calling a convention to amend Section 141. Thus, 
pro-amendment forces portrayed the referendum as a test of the 
entire Gray Plan.
In a thorough analysis of the referendum campaign,
Robbins Gates later wrote: "However confused the issue may
have become, no citizen of;Virginia could claim that he had
19purposely been left uninformed." Recent documents demonstrate 
•that the suspicions of Darden and other moderate organization 
men that the Gray Plan was to be dropped were well-founded. 
Before the referendum was held, the organization's hierarchy 
decided to drop the Gray Plan and adopt a more belligerent 
stance toward the Supreme Court. However, the enthusiasm for
T Q
Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 1, 1956, p. 1.
19Gates, p. 74.
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interposition was checked as a precaution against endanger-
20ing the margin of victory in the referendum. Editor Kil­
patrick was especially eager to push on with interposition.
He wrote Harry Byrd, Jr. that his correspondents in Mississippi 
and South Carolina were urging the adoption of an interposition 
resolution in Virginia. Since the Old Dominion did not possess 
the same racist image, they thought a Virginia resolution
"would carry far greater national impact than the same action
21m  South Carolina, Georgia, or Mississippi." The idea of a
united Southern front also appealed to Senator Harry Byrd. 
Congratulating Kilpatrick on his splendid exposition of inter­
position, Byrd mentioned that Senator James Eastland of Missis­
sippi said that the editorials were "gaining great popularity 
all through the South." Relating this to the Virginia referen­
dum campaign, Byrd said: "Above all, we must not compromise
our convictions by premature legislation." Plainly, the 
Virginia Senator did not want Virginia to commit itself to the 
Gray Plan and limited compliance to the Supreme Court’s deci­
sion. However, Byrd advised the enthusiastic editor to cool 
temporarily the interposition fires because nothing should be 
said "that will injure the big vote we must secure on January 
9 , as this will be the foundation stone for our future
9 n
Letter, James J. Kilpatrick to Tom Waring, December 9, 
1955, University of Virginia, Archives, Kilpatrick Letter File.
9 i
Letter, James J. Kilpatrick to Harry Byrd, Jr.,
December 19, 1955, University of Virginia, Archives, Kil­
patrick Letter File.'
101
22
battles." Thus, several weeks before the referendum, the 
organization's hierarchy prepared to convert the expected 
victory at the polls into a mandate for total resistance to 
the Supreme Court's decision.
A combination of local and Southern enthusiasm for 
interposition plus the encouragement of Senator Byrd inten­
sified Kilpatrick's ardor for defiance. The Richmond editor 
assured Byrd that interposition "is basically and fundamen­
tally sound, it transcends the race issue, and it offers hope 
for a check and balance that must be asserted against the 
Supreme Court before all reserved powers of the States are 
whittled away by judicial legislation." Kilpatrick wrote of 
his eager anticipation for the conclusion of the referendum 
campaign since
the necessity for .keeping interposition statements 
under wraps will have ended. You can imagine how 
impatient I am to put aside the Gray Commission's 
program, which is a hodgepodge of expediency and com­
promise, in favor of a direct, forthright stand based 
upon fundamental principles of our Constitution. Like 
yourself, I am convinced that if as many as ten or 
eleven States would unite in a single front, the court 23 
would find its mandates almost impossible of enforcement.
Just as Virginia had been the capital of the Confederacy,
Senator Byrd and editor Kilpatrick hoped to make it the leader
22 Letter, Harry F. Byrd to James J. Kilpatrick, 
December 23, 1955, University of Virginia, Archives, Kil­
patrick Letter File.
2 3Letter, James J. Kilpatrick to Harry F. Byrd, Decem­
ber 28, University of Virginia, Archives, Kilpatrick Letter
File .
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of the South's struggle against the Supreme Court's attack 
upon white supremacy.
Some hint that the Gray Plan was to be "put aside" 
was given during the referendum campaign. On December 17, 
1955, Senator Byrd issued a statement placing all of his 
immense prestige behind the referendum. "The conditions con­
fronting us are such that we will succeed better by going on 
a flexible basis or on a basis of standby legislation than by 
attempting to enact complete and final legislation to begin 
with the school term next September." By postponing action, 
Byrd suggested that "it is possible that some form of action 
can be accepted as a pattern for all the Southern states. The 
battle to preserve our public school system may last for many 
years and we may find it necessary to change our tactics from 
time to time." The Senator then suggested that not even the 
Supreme Court fully endorsed the Brown decision. "If segre­
gation was illegal on May 17, 1954, as declared by the Supreme 
Court, then it was illegal in September, 1954, when the
Supreme Court permitted the schools to continue on a segre- 
24gated basis.
Governor Stanley also made several comments during the 
referendum campaign which hinted at a reversal of Virginia’s 
policy. On December 19, Stanley indicated that he would not
2 4Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 18, 1955, p. 4.
Byrd also mentioned that Negroes would suffer the most from 
desegregation since "the cost of schools is borne nearly en­
tirely by the white,population." Apparently Byrd still hoped 
that black citizens could be frightened into pursuing a course 
of voluntary segregation.
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decide on recommending the Gray Plan to the General Assembly
25until after the referendum. Three days before the referen­
dum, Stanley told a statewide radio audience that a "no vote"
26was a vote "for mixed schools in Virginia." Apparently, 
by underscoring the race issue, the Governor was attempting 
to erect some rationale for interpreting the expected triumph 
as authority for delaying action on the Gray Plan.
On January 9, the referendum to hold a limited consti­
tutional convention was adopted by an impressive margin of
27304,154 votes to 146,164 votes. As expected, the percentage
of voters who went to the polls in each district was greatest
where the number of Negro voters was the highest. Black belt
whites voted emphatically for the amendment, most likely with
the hope of preventing enforced desegregation anywhere in
Virginia. Significantly, Negroes voted with the same unanimity
against calling a constitutional convention. Outside the black
belt, the referendum carried all but ten counties, although
28with lower percentages.
9 c.
Ibid., December 20, 1955, p. 1.
^ Ibid., January 7, 1956 , p. 1.
27 
1 Ibid.
9 o
Gates, pp. 86-95.
104
The reasons for pro-amendment votes were unclear in 
white areas outside the black belt. The endorsement of a 
constitutional convention by Battle, Darden, and Lancaster 
probably influenced a number of white voters. Others 
obviously shared racial views similar to the Defenders . How­
ever, many probably voted "yes", hoping that the Gray Plan 
could help Southside Virginia without damaging local control 
of education. Many Virginians assumed that they would con­
tinue to control local school policy as well as the rate of 
desegregation.
A cautious analysis of the referendum was made by the 
Richmond Times-Pispatch, which supported the amendment of 
Section 141 as a means of saving the public schools. Accord­
ing to an editorial, the referendum was only a "first step 
toward putting the Gray Plan into effect." The Commission's 
goal, the editor emphasized, was "to avoid enforced .integra­
tion not to avoid all integration." Furthermore, the 
editorial added, the Commission never recommended closing 
"the entire public school system of Virginia." A policy of
gradual desegregation, consistent with "Judge Parker's ruling"
29was the course advised' by the Times-Dispatch.
With the referendum safely won, the organization's 
inner circle concentrated on distorting the meaning of the 
referendum. Leading the way was the determined editor of 
the News Leader who wrotes "Overwhelmingly, Virginia wants
2 9Editorial, Richmond Times-Pispatch, January 10, 1956,
p. 12 .
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no part of integrated public schools. Beyond question,
Virginia objects to the Supreme Court's usurpation of power
beyond its authority.  ^ Senator Byrd added his prestige to
this interpretation by observing that the referendum was
simply an indication of "the opposition of the people to 
31integration."
After misrepresenting the purpose of the referendum,
Kilpatrick urged that Virginia alter its strategy. He
opposed an early constitutional convention which also meant
postponing the other recommendations of the Gray Plan.
Instead of acting on the Gray Plan, Kilpatrick urged the
General Assembly, which was to meet on January 11, to act
32on a resolution of interposition. He explained that inter­
position was an "announcement" by a state that an "alleged 
infraction" of the Constitution "be judged by all the States." 
Moreover, the editor asserted, erroneously, that enforcement
of the "objectionable construction" was suspended by activat-
. . 33m g  the process of interposition.
The Times-Di spatch, assuming a moderate stance, 
thought interposition "would be a useful and important
^ °Editorials, Richmond News Leader , January 10, 1956
p- 12 .
31Richmond Times-Dispatch, J anuary 11, 1955, p. 1.
32Editorial, Richmond News Leader, January 10, 1956,
p- 12.
3 3Editorial, Richmond News Leader, January 12, 1956,
p. 12.
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3 4gesture" only as a symbol of protest. More critical of 
interposition was the Virginian-Pilot which argued that the 
idea was falsely described as a technique for evading the 
Brown decision. Furthermore, the editor warned that inter­
position with its "intent to circumvent the Supreme Court
3 5decision" could taint the Gray Plan with illegality.
The controversy over Virginia's school policy was 
further complicated by an announcement from the Arlington 
School Board that it intended to implement a local plan of 
desegregation. The Arlington plan called for gradual deseg­
regation beginning with the elementary schools in 1956p  
junior high in 1957, and senior in 1958. Segregated schools 
would be provided for children of parents who were opposed 
to desegregation. However, the parents would have to provide 
the transportation to the segregated schools. The plan was 
defended as being consistent with the recommendations of the 
Gray Plan and the tradition of local control of education.
The Arlington proclamation led to a heated debate over state 
and local responsibility for public education. Garland Gray 
was furious and proposed a moratorium on local action "until
■^Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 11,
1956, p. 12.
O r
Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, January 14, 1956,
p. 6.
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the State's policy is finally determined by the Governor
and the duly elected representatives of the People of the 
3 6Commonwealth."
On January 11, the regular session of the General
Assembly convened and five days later it deferred the Gray
Plan to a special session. The rationale given by the
legislators was that the Assembly would be occupied fully
with normal legislative matters. A Constitutional Convention
37was set for March 5 by the Assembly. The Times-Dispatch
approved of the delay and believed that a special session
in June would allow the Assembly sufficient time to pass an
3 8assignment plan and tuition grants for September.
The delay worked to the advantage of resisters attempt­
ing to win support for interposition. On January 19, 1956, 
State Senator Harry C. Stuart, along with thirty-four other 
members of the Virginia Senate, introduced a resolution of 
interposition. The act was rich with Virginia symbolism.
Stuart was the great nephew of J.E.B. Stuart and January 19
3 9was the anniversary of Robert E. Lee's birth. However, the
Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 15, 1956, p. 1.
^ Ibid. , January 17 , 1956, p. 1.
"^Editorial, Ibid. , p. 12.
3 QRichmond Times-Dispatch, January 20, 1956, p. 1.
Stuart resolution did not satisfy more rabid interposition- 
ists since it contained a startling omission: it did not
declare the Brown decision "null and void." Instead, the 
resolution pledged "to take all appropriate measures, honor­
ably, legally, and constitutionally available to us to resist
40this illegal encroachment upon our sovereign powers." Al­
though Kilpatrick had argued that a resolution of interposi­
tion automatically suspended the implementation of the Brown 
decision, the Stuart resolution rejected this interpretation. 
Specifically, the interpositionists agreed to omit a clause, 
favored by Kilpatrick, which had stated that Virginia's 
school segregation law was still "in full force and effect."
As Kilpatrick explained, a strong resolution was dropped on 
the recommendations of State Senators Robert Button and
Albertis Harrison who counseled that only a mild declaration
41had a chance of winning acceptance outside the South.
Instead of interposition, Virginia's leadership hoped,
as Kilpatrick explained, to explore all tactics for preventing
"enforced integration of our schools until the question of the
42court's decree is put to rest," By employing every available 
evasive maneuver, Virginia segregationists hoped to prevent
^ 1  Race Rel. L. Rep. 4 45
4^Richmond News Leader, January 19, 1956, p. 14. 
42
q Ibid.
integration on the theory that an amendment to the federal
Constitution or a subsequent Supreme Court decision would
reverse the desegregation decision. Organization men pointed
to other examples where the Supreme Court had responded to
political pressure by reversing controversial decisions.
Defiance also served the Democratic organization in another
way. By postponing desegregation the Party could claim to
have exhausted every method of preventing desegregation. The
longer the struggle endured, the longer the political benefits.
No potential massive resister publicly spoke of winning time
to ease racial tensions so that Virginia could eventually
desegregate. Instead, defiant segregationists, as explained
by the News Leader, promised "litigation, legislation, appeals
to sister States for a Constitutional amendment, judicial
proceedings within our State courts" in an effort to block
43enforcement of the Brown decision.
The unwillingness of Virginia's legislators to accept 
an extreme nullification statement indicated that a majority 
recognized the theoretical and practical shortcomings of 
Kilpatrick's argument. When Delegate Robert Whitehead de­
nounced the watered-down resolution of interposition, the 
exasperated Kilpatrick moaned:
^Ibid., January 27 , 1956 , p. 10.
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There was a time when Virginia could recognize 
the face of tyranny. We had strong men in this 
Commonwealth then, fearless men, who loved liberty, 
men who would resist usurpation. What has become . . 
of this spirit? How has our heritage been wasted?
On February 1, the General Assembly approved the Stuart
Resolution by votes of 3 6 to 2 in the Senate and 90 to 5 in
4 5the House of Delegates. A number of legislators prefaced
support of Virginia's declaration by stating that their vote
represented a protest rather than an attempt to nullify the
Supreme Court's decision. Robert Whitehead again warned:
"The lack of general resistance to the adoption of this
resolution stems from the fact that a large portion of the
membership is laboring under the delusion that it is nothing
more than a strong protest against the May 17, 1954, decision." 
. 4 6(his emphasis) Despite the concessions of the interposi- 
tionists, Whitehead was worried that Virginians later would 
misconstrue the Stuart Resolution as a legislative endorsement 
for total resistance. Whitehead concluded by indicting Kil­
patrick for confusing the people and leading them "to think
that he has discovered a staff on which they can lean, when
47m  fact it is but a broken reed."
^ Ibid„, January 23, 1956 , p. 10.
45Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 2, 1956, p. 1.
46Remarks of Delegate Robert Whitehead of Nelson 
County before the House of Delegates of Virginia on 
Fe bruary 1, 1956 .
Ibid .
In the Senate, Ted Dalton made a speech similar to
Whitehead's. "We’re spinning our wheels on a big word that
is going to mislead our people into thinking it will preserve
48separate schools." Looking into the future, Dalton predic­
ted that the resolution was only strengthening the legal case 
of the NAACP as an example of circumvention. Exasperated by
the Assembly's conduct, Dalton concluded: "Are we going to
4 9cry at the moon?"
Probably only a few legislators thought that Virginia 
had accomplished anything of substance by passing the reso­
lution. Most agreed with the sponsor of the resolution, Harry 
Stuart, who confessed; "The resolution in itself will not 
legally suspend the enforcement of the decision in Virginia. 
However, he hoped that the resolution would "set in motion a 
chain of actions that will:not only impede the enforcement of
it in Virginia, but will entirely obliterate the decision in
51Virginia and elsewhere." Only a very few shared Kilpatrick1 
zeal for recapturing the spirit of 1798. Mills Godwin, a 
black belt senator and a massive resister who was later to 
become governor, remarked; "I am just so glad that I have a
52chance to raise my voice in behalf of this great principle."
4 8Richmond News Leader, February 1, 1956, p. 1.
4 9Ibid .
5ftIbid., January 27, 1955, p. 1.
Ibid .
5?Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 2, 1956, p. 3.
112
Publicly and privately Kilpatrick admitted that little 
of substance was accomplished by the Stuart Resolution. 
Legally, Kilpatrick wrote, "our action was persuasive, decla­
ratory, expressive of policy and opinion— nothing more. As 
for the future, it can be said at the moment only that Vir­
ginia has made her appeal; we must wait for our sister States 
5 3to respond." Similar expressions combining both wishful 
thinking and realism were expressed by Kilpatrick in a letter 
to Senator Byrd. With the resolution about to be passed, the 
Richmond editor wrote that while "we hope earnestly that 
interposition will void the Supreme Court's decision, we can­
not say as a matter of certainty that that will be the effect. 
I imagine that it will depend entirely upon how much force 
the Supreme Court is able to exert in carrying out its man­
dates. If Eisenhower should send troops in to enforce the
court decision, I believe we would find that our resolution
54had not actually 'voided' these decisions at all."
Technically the extreme interpositionists like Kil­
patrick were forced to make major concessions . They would
have preferred joining Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia in
55"nullifying" the Brown decision. However, numerous lawyers 
among the Virginia legislators recognized that they could not
5 3Editorial, Richmond News Leader, February 2, 1956,
p . 12 .
54Letter, James J. Kilpatrick to Harry F. Byrd, January 
30, 1956, University of Virginia, Archives, Kilpatrick Lettsr 
File.
55I Race Rel. L. Rep. 440 (Miss); I Race Rel. L. Rep. 
438 (Ga.); I Race Rel. L. Rep. 437 (Ala.).
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overlook the Civil War and a hundred years of constitutional 
history. Though they disagreed with the decision, moderate 
segregationists accepted the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts and the federal government’s power to enforce the law. 
The extremists, nonetheless, won an important strategic vic­
tory. In subsequent months the legislative history of the 
resolution, as Robert Whitehead predicted, was forgotten and 
massive resisters were able to use the Stuart Resolution to 
justify the school closing laws.
While the attention of the General Assembly was 
focused on the interposition debate, other bills were intro­
duced which anticipated massive resistance. John B. Boat­
wright, a staunch segregationist from Buckingham County,
introduced a bill which would have prohibited the spending
56of state funds for racially mixed schools. Though unsuc­
cessful, Boatwright's bill indicated the determination of 
some legislators to adopt massive resistance immediately.
The General Assembly did pass legislation aimed at 
disciplining Arlington County and discouraging similar local 
initiative. Oddly enough, Arlington was the only Virginia 
county to elect its own board of education. On January 30, 
1956, Delegate Frank Moncure of Stafford County introduced 
a bill which repealed the statutory provision providing for
r C
Richmond Times-"Dispatch, January 25, 1956 , p. 6.
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57the popular election of school boards. Calling for the 
defeat of the bill, a Richmond Times-Dispatch editorial chas­
tised Moncure and the other patrons of the legislation for 
their "unjustifiable interference with local self-government
and an attempt to change the rules in the middle of the
58 59game." Nevertheless, the bill easily became law. Under
pressure, the Arlington School Board assured the General 
Assembly that they would postpone desegregation until a state­
wide policy had been formulated„^
Delegate Boatwright also introduced another bill aimed 
at correcting the unorthodox views of the northern Virginians. 
Boatwright's legislation would have prohibited certain classes 
of federal employees from serving on school boards or holding 
other local offices. At the end of B’ebruary the bill was 
defeated.^ ;
Aside from the interposition resolution, however, the 
most controversial proposal relating to education was a joint 
House Resolution introduced by the conservative Speaker of 
the House, E. Blackburn Moore. The resolution, presented to 
the House on February 20, declared that public schools should
57Richmond News Leader, January 30, 1956, p. 1.
r O
Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 1,
1956, p 0 16.
59Acts of General Assembly, Chapter 591, Reg. Sess. 
1956, p. 949“
^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 6, 1956, p. 1.
61Richmond News Leader, February 10, 1956, p. 1.,
February 29, 1956, p. 1.
115
continue to be operated on a segregated basis for the
1956-1957 school year. Uncertainty regarding the date and
the length of the special session plus the need for time for
local administrative adjustments were among the reasons offered
6 2for postponing desegregation. Strategically, the recommen­
dation was consistent with the policy outlined in the inter­
position resolution which was to use all "appropriate measures" 
to resist the Brown decision. Postponing action would also 
allow the organization time to develop a case for abandoning 
the Gray Plan. Though not a law,, the Moore resolution, if 
passed, would have carried great weight with the Governor.
Outside the black belt, Virginia newspapers attacked 
the Moore resolution. Before the resolution was drawn up 
the Times-Dispatch charged its sponsors with "bad faith." An 
editorial argued that the Gray Plan and the pro-amendment 
campaign had recommended "haste so as to provide educational 
aid in the school years 1956-1957." Citizens who voted to 
aid black belt counties and to facilitate desegregation in 
regions with few Negroes, the editor remarked, were not told
"that the people really voted on January 9 not to have any
6 3integration at all."
r o
Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 21, 1956, p. 1.
^Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 13,
1956, p. 14.
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This sense of betrayal was especially strong in south­
west Virginia where the Negro population was negligible. The 
editor of the Bristol Herald Courier recalled that politicians 
had stumped the southwest "exhorting haste in protecting our
fellow Virginians in the east and promising local option to
64localities where integration might be acceptable." Joining
the Times-Dispatch and the Bristol Herald Courier were the
Lynchburg News, Charlottesville Daily Progress, Roanoke Times ,
Danville Bee, Staunton News Leader, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot
6 5and the Lynchburg Advance, to name a few. Generally the 
papers believed that the Moore resolution patently violated 
the "good faith" requirement of Brown II and endangered the 
effort to restrict desegregation through the local option 
scheme. The Charlottesville Daily Progress wrote that Vir­
ginia had to choose between "segregation in Arlington and a 
few similar localities or the protection of the rest of the 
State against the desegregation decree.
The Richmond News Leader, not surprisingly, supported 
the Moore resolution and repudiated local option. Though not 
a law, the editor held that "the localities, as creatures of
^Quoted in the Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 27, 
1956, p. 12.
65Ibid., February 23, 1956, p. 6, February 27, 1956, 
p. 6 . On these dates the Times-Dispatch listed the news­
papers supporting and defending the Moore Resolution.
66Quoted in the Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 23,
1956, p. 6.
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the State, or children of the State, would be expected to
obey such policy declarations implicitly." Recalling the
resolution of interposition, the editorial suggested that to
permit local assignment would be viewed as a "surrender by
the State to the very encroachment to which we have just de-
6 7clared that we would never surrender." As Whitehead pre­
dicted, the organization interpreted interposition as broadly 
68as possible. Furthermore, whereas the organization defended 
a localities privilege to close public schools, it attacked 
local authority to maintain desegregated public schools . The 
attempt to impose a statewide school policy involved a mass 
of contradictions.
The Moore resolution also contributed to a confronta­
tion between its sponsor and Attorney General Almond, both 
suspected of having design^ on moving to the Governor's man­
sion. Two days after the resolution was introduced, the
Attorney General observed that it would not be consistent with
6 9"deliberate speed." Supporting Almond was Lieutenant
Governor A.E.S. Stephens who believed the Moore resolution
7 0would make Virginia's position "legally untenable." In
fi 7Editorial, Richmond News Leader, February 13, 1956,
p . 10 .
C Q
See page 110 for Whitehead's observations.
fi QRichmond News Leader, February 22, 1956, p. 1.
^Ibid., February 20, 1956, p. 1.
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reply, Moore argued that the resolution was consistent with
his interpretation of "deliberate speed." which was still
7 1undefined by the federal courts. Byrd's close friend 
charged that no person could oppose his resolution if he
7 2"opposes the mixing of the races in the public schools."
Almond side-stepped the attempt to paint him as an integra-
tionist by stating that the Moore resolution would be a
"dangerous weapon in the hands of the opposition." Any plan
designed to avoid the "serious impairment or destruction"
of race mixing, the Attorney General continued, must fall
73"within the framework of the law."
In the midst of the Moore-Almond exchange, Senator
Byrd issued a1 brief statement from Washington calling for
massive resistance:
If we can organize the Southern States for massive 
resistance to this order [to desegregate] I think 
that in time the rest of the country will realize 
that racial integration is not going to be accepted 
in the South.
In interposition, the South has a perfectly l^gal 
means of appeal from the Supreme Court’s order.
Byrd's statement was probably timed to give maximum support
to a declaration against the Brown decision which was being
71Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 22, 1956, p. 6.
72Ibid .
7 3Richmond News Leader, February 27, 1956, p. 1.
7 4Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 25, 1956, p. 1.
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7 Sdrafted by southern senators and representatives. But the 
statement also may have been designed to win votes for the 
Moore resolution. The interaction of state and regional 
policy statements figured to bolster resistance in both 
spheres„
Despite Senator Byrd's intervention the Moore resolu­
tion died in the Senate Rules Committee in early March, after 
being passed by the House of Delegates . In presenting his 
resolution Speaker Moore clashed with some members of the 
Rules Committee. Lieutenant Governor Stephens wondered if 
Moore intended to brand "anyone who opposes this resolution 
as an integrationist." Avoiding the question, Moore stuck to 
the position that Virginians should resort to every possible 
delay and would make "a big mistake if we speedily move into 
a position which permitted ,a start toward integration.” 
Senator Edward Breeden of Norfolk replied that he wanted seg­
regated schools but, referring to Almond's objections of the 
Moore resolution, said: "It's a matter of whether the law­
yer's advice should be followed or the layman's.” Most sena­
tors apparently objected to taking action which appeared to
conflict with the Gray Plan or which might hurt Virginia’s
, 7 6case m  court.
7 6Ibid. On the same day that Byrd's statement was 
printed, the~~Times-Dispatch reported that Southern leaders 
were working on a regional policy statement.
76Ibid., March 9, 1956, p. 1. The Moore resolution, 
in an amended form, .passed the House on February 28 by a vote 
of 62-34. The amendment stated that the resolution should 
not influence the Governor's decision to call a special session.
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On March 11, ninety-six southern congressmen and
senators adopted a so-called "Southern Manifesto" pledging
themselves "to use all legal means" to reverse the Brown
decision. Virginia's two senators and all of its representa-
7 7tives signed the Manifesto. In an effort to win broad
support the declaration omitted the use of words such as
"interposition" and "nullification." Senator Byrd described
the Manifesto as "part of the plan of massive resistance we've
been working on and I hope and believe it will be an effective 
i,78action.
Although Senator Byrd had coined the term "massive 
resistance," Virginia still balked at accepting this policy.
The General Assembly adjourned without passing any genuine 
massive resistance legislation. However, the legislature 
indicated a readiness to move toward total defiance at a more 
suitable time. Beside passing the Moncure Bill, the Assembly 
approved a resolution, introduced by Samuel E. Pope, to pre­
vent interscholastic or intramural athletic competition between 
the races. The Times-Pispatch considered the Pope resolution 
"wrong and indefensible,," and believed it brought "Virginia
77Ibid„, March 12, 1956, p. 1. Virginia's two Repub­
lican Representatives, Richard Poff and Joel Broyhill, joined 
their Democratic colleagues in signing the declaration. 
Eventually 101 of the 128 Southerners in Congress signed the 
"manifesto". Albert Gore, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Estes 
Kefauver were the only Southern Senators who failed to sign 
the document.
7 fiIbid., March 13, 1956, p. 1.
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and the United States into disrepute in many parts of the 
79world." Though the resolution was not a law, Attorney
General Almond relied upon it in advising school officials
8 0to maintain segregated athletic competition.
Along with legislation aimed at regulating school
policy, the General Assembly passed another law designed to
harass the desegregation efforts of the NAACP. The statute
gave the courts the authority to require the disclosure of
certain information by parties who brought suits against school 
81boards. For example, the courts could request the names of
contributors supporting school litigation or require oaths that 
the case was instituted by the actual plaintiffs named in the 
suit. Delegate John J. Williams, one of the sponsors of the 
legislation, admitted that the law intended to hinder the
O O
NAACP.
In early March while the General Assembly completed 
i'ts work, the delegates to the constitutional convention voted 
unanimously to amend Section 141 of the Virginia Constitution. 
The amendment permitted the General Assembly and local govern­
ing bodies "to appropriate public funds for Virginia students 
in public and nonsectarian private schools." The convention,
^Editorial, Ibid., March 12, 1956 , p. 16.
^Ibid., March 26, 1956 , p. 1.
o i
Acts of the General Assembly, Chapter 67 0, Reg.
Sess., 1956, p. 1026.
p n
Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 21, 19 56, p. 1.
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which included ten Defenders, also endorsed interposition by 
a vote of 35 to 3.^
With the work of the General Assembly and the constitu­
tional convention completed, Virginia waited for the Governor 
to designate a date for a special session of the General 
Assembly to act on the recommendations of the Gray Committee. 
Governor Stanley resisted pressure to move rapidly on the 
Gray Plan. During the referendum campaign the Governor had 
pressed for speedy action. However, the Governor now viewed 
the Gray Plan as "standby proposed legislation for such time 
as it's deemed proper." Instead Stanley hoped Virginia would 
find "some method whereby we might continue, even beyond the 
next school year, our present system.
The struggle over school policy, as the referendum 
campaign and the meeting of- the General Assembly demonstrated, 
was deeply enmeshed in politics. The seeds of the organiza­
tion's destruction were contained in the school issue. One 
wing of the organization represented by Colgate Darden and 
John Battle was convinced that any deterioration of Virginia’s 
schools threatened social and economic programs of the state. 
Though segregationists, they preferred accommodation to school 
closures. Governor Stanley's weak endorsement of Section 129 
was aimed at alleviating some of their fears .
 ^^ Ibid., March 8, 1956 , p. 1.
^ Ibid ., Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 10, 1956 ,
p . 1 .
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The extreme segregationists were not strong enough to
risk total resistance until the Supreme Court and interposition
were made the major issues in Virginia politics . The massive
resisters, through Kilpatrick's editorials, emphasized that
the Brown decision was not only a bad decision, but part of a
trend which threatened: "the whole concept of this Union,
(of which) the greatest feature of its architecture, was the
8 5concept of dual sovereignty. . . . "  Thus, the defense of 
constitutional government, as interpreted by the states, super- 
ceded Virginia's obligation to public education or to obey 
the law. Perhaps even more significant, the legitimacy of the 
Brown decision was made to appear debatable. Furthermore, 
Virginians were told that legal methods were available for 
evading the desegregation order. Even interposition, coun­
seled Senator Byrd, was a "legal means" of challenging the 
Supreme Court. As a result, conservative politicians could 
support their black belt colleagues without indulging in racial 
epithets .
Despite the pressure for massive resistance, many 
legislators were uneasy about abandoning the Gray Plan. After 
the referendum campaign, advocating total resistance seemed 
dishonest. Many legislators had rationalized their interpo­
sition vote as a mere protest which in no way conflicted with 
their support of local option.
o c
Richmond News Leader, February 2, 1956, p. 12.
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In the debate on the Moore resolution, the underlying 
issue of race surfaced. Moreover, in voting on the Moncure 
Bill, Pope resolution, or the NAACP Bill, legislators knew 
that their commitment to segregation was also being tested*
The manipulation of the race issue was the lever for imposing 
orthodoxy in the organization* The politically ambitious, 
like Attorney General Almond, recognized that to be "soft" 
on integration meant losing the black belt and the endorsement 
of Senator Byrd* Loyalty to white supremacy and constitutional 
principles interacted to give the organization a tremendous 
political advantage*
Ironically by emphasizing "fundamental principles," 
the organization was forced to compromise its greatest source 
of pride— integrity. The conduct of the referendum campaign 
was riddled with deception. Interposition raised hopes which 
its author and defenders recognized as patently false. By 
giving alternating interpretations of Virginia's interposition 
resolution, massive resisters only compounded the confusion.
While accusing the federal government of totalitarianism, the 
General Assembly demonstrated its intolerance in efforts to 
discipline Arlington County and the NAACP.
The rise of massive resistance was not the result of a 
statewide grass roots movement* The Democratic organization 
was determined to defy the Supreme Court from the very beginning. 
However, limited compliance as outlined by the Gray Commission
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seemed to be Virginia's only alternative. With the inter­
position mania, coupled with regional resistance, the Demo­
cratic organization thought itself strong enough to adopt 
a more defiant course.
CHAPTER V
MASSIVE RESISTANCE
In the spring and early summer of 1956 action on the 
school issue stalled temporarily, as the Old Dominion waited 
on its Governor to call a special session of the General 
Assembly. Plainly, Governor Stanley contemplated delay un­
til the federal courts ordered white schools to admit Negro 
children. Thus the timing of the special session would be 
determined, in part, by the aggressiveness of the NAACP law­
yers in the courts. Recognizing that no school district would 
voluntarily desegregate, Spotswood Robinson and Oliver Hill 
announced their intention to litigate intensively until white 
school doors were open to Negro children. "We feel that we 
have been more than patient," the lawyers e x p l a i n e d E s ­
tablishing September 1956 as the target date for desegregation, 
the NAACP represented Negro parents in suits filed in Newport 
News, Norfolk, Arlington and Charlottesville. Unlike the 
Prince Edward case, which was renewed, the new litigation was 
instituted in more favorable settings. None of the new suits
^Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 22, 1956, p. 1.
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were in the black belt, and with the exception of Charlottes-
2
ville, all were m  urban areas.
Defendant school boards were placed in an awkward posi­
tion between a possible court order to desegregate and an in­
formal state policy of preserving segregated schools. Repre­
sentatives of school boards pressed Governor Stanley to call 
a special session so that school officials could present some 
evidence of meeting the requirements of the Brown decision 
to the federal judges. Finally Governor Stanley asked the
Gray Commission to reassemble in order to find a plan of
3
legally avoiding desegregation.
While Governor Stanley procrastinated, Byrd, Smith,
Tuck and Abbitt worked feverishly to devise a school plan for 
the Governor. Congressman Howard Smith played the leading 
role in developing legal gambits for evading court orders to 
desegregate. Smith suggested tnat Virginia could prevent 
integration by withholding funds from desegregated schools, 
by using the state police power to close mixed schools, or by 
merely disregarding the state's obligation to provide public 
education under Section 129 of the Virginia Constitution.
The last recommendation was offered on the theory that Sections 
129 and 14-0, (voided by Brown) were inseparable. By repealing 
Section 140, Smith argued, the Supreme Court had upset: the
^Southern School News, Vol. II, No. 11 (May, 1956), 
p. 3; Vol. 2, No. 12 (June, 1956), p. 13,” Vol. 3, No. 1 
(July, 1956), p. 11.
Richmond Times-Dispatcn, May 1, 1956, p. 1.
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Commonwealth's ability to provide an "efficient" public 
education under Section 129.^
Representative Smith's major objective was to lay the 
foundation for a dramatic confrontation between the Federal 
Government and Virginia. He recommended two methods for 
creating such a clash. First, he suggested that the General 
Assembly should assume complete responsibility for desegrega­
ting public schools. Then, citing the Eleventh Amendment, 
the General Assembly would withdraw its consent to be sued 
after refusing to integrate public schools. Secondly, Smith 
believed that any assignment plan should provide an appeals
system which left the ultimate judgment of student placement 
Sto tne Governor. When the Governor refused to assign a 
Negro child to a white school, Smith predicted that the Su~ 
preme Court would be placed' "in the embarrassing position of 
having to issue an order against a Governor of a sovereign 
state, which they could not enforce."^
The recommendations offered by Smith would also serve 
Virginia in other ways during the school crisis. By employ­
ing evasive legal tactics, he predicted, Virginia could tie 
up desegregation litigation for several years. Moreover, if 
the Governor and the General Assembly assumed greater respon-
^Undated memorandum in Box 110 of the Smith Letter File, 
University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File.
"’ibid.
^Letter, Howdra W. Smith to Harry F. Byrd, May 4, 19 56,
University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File.
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sibility, Smith reasoned that the pressure on local school
7
boards would be relieved. Excited by the prospects of
this strategy, Judge Smith urged Senator Byrd to join him in
placing his ideas before Governor Stanley. "One voice crying
8in the wilderness seems to make no impression."
Each of the suggestions made by Judge Smith was dubious 
constitutionally. Even he doubted their validity in a court 
of law. Writing to David J. Mays, counsel for the Gray Com­
mission, Smith explained: "May I repeat what I said last
night that I haven't the faintest idea of winning any case on 
this subject before the Supreme Court and these suggestions 
are made with the idea of raising and stressing every possible
9
point in the litigation." Consuming time and embarrassing 
the Supreme Court were uppermost in Smith's mind.
Despite Smith's influence, David J. Mays wrote him 
that the recommendations regarding the Eleventh Amendment 
would offer Virginia no legal defense. Sterling v. Constantin 
(287 U.S. 378) and Ex Parte Young (209 U.S. 123), Mays con­
tinued, made "it pretty clear to me that the Governor of the 
State is subject to injunctive order in the Federal Court when
7
Undated memorandum, Smith Letter File.
^Letter, May 4, 19 56.
9Letter, Howard W. Smith to David J. Mays, May 10, 1956,
University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File.
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he is violating rights under the Federal Constitution,"1  ^
Nonetheless Smith met with the Gray Commission in Richmond 
on May 26, in order to introduce his views. The secret 
meeting, like many during this period, was attended by other 
representatives of the organization's hierarchy. While Smith 
introduced his legal arguments, Representative William Tuck 
pointed out the political advantages of "walking the last 
mile." Tuck argued that by using every tactic of delay, the 
organization would satisfy the voters that it had made very 
effort to obstruct desegregation.11 With an election in 1957 
in the offing, this strategy carried considerable weight with 
the Commission's members, especially those from the Southside.
As a result of the meeting with the Commission and the 
exchange with David Mays, Smith dropped his affection for the 
Eleventh Amendment as a leg^l ploy. Writing to State Senator 
Curry Carter, Smith explained: "I do not think there is any
sure answer to the problem except the purse strings. As the 
State Constitution requires the Commonwealth to conduct a se­
gregated system of schools, as well as an efficient system, it 
seems to me that the Legislature if it chose to do so, is fully
10Letter, David J. Mays to Howard W. Smith, May 25, 19 56, 
University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File.
11The meeting is mentioned in a letter from Howard W. 
Smith to Honorable Curry Carter, June 4, 1956, University of 
Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File. An interview with a 
participant of the meeting, who preferred to remain unnamed, 
discussed the issues covered by Smith and the remarks made by 
Representative Tuck.
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justified in denying funds to integrated schools."12 As sub­
sequent events proved, a consensus rapidly developed among 
the massive resisters that segregation in all of Virginia's 
schools could be maintained only by a fund-withholding policy.
By June, the Governor still had not set the date of a 
special session. Attorney General Almond publicly asked 
Governor Stanley to call an emergency meeting of the Assembly. 
In charge of providing legal counsel for the school boards, 
Almond urged the state legislature "to meet the attack of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
13I have fought to the end of my legal rope."
Almond's plea brought to the surface a difference of
opinion among Virginia's elected officials. E. Blackburn
Moore wondered if the Attorney General intended to "fight for
a continuance of segregated; schools . . .  or does he desire
legislation that would permit any form of integration for
14this coming school year?" Endeavoring to maintain his 
reputation as an uncompromising segregationist, Almond charged 
Moore with "deliberately distorting and misrepresenting my 
position." Pointing out that Moore offered no plan for Vir­
ginia, the Attorney General promised to "continue the fight
12Ibid., Smith to Carter.
13Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 1, 1956, p. 1.
1 4Ibid., June 4, 1956, p. 1.
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to preserve segregation in the Virginia public school sys­
tem." Despite the House Speaker's attempt to portray him as 
"soft" on integrationf Almond was "sure the people of Virginia 
do know who has waged the fight against the NAACP . The
Moore-Almond exchange ended with the House Speaker asking 
that the Attorney General specify the legislation he preferred. 
Speaker Moore firmly opposed any legislation "which would put 
the stamp of state approval on integration in any public school 
of Virginia „ In recalling the incident eight years later,
Almond interpreted Moore's attack as "a calculated attempt
to embarrass me when I announced for governor. I knew at the
17time when Moore cackled it was an echo of Byrd's chirp. "
Following the Gray Commission's recommendation, Gover­
nor Stanley announced on June 6 that a special session of the
18General Assembly would be convened within ninety days. By 
mid-June massive resisters were apprehensive about the forth­
coming meeting of the Legislature,, On June 15 a group of 
Southsiders, who could be counted on to defy the Supreme Court, 
held a private meeting in Petersburg. Discussing the con­
ference with Judge Smith, Garland Gray said: "We agreed that
^ Ibid., June 5, 1956, p. 1.
17Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, June 8, 1964, p. 1. 
1 8Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 7, 1956, p. 1.
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unless something is done between now and the call of the 
Session to bring some pressure on other members of the Legis­
lature, we may reach Richmond and finally enact some of the 
Gray Commission's program. The group I met with today is 
willing to go to any extreme that may be necessary to prevent 
integration anywhere in Virginia." Senator Gray reminded 
Judge Smith that "to prevent ill-advised legislation in the 
coming Session, it is going to be necessary for everyone to 
use all the influence that he can between now and whatever 
date the Assembly convenes." The consensus of the conference 
was also relayed to the Governor, by phone, from Petersburg. 
Gray reported that the Governor was "apparently of the same 
opinion as we are and like us also, he is becoming satiated
with attorneys who constantly think only in terms of com-
t -.19pliance. "
Pilled with apprehension, the organization hierarchy 
scheduled a meeting for July 2 in Byrd's Washington office in 
order to prepare a plan for the upcoming session. Four items 
were suggested by Gray for the conference's agenda. First, 
Gray suggested that Virginia issue a declaration dedicating 
itself to segregated public schools. Secondly, he thought 
that state funds should be withheld from school districts 
which decide to desegregate their schools. Thirdly, he urged
19Letter, Garland Gray to Howard W. Smith, June 15,
1956, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File.
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that the right to sue local school boards be repealed except 
for contractual disputes. Finally, Gray believed that all 
contested school assignments should be handled by the Gover­
nor. Meeting as planned, the participants worked out the 
fundamentals of the school plan presented by Governor Stanley
O. 0-7 2 0on August 27.
The exact date of the special session was delayed pend­
ing the outcome of desegregation suits in the federal courts. 
Since Judge Hoffman postponed the hearings in the Norfolk and 
Newport News cases until November,the Governor focused his 
attention on the litigation being conducted in Charlottesville, 
Arlington and Prince Edward County. Governor Stanley prob­
ably hoped that the courts would accept Virginia's legal argu­
ments or at least postpone segregation for another year. The 
hope was short-lived. During the Charlottesville hearing, on 
July 12, Judge John Paul informally concluded that the Negro 
plaintiffs were entitled to a decree which permitted them to 
enter white schools in September, 1956. Judge Paul did not 
conceal from the litigants that his opinion was influenced by
20 Letter, Garland Gray to Honorable Howard W. Smith,
June 19, 19 56, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter 
File. The letter stated that the following state legislators 
would attend the meeting: J. D. Hagood, C. W. Cleaton, Samuel
E. Pope, Jack Daniel, Mills Godwin, Stuart Wheatley, and 
Garland Gray. Most likely Watkins Abbitt and Bill Tuck joined 
Smith and Byrd. Attorney General Almond did not attend but 
stated that David J. Mays gave them the "straight dope" on 
the law. Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, June 8, 1964, p. 1.
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recent events in Virginia. Up to the constitutional conven­
tion, Virginia seemed to be acting in good faith, said Paul. 
But, he continued: "Then something happened. I don't know
what. But from that day since, nothing has been done except 
to follow the policy of calculated delay. I don't think I 
am being unduly critical in saying that because I think the
governor, himself, admits that this is his purpose: to do
21nothing until forced to do so. . . . "  While Judge Paul did
not want his court to be a party "to a policy which has as
its purpose delay and evasion of the Supreme Court of the
United States," he was no social revolutionary. According to
the Judge, the Brown decision did not mean "that everybody
can run to whatever school he wants to attend. . . .  I don't
think any decree should be sweeping enough to say to every
Negro child in Charlottesville 'you can go to whatever school
you want.'" A variety of "legitimate reasons for discrimina-
22t’ion" in assigning pupils existed, Judge Paul concluded.
In his written opinion and decree of August 6, Paul 
swiftly disposed of the defense's argument. "It has long 
been settled that suits against state officers to restrain 
the enforcement of state laws which contravene the Federal 
Constitution are not suits against state." On this point 
Judge Paul cited Sterling v. Constantin (2 87 U.S. 37 8) and
2 ]"Quoted in Southern School Nev/s, Vol. Ill, No. 2 
(August, 19 56), p. 12.
" Richmond News Leader, July 13, 1956, p. 1.
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Ex Parte Young (209 U.S. 123) a The judge also agreed with
the plaintiffs that the school superintendent could not be
dismissed as a defendant and that the Negro plaintiffs could
bring suit without making formal application to attend a
white school. Judge Paul observed that following a request
by the plaintiffs' attorneys to reorganize the public schools,
the school board's reply indicated that they had no intention
of complying with the Supreme Court's decision. Application
to Charlottesville schools would amount to a time-consuming
and useless formality. The Charlottesville School Board was
ordered to discontinue its discriminatory admissions policy
2 3beginning in September, 1956. Three weeks later, Judge
Paul suspended his injunction pending the school board's
24appeal to a higher court.
At the end of July, Judge Albert V. Bryan rejected 
Virginia's legal arguments in the Arlington school case. Bry­
an's injunction provided for the admission of Negro children 
to elementary schools on January 31, 1957, and to junior and 
senior high schools in September, 19 57. The delay was aimed
at giving the defendants an opportunity to adjust to any
25legislation passed by the General Assembly.
22Allen v. School Board of the City of Charlottesville, 
I Race Rel. L. Rep. 886, 888-89 (W.D. Va» 1956).
2 I^ Race Rel. L. Rep. 89 0.
25Thompson v. County School Board of Arlington County, 
144 Fo SuppT^TT^r^X^^ETFrTiT^ITsTr-”
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As Judge Paul had done in the Charlottesville case, 
Bryan commented on the meaning of the Brown decision. Draw­
ing on the Briggs dictim, Bryan wrote that the Supreme Court 
did not "compel the mixing of the different races in the 
public schools. . . . The order of the court is simply that
no child shall be denied admission to a school on the basis 
of race or color." The Judge emphasized that his opinion did 
not nullify present or future assignment plans as long as they 
were not based on race. Concluding his opinion, Bryan pre­
dicted that "compliance with that [Brown] ruling may well not
necessitate such extensive changes in the school system as
4.' • 4- ..26some anticipate.
The Charlottesville-Arlington cases established several 
imporcant precedents for desegregation cases in Virginia’s 
federal courts. First, the;cases demonstrated that federal 
district judges, thought Virginians by birth, meant to uphold 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in the segregation cases. Total 
noncompliance and far-fetched legal arguments were to receive 
little sympathy. Secondly, the judges indicated that they 
did not intend to supervise a social revolution or operate a 
local public school system. They accepted the interpretation 
of the Brown decision written in Briggs v. Elliott. Thirdly, 
the judges, especially Bryan, invited the state government 
to adopt a pupil assignment plan. The judges hinted that 
other criteria besides race and time-consuming plans of appeal 
might well result in only token desegregation which the courts
26Id. at 240.
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2 7nonetheless would find acceptable. The editor of the 
Times"Dispatch wrote that the rulings of Judges Paul and Bry­
an would form the background of the special session. The 
opinions, the editor thought, meant that any school plan de-
2 8vised by the General Assembly must permit some desegregation.
On July 23, Governor Stanley officially launched Vir­
ginia down the road to massive resistance. Setting August 27 
as the date for the special session, Stanley said that he in­
tended to recommend cutting off state funds to schools which
integrated their classrooms. The Governor also opposed any
29plan which accepted the principle of racial integration.
The announcement actually came as no surprise to Byrd's 
opponents, since word of the Washington meeting was common 
knowledge. Recognizing that Stanley was lodged in the Byrd- 
Tuck-Abbitt-Smith camp, the anti-organization Democrats pon­
dered the political ramifications of massive resistance.
Martin A. Hutchinson, who challenged Byrd in the 19 46 Demo­
cratic primary for the Senate, wrote: "Suppose Moore [E.
Blackburn Moore] or some other candidate boldly stated that if
2 7Judge Sterling Hutcheson, who would handle the Prince 
Edward case, proved to be an exception to the role. In a 
series of decisions Hutcheson postponed a desegregation order 
because of the tremendous opposition to desegregation which 
developed in Prince Edward County.
9 8Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 1, 1956,
p. 10.
^Ibid., July 24 , 1956, p. 1.
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elected Governor he would see that the schools were operated
just as they have been come what may: Would not such an
3 0appeal have considerable support in Virginia?" Robert White­
head told Cabell Phillips, a prominent journalist born in 
Virginia, that "it now appeared that the Negro issue could be 
exploited to advantage by Byrd and his crowd for many years
to come, and that I had heard the boast has been made that it
31was good for 25 years." Byrd Democrats might challenge the 
Hutchinson-Whitehead statements of anti-organization Democrats. 
Yet the subsequent campaign of Attorney General Almond proved 
that Hutchinson and Whitehead were accurate political fore­
casters .
In order to insure the success of massive resistance, 
the Gray Commission had to accept the fund cut-off. Many mem­
bers of the school study commission believed that the Gray plan 
was still the best method of dealing with the desegregation 
order in Virginia. Moreover, many commission members winced 
at the inconsistancy between supporting local option and tuition
grants during the referendum campaign, and then supporting a
32fund witholding plan at the special session.
3 0Letter, Martin A. Hutchinson to Robert Whitehead,
July 31, 1956, University of Virginia, Archives, Whitehead 
Letter File.
31Notes of Robert Whitehead, August 2, 1956, University 
of Virginia, Archives, Whitehead Letter File.
Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 23, 1956, 
p. 12. The editorial elaborated on the inconsistency between 
fund witholding and pupil assignment.
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Southside legislators played a prominent role in 
countering.the argument of the adherents of the Gray Plan,
They sought understanding for their plight by arguing that any 
sort of compromise, in the racially tense black belt, meant cer­
tain political defeat. Black belt legislators reminded their 
opponents that supporting the Gray Plan was easier where there 
was no "Negro problem," Finally, the massive resisters appealed 
for loyalty to the Democratic organization. They argued that 
once fund withholding had failed, Virginia could fall back on 
the Gray Plan, In the process, the Southsiders asserted, de­
segregation would have been postponed and their electorate
3 3satisfied that Virginia had "walked the last mile,"
Before the public, the massive resisters played on 
racial fears and also argued that the opportunity for perma­
nently containing or regulating desegregation was nonexistant. 
Representative Tuck summarized this point of view when he 
warned i
There is no middle ground, no compromise. We're either 
for integration or against it and I'm against it. . . .
33The position of Southside legislators was derived from 
interviews with two members of the Gray Commission who took 
opposing points of view on fund withholding. The position 
that the political realities prevented anything but the most 
extreme stance by a black belt politician is still held today. 
Mills Godwin, for example, has said "that no member, especially 
from Southside, could have stayed in the General Assembly, 
who had not held strong views on integration of the public 
schools„" Quoted in M. Carl Andrews, No Higher Honor; The 
Story of Mills E. Godwin (Richmond: Dietz Press, 1970) ,
p. 41.
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If they {other regions of Virginia] won't stand with us 
then I say make 'em. We cannot compromise. . . .  We 
may have to have five, ten, or one hundred special ses­
sions or even have the Assembly stay in constant 
session. . . .  If you ever let them [Negroes] integrate 
anywhere the whole state will be integrated in a short 
time.34
Tuck was correct only in predicting that Negro leaders would 
not be satisfied with token integration. However, he was 
dreadfully wrong in forecasting integration "in a short time."
One of the staunchest defenders of Governor Stanley's 
position was James Kilpatrick. The Richmond editor literally 
laid out the strategy of the massive resisters in the editorial 
pages of the Richmond News Leader. Following Stanley's an­
nouncement, Kilpatrick came to the Governor's defense. To 
adopt pupil assignment, the editor wrote, would be "a conces­
sion that the Supreme Court had acted lawfully." Furthermore, 
any compromise was "an abandonment . . .  of the constitutional 
principles so ringingly asserted just a few months ago." With­
out offering an explanation, the editor argued that white
people "are less ready for it [desegregation] than they were 
3 5two years ago." The unwillingness of Virginia's highest 
elected officials to offer leadership and defiant editorials 
by Kilpatrick certainly helped to explain the deteriorating 
situation„
^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 28 , 1956 , p. 1.
Q C
Editorial, Richmond News Leader, July 24, 1956,
p. 6.
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The News Leader believed that Virginia's goal "should
be to fight a holding action. " Thus, if "a year's delay can
be gained, then let us gain it." The purpose of evasion was
to give other states a chance to react to the Brown decision.
Pointing out that courts reverse decisions or that some future
amendment might guarantee segregated schools, Kilpatrick wrote
36"we may yet win unqualified victory." Even more signifi­
cant, delay provided "that much more time for resistance to 
harden and determination to grow more resolute." The editor 
never argued that time could be used to ease the problems of 
adjustment. In viewing the future, editor Kilpatrick often 
recalled the example of Prohibition. If fifteen years were 
needed to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment, he wrote, "we ought
to be willing to fight as long to win reversal of Brown v.
37Board of Education."
The purpose of raising constitutional arguments was to 
shift the argument away from race. However, with crucial leg­
islative decisions about to be made, Kilpatrick also exploited 
the race issue. He argued that if concessions were made and 
then the Supreme Court reversed itself, Virginia might not be
able to undo the damage. "The eggs, will have been scrambled 
3 8then." Using Washington, D. C. as a test case, Kilpatrick 
played on the themes of racial violence and sexual offenses
36Ibid., July 27, 1956, p. 10.
3^Ibid., August 28, 1956, p. 10.
38Ibid., July 24, 1956, p. 10.
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39associated with desegregated school systems. Negroes,
the editor charged, have "demonstrably lower aptitudes for
learning and shockingly different standards of moral be- 
40havior. . . Racial mixing, Kilpatrick was sure, would
be more harmful to whites than helpful to Negroes. "Once 
our schools are race-mixed, that last essential barrier to 
complete racial amalgamation will have been abandoned." The 
result, the editor predicted, would be to reduce the South 
"to the melancholy status of another Cuba, a Puerto Rico, a 
Brazil0"44
The Kilpatrick editorials spelled out a strategy and
a psychology of resistance. The plan initially had a certain
flexibility since even Kilpatrick admitted that as a last re-
42sort, Virginia might have to resort to an assignment plan.
The idea that Virginia could eventually retreat to something 
like the Gray Plan appealed to legislators reluctant to follow 
the Southside. However, the emphasis on "fundamental prin­
ciples" and racial fears eventually cancelled political flexi­
bility. Once massive resistance was adopted, politicians were
4QIbid., August 1, 1956, p. 12.
41Ib-id. , August 6 , 1956 , p. 12.
42Ibid., July 27,1956, p. 10. Kilpatrick wrote that
"pupil assignment is the last resort, not the first."
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not able to admit that the hot rhetoric was a charade.
On August 21 and 22, Stanley's recommendations won the
grudging endorsement of the Gray Commission. The executive
committee supported the Governor by a narrow 6-4 vote, while
the full Commission approved the new policy by a 19-12 margin.
With a few exceptions, the split in the voting demonstrated
a significant correlation between a member's vote and the Negro
4 3population of his constituency.
With the special session about to meet, Senator Byrd 
made an effort to ensure victory for a program of total re­
sistance. From his home in Berryville, the Senator said:
If Virginia surrenders, . . . the rest of the South
will go down, too. . . .  I am a law abiding citi­
zen . . . but I do not believe the Supreme Court is so
sacred we can't criticize it. . . .  Why can't we 
fight this thing with every ounce of energy and capacity?
I think we are on strong ground. 44:
As Governor Stanley prepared to welcome the emergency
assembly, the Richmond Times-Dispatch wrote that not a single
daily newspaper outside the Southside and Tidewater backed
the Governor. A survey of the Virginia dailies emphasized
that editors were not only annoyed by the abandonment of the
Gray Plan, but feared that closed schools would hinder
^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 22, 1956, p. 1;
August 23, 1956, p. 1.
^Ibid. , August 26 , 1956 , p. 1.
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4 5economic development and invite federal intervention.
Countering the criticism from the press, Governor Stanley
claimed that ninety-five percent of Virginia's white citizens
46supported his policy.
Addressing the General Assembly on August 27, Governor
Stanley, amid cheers and rebel yells, outlined his plan to
47prevent integration in Virginia. The objective was to be 
reached by closing schools about to be desegregated by with­
holding state funds. Fund cutoff was to be complemented by 
a proposal to provide tuition grants for students who wished 
to attend private, non-sectarian schools. Other suggestions 
included state legal assistance to school boards and retire­
ment coverage for public school teachers moving to private 
48schools 0
45Editorial, Ibid., p. 2D. The News Leader (Editorial, 
August 27, p. 10) wanted a year's delay but preferred a plan 
Worked out by Donald Richberg, former chairman of the National 
Recovery Administration and Charlottesville resident. Pre­
sented to the General Assembly by state Senator Edward 0.
McCue of Charlottesville, the McCue-Richberg plan called for 
the General Assembly to assume control of public education 
and to defend itself from a suit by use of the Eleventh Amend­
ment. In no way original, the idea had been suggested by
Representative Howard Smith and Judge William Old before being 
championed by Richberg and McCue.
^ Ibid. , August 24 , 1956 , p. 1.
^^  Ibid., August 28, 1956, p. 1.
A pInaugural Address and Addresses delivered to the 
General AssemBly" oT'vTrginia by^homas”TJ7“Braniey, r93^TT9 5 8 
TCommonweaXtH of Virginias Division of Purchase and Printing, 
1958), pp. 1-8.
In defending his program, Governor Stanley concen­
trated on three issues. First, Stanley argued that any future 
school closures did not violate Section 129 of the Virginia 
Constitution since, by definition, integrated schools were 
automatically not "efficient." Secondly, the Governor held 
that the state would not be responsible for closing Virginia's 
schools. "If any school is closed, it will be because a per­
son, or persons, of one race seeks to force his way into a 
school in which the opposite race is taught." Finally,
Governor Stanley reminded the Assembly of its duty to uphold
the constitutional principles enunciated in the interposition 
49resolution.
The opposition to the Stanley Plan was more formidable
than during the referendum campaign. Colgate Darden, Dabney
Lancaster and Thomas C. Boushall, all of whom had campaigned
50for the amendment of Section 141, opposed the Governor. 
Lancaster, who had directed the State Referendum Information 
Center, was especially disillusioned. He disclosed that 
Governor Stanley had "convinced me that the original recommen­
dation of the Gray Commission offered the best hope of avoiding 
integration." Darden charged that the Stanley Plan was un­
constitutional, disrespectful of local government, and harmful
-^'ibid. , pp. 5-8 .
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to areas with small Negro populations. He predicted that the
measure would generate great hostility toward the South- 
51side.
The Darden-Lancaster views, presented to a public
hearing early in September, were met by firm endorsements of the
52Stanley Plan from Representative Tuck, Abbitt and Smith.
The Senate floor leader, Mills E. Godwin, Jr., who read the 
statement of the organization's hierarchy to the hearing, also 
elaborated on the evils of the Brown decision. "Integration, 
however slight, anywhers in Virginia would be a cancer eating 
at the very life blood of our public school system." Regard­
ing Virginia's response to the Supreme Court's decision 
Godwin emphasized: "If we think it is right, we should accept
it without circumvention or evasion. If it is wrong, we
should never accept it at all. Men of conscience and principle
53do not compromise with either right or wrong."
During the public hearing all the familiar arguments 
for and against the Stanley Plan were repeated. However,
Henry T, Wickham, Jr., special assistant to the attorney gen­
eral, and David J. Mays, counsel for the Gray Commission, 
clarified several aspects of the Stanley Plan. Wickham pointed 
out that the plan was designed to prevent integration rather
51Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 2, 1956, p. 1. 
^Ibid. , September 8 , 1956, p. 8.
^Ibid. , September 5 , 1956 , p. 1.
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5 4than to provide "a legal defense against integration suits," 
Mays thought that fund witholding might get through the courts 
if the localities were permitted to operate with local funds. 
Turning to the matter of an assignment plan, he warned that 
one would be approved by the federal courts only if it offered 
the aggrieved party the opportunity for relief. Cutting off
funds, Mays contended, tainted the constitutionality of any
. . . 55Virginia assignment policy. Considering legal advice and
the early district court decisions, the proponents of the 
Stanley Plan were aware of its constitutional shortcomings.
The legal criticisms of the Stanley Plan were neutralized or 
confused on September 10 when Attorney General Almond rendered 
an opinion supporting the constitutionality of fund withhold­
ing. He said the General Assembly had the power to define an 
"efficient." school system. -The Legislature, Almond believed,
had no duty to support an "inefficient, or in other words,
56desegregated school system."
5 4. Ibid.
^^Ibide, September 6, 1956, p. 1.
5 6Ibid., September 10, 1956, p. 1. Later when Almond had
become the celebrated martyr of massive resistance, he claimed 
that he had told the Governor that fund witholding would not be 
accepted by the courts. If this was true, the record still 
shows that he played an important role in 4:he passage of legis­
lation which he viewed as hopelessly unconstitutional. His 
private beliefs in no way reduced his responsibility for de­
veloping support for massive resistance. Norfolk Virginian- 
Pilot, June 8, 1964, p. 1.
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The opponents of the Stanley Plan introduced bills
that would have permitted either statewide or local referenda
on the fund witholding measure. The purpose of the bills was
to reduce the likelihood of massive school closings by giving
the people an opportunity to retain control over local school
57policy. The Governor, in turn, hoped to win greater support 
for his major bill by offering two bills (H.B. 77 and S.B. 56) 
which were designed to reduce fears of massive school closings. 
Originally, Stanley's bill (H.B. I) would have closed a school 
district’s elementary schools, if an attempt was made to dese­
gregate one elementary school, or a school district’s secondary
schools, if an attempt was made to desegregate one high 
5 8school. On September 12, Stanley offered the new bills
which had the effect of limiting the school closing fund cut­
off provisions to the school where admission was sought by a 
member of the opposite race. Included in the new bills were pro­
visions which attempted to confer legal immunity on the Governor
59and General Assembly or their representatives. As Robbins 
Gates observed, the attempt to place the Governor and General
 ^^ Ga/tes , pp. 17 6-78 .
58H.B„ 1, Journal of the House, Extra Sess. 1956.
°^S.B. 56, Journal of the Senate, Extra Sess. 19 56.
The bill specifically stated that neither the Governor nor the 
state was to be subjected to a law suit while carrying out 
school policy. House Bill 77 provided the same sort of 
immunity to school board members.
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Asembly between the Supreme Court and the school boards was 
a "magnificent obsession that had haunted Virginia's segre­
gationists from the very first.
The effort by Governor Stanley to widen the margin of 
victory was not successful. The advocates of the Gray Plan 
were able to force votes on a local option amendment to 
Stanley's bill in both the Senate and the House, By votes 
of 59 to 39 and 21 to 17, the House and Senate respectively 
defea.ted the attempt to amend Stanley's bill. The challenge 
turned back, the Governor's forces passed an unamended bill
by a 61 to 37 vote in the house and a 22 to 16 vote in the 
61Senate. During the House debate, Howard H. Adams, Chief 
patron of the Stanley Bill urged the delegates to support the 
Governor because: "It is our duty and responsibility to see
that our racial purity and ;distinctiveness is maintained at
all costs. Our country can remain the world leader it is in
62 • no other way." The opponents questioned the constitution­
ality of the Stanley Bill and urged a more flexible plan. 
Though defeated, the local optionists put up a determined 
fight.
Virginia did not enter massive resistance with an im­
pressive consensus in the General Assembly. The votes on fund
^Gates, p. 181.
^ R ichmond Times-Dispatch, September 18, 1956, p. 1.
6 2 , .Ibid.
withholding seemed to support Delegate Harry B. Davis' ob-
6 3servation that Virginia reacted "as if it were two states."
With two exceptions, black belt legislators voted against
local option. Republicans (all seven for local option), the
Arlington delegation, and urban legislators (Richmond, Norfolk,
and Roanoke) voted almost unanimously for local option. While
no integrationists, the urban legislators recognized that
housing patterns would slow the pace of desegregation in the
cities. Moreover, they feared that the possibility of school
closings, would threaten economic growth. The area outside
the black belt where the organization won most dramatically
was in rural Virginia. Loyalty to the organization and the
tradition of rural, conservative rule helped to explain the
64vote of men without a "black problem."
After the battle over fund withholding, the remaining
bills which supplemented the school closing measure easily
passed the General Assembly. Altogether the legislature passed
65twenty-three bills which dealt with the school problem. Af­
ter fund cut-off, the most important as a barrier against 
desegregation was the law creating a three-man pupil placement 
board. The placement board was given the authority to assign 
all pupils in the state according to "nonracial" criteria.
6 3TU. .Ibid.
64Gates ? pp„ 184-8 8.
Southern School News, Vol. 3, No. 4 (October, 1956), 
p. 16. This number has a brief description of the twenty-three 
bills passed by the General Assembly.
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The assignment guidelines were vague enough to prevent the 
possibility of assigning any Negro child to a white school.
A cumbersome system of appeals was devised so that the com­
plainants would be unable to receive relief during the school 
6 6year.
The major constitutional flaw of the assignment plan
was its association with the school closing law. If the
placement board assigned a Negro to a white school, which was
unlikely, the Negro would be denied relief since the school
would be closed. The Governor would then take over the school
and attempt to reorganize it so that classes could be resumed
on a segregated basis. If unsuccessful, the school could be
returned to the local officials and presumably be operated
6 7with local funds. The remote possibility of local finan­
cing, was the "loophole" th;at some Virginians believed would
68save Virginia's assignment plan.
• ' The special session also passed legislation which
helped individuals and communities to move from public to 
private education. Of these measures, the most important
fi 6Acts of the General Assembly, Chapter 70, Extra Sess. 
1956, pp. 74-77. The pupil placement board was expected to 
relieve pressure on the local school boards from desegregation 
suits. Other statutes which were intended to ease the problems 
of the localities included state legal aid and permission to 
appropriate school funds on a monthly basis.
^Ibid., Chapter 68, pp. 69-72.
^ Southern School News, Vol. 3, No. 4 (October, 1956),
p. 16.
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required state and local governments to provide funds for
students seeking to enroll in private non-sectarian schools.
The tuition grant was not to exceed the normal per pupil cost
of attending a public school in the locality where the grant 
69was requested. Besides providing tuition grants, the 
General Assembly amended the Virginia Supplemental Retirement 
Act so that teachers moving from public to private schools 
would not lose state retirement benefits. Finally, the State 
Board of Education was prohibited from refusing to accredit 
any school or diploma issued by a school using a building or 
facilities which did not meet the standards of the State 
Board.70
Related to the school legislation was a package of 
laws designed to harm, if not eliminate NAACP legal action in 
Virginia. The so-called anti-NAACP laws included: provisions
requiring the registration of persons or organizations invol­
ved in racial litigation, broader definitions and harsher 
penalties for lawyers engaging in legal malpractice, and the 
establishment of two joint committees to investigate organi­
zations involved in racial activities and the effectiveness
71of the laws against malpractice. The anti-NAACP laws were
69Acts of the General Assembly, Chapters 56, 57, 58, 62, 
Extra Sess. 1956 , pp. 56-60 , 62.
7^Ibid., Chapters 39, 65, pp. 42-48, 65.
71Ibid., Chapters 31-37, pp. 29-42.
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a product of the intense hatred generated against the Negro 
organization following the Brown decision. The legislators 
most interested in the legislation believed that the NAACP 
did not represent the "average" Negro. Delegate C. Harrison 
Mann, on introducing the legislation said: "He doubted
seriously that Virginia Negroes would have brought a single
7 2school suit had they not been stirred up from the outside."
Some of the more conservative legislators viewed the organi-
7 3zation as subversive. Though unsympathetic with the NAACP's
objectives, both Richmond newspapers opposed the legislation
74as a threat to traditional constitutional freedom. The
anti-NAACP legislation passed easily, although the Richmond
Times"Dispatch reported that many legislators privately
opposed the laws, but feared being labelled "friends of the
75NAACP" or "integrationists
During the emergency session, the rationale of massive 
Resistance was explained and defended by Albertis S. Harrison, 
Jr., a highly regarded black belt Senator.
7 2Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 11, 1956, p. 1.
7 3TInterviews
7 4Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 29, 1956, p. 8., 
Richmond News Leader, September 10, 1956, p. 10.
7 5'Ibid., September 21, 1956, p. 1.
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By sovereign legislative act instructing the 
sovereign head of a sovereign state to preserve the 
peace and tranquility, and to forbid compulsory in­
tegration, S„B0 56 would seek to force the federal 
courts to decide the presently undecided question 
of whether a state must operate integrated schools and 
compel children to attend therm So far, the federal 
courts have said only that a state may not segregate 
children by race,
Virginia, Harrison concluded, was defining "the legal battle-
7 6ground for the ultimate test of state sovereignty."
Senator Harrison's analysis contained two major con­
stitutional themes. The first was the anachronistic theory 
of dual sovereignty popularized by Kilpatrick. Though organi­
zation leaders apparently recognized the shortcomings of 
interposition, they continued to endorse it as an option open 
to Virginia. Secondly, Harrison made use of the Briggs inter­
pretation of the Brown decision to argue that Virginia's obli­
gation to desegregate public schools was unclear. When 
combined, the two ideas persuaded enough legislators that 
massive resistance was a perfectly legal maneuver. The expla­
nation also helped to combat the charge that the legislators 
were setting a bad example by resisting the law of the land.
The minimum objective of the school closing legislation 
was to delay a desegregation order by introducing other issues 
for litigation. In the immediate sense, many legislators thought 
that by postponing desegregation by even one year, scores of
"^Ibid., September 22 , 1956 , p. 1.
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white students would "move up one more grade without the risks
7 7and evils of race mixing,," More optimistic were those who 
hoped that as part of a southern response, Virginia's resis­
tance would persuade either Congress or the Supreme Court to 
reverse the school decisions. Others wished to see whether the 
President would use troops in a confrontation with the Governor. 
Regardless of the outcome of Virginia's legislation in the 
courts, the massive resisters explained, the state could fall 
back to the Gray Plan. The people, the organization leaders 
argued, would be satisfied that Virginia's leaders had exhaus­
ted all "legal tactics" for preventing desegregation.
In the long run, the school closing legislation was 
doomed for several reasons. First, the plan completely ignored 
regional differences in Virginia. If threatened with school 
closings, areas outside the; black belt would refuse to sacri­
fice their public schools for the sake of the Southside.
Second, the laws clashed with the tradition of local control 
over education. If Virginians disliked policies dictated from 
Washington, many also questioned orders from Richmond. Finally, 
the federal courts of Virginia had already indicated that they 
would rule against blatant attempts to evade the Brown decision.
Massive resistance marked the high point of a strategy 
to retard the pace of desegregation through time-consuming liti­
gation. Although sometimes viewed as just another tactic in
^Editorial, Richmond News Leader, August 28, 1956, p. 10.
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Virginia's legal arsenal, total resistance was transformed 
into a sacred goal. In leading Virginia down the path of mas­
sive resistance, Senator Harry Byrd and Southside legislators 
played the leading roles. The Senator's commitment to mas­
sive resistance was magnified by the view that Virginia was 
the test state of the South. If desegregation failed in Vir­
ginia, Byrd thought the South would triumph in its attempt to 
reverse the school decision. For the Southside, the political 
heart of the Byrd organization, desegregation clashed with 
over three hundred years of history. Regardless of the poli­
tical ramifications, black belt legislators would have been 
massive resisters. In adopting the course of massive resistance, 
they risked and ultimately succeeded in fracturing the organi­
zation. Yet total resistance offered political opportunities 
since the race issue in an emotional atmosphere could be used 
to devastate political opponents. With the race issue, rural 
Virginia made its stand against the nationwide equalitarian 
movement which would ultimately increase the power of the Negro 
and the cities. As 1956 passed into history the organization 
turned its attention to winning the gubernatorial election, to 
defending massive resistance in the federal courts and to dis­
crediting the opponents of Virginia's school policy.
PART II. THE DECLINE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE
CHAPTER VI
THE 19 57 STATE ELECTION
On November 17, 1956, Virginians received some insight 
into the political and legal ramifications of the Common­
wealth's school policyo Unwilling to risk the loss of another 
opportunity, J. Lindsay Almond announced that he would seek 
the Democratic party's nomination for governor in the 1957 
primary. On the same day Judge Walter J. Hoffman hinted that 
he would declare unconstitutional the recently enacted pupil 
placement plan.'*'
Attorney General Almond's announcement was unusual in 
two ways. First, most political observers could not recall 
dny recent politician declaring his candidacy so early.
Second, Almond's political plans were made public without ob­
serving the customary formality of consulting Senator Byrd. 
Ever since 1954, Almond had devoted every possible moment to 
building up support for his candidacy. As Attorney General he 
had continuous contact with local sheriffs, commonwealth's 
attorneys, clerks and other members of the organization's in­
frastructure. By securing the support of the grass roots and 
by acting early, Almond hoped to present the organization's
1Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 18, 1956, p. 1.
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hierarchy with a fait accompli before his competition could 
2organize.
In order to win the organization's approval the 
Attorney General had to have the endorsement of the black 
belt. Undoubtedly a segregationist, Almond, the lawyer, had 
some doubts about the future success of massive resistance.
But, Almond, the politician, recognized that his political 
future depended on out doing any segregationist candidate.
Thus, in declaring his candidacy, the Attorney General remarked 
"For more than five years I have fought to save our public 
school system from destruction and to defend Virginia's right 
to govern in her own internal affairs and in the lawful exer­
cise of her inherent constitutional sovereignty. . . .  I shall
continue to fight with never diminishing faith that right will
3
ultimately triumph." In seeking the governorship Almond sub­
sequently outstripped any Virginian in his dedication to the 
maintenance of segregated education.
Almond's strategy worked perfectly. Garland Gray, con­
sidered Almond's major challenger, hurriedly canvassed the 
organization, and determined that he could not secure adequate 
support. On December 6, the state Senator from Waveriey 
announced that he would not seek the Democratic party's nomi­
nation. In a brief statement Gray said that the school crisis
2Luther J. Carter, "State House Bid Delayed", Norfolk 
Virginian-Pilot, June 8, 1964, p. 1.
Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 18, 19 56, p. 6-D.
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was the most serious the Commonwealth had faced in recent
generations„ Considering the circumstances, Gray thought
that "a division among the proponents of segregated
schools, . . . would be far-reaching and perhaps even disas-
4trous."
On the same day, Delegate Robert Whitehead announced 
that he would not enter the Democratic primary. Any hope the 
anti-organization Democrat had of being a factor in the pri­
mary was dashed by Gray's withdrawal from the contest. Only
a split in the organization would have provided anti-Byrd
5Democrats with a chance m  the race for the nomination.
On December 11, Senator Harry Byrd endorsed Almond's 
candidacy. The Senator described Almond as "a candidate 
tried and tested by many years of arduous public service as a 
judge, congressman, and attorney-general of Virginia. He is 
well equipped to deal with the extremely difficult problems 
how confronting Virginia." Equally significant was Byrd's 
advice "to begin promptly" the organizational work for the 
November campaign instead of waiting until after the primary.6 
Political observers could not recall an instance when Senator 
Byrd had spoken so candidly or so early. James Latimer, Rich­
mond Times-Dispatch’s political reporter, described Byrd's
^Southern School News, Vol. Ill, No. 7 (January, 1957),
p. 11.
JIbid.
^Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 12, 1956, p. 1.
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7
performance as "a rare evocation of command powers." Al­
though the Virginia patriarch predicted an unprecedented 
victory, he wanted to take nothing for granted.
Within a month, the organization closed its ranks be­
hind the fiery Attorney General, Almond's hard work and 
political boldness paid off, since the major obstacles to his 
success now were eliminated. Avoiding a fratricidal war, the 
Democratic organization turned its attention to smashing the 
GOP and winning a mandate for massive resistance.
Ironically, on the day that Almond dedicated his candi­
dacy to preserving segregated schools, he listened to Judge 
Walter J. Hoffman attack Virginia's Pupil Placement Plan, one 
of the bulwarks devised by the special session to prevent in-
g
tegrauion. The hearing before Judge Hoffman, on November 17, 
was prompted by motions entered by the school boards of Nor­
folk and Newport News which asked the court to dismiss dese­
gregation petitions filed by Negro parents. The school boards 
contended that the newly enacted assignment plan provided the 
plaintiffs with an administrative remedy which must be exhaust­
ed before relief was sought in the federal courts. Consolidat­
ing the two cases, Judge Hoffman restricted the argument to 
the constitutionality of the placement law since related issues
7
James Latimer, p. 83.
^Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 18, 1956, p. 1.
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were about to be disposed of by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in the appeal from the Arlington-Charlottesville de-
. . 9cisions.
During the hearing the NAACP lawyers argued that the 
Pupil Placement Act was unconstitutional in intent and failed 
to provide an adequate administrative remedy. The Negro law­
yers explained that the assignment plan was one part of an 
elaborate attempt to defy the Supreme Court. The lawyers for 
the defense retorted that the intent of the legislators was 
unclear and that the assignment plan was unrelated to other 
legislation passed by the General Assembly. jMoreover, they 
maintained that regardless of the General Assembly's intent, 
the plan permitted a locality to operate a desegregated school 
system with local funds. Because of this loophole, the defense 
contended, the Virginia plan was no different from North and 
South Carolina statutes upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals o
9
Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 19, 1956, p. 1. Judge 
Walter Hoffman, who heard the Norfolk and Newport News cases, 
was an Eisenhower appointee. The Republican candidate for 
Attorney General in 1953, Judge Hoffman was widely criticized 
by massive resisters. Not only were his decisions unpopular, 
but Hoffman frequently chastized the Democrats for the brand of 
leadership they offered the state. Today Judge Hoffman is an 
outspoken critic of busing and applauded by those who formerly 
scolded himc During massive resistance, the style rather than 
the substance of Hoffman's decisions made him unpopular. As 
Judges Paul and Bryan, Hoffman was guided by the Briggs dictum 
in dealing with school cases.
^Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 18, 1957, p._l. The 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the North Carolina plan 
in Carson v. Warlick, 238 F . 2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956) and the 
South Carolina plan in Hood v. Board of Trustees, 232 F. 2d 
626 (4th Cir. 1956).
164
Judge Hoffman left little doubt that the future of the 
Pupil Placement Plan was in jeopardy. "If I had to rule on 
it today I would throw it out the window."11 Equally annoy­
ing to Virginia's political leadership was Judge Hoffman's 
practice of questioning the motives which prompted the emergen­
cy legislation. "Was it or was it not a design to flaunt the 
decision of the Supreme Court . . . which . . .I'm bound to 
follow?" The legislation was "good politically," Judge Hoffman 
observed, but it did not "reflect good judgment."12 Judge 
Hoffman even taunted Attorney General Almond by interrupting 
him in the midst of an explanation of the assignment plan to 
comment: "They sure made it complicated didn't they?"11 Vir­
ginia, Hoffman continued, had no alternative but to attempt
to implement the Brown decision. "We've got it and we've got 
14to eat it."
Prior to Judge Hoffman's decision, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the district court decisions in the
15Arlington and Charlottesville cases. With Judge John J.
Parker writing the opinion, the court agreed that the Eleventh
11Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 18, 1956,
p. 1.
12 . . .Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 18, 1956,
p. B-l.
14Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 18, 1956,
p. 1.
15School Board, of Charlottesville v. Allen, 240 F. 
2d 59 (4th Cir. 1956).
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Amendment provided no protection to state officials or agencies
attempting to obstruct the enjoyment "of individual rights
16under the Constitution. . . Noting the intransigency of
the school boards, the court found the decrees ordering dese­
gregation to be reasonable. "The decrees do not attempt to 
direct the school officials as to how they shall perform their 
duties or exercise the discretion vested in them by law, but
simply forbid them to discriminate against the plaintiffs, or
17other Negro children similarly situated. . . . "  Finally the 
court held individual applications for admission were unneces­
sary considering the stated policies of the school boards.
Equity, the court observed, "does not require the doing of a
18vain thing as a condition of relief." The court distin­
guished the cases at bar from Carson v. Warlick on the grounds
that in the latter case "ah adequate administrative remedy had
19 . . .been prescribed by statute. . . ." While the Virginia Pupil
Placement Plan was not an issue, the court's emphasis on
"adequate" administrative remedies strengthened the case of
the Negro plaintiffs in Norfolk and Newport News.
On January 11, 1957, the newly created Pupil Placement
Board was placed in jeopardy when Judge Iioffman ruled that the
16Id. at 63.
17Id.o at 64.
18Ibid.
19Ibid.
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20Pupil Placement Act was unconstitutional. In determining
the constitutionality of the placement plan, Judge Hoffman
examined the events leading to the special session as well as
the laws passed in conjunction with the assignment plan. After
discussing the Gray Report, the interposition resolution, and
remarks made by Governor Stanley, the judge concluded that the
Pupil Placement Plan was part of a scheme to defy the Supreme
21Court and was therefore "unconstitutional on its face."
Even if the intent of the General Assembly was not un­
constitutional, Judge Hoffman held that the assignment plan 
failed to offer the plaintiffs an adequate administrative 
remedy. The Virginia plan had several serious flaws according 
to Judge Hoffman. First, most children were automatically pre­
vented from attending a desegregated school by a requirement 
that they remain in the school they were presently attending 
until graduation. The only exceptions to this rule were stu­
dents who moved or demonstrated a "good cause" for requesting
2 DAdkins v. School Board of the City of Norfolk, 14 8 F. 
Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1957). On December 25, 1956, Governor
Stanley appointed Hugh V. White, Nansemond County School Super­
intendent, Beverly H. Randolph, a Richmond attorney who lived 
in Charles City County, and Andrew A. Farley, publisher of the 
Danville Register and Danville Bee to the Pupil Placement Board. 
Since all three men lived in the black belt and were opposed to 
desegregation, their selection seemed to guarantee segregated 
schools for Virginia.
^Id. at 436.
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a transfer. Judge Hoffman thought a successful demonstration
2 2of a "good cause" was "problematical." Second, the plain­
tiffs were subjected to a variety of criteria aimed at pre­
venting integration. The most onerous was the requirement that 
the Placement Board consider the effect of a pupil's assignment 
on the "efficient operation" of the school. Since the law­
makers during the special session had defined an "efficient" 
school as a segregated school, Judge Hoffman observed that "the 
Pupil Placement Board would indeed be derelict in its duty if
it ever permitted admission of a Negro child in a school here-
2 3tofore reserved for white children, and vice versa." Third,
if not automatically eliminated, a student unhappy with his
assignment faced a procedure of administrative appeals which
could consume as much as 105 days before court action. Judge
Hoffman feared that the school year would be over before the
student received satisfaction which might not even apply to
24admission to the next grade. Finally, if a Negro was even­
tually assigned to a white school, the effort would be negated 
by the activation of the school closing and fund withholding 
statutes. The judge dismissed the argument advanced by the
defendants that local financing provided a "loophole" which
25preserved the constitutionality of the assignment plan. As
22Id. at 441.
23Id. at 442.
24Id. at 443.
25Id o at 444.
a result of the "loophole", Judge Hoffman predicted that the
class of schools ultimately affected would be left with a
"mere pittance to what is required to operate the public
2 6schools in any community."
Judge Hoffman distinguished the Virginia plan from 
North and South Carolina statutes upheld by the Fourth Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals. The North Carolina plan contained 
neither fund withholding nor school closing provisions. The
South Carolina plan provided for fund cut off, but it did not
27order integrated schools to be closed. Although the objec­
tive of the two Carolinas was similar to Virginia's, the Old 
Dominion's bold statement of purpose prevented its plan from 
falling under the precedent of Carson v. Warlick. In survey­
ing the events up to and including the 19 56 special session, 
Judge Hoffman concluded: "The pattern is plain-the Legis­
lature had adopted procedures to defeat the Brown decision.
In doing so it is safe to say that Chapter 70 (the assignment
2 8plan) is invalid on its face."
Although Judge Hoffman voided the assignment plan, like 
Judges Paul and Bryan, he endorsed the interpretation of the 
Brown decision in Briggs v. Elliot. "Nothing herein shall be 
construed as automatically granting to plaintiffs the right 
to enter schools of their choice,," As long as race was not 
a criteria for assignment, Judge Hoffman wrote "there is no
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inherent right of any child to attend any particular school 
in which children of another race are in attendance."29
Despite the ruling, Virginia was left with a lot of 
maneuverability. A future placement plan consistent with the 
and Carson opinions was not precluded by the Hoffman 
decision. Even the Pupil Placement Board was still in busi­
ness since no injunction preventing it from meeting was asked 
for by the plaintiffs. "Unless and until lawfully prevented," 
the three-man board announced that it intended "to carry out 
its duties and responsibilities under the Pupil Placement Act 
in strict accordance with its terms."30
The Prince Edward County case provided the only excep­
tion to the trend of federal court decisions chipping away at 
massive resistance. On January 23, 1957, Judge Sterling 
Hutcheson, a native of Southside, Virginia, refused to desig­
nate a date for beginning the desegregation of Prince Edward1s 
31public schools . Quoting liberally from the second Brown de­
cision, Judge Hutcheson concluded that "it is clear that the 
law must be enforced but the Court is conscious of the variety
of problems of a local nature constituting factors to be con-
32sidered m  the enforcement." Although citizens deprived of
29Id. at 446.
30Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 15, 1957, p. 1.
31Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 
149 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Va. 1957).
32Id. at 435 . ,
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their constitutional rights were entitled to a remedy, Judge
Hutcheson thought that "in view of the grave and perplexing
problems involved, the exercise of that right must be de- 
33ferred." Considering the provisions for closing Prince
Edward’s public schools, Hutcheson believed "a continuation of
the present method could not be so harmful as an interrupted 
34education."
A presence of a large Negro school population coupled 
with the propaganda of the Defenders made the Prince Edward 
suit the most difficult of the early Virginia school cases. 
Judge Hutcheson correctly predicted that Prince Edward County 
would close its public schools rather than integrate. However, 
by refusing to set a date for instituting even the most gradual 
plan of desegregation, Judge Hutcheson’s decision, in effect, 
rewarded resistance to the;Brown decision. Applied to other 
school districts, the Hutcheson decision held out the hope that 
•by demonstrating potential racial unrest a desegregation order 
would be postponed. The Richmond Times-Dispatch thought 
Hutcheson's ruling would be useful in the Newport News case 
where the Negro was approximately forty-three percent of the 
population and white resistance to desegregation was reported
3 3Ibid.
34Id, at 439.
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35to be strong. Perhaps, the editor wrote, Judge Hutcheson
had provided the Supreme Court with a "rationale for relax-
ing its pressure on the ’black belts' of the South."
In early February, Judge Hoffman ordered the school
boards of Newport News and Norfolk to desegregate their pub-
37lie schools beginning in September, 1957. The basis for
Judge Hoffman's ruling in both cases was the failure of the
school board to take any steps toward complying with the Su-
3 8preme Court’s decision. Judge Hoffman saw no indication that
"prolonged delay will lead to leadership in the direction of
compliance." Extensions of time because of local unrest,
Judge Hoffman argued, were used instead to devise methods of
39preventing desegregation. Thus, reliance on community unrest 
as a defense against a desegregation order, used in the Prince 
Edward case, was rejected in the Norfolk case.
Although an extremely unpopular decision, the substance 
of Judge Hoffman's opinion was by no means radical. After re­
ferring to the Briggs dictum, the judge emphasized that housing
Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch , January 25, 1957,
p. 12.
3^Ibid.
37Adkins v. School Board of the City of Newport News,
II Race Rel. L. Rep. 33 4 (E.D. Va. 19 57") Beckett v. The School
Board of Norfolk, II Race Rel. L. Rep. 337 (E.D. Va. 1957).
38Adkins at 335-36; Beckett at 339.
3^Adkins at 3 36.
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patterns would restrict actual desegregation,, Natural and 
artificial boundaries, Hoffman explained, would preserve se­
gregated schoolso "I do not know of any particular law that 
prevents the so-called gerrymandering of the school areas„
In prescribing a gradual plan of desegregation in Newport News,
Judge Hoffman anticipated "ample time to arrange for any neces-
41sary reallocation „ « „ of white school children,. "
Ihe Hoffman decisions were subjected to greater criti­
cism than the earlier decisions of Judges Bryan and Paulo Un- 
like the latter judges, Hoffman's rulings followed the passage 
of the massive resistance legislation Since he ignored the 
special legislation, except as evidence of bad faith, the judge 
was viewed as a traitor„ The Ricbmond Times-Pispatch charged 
that when Hoffman "donned the judicial robes of a federal court, 
he detached himself from his state, and became an instrument of
federal power," If he was torn between federal and state loyal-
42ty,- the editor suggested that Hoffman "could have resigned."
Ihe heated response to Hoffman's decision was also re­
lated to his method of dealing with the cases. In both decisions 
Judge Hoffman delivered his opinion immediately following the 
hearings from notes or extemporaneously,, Although the procedure 
quickened the pace of the litigation, Hoffman opened himself to
40Ibido
44lbid c
&  o"Editorial, Ri climond Time s -Pi spat ch, February 13, 19 57,
P o 14- a
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the charge of having prejudged the cases.43 Just as irritat­
ing to massive resisters was Hoffman's habit of interrupting 
his legal opinions with occasional criticisms of Virginia's 
political leaders. Scoffing at the claim that more time was 
needed to develop a better solution, Hoffman observed: "I
have heard no proclamation from our distinguished leaders
44announcing plans to reverse themselves." Although Hoffman's 
observations were accurate, their result was to invite public 
censure and to challenge the credibility of his rulings.
The criticism leveled at Judge Hoffman was also related 
to the campaign for governor. The organization intended to 
make massive resistance the central issue of the campaign. 
However, if the heart of the resistance legislation was voided 
by November, 1957, the Democratic claim that the Brown deci­
sion was reversible would lack credibility. Also the federal 
court decisions strengthened the case for a local assignment 
plan which the expected Republican candidate, Ted Dalton, was 
known to favor. The organization suspected Judge Hoffman, who 
had been the Republican candidate for Attorney General in 1953, 
of helping his old running mate along. Thus, Senator Byrd 
personally lashed out at the judge. Speaking at Hampton Roads 
Byrd confessed: "Had I known he would resort to prejudiced
and political statements I would have fought his confirmation
43Ibid. February 12, 1957, p. 1; February 13, 1957, p. 1.
44Richmond News Leader, February 12, 19 57, p. 1.
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as long as I could stand on my feet." Hoffman's conduct,
Byrd thought, "could not fail to cause bitter resentment and
45inflame public opinion." The Virginia senator left the im­
pression that Judge Hoffman's decisions would be overturned by 
a court less politically motivated. Also, Senator Byrd appeared 
to be repaying Judge Hoffman for his criticism of the organi­
zation .
In addition to attacking Judge Hoffman, massive resisters 
took advantage of other opportunities to suppress, ridicule or 
ignore critics of the school closing policy. A brief contro­
versy was precipitated by an unsigned "Statement of Conviction 
on Race" issued by the Richmond Ministers Association in late 
January. The statement accused Governor Stanley and a majority 
of the legislators of taking "long strides toward a vindictive 
dictatorial way of government, foreign to our tradition and
guaranteeing years of tension if not tragedy among the citizens 
4 fio-f Virginia. " Especially odious to the ministers was the 
law requiring the registration of individuals or groups engaged 
in promoting or obstructing desegregation. The ministers 
viewed the law as an attempt "to restrict the open, free criti­
cism of its the [General Assembly's] coerced rule by forbidding 
unhampered freedom to discuss the matter or to enter litigation
A ^Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, May 10, 1957, p. 1.
^Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, February 1, 1957,
p. 1.
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over it. Adding insult to injury, it has, furthermore, exempted
47politicians and political groups from these restrictions."
In response to the ministers' charge, Delegate James JVL
Thomson, the zealous chairman of the Committee on Law Reform
and Racial Activities, announced that he planned to study the
statement in order to determine whether it violated recent
legislation regarding racial activities,, The ministers were
warned that they "may criticize all they want . . . but if they
are urging legislation to foster integration or segregation
48they would be getting themselves into t r o u b l e A l t h o u g h  
the Richmond News Leader joined the ministers in their criti­
cism of the registration law, the editor ridiculed the histori­
cal and legal justification for the statement. Editor Kilpatrick
was especially amused by the ministers 1 reluctance to identify
49themselves unlike the legislators whom they attacked. The 
incident demonstrated that the effectiveness of the ministers 
as a pressure group was easily checked since they could not 
advance too far ahead of their congregations.
4 7" Richmond Mews Leader, January 29, 1957, p. 1. Section 
nine of the statute said; "This act shall also not apply to any 
person, firm, partnership, corporation, association, organization 
or candidate in any political election campaign. . . . "  Acts of 
the General Assembly, Chapter 32, Extra Sess., 19 56, p. 33.
48Ibid.e The Committee on Law Reform and Racial Activities 
was one of the two committees created by the special session to 
harass the NAACP. James M. Thomson is the brother of Mrs. Harry 
Byrd, Jr.
^Editorial, Ibid., p. 10,
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Almost overlooked in the attempt to portray a unanimous 
support of massive resistance was a report submitted by the
Richmond First Club offering a five point program for achiev-
5 0m g  desegregation. The plan which included such criteria as
geography and student achievement would have allowed only token
desegregation. A non-partisan organization of business and
professional men,, it had submitted a report, similarly ignored
during the debate over interposition, which concluded that de~
51segregation could work in the Richmond public schools. Though 
unsuccessful in presenting its case, the Richmond First Club 
demonstrated that some influential citizens preferred limited 
desegregation to the school closing legislation.
Another casulty of massive resistance was State Senator 
Blake T „ Newton who was not reappointed to the State Board of 
Education when his term expired. As a legislator and as a 
board member, Newton had opposed the Stanley Plan. Though 
'Stanley explained his decision as an effort to give all regions 
better representation on the Board, the Governor’s objective
was widely viewed as an attempt to secure a majority vote in
52 . •favor of his position. The goal was achieved with the
appointment of the arch-segregationist State Senator Garland
53Gray to the State Board of Education.
^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 1 , 19 57 , p. 1.
^Ibid., February 24 , 1956, p. 1.
52Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, January 29, 1957, p. 1.
53Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 15, 19 57, p. 1.
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As the federal courts chipped away at the school-clos­
ing legislation and massive resisters attempted to thwart 
unorthodox views of the school crisis, Virginia settled down 
to a long political campaign. Without serious opposition in 
the primary, the Democratic organization concentrated its 
efforts on demolishing the Republicans, The major issue of 
the campaign was massive resistance. The organization argued 
that only by completely disregarding the Supreme Court could 
Virginia preserve segregation. In mid-March Senator Harry 
Byrd set the tone for the campaign. Speaking in Richmond, he 
saids "We have a right to defy the Supreme Court, if we do so 
without violence and do not try to overthrow the government." 
Arguing that the Brown decision overturned a precedent upheld 
in the Gong Lum case, Byrd concluded^ l!I say we still have a 
right to choose between these two," The Senator explained that 
massive resisters were incorrectly identified as school 
closers. Instead Byrd described resisters as school savers 
since he believed that it was impossible to "have integration 
in Virginia and preserve the public schools." By ignoring the 
Supreme Court, Senator Byrd held out the hope that the Brown 
decision would be reversed„
Ted Dalton, who would be the Republican standard bearer, 
explained the GOP5s position on desegregation. He charged 
that Senator Byrd raised false hopes by holding out the possi­
bility that the Supreme Court would reverse the Brown decision.
54Ibid., March 15, 19 57, p. 1.
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Attacking massive resistance, Dalton favored a pupil assign­
ment plan similar to the one adopted by North Carolina«,
"Keep the schools white as possible under law and order but,
55by all means, keep the public schools„ " The soundness of
Dalton's position was reinforced on March 25 when the United
States Supreme Court declined to review Virginia's appeal of
the Fourth Circuit's decisions in the Charlottesville-Arling- 
56ton caseso As a result, school desegregation m  the two 
localities by September of 1957 appeared likely,,
Although consistent with federal court decisions, Dalton's 
stance had obvious political liabilities„ Following the Repub­
lican's remarks, Governor Stanley invited Dalton to enter the
campaign as an "integregationist" which Stanley defined as
57any person "willing to accept any integration. «, . „" The 
plan to exploit the race issue was repeated at the Jefferson- 
Jackson Day Dinner held in Richmond on March 29, 1957. James 
Latimer reported that privately the organization hoped that 
Ted Dalton would run for Governor. The Democrats, according to 
Latimer, aimed "quite simply and frankly, to paste the label 
'integrationist' all over Dalton if he runs—-and they're sure 
they can make it stick through the campaign propaganda battle."
5 5Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, March 25, 19 56, p 9 1.
~^Ibid,, March 26, 1957, p„ 1„
^IbicL , March 27, 195 7, p, 1.
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The Democrats hoped "to clobber him so badly as to demolish
him and the GOP as a force in state level politics for years 
,,58to come.
Perhaps no man was more aware of the legal fragility 
or political potential of massive resistance than the Demo™ 
cratic candidate for governor, J, Lindsay Almond. As attor­
ney general, he had been cautious in his legal opinions so
that as late as July of 1957 Almond's resister credentials
59were still being questioned. But in the course of the
election campaign, using all of his oratorical skills, Almond
became the champion of massive resistance. Attacking the
local assignment plan proposed by Dalton, Almond claimed it
would "not and cannot preserve the public school system from
6 0the destructive effects of integration." The admission of 
several Negro children to North Carolina schools under a local 
placement plan proved, Almond charged, that Dalton "embraces 
and accepts the principle of race mixing in the public 
schools." As a result, the Democratic candidate warned, the
5RRichmond Times-Dispateh, March 2.9, 1957, p. 1. 
^Editorial, Richmond Times-"Dispatch, July 5, 1957 , p. 14.
c n
N 03: folk Virginian-Pilot, July 7 , 1957 , p. 1.
^Ibid„, July 25, 1957, p. 1.
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"NAACP and 'fellow travelers5" would be aided in reaching their
f) ?goal of a "totally amalgamated society,"
The highlight of Almond's campaign was his promise to 
provide a plan that would save Virginia from a desegreation 
order. The Dalton plan, he explained,, not only legalized inte­
gration, but, through litigation, turned over "to the NAACP 
the placement of Negro children in white schools. This is 
government by NAACP in Virginia. This I cannot embrace. This 
I will resist with every honorable means at my command." 
Almond's solution was "a position of flexibility so as to meet 
to the best advantage any condition which may arise and adopt 
[Virginia's] power and government machinery to the most effec­
tive means in resisting integration." Above all Virginia must
63not ■’compromise with principle." When challenged by Dalton
to reveal his plan, Almond weakly replied that he did not want
64to expose it to the NAACP.
In his campaign, Ted Dalton attacked the secrecy and 
machine-like quality of the Byrd organization. Virginia's de­
fense of states' rights, he asserted, was accompanied by an
65attack upon local rights. ‘ The Republican candidate explained 
that Almond had no alternative plan for maintaining segregated
Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 11, 19 57, p. 1.
^ Ibid. , August 27, 1957, p. 1.
^ Ibid., August 24, 1957, p. 3,
65Ibid., September 14, 1957, p. 2.
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public schools. The example of North Carolina showed, accord­
ing to Dalton, that a state could strengthen its legal posi­
tion "by token compliance with the Supreme Court decision. 
Virginia, he explained, would either have no public schools 
or public schools accompanied by some desegregation. The
choice was not between integration and segregation as the
6 7Democratic party led the voters to believe. Finally, Dalton 
ridiculed the argument that the Supreme Court would reverse 
itself. "Think about it--don't be swayed by somebody who can 
holler the most for white supremacy.
Legally, Ted Dalton’s position was stronger than Lindsay 
Almond3 s. With the various federal district court rulings, 
the ability of the state to maintain segregated schools through­
out the state in the fall of 1957, without school closings, 
appeared questionable. The only legal tactic left to Vir­
ginia's attorneys was to slow the judicial process by a series 
of - time-consuming appeals. The Democratic organization recog­
nized, that considering its campaign promises, a court order to 
desegregate public schools might have a dramatic effect on the 
election returns„
^Ibid * , July 25 , 1957, p. 1.
67Ibid., July 30, 1957, p. 4.
(TO
Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 17, 1957, p. 1.
182
The dim future of the school closing laws was made more
apparent on July 13, 1957, when the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed Judge Hoffman's desegregation order and his
59interpretation of the placement laws. Attorneys for the
Norfolk and Newport News school boards immediately announced
their intention to appeal the decision before the Supreme Court.
Simultaneously, the school boards' lawyers asked the Fourth
Circuit Court to stay its desegregation order pending action by
the Supreme Court. Since circuit courts normally refused stays
when a review was being sought from the Supreme Court, massive
7 0resistance was m  serious trouble. The Norfolk Virginian- 
Pilot predicted that "the distance to the last ditch of resis­
tance in the federal courts may be shorter than the Stanley
Plan authors thought it would be. The distance . . . might be
71measured in months rather than years." Virginia won a re­
prieve in the Norfoik-Newport News cases when the Fourth Cir­
cuit Court decided to grant the requested stay. Since the 
Supreme Court was adjourned until October and Judge Hoffman 
said he would not order desegregation during a school year,
segregated schools were preserved for another year in the
72Norfolk-Newport News area.
5 9School Board of the City of Newport News v. Atkins;
School Board"o~f~1Ehe"'''cTty~of Norfolk v. Beckett, 2 Race Rel. L.
Rep o "8~08 f4th Ciri 1 9  5 1 )  .
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, July 14, 1957, p. 1.
^Editorial, I b i d p. 4.
72Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, July 19, 1957, p. 1.
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Desegregation orders were still in effect in Charlottes­
ville and Arlington. Pending the Supreme Court ruling on the 
Norfolk-Newport News cases, Attorney General Almond asked 
Judges Paul and Bryan to stay their decrees. The state argued 
that the judges should wait until the United States Supreme
Court ruled on the pupil placement law which had not been an
7 3issue m  the Charlottesville-Arlington cases. For contra­
dictory reasons Almond's legal strategy was successful.
In the Charlottesville case, Judge Paul, as a matter of 
courtesy, suspended his decree pending action by the United 
States Supreme Court. However he also enjoined the enforcement 
of the pupil placement law in Charlottesville until the Su­
preme Court acted. Thus, Charlottesville's Negro pupils were
not required to apply with the pupil placement board as a pre-
7 4requisite for attending a white school.
The following day, July 27, Judge Bryan ruled that the 
stay issued by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was not a 
sufficient reason for postponing his ruling. However, Judge 
Bryan rejected the plea of the NAACP that the original deseg­
regation order be amended so as to specify that Arlington stu­
dents could bypass the pupil placement law. Since the law had 
not been an issue in the Arlington case, Judge Bryan believed
73t. . ,Ibid .
"^Allen v. School Board of Charlottesville, 2 Race Rel. 
L. Rep. 98 6 (W.D. Vai' 195TTb
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7 5that the NAACP request was premature. Consequently, the 
Negro plaintiffs would have to apply with the Pupil Placement 
Board for a transfer in order to test the lav/'s constitution­
ality. Bryan concluded: "In this way, specificity and pre­
cision will be given to each complaint, it will be individual­
ized and it will be appraised in its own peculiar environment,
of course in the light, too, of the regulations and precedents 
76than at hand." The latter observation seemed to preclude the
use of class action suits by the NAACP. As Attorney General
Almond later commented, the ruling appeared "to foreclose any
77NAACP concept of mass integration."
The effect of the Bryan-Paul decisions were identical-- 
the postponement of desegregation orders. However, quick ac­
tion on the part of Arlington's Negro plaintiffs provided Judge 
Bryan with another opportunity to integrate Arlington's white 
schools. Following Bryan's ruling, a number of Negro students 
applied for transfers with the Pupil Placement Board. Their
applications were rejected "for reasons which the board deems
7 8to be good and sufficient." Returning to the district court 
on September 14, Judge Bryan ordered the Arlington School Board
7 5Thompson v. School Board of Arlington County, 2 Race 
Rel. L. Rep.‘810, 811 (E.D. Va. 1957).
^Id. at 811.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, July 30, 1957, p. 1.
^Ibid., August 30, 19 57, p. 1.
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7 9to admit seven Negroes to previously all white schools. In
Judge Bryan's opinion the administrative remedies of the Pupil
Placement Act were "too sluggish and prolix to constitute a
reasonable remedial process." The only explanation for the
Pupil Placement Board's action, thought Judge Bryan, was a
"simple adherence to the prior practice of segregation." He
added that for a Negro to submit "to that act amounts almost
to assent to a racially segregated school." In conclusion, Judge
Bryan reminded the defendants that seven Negroes in a white
school population of 21,245 could hardly have a significant
8 0impact on public education in Arlington.
Since Bryan had set September 23 as the date of admission, 
his ruling posed a sticky problem for the organization. Vir­
ginia's attorneys immediately made plans to seek a suspension
of the order pending another appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court 
81of Appeals. Fortunately for the Democrats, Bryan granted a
stay of his order on the grounds that tremendous injury would
8 2result if his order was reversed. Considering that the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals had already turned down an appeal from 
Norfolk and Newport News on the same issue, Bryan's ruling was
Thompson v. School Board of Arlington County, 2 Race Rel. 
L. Rep. 987 (E.D. Va. 1957).
80Id. at 788-91.
O 1
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, September 15, 1957, p. 1.
o 9
Ibid., September 19, p. 1.
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extremely generous. Thus, once again, the Democratic organi­
zation was spared the embarrassment of closed schools prior 
to the November 5 election.
The flow of adverse federal district and appellate court 
rulings had worried the organization hierarchy. Congressman 
Howard Smith warned that Almond must be prepared for an adverse 
ruling from the Supreme Court on the Norfolk appeal. He
cautioned: "It will catch us in the middle of a gubernatorial
8 3campaign in which segregation is the chief issue." Congress­
man Burr P. Harrison, who represented the Shenandoah Valley, 
was even more alarmed. He wrote Smith: "By the appointment of
a Commission, the support of its plan, and the enactment of 
laws constituting a different scheme, we have placed ourselves 
in a position before the people of saying that we have the 
answer and we are suffering•today when the people examine our 
'answer' and conclude that we have been inconsistent and that 
our present laws constitute no answer." Harrison reminded Smith
that in the Shenandoah Valley, with its slight Negro population,
8 4voters did not like the fund cut off plan.0
On October 7, Attorney General Kenneth C. Patty appeared 
before the Supreme Court with the request that the Court defer
83Letter, Howard W. Smith to Honorable Burr P. Harrison, 
September 30, 1957, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith 
Letter File.
84Letter, Burr P. Harrison to Howard W. Smith, October 9,
19 57, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File.
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action on the Norfolk caseD The reason given for requesting 
the delay was "to avoid confusion, prevent conflict, and pro­
mote comity between federal and state courts, conformable with
8 5established doctrine of the Courto" Circumstantial evidence 
indicated that the Democrats did not want a United States Su­
preme Court ruling until after November 5„ The Democrats were 
not to have their way as the Supreme Court dealt another blow 
to massive resistance on October 21, 1957, by refusing to review 
the Fourth Circuit Court's decision upholding Judge Hoffman,,88 
Ted Dalton immediately called for a special session but Governor
Stanley and Lindsay Almond pretended that the Court's action had 
87no significanceo Stanley rather dryly commented: "There is
no cause for .school patrons, faculties or pupils to be appre- 
88hensive0" Almond, in his typical fashion, told an audience
R 5 .Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, October 8, 19 57, p„ 1. The
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was about to rule on a case 
dealing with the placement plan, Defebio v„ School Board of 
Fairfax County, 100 SoEn 2d 760 (Va0 Sup0 Ct „ of App„ 1957)„
'Fhe Defebio case was not exactly analogous to the Norfolk case 
since the plaintiffs were white„ As it turned out the appeal of 
the white plaintiffs was rejected by the Virginia Supreme Court 
because the plaintiffs failed to show a violation of equal pro­
tection of the laws, Kenneth Patty replaced Lindsay Almond as 
Attorney General during the political campaign.
88Ibid0 , October 22, 1957, p, 10
87Ibid0
88Ibido, October 23, 1957, pD 1°
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in Princess Anne County; "I have faith that the decision
ultimately will be reversed since the record of the Supreme
Court is one of reversing itself because it doesn't know what
89it's doing or what it's talking about." Dalton replied
that "after losing round after round in federal courts . „ .
[Almond] should be more aware than anyone else that the Supreme
90Court will not reverse itself."
For Ted Dalton the trend of federal court decisions was
not enough to overcome the integrationist tag which Almond and
the organization had pinned on him. The organization deceptively
but successfully portrayed the election as offering Virginians
a choice between white schools or integrated schools. Senator
Byrd told a Leesburg audience that the Virginia contest would
have far reaching effects "because this is the first Southern
state wherein the issue has been clearly defined in a state elec-
91tion as being between integration and segregation." In addi­
tion to fighting the integrationist label, national events were 
also unkind to Ted Dalton. In the midst of the campaign a 
school crisis developed in Little Rock, Arkansas. When Governor 
Orville Faubus summoned the Arkansas National Guard, preventing 
desegregation, Almond approved. "It's very apparent that he 
[Faubus] faces a crucial situation of non-acceptance by the 
people." As governor, Almond promised to "exercise every resource
^9Ibidc , October 25 , 1957, p. 1. 
" ibid. , October 26, 1957, p. 1. 
91Ibid., October 8, 19 57, p. 1.
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to preserve law and order everywhere in Virginia." Reluctant
to criticize a Republican president and fearful of alienating
voters, Dalton evasively observed that limited information pre-
9 2vented him from commenting on the situation. Virginia's
political observers recognized the resolution of the Little Rock
situation would determine the limits of Virginia's resistance.
The editor of the Richmond Times-Dispatch hoped that Faubus
would "somehow manage to vindicate the right of sovereign
states to control its own affairs, including its public 
93schools."
When President Eisenhower sent federal troops into Little 
Rock, the Democrats siezed the issue in a final effort to 
embarrass Dalton. Almond declared that Little Rock was only a 
"token of what will transpire in Virginia and throughout the 
South if these states are compelled to mix races in their public 
schools. I say Little Rock is a living example of Mr. Dalton's 
concept of limited integration." The Democratic candidate ac­
cused President Eisenhower of abdicating leadership "for motives 
of political expediency to the demands of a power crazed minority 
pressure group." Then Almond challenged Dalton to "tell the
people whether he endorses and approves of the President's hasty
9 4
action and the derogation of the rights of a sovereign state." 
^Ibid. , September 4, 1957 , p. 1.
^Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 7, 1957,
p. 12.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, September 25, 1957, p. 1;
September 26, 1957, p. 1.
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Faced with a political dilemma of choosing between party
loyalty and the realities of Virginia politics, Dalton asked
President Eisenhower to withdraw the troops. The Republican
candidate, however, did not challenge the legality of the
President’s action. Instead, Dalton chose to argue that the
9 5President had broken with the 1956 party platform, Albertis 
S. Harrison, the Democratic candidate for Lieutenant Governor, 
said Dalton responded too late. Arguing that the troops were 
unnecessary, Harrison held that "through sheer force the
President of the United States stripped the states of their
, „ 9 6 sovereignty„
Along with the Little Rock crisis, the newly enacted
Civil Rights Bill was also unpopular in Virginia, Senator Byrd
identified Dalton as part of an anti-Southern phalanx which
included President Eisenhower, Attorney General Herbert
9 7Brownell, and the NAACP. The Republican candidate suffered 
from the sharp dip in the President’s popularity as a result 
of Little Rock and the Civil Rights Bill.
When the votes were tabulated, to no one's surprise, 
Almond had soundly defeated Dalton by a vote of 326,921 to 
188,628, By receiving thirty-seven percent of the vote, the 
Republican party lost eight percentage points off its total
9^Ibid., September 29, 1957, p. 1,
^ Ibldo , October 2 , 19 57 , p. 1.
^7Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 12, 1957, p. 1.
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m  1953. Considering the manipulation of racial themes and 
unpopular national events, the Republican candidate nonethe­
less made a respectable showing. Dalton thought that Little
Rock had destroyed him. "It wasn't a little rock, it was a 
99big rock." The Arkansas confrontation obviously had hurt 
the Republican candidate, but well before Little Rock he was 
beaten by the exploitation of the race issue in Virginia. Only 
a court order prior to the election desegregating several pub­
lic schools could have upset the organization's strategy. 
Desegregation would have led to school closings, dissatisfac­
tion outside the black belt, and the revelation that Virginia 
had to pursue a course similar to the one proposed by Dalton.
9 8Latimer, p. 86.
99Richmond Times-Dispa:tch, November 7 , 1957 , p. 1.


CHAPTER VII
THE COLLAPSE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE
Before the new governor took office, several important 
developments occurred on the school front. After approxi­
mately a year, the two committees investigating the NAACP 
made their reports. The Committee on Offenses Against the 
Administration of Justice, chaired by Delegate John Boat­
wright, concluded its findings by charging ten NAACP lawyers, 
including Oliver Hill and Spotswood Robinson III, with ille­
gally promoting and soliciting litigation."*" The committee 
charged that Negro plaintiffs often were unaware that deseg­
regation was the goal of the school suits; that sometimes 
individuals did not know they were party to a suit; that the 
NAACP paid lawyers' fees and court costs regardless of the
plaintiffs' ability to pay; and that the NAACP generally so-
2
licited business.
The NAACP used several arguments in combatting the 
charges. First, it held that the Virginia statutes were un-
"*"Report of the Committee on Offenses Against the Ad­
ministration of Justice (Commonwealth of Virginia: Division
of Purchase and Printing, 1957), p. 20.
2Ibid., pp. 16-19; Report of the Committee on Law Re­
form and Racial Activities (Commonwealth of Virginia: Divi­
sion of Purchase and Printing, 1959), pp. 8-11.
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constitutional. Second, even if the laws were valid, the
NAACP argued that it was not involved in illegal activity.
Finally, the Negro organization refused to disclose the names
and addresses of its membership on the grounds that members
3
would be subject to local harassment.
Appearing before the investigative committees and
fighting the attempts to obtain the membership lists absorbed
the time and resources of the NAACP lawyers. Such diversions
prompted speculation that the Negro attorneys "may well find
themselves too limited in time and resources to take the of-
4
fensive with any new desegregation suits." Delegate James 
M. Thomson, Chairman of the Committee on Law Reform and 
Racial Activities, reportedly remarked that his committee had 
acquired enough information to keep the NAACP from litigating
5
which, "after all [is] the heart of the organization.” Con­
sidering the purpose of the legislation, the findings were no 
surprise. Consequently, the Virginia Conference of the 
NAACP, as massive resisters hoped, was forced to defend its 
very existence while directing the school litigation.
Following Almond’s election, the Fourth Circuit Court
3
National Association For Advancement of Colored Peo- 
ple v. Patty, 159 F . Supp. 503, 507 (E .D . Va. 1958) . In his op- 
inion, Judge Soper has a concise discussion of the organization 
of the NAACP and of the effects of Virginia’s attempt to restrict 
or destroy its influence.
R^ichmond News Leader, February 27, 1957, p. 1.
^Ibid., March 14, 1957, p. 3.
of Appeals reversed Judge Hutcheson's decision that unfavor­
able conditions justified delaying desegregation in Prince 
Edward County. The court held that a person "may not be de­
nied enforcement of rights to which he is entitled under the 
Constitution of the United States because of action taken or 
threatened in defiance of such rights.11^ Endeavoring to 
soften the effects of the ruling, the court reminded the dis­
trict court judge that segregation did not have to be abol­
ished "at once with respect to all grades in the schools, if 
a reasonable start were made to that end with deliberate
7speed considering the problems of proper administration. 1 
Applied to other areas of Virginia, the Fourth Circuit 
Court's ruling meant that the threat of racial unrest pro­
vided no defense against a desegregation order. Yet the 
court continued to emphasize that the most limited compliance 
would satisfy the Supreme Court.
On January 11, 1958, Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., 
delivered his inaugural address. A month earlier, Senator 
Byrd had urged Almond to make "a great address such as you 
are capable of delivering on the encroachment of the Federal 
Government upon the States with special reference to the seg­
^Allen v. School Board of Prince Edward County, II 
Race Rel. L. Rep. 1119 (4th Cir. 1957).
7Id. at 1120.
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8regation decision, . . . "  The address was no disappointment
to Byrd, as Almond devoted ninety percent of his speech to
the themes of the federal invasion of state powers and his
mandate to resist such encroachments, Almond pointed to the
"tyranny of majority" as the fundamental threat to democracy.
Paradoxically, he said, the greatest menace to Virginia came
from "minority spokesmen" who were "armed out of political
expediency with inordinate power to force their will upon the 
9
majority." On the school issue, the new governor held that 
sound education and desegregation were incompatible in Vir­
ginia. He predicted that "integration anywhere means des­
truction everywhere. And to paraphrase a great statesman, I 
say to you simply that I have not been elected Governor to 
preside over the liquidation of Virginia’s schools."^
Almond made only two recommendations to the General Assembly. 
One, a direct product of the Little Rock crisis, was a re­
quest for the power to close any school policed by federal 
authorities. Second, Governor Almond wanted the legislature 
to establish a commission devoted to the study of constitu-
g
Letter, Harry F. Byrd to J. Lindsay Almond, Decem­
ber 10, 1957, University of Virginia, Archives, Kilpatrick 
Papers.
9
"Inaugural Address of J. Lindsay Almond, Jr.," Janu­
ary 11, 1958, in Inaugural Address and Addresses delivered to 
the General Assembly by J. Lindsay Almond, Jr. 1958-1962 
(Commonwealth of Virginia: Division of Purchase and Printing)
pp. 4, 8.
10Ibid., p. 7.
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tional government. ^
The next day the General Assembly went to work, on a 
number of measures designed to repair the weaknesses in the 
massive resistance armor. The supplementary legislation won 
virtually unanimous approval in both houses, despite further 
indications: from the federal courts- that the defiance was 
doomed.
To improve Virginia's case before the federal courts, 
the legislators amended the Pupil Placement Act. The word 
"efficient" which, had given the placement law difficulty in 
the district courts, was eliminated. Also, the long list of 
criteria for judging assignments was replaced by the less
12elaborate phrase found m  the North Carolina placement plan.
The intention of the amendments was to improve the appearance
of the assignment plan so that the Negro plaintiffs would
13have to retest its constitutionality. In explaining the
purpose of the legislation, Almond stressed: "We are not
coming around to the North. Carolina viewpoint as far as the
14policy of this state Is concerned." However, as long as 
the placement plan was related to school closing and fund 
cut-off legislation, the courts would regard such attempts to
11Ibid., pp. 6-8.
12Acts of the General Assembly, Chapter 500, Reg. 
Sess., 1958, p. 638.
13 . .Norfolk Virginia—Pilot, February 14, 1958, p. 1
14Ibid.
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purify the assignment law as superficial.
At Governor Almond's request, the General Assembly
eliminated the "loophole" in the school closing legislation
which permitted a locality to operate desegregated schools
without state funds. The new legislation provided that the
Governor was not required to return a closed school to local
authorities upon the requests of the Board of Supervisors and
15the Board of Education. Thus the possibility of desegrega­
tion in a community unwilling to tolerate closed schools was 
virtually prohibited.
The General Assembly also passed the legislation re­
quested by the Governor in his inaugural address. The so- 
called "Little Rock bill" provided for the closure of any 
school policed by federal authorities.^ A second bill, 
nicknamed "Little Rock Junior," authorized the Governor to
17close all of the remaining schools m  the school district.
The legislature also passed a bill creating the Virginia Com­
mission on Constitutional Government and appropriated funds
18to subsidize its work. The Virginia Commission on Consti­
tutional Government would devote the next ten years to ex­
pounding the doctrines of states1 rights and strict construc­
15Acts of the General Assembly, Chapter 631, Reg. 
Sess., 1958, p. 939.
~^Ibid., Chapter 41, p. 26.
~^Ibid., Chapter 319, p. 367.
1 O
Ibid., Chapter 233, p. 275.
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tion through publications, seminars on constitutional govern­
ment, and meetings with like-minded groups throughout the 
nation. In 1968, the organization's efforts came to an end
when the General Assembly- refused to appropriate the funds
19needed to maintain its operation.
Complementing the legislation which dealt with school 
districts and the assignment plan were another series of 
bills designed to hobble the NAACP. The General Assembly 
consolidated into one body' the two legislative committees 
created to harass the NAACP— 'the Committee on Offenses 
Against the Administration of Justice. When Delegate Kathryn 
H. Stone of Arlington submitted an amendment providing for 
opening committee hearings to the public, she was rudely re­
buked. The sponsors of the legislation consolidating the 
committee, Delegates Boatwright and Thomson, were categori­
cally opposed to any amendment from Delegate Stone since they 
considered her unfriendly to the legislation. Delegate Frank 
P. Moncure viewed the amendment as automatically ill-
conceived, since uthe lady- from Arlington is an integration-
20ist and has admitted it on the floor of the House."
Three other measures were passed by the legislators to 
hamper the. effectiveness of the NAACP. First, a joint reso-
19I.n 196 8 the General Assembly repealed the statute 
creating the Commission on Constitutional Government. See 
Acts of the General Assembly, Chapter 536, Reg. Sess., 196 8,
p. 759.
? nRichmond News Leader, February 21, 195 8, p. 1.
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lution was passed which requested the Virginia State Bar to 
take action against cases of unethical and illegal practice 
of the law. The bar was directed to use the findings of the 
Boatwright and Thomson committees. Second, tax deductions 
for contributions to organizations involved in litigation in 
which they were not a party were made illegal. The law's ob­
jective was to undercut the financial resources of the NAACP. 
Finally, the General Assembly approved a bill which required
non-stock corporations to disclose their membership rolls if
21they were accused of illegal practice of the law.
The continued tenacity of the massive resisters in 
their efforts to obtain the NAACP membership lists came at a 
moment when the future of such a tactic seemed to have no 
prospect of holding up in the federal courts. On January 21, 
1958, prior to the introduction of the bill, a three-judge 
federal district court found that the 1956 legislation re­
quiring the NAACP to disclose its membership was prohibited
22by the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Judge
21Acts of the General Assembly, HJR, No. 50, Reg.
Sess., 1958, p. 1102; Chapter 34, p. 22; Chapter 506, p. 644
22National Association for Advancement of Colored Peo­
ple v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503, (E-.D. Va. 1958). The regis­
tration statutes were Chapters 31 and 32 of the acts passed 
by the 1956 special session. The court focused its attention 
on Chapter 32 which required the registration of persons or 
organizations engaged in (1) promoting or opposing racial 
legislation, (2) advocating racial integration or segrega­
tion, (3) raising or expending funds to promote litigation or 
(4) whose activities led to racial conflict. The NAACP and 
the Virginia Conference agreed that they were involved in the 
first three activities. The NAACP Legal Defense and Educa^ - 
tion Fund admitted that it engaged in activities two and three
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Morris Soper, who wrote the majority opinion, held that the
legislation was part of Virginia's plan of massive resistance
to the Brown decision. He found that the Negro organization,
as a result of the laws, had suffered a decline in revenue
while individual members were the victims of assorted harass- 
23ments. The result, Judge Soper concluded, was unquestion­
able a restriction of the rights of free speech and due pro- 
24cess. The major issue, to Judge Soper, was whether or not 
Virginia had exceeded its police powers in passing the regis­
tration legislation. His conclusion was that the restric­
tions placed on free speech were unjustified since the Negro 
organizations endeavored "to abide by and enforce the law and
have not themselves engaged in acts of violence or distur-
25bance of the public peace." The discriminatory character
of the legislation, Judge Soper wrote, was "emphasized by the
exemption of persons engaged in a political election campaign
who are free to speak without registration whereas persons
having no direct interest in elections as such and concerned
only with securing equal rights for all persons are covered
2 6by the Statute," Although organizations advocating segre­
gation, like the Defenders, also had to register, Judge Soper
23Id. at 515-16.
24Id. at 524, 528.
25Id. at 526.
26Id. at 525.
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wrote that equality of treatment was not a result. "Regis­
tration of persons engaged in a popular cause imposes no 
hardship while, as the evidence of this case shows, registra­
tions of names and persons who resist the popular will would
lead not only to expressions of ill will and hostility but to
27loss of members by the plaintiff's Association."
Judge Soper was especially critical of Virginia's at­
tempt to identify the names of NAACP financial contributors 
or fund raisers. He believed that the attempt to damage the 
financial ability of the NAACP to support litigation was pos­
sibly the most important part of Virginia's plan to prevent 
desegregation. On this point Soper observed: "The right of
access to the courts is one of the great safeguards of the 
liberties of the people and its denial or undue restriction 
is a violation of the due process clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments." The requirement that every contribu­
tor register, Soper concluded, was oppressive and "part of a
deliberate plan to impede the contributors in the assertion
2 8of their constitutional rights."
The court also voided the statutes defining the crime 
of barratry. In an expanded definition of barratry, the law 
made it illegal for a person or persons without a direct in­
terest in a case to contribute to the expense of the litiga­
tion. Legal aid societies were excluded as agencies which
27Id. at 527-28.
28Id. at 528.
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29dealt with, the general public on a variety of legal matters.
To Judge Soper, the major issue raised by this statute was 
whether Virginia could make it a crime for an organization to 
contribute money to defend the cause of civil rights.3  ^ Al­
though Judge Soper readily acknowledged Virginia's rights to 
maintain high standards of legal practice, he held that the 
barratry statute violated the. equal protection and due process 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The equal protection 
clause was violated because the statute "forbids the plain­
tiffs to defray the expenses of racial litigation while at the
same time it legalizes the activities of legal aid societies
31that serve all needy persons in all sorts of litigation."
By attempting "to put the plaintiff corporations out of busi­
ness by forbidding them to encourage and assist colored per­
sons to assert rights, established by the decisions of the
Supreme Court," Judge Soper found the statute in violation of
32the due process clause. Judge Soper concluded that the
Negro organizations were not engaged in soliciting or stirring
up litigation, but instead were devoted to instructing and
33assisting Negroes in the realization of their rights.
29Acts of General Assembly, Chapter 35, Extra Sess., 
1956, p. J6~. '
3QNAACP v. Patty at 531.
31Id. at 533.
32Ibid.
3 3Ibid.
203
Judge Soper refused to interpret the constitutionality 
of two other statutes which dealt with malpractice on the 
grounds that the laws were too vague. Judge Walter Hoffman 
concurred with Judge Soper to give the NAACP its victory.34
Judge Sterling Hutcheson wrote a lengthy dissent which 
was devoted to an essay on the doctrine of abstention. At 
stake in this case, Judge Hutcheson wrote, was "the tradition­
ally delicate balance between the courts of the states and the 
35federal courts." The federal courts, he argued, were not to 
construe a state statute involving a federal right until the 
state court had acted. The basis for this rule was the "fun­
damental concept of separate sovereigns embodied in the Cons­
titution of the United States."33
Despite the district court's ruling, the legislators
37passed a new registration bill into law. Delegate Harrison
Mann, who had sponsored the 1956 bill, defended the new bill
on the grounds that the district court's decision was subject
3 8to a reversal by a higher court. Considering the political 
liabilities of identification with the NAACP, legislators did 
oppose a measure designed to vex the Negro organization. The
34 Id. at 533-34.
35Id. at 535.
33Ibid♦, at 540.
37Acts of the General Assembly, Chapter 419, Reg.
Sess., 1958, p. 549.
3 8Richmond News Leader, February 25, 1958, p. 1.
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sponsors of the legislation also believed that it had a good 
chance of being upheld by the state courts.
This, opinion was bolstered by a decision of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia on the day before the federal 
district court's decision, holding that the power of investi­
gative committees to subpoena the membership lists of the
NAACP was a "reasonable exercise of the state's police 
39power." The "obvious purpose" of the legislation, the court
held, was to direct "the committee to investigate and report
on the manner in which such malpractice laws are administered
40and enforced. . ." Thus the Virginia Supreme Court rejected 
the incontrovertible evidence that the real purpose of the 
legislation was to handcuff the NAACP. In construing statutes 
the court retreated to the position that it was "well^-settled 
that it is not within the functions of the judiciary to in­
quire into the motives which inspire the legislature to enact 
laws. "4^
The apparent consensus on massive resistance in the 
General Assembly disguised continued differences between urban 
and rural legislators which, surfaced on other issues. The 
"country boys" made two unsuccessful attempts to reverse the
39National Association For the Advancement of Colored 
People v. Committee on Offenses Against the Administration of 
Justice, 101 S.E. 2nd 631, 639. (Va. Sup. Ct. of App.,
1957).
40id. at 640.
4 1 T.r •. j Ibid.
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growing influence of urban and black Virginia which were dir­
ectly related to the school question. On January 29, Garland 
Gray introduced a bill which provided that prospective voters 
would have to register on blank sheets of paper without the 
benefit of any advice from th.e registrar. The bill's un­
stated purpose was reportedly to frustrate the registration
42of Virginia's Negro citizens'. However, many legislators
opposed the measure because they believed the NAACP would
carefully instruct blacks, so that only uninformed whites
43would be disfranchised. Urban legislators were also re­
minded that the rural wing of the Democratic organization had 
thrived on a restricted electorate. After vigorous debate, the 
bill was passed in an amended form which allowed the applicant
to refer to the pertinent provision of the Virginia Constitu-
44tion during the registration.
Another attempt by rural legislators to maintain the 
status quo surfaced in the form of a House Resolution which 
declared that population should be de-emphasized as a factor 
in redistricting the General Assembly in 196 2. The sponsor 
of the legislation, Delegate John H. Daniel, believed that 
the perpetuation of rural dominion in the General Assembly
42Richmond Times,-Dispatch, January 30 , 1958, p. 1.
43Ibid.
44Ibid. , March. 5, 1958, p. 1. The bill passed the 
House of Delegates by a narrow vote of 50-46. Two days later 
the bill passed the Senate by 3 2-0,
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45would ensure "sound government." After a successful fili­
buster, organized by urban legislators, the House of Dele­
gates passed instead a resolution which retained population
as the primary criteria for reapportioning the General As-
46sembly. Th.e inability- of rural legislators to push their 
resolution through, the House was a sign that the grip of the 
conservative wing of the Democratic organization was not as 
strong as massive resistance indicated. Although urban legi­
slators supported much, of massive resistance, they were not 
about to surrender the prospect of future power on the school 
issue.
Another indication of the split within the organiza­
tion was demonstrated by the response to Senator Harry Byrd's 
announcement on February 10 that he would not run for re- 
election in 1958. Although the Senator desired to devote 
more time to his invalid wife, Byrd reversed his decision two 
weeks later. Most political observers believed that Byrd's 
reassessment was prompted by the prospect of a battle for his 
Senate seat between ex-Governors John Battle and William 
Tuck. A Battle-Tuck primary was expected to evolve into a 
feud having the prospect of undermining massive resistance 
and the organization. To prevent such a destructive cam-
45Ibi.d. , February 20, 1958, p. 1.
46^Ibid. , March. 5, 1958, p. 1; March 6 r 1958, p. 1.
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47paign, Byrd decided to seek re-election.
With the adjournment of the General Assembly, Governor
Almond prepared for the expected school closings in the fall.
In February, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Judge
Bryan's order admitting seven Negro children to white 
48schools. In May, the Supreme Court refused to review the
Fourth Circuit's ruling in the Arlington case so that Vir-
49ginia was left without any other legal recourse. Conse­
quently, Arlington, like Norfolk and Charlottesville, appeared 
likely to have either desegregated or closed schools in 
September of 1958.
Governor Almond and his attorney general, Albertis 
S. Harrison, recognized that Virginia had exhausted all of 
its legal ploys in behalf of massive resistance. At a high 
level meeting in Washington on July 2, 1958, this viewpoint 
was stressed by Harrison. According to the Attorney General, 
however, Representative Howard Smith still "hoped at some 
time there would be a test of the right of a Governor of a 
state to interpose the sovereignty of such State." Attorney 
General Harrison pointed out that this alternative was elimi-
47Latimer, pp. 87-88. Byrd easily defeated Dr. Louise 
Wensel, a physician from Augusta County by 317, 221 to 120,
224 (p. 89).
48School Board of Arlington County v. Thompson, 3 Race 
Re 1. L . Re pi 187 , (4 th Cir. 1958) .
4 9Arlington School Board v. Thompson, 3 Race Rel. L. 
Rep. 423 (4th Cir. 1958) .
2Q8
nated by the Little Rock precedent. Governor Almond, Harri­
son explained, would find himself "in the same position as 
Governor Faubus if he uses either the state police force or
the National Guard to prevent the enforcement of an order of
50one of our Virginia Federal Judges."
Of greatest distress to Harrison was the failure of 
the Democratic organization to work out a well-conceived plan 
to cope with the expected desegregation order. Despite the 
massive resistance propaganda, the Attorney General predicted 
that only a quarter of Virginia would "close their schools 
rather than integrate." Arlington, Charlottesville, and Nor­
folk were expected to insist on reopening the public schools. 
Harrison believed that eventually a private school system 
would emerge in areas with dense Negro populations once black 
enrollments surpassed token levels. Until then, he urged the 
organization to provide a formula for the transition period. 
If the organization failed to provide a plan, Harrison 
warned, "it will be supplied by others, and we may be in even 
more travail."51
The confidential views of the Attorney General illumi­
nated a major problem for the Almond Administration. Recog­
nizing that the legal realities dictated a retreat from mas-
50Letter, Albertis S. Harrison, Jr., to Howard W.
Smith, July 11, 1958, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith 
Letter File.
51Ibid.
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sive resistance, Almond and Harrison were discomforted by the 
inflexibility of the organization's hierarchy. Thus the last 
months of massive resistance were dominated by Governor Al­
mond's attempt to deal with the dilemma of satisfying the 
courts while averting political disaster.
Anticipating a crisis in the fall, Almond intended to 
exploit all the remaining legal loopholes for evading a de­
segregation order before closing the schools. The Governor 
hoped to satisfy the people of Virginia that he had utilized 
every legal maneuver to prevent desegregated schools. The 
legal developments took several directions. One was an at­
tempt to capitalize on a ruling delivered on June 20 by Fede­
ral District Court Judge Harry L. Lemley in Arkansas, which
ordered the postponement of desegregation in the Little Rock
52case for two and one-half years. Judge Lemley considered
his decision a "tactical delay," necessitated by the violent
53opposition to the Brown decision in the Arkansas city.
Until Judge Lemley's order was reversed, Virginia's leaders 
argued that desegregation would be accomplished by turmoil 
similar to that experienced by Little Rock. A second devel­
opment was the formulation of local assignment plans designed 
to prevent desegregation in Charlottesville and Norfolk where 
Judges Paul and Hoffman had discredited the Pupil Placement
52
Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp 13 (E.D. Ark. 1958).
53Ibid., at 28.
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54Board. Finally, a half-hearted effort was made to argue
that the General Assembly's revision of the Placement Act
justified new litigation.
One by one the last legal maneuvers were knocked down
by the federal courts. On August 18, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals overruled Judge Lemley's order on the
grounds that if upheld it "would amount to an open invitation
to elements in other districts to overtly act out public op-
55position through violent and unlawful means." On September
12, after a special term, the Supreme Court in Cooper v. Aaron
56upheld the Court of Appeals in a brief per curiam order.
Two weeks later the Court delivered an expanded opinion signed
by all the justices, which declared that the rights of Negro
children "can neither be nullified openly and directly by
state legislators or state executive or judicial officers,
nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for 
57segregation." The Court traced the turmoil in Little Rock 
"directly . . .  to the actions of legislators and executive 
officials of the State of Arkansas . . . which reflect their
own determination to resist this Court's decision in the
Southern School News, vol. V, No. 2, (August, 1958),
p. 6.
Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F. 2d 33, 40 (8th Cir. 1958).
cc
Aaron v. Cooper, 78 S. Ct. 1399 (1958).
~^Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958).
5 8Brown case." Although the Little Rock decision was a war­
ning to the South in general, Governor Almond believed that 
the justices wrote their opinions "with their eyes on Vir- 
ginia," where several schools were already closed. The 
Court's opinion, Almond declared, "indicts and insults every 
state legislator, every state judicial officer, and every
governor whose convictions relating to the oath 'to support
59this constitution' differ from the court's." Taking issue
with the Governor's interpretation, the editor of the Norfolk
Virginian-Pilot wrote that the Court instead had demolished
the false idea that "legislation and litigation will buy time,
and that in time something may- turn up" which will reverse
the Brown decision.^
On August 18, the same day that the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals reported its decision in the Little Rock
case, the Norfolk School Board announced that it rejected the
applications of all one hundred and fifty-one Negroes who
61sought admission to white schools. Using the assignment 
criteria established by the School Board, one hundred and 
twenty-three students were eliminated for failing to meet 
scholastic requirements, for refusing to submit to testing
58Id. at 15.
n; q
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, October 1, 195 8, p. 1. 
^Editorial, Ibid. , p. 4.
^"School Board Resolution of August 18, 195 8," III 
Race Rel. L. Rep. 9 45.
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procedures, or for other "equally cogent reasons." The re­
maining twenty-eight students were rejected on the grounds 
that their educational progress would be hindered by racial
isolation, by too many school transfers, or by possible
6 2racial conflicts. On August 25, Judge Hoffman told the
Norfolk School Board that racial isolation or the expectation
of racial disorder were not acceptable legal grounds for de-
6 3nying applications to white schools. The School Board's 
position was most difficult. If it refused to admit some 
Negroes, the School Board was subject to a contempt citation 
from Judge Hoffman. However, by admitting Negro students, 
the school closing law would be activated. Furthermore, the 
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, on the request of seg­
regationists, had issued an injunction forbidding the School
Board to make any assignments on the grounds that this was
64the responsibility of the State Pupil Placement Board.
Faced with a difficult choice, the School Board, on August 29,
announced that it would assign seventeen Negroes to white
65schools m  September.
Massive resisters reacted to the Norfolk decision by
62Ibid., at 945, 946.
^"District Judge's Statement of August 25, 1958"
3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 946 at 951-52.
^ Coley v. Brewbaker, III Race Rel. L. Rep. 944.
a c.
"School Board's Report of August 29, 1958," III Race 
Rel. L. Rep. 955.
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rededicating their opposition to the Supreme Court. By coin­
cidence, the Norfolk announcement was made a day before the 
annual meeting of the Democratic organization's faithful at 
Senator Byrd's apple orchard in Berryville. Seated on apple 
crates and munching box lunches, the quasi-political rally 
listened approvingly as the Senator vilified the Supreme 
Court and the NAACP. Byrd charged: "It is the Warren Court
school decision that has forced this ordeal upon us." The 
Court's accomplice was the NAACP, which the Senator described 
as "a fourth branch of the federal government." The leader of 
the Democratic organization urged his followers to continue 
the fight against the Warren Court "fortified by the belief 
that we are fighting to preserve the fundamental principles of 
our constitutional democracy.
More specifically, the leaders of massive resistance
believed that Governor Almond had not properly utilized the
Pupil Placement Ace in the struggle to preserve segregation.
Representative Watkins Abbitt urged: "If the Pupil Placement
6 7Act is ever going to be used, it has to be used now." In 
his editorials, James Kilpatrick tore into Almond for not 
using the' "cleaned-up" assignment plan. The editor wondered: 
"If the Governor of Virginia won't defend the laws of Vir­
ginia, who will?"^
6 6Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 31, 1958, p. 1.
6 7Richmond News Leader, September 1, 1958, p. 1.
c o
Editorial, Ibid., August 30, 1958, p. 6. Two weeks
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As pressure for some dramatic act of resistance 
mounted from organization stalwarts, Governor Almond made his 
only attempt to prepare Virginia for the end of massive resis­
tance. At a September press conference, the Governor dis­
missed the pleas to interpose the Pupil Placement Board be­
tween the federal courts and the Norfolk School Board or any 
other school board. As long as the statute was tied to school 
closing laws, Almond realized, the federal courts would not 
re-examine the assignment plan because of a few superficial 
alterations. School closing and fund cutoff were all that 
remained to prevent desegregation. On the subject of inter­
position, Almond frankly stated that;
I've tried to make it clear the question is the 
power of the federal government. I must recognize 
that no state could require a citizen to confine him­
self to state judicial remedies in solution of a fede­
ral question involving his rights.
So long as school boards are under the coercive 
powers of the court, no act can relieve the school 
board members of their responsibilities to that court 
as determined by the court.69
Governor Almond also sympathized with the Norfolk School
Board's decision to assign Negro pupils to white schools. He
later Kilpatrick publically apologized to Almond and Harri­
son. The editor explained that the Pupil Placement Act was 
an "empty thing" which had been destroyed by Judges Paul and 
Hoffman. Editorial, Ibid., September 13, 19 58, p. 8. The 
apology followed a two hour conversation between Kilpatrick, 
Almond, and Harrison in which the state officials ostensibly 
convinced the editor that the Pupil Placement Act provided 
Virginia with no legal defense. Letter, James J. Kilpatrick 
to J. Segar Gravatt, September 19, 1958, Univeristy of Vir­
ginia, Archives, Kilpatrick Letter File.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, September 3, 195 8, p. 1.
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explained that he could not "criticize a lawyer who refuses
70to advise his client to go to jail." Perhaps Almond was 
also suggesting that he had no intention of going to jail to 
satisfy massive resisters.
No powerful organization Democrat, including the Gov­
ernor, had ever offered such a candid assessment of Virginia's 
massive resistance. The Governor's observations were an ad­
mission that Virginia was at the end of the line. Yet, be­
cause of the political risks, Almond refused to call a spe­
cial session of the General Assembly, because that would show
"no faith in what we have tried to do thus far to protect our 
71schools." Politically, school closings were virtually ne­
cessary in the hope that massive resisters would be satisfied 
that the Governor had "walked the last mile" in the defense 
of segregated schools.
Two days after his press conference, Governor Almond 
succumbed to political pressure and reversed his position on 
the Pupil Placement Act. Most likely his statement of Sep­
tember 2 was a trial balloon aimed at detecting signs of sup­
port for a shift in school strategy. Speaking for massive 
resisters on September 3, Garland Gray said: "The Pupil
Placement Board was provided by the legislature to intervene 
i.n situations such as this. T support wholeheartedly the po-
717 -1- ibid.
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. . 72sition taken by the Defenders." The next day, the Governor
delivered a statement to school officials which proclaimed 
that the authority to assign students rested with the Pupil 
Placement Board. "The Court may assume the power but lacks
73the authority to make the assignment or enrollment itself."
Because of the nature of the injunctive process and the Briggs
dictum, Governor Almond advised school officials that they
were under no obligation "to operate any public school,
74whether integrated or not." Referring to state court in­
junctions in the Norfolk and Charlottesville cases, the Gov­
ernor warned that for "a school board to violate such state
injunctions . . . would be susceptible to the construction
75that the action was voluntary and wilful." Almond increased 
the pressure on school boards by reminding them that the re­
sponsibility for school closing rested on their shoulders.
He hoped that "no charge be justifiably made that any School
Board has thwarted the will of the overwhelming majority of
7 6the people of Virginia . . . "
^ Ibid. , September 4, 1958, p. 1.
73"Governor's statement of September 4, 195 8," III Race 
Rel. L. Rep. 9 59.
74T, . .Ibid.
75Ibid. In Charlottesville the judge of the corpora­
tion court issued an injunction prohibiting the local school 
board from making any assignments until October 15, 1958. 
Southern School News, vol V, No. 3 (September, 1958), p. 6.
Ibid.
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The Governor's statement won the approval of the mas­
sive resisters. Agreeing with Almond that school boards could 
not assign pupils to schools, Representative Tuck declared 
that consequently "the federal courts had no authority to
enter any orders directing them to do so, and such orders are
77a nullity and ought not to be obeyed." However, the Norfolk
School Board announced its intention to continue enrolling
7 8students under the local assignment plan. On September 18, 
Judge Hoffman ordered the admission of Negro students to Nor­
folk's white school and dissolved the state court injunc- 
79tion. On September 27, following the refusal of the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals to stay- the order to desegregate,
the Governor issued an order closing six of Norfolk's white
8 0senior and junior high schools. Ironically, all of the 
city's Negro schools opened on September 29.
The same pattern of events occurred in Charlottesville. 
After finding the local assignment plan unsatisfactory, on 
September 9, Judge John Paul ordered the admission of twelve 
Negro children to Charlottesville's white schools. Judge Paul
77Richmond News Leader, September 5, 1958, p. 1.
7 8"School Board Statement, Resolution of September 5,"
3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 950.
7 9 . . .Text of Hoffman's, opinion, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot,
September 19, 195 8, p. 12.
80School Board of the City of Norfolk v. Beckett,
3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 961 (4th Cir. 1958); "Governor Orders 
Closing of Schools," 3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 96 3.
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admitted that it was "unpleasant to be at odds with the gov­
ernment of my own state." But he did not believe that Vir­
ginians were "less able to cope with a new and different sit-
O T
uation than the people of . . . other states." Following
an unsuccessful appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Governor Almond closed two Charlottesville schools on Sep- 
8 2tember 19. Like Norfolk, neither a local assignment plan
nor the Pupil Placement Board prevented school closings in
Charlottesville.
The first school closed by Governor Almond, however,
was the Warren County High School in Front Royal. The Warren
County suit was not filed until August 29, 1958, the day the
Pupil Placement Board refused the applications of twenty-six
Negroes attempting to enter the all white high school. Since
the Negro high school students were bused out of the county
to receive their education, the suit involved a blatant case
8 3of racial discrimination. On September 8, 1958, Judge John
Paul ordered the Warren County School Board to admit twenty-
84two Negro students to the white high school. During the 
81Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, September 10, 1958, p. 1.
O O
Southern School News, Vol. V, No. 4 (October, 1958),
p . 3.
8 3Ibid., Fifty-nine Negroes were bused approximately 
fifty-five miles to Manassas Regional High School. They were 
boarded there during the week and returned home on the week­
ends. Another forty-seven Negro pupils traveled to Berry- 
ville daily, a round trip of about fifty miles.
8 4Kilby v. School Board of Warren County, 3 Race Rel.
L. Rep. 972 (W.D. Va. 1958).
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hearing Judge Paul indicated that Virginia would gain little
by postponing the desegregation order. "I think you will
agree that two or three years ago the atmosphere was much
more favorable to the acceptance of integrated schools than
it is now. The last two or three years have been consumed by
officers of the state government and politicians building hos- 
8 5tility." On September 12, Governor Almond closed the Warren
County High School following an unsuccessful appeal to the
86Fourth. Circuit Court of Appeals.
In September of 195 8 nine schools were closed in three
Virginia communities, and approximately 12,700 children were
forced out of their normal school routine. Arlington County
narrowly missed an order closing its schools. On September
17, 195 8, Judge Bryan approved the transfer of four Negro
children to white schools, but postponed their admission until
8 7mid-term since school had already started.
The only legal triumph of the massive resisters was in
the Prince Edward County case. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals had reversed Judge Hutcheson's refusal to set a date
8 8for the beginning of desegregation in the Southside County.
85Norfolk yirginian^Pilot, September 9, 19 58, p. 1.
^ Southern School News, vol. V, No. 4 (October, 1958),
p. 3.
Ibid.
O O
Allen v. School Board of Prince Edward County, 249
F. 2d. 462, (4th Cir. 1957). .
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On remand, Judge Hutcheson decided, in a rather unique opin­
ion, that the Prince Edward School Board could have until
1965, or ten years after Brown II, to comply with the deseg- 
. . 89regation decision. The ruling was based on the assumption 
that there was no evidence "that in accepting new theories of 
social and moral reform, the modern human is any more adap­
table than that of the Athenians of 500 B.C."99 Thus Judge 
Hutcheson held that Prince Edward should have ten years to 
adjust to the Brown decision, since the Athenians were given 
the same period to adjust to the laws of Solon.91 Even the 
finality of this order was qualified by the assertion that 
the court could "modify it by accelerating or extending that
date of compliance . . .  as the best interest of the parties
92and the public may appear. . . ."
The school closings meant that the Almond administra­
tion would have to find a politically graceful method of re­
opening the schools. The method settled upon was to institute 
a suit in the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals that would 
test the constitutionality of the tuition grant plan and the 
school closing legislation. The suit was expected to achieve 
two objectives. First, if the Virginia Supreme Court of
89Allen v. School Board of Prince Edward County, 164
F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Va. 1958).
90Id. at 79 2.
91Id. at 794.
92Ibid.
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Appeals declared the massive resistance legislation unconsti­
tutional, Governor Almond hoped to avoid the charge that he 
had capitulated to the federal government. The administra­
tion figured that most Virginians would accept the verdict of 
the state's, highest court on massive resistance. Second, by 
knocking down the school closing law, the Supreme Court of 
Appeals would give the tuition grant plan a new vitality. 
Almond and Harrison expected Virginia to move in the direction 
of a private school system, and they expected tuition grants 
to play an important role in such a transition. They recog­
nized, however, that tuition grants would meet with great 
difficulty in federal courts, if granted to individuals where 
no public schools existed. When State Comptroller Sidney Day 
refused to issue tuition grants- on the grounds that their re­
lationship to the school closing legislation made them uncon­
stitutional, the stage was set for the friendly suit filed by
9 3Attorney General Harrison.
Subsequent events demonstrated that the Almond-Harrison 
strategy did not have the approval of Senator Byrd, who did 
not budge from the position of massive resistance. Senator 
Byrd, Howard Smith, Bill Tuck and their followers wanted Gov­
ernor Almond to meet the federal authorities at the school 
house door. Nevertheless, the Attorney General attempted to 
explain the purpose of Harrison v. Day to the Senator.
93Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, September 14, 195 8, p. 1.
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Harrison wrote;
It was certain that suits, were going to be filed 
in the Federal courts attacking the school closing law 
and the fund cut-off law-. We felt that we would have 
no chance whatever of sustaining these laws in the 
Federal courts, and, furthermore, that if the laws were 
to be tested, such test should come in the State’s own 
appellate court.94
Several months later, the Attorney- General admitted that the
administration held out little hope for a favorable verdict in
. . 95the Virginia Supreme Court.
Though Almond expected the state and federal courts to 
knock down the school closing legislation, he failed to pre­
pare Virginians for the end of massive resistance. The Gover­
nor instead continued to engage in race—baiting and discour­
aged any discussion of compromise. If Virginia surrendered, 
Almond predicted that the state would be left "in the defense­
less position of having white teachers teaching Negroes and
96Negro teachers teaching white pupils." After nine Virginia 
schools were closed, Almond pledged; "I will never volun­
tarily yield to that which I am convinced will destroy our
97 . •public school system." Unwilling to accept any responsibi­
lity for the closed schools, the Governor asserted; "If
9 4Albertis S. Harrison, Jr., to Harry F. Byrd, Septem­
ber 22, 195 8, University of Virginia, Archives, September 22, 
195 8, Smith Letter File.
95Albertis S'- Harrison, Jr. , to Harry F. Byrd, Janu­
ary 6, 1959., University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter 
File.
9 6Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, September 17, 195 8, p. 1.
97Ibid., October 1, 1958, p. 1.
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public education is destroyed in Virginia, the sole responsi­
bility for that unhappy and tragic event must rest and abide
with those official and unofficial, who have confederated to-
9 8gether to achieve that result." Governor Almond did not 
want to expose himself to charges of capitulating to the Fed­
eral Government. Besides, he had built up the hopes of many 
a segregationist by promising that he had a plan to preserve 
segregated schools. By yielding reluctantly to the verdict 
of Virginia's, highest court, Almond hoped to end massive re­
sistance without splitting the organization. Ultimately the 
plan failed.
One development that Almond and other organization men 
hoped to avoid was voluntary' desegregation by a Virginia city 
or county. Massive resistance had been sold on the principle 
that it had the support of the entire state. After the high 
school in Front Royal was closed, Almond urged all the coun­
ties to "stand firm in this crisis so the state may utilize
every avenue possible to prevent the destruction of public
99schools in Virginia." While Virginia had pictured itself 
as the defender of the states against an oppressive federal 
government, ironically it was, for the moment, completely in­
sensitive to local differences within the state. Discoura­
ging local action, Almond said; "Tfie political subdivisions
98.,., •Ibid.
^ Ibid. , September 17, 1958, p. 1.
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are creatures of the people through the General Assembly with 
the people retaining all the powers unless they have con­
ferred them in the General Assembly to exercise. On this
point the News Leader was characteristically blunt. It sim­
ply stated that
there's no such thing as local rights. The localities 
exist by sufference of the State as a whole. Whatever 
rights the counties and cities have are no more than 
revocable privileges, and it might be just as well, at 
this particular time.
Former Governor Tuck was even more forceful in his disappro­
val of independent local action against state policy. "Some
don't want to stand. As much as I love local self-government,
102I say if they don't want to stand make them stand." The
News Leader, which had prided itself on raising transcendent 
principles, also appealed to white racism in order to discou­
rage local action. It made the familiar argument that "Our
society is predicated upon the maintenance of a social wall
103between the races." This principle was bolstered by sta­
tistics demonstrating that the role of illegitimate births 
among Negroes far exceeded that of whites. In Warren County, 
for example, the editor emphasized that one of four Warren
loo.,., . j Ibid.
^Editorial, Richmond News Leader, September 8, 1958,
p. 12.
10?Richmond News Leader, November 13, 1958, p. 5.
103Editorial, Ibid., September 15, p. 10.
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. . 104Negroes was illegitimate.
If the localities were not to be permitted to deal 
with their problems, what solution did the state offer? Re­
jecting interposition, the Governor and his advisers thought 
more seriously about encouraging the conversion of Virginia's
public school system to a private school system over a period of 
105years. From 1954 through the Gray Plan, some form of pri­
vate education had been contemplated. Amending Section 141 
had been done in recognition of the financial difficulties 
related to the establishment of private schools. The con­
stitutionality of tuition grants was vital to the transition 
to private schools. More so was the willingness of Virginians 
to put up with the Spartan conditions characteristic of such 
a venture.
Private school foundations sprouted in Charlottesville, 
Arlington, Warren County and N o r f o l k . G e n e r a l l y  classes 
were held in vacant homes and other make-shift buildings. 
Governor Almond made a concerted effort to encourage the pri­
vate school experiment. "From the standpoint of culture, re­
finement, education, patriotsm and loyalty," he predicted
105 . . .Norfolk Vircrinian-Pilot, September 17, 1958, p. 1.
■^^Since Prince Edward County was not forced to dese­
gregate in the fall of 1958, it held its plans for private 
schools in reserve.
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107that Virginia's future citizens would not be inferior.
Yet the early experiments demonstrated that private education 
could not win widespread support except in towns and small 
cities. In communities like Charlottesville, Front Royal in 
Warren County and Farmville in Prince Edward County, leaders 
of private school movements found it easier to mobilize the 
community. Carpenters, bricklayers, and other skilled wor­
kers were willing to donate their services in order to main­
tain segregated schools.
The city of Norfolk demonstrated the difficulty of 
converting to a private school system in a large metropolitan 
area. A booming seaport, businessmen feared that closed 
schools would prompt the Navy to loosen its connections with 
the community, and discourage private industry from moving 
into the area. Though reluctant to take a public stand, Nor­
folk businessmen, like their colleagues throughout the state,
eventually used their influence to urge the re-opening of the
109closed public schools. Though at times curiously apathe-
1Q7 . .Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, September 26, 195 8, p. 1.
10 8Bob Smith, They Closed Their Schools CChapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1965), pp. 163-168. A 
similar effort is described by Clyde Walter Mathews, A Study 
of the Political and Economic Effects of School Integration 
on Front Royal and Warren County, Virginia. M.A. Thesis,
East Carolina College, 196 3.
109Luther j. Carter, ’Desegregation in Norfolk,” The 
South Atlantic Quarterly 58 (Autumn, 1959), 507-520. A hun- 
dred prominent businessmen signed a full page advertisement 
supporting public schools which appeared in both. Norfolk 
papers on January 26, 1959, after state and federal courts 
had knocked down the school closing laws. Businessmen,
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tic about the future of their public schools, the citizens of 
Norfolk indicated that they would not support a private 
school system. A private school corporation in Norfolk was 
able to raise only fourteen thousand dollars in a fund drive 
advertised as a test of strength for the private school move-
Another crucial factor in any private school operation 
was the attitude of the public school teachers. In the case 
of Virginia, as in other Southern states, the teachers had to 
make a choice between supporting public education or the 
racial mores of the community. In Norfolk, the teachers 
voted to support desegregated schools if they could not be 
reopened on any other basis.Furthermore, Norfolk 
teachers refused to teach in the private schools organized by 
the Tidewater Educational Foundation, and only reluctantly
Carter argued, feared the General Assembly would withdraw 
their support for the port and highway improvements prior to 
the court decisions (p. 518).
~^^Ibid., p. 519. An example of Norfolk's apathy was 
the sparse participation of the city's voters on a referendum 
held on November 18, 1958. The referendum asked the voters 
whether or not they wished the control of the schools returned 
to the city on an integrated basis and at increased expense. 
Only twenty-one thousand of some fifty thousand qualified vo­
ters participated in the referendum. By a vote of 12,340 to 
8,172, the citizens of Norfolk preferred to keep the schools 
under state authority. Since the question presented to the 
voters was drafted to encourage this result, the meaning of 
the referendum was unclear. (Carter, p. 515).
Washington Post, October 5, 1958, p. 1. On October 
4, the Norfolk Education Association voted 4-1 in favor of 
desegregation, if schools could not be opened otherwise.
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agreed to supervise tutoring groups. Neither substitute, the
Norfolk teachers held, could "adequately and efficiently re-
112place our public schools." The stand taken by the Norfolk
teachers earned the rebuke of Representative Tuck who charged 
that the teachers were, "unwilling to stand up for prin­
ciples. . . . "  had "little devotion to the great profession to 
which they belong . . . "  and were "undertaking to coerce them 
Ithe children] to return to integrated schools." The result, 
Tuck predicted, would be to "make of our little, children a
seed bed for the infiltration and implantation of spurious
113views and doctrines." In contrast, the teachers in small
cities and towns like Farmville and Front Royal moved more
114easily from public to private schools.
Up to the fall of 1958, the Virginia Education Associ- 
ation had been extremely cautious regarding its statements on 
massive resistance. Nevertheless, on October 30, the VEA 
passed a resolution by a 4-1 margin which expressed "grave 
concern" over the school closings and asked for a special 
legislative assembly which would "assure the continued opera­
tion of the Virginia public schools as a state supported func- 
115tion." The vote was taken after the teachers listened to
112Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 9, 195 8, p. 1.
113Richmond News Leader, November 13, 195 8, p. 5.
■^^Smith., p, 16.8,
1 1 6 Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, October 31, 195 8, p. 1.
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the Governor condemn the NAACP, elaborate on the penalties of 
mixed faculties, and describe the Supreme Court as a "cancer 
gnawing at the heart of our constitution.” On the follow­
ing day, Lieutenant Governor A.E.S. Stephens observed dejec­
tedly "when you pick up a newspaper and see that a large body
of teachers has voted not to parti.ci.pate in a private school
117movement, you ask yourself 'where is their loyalty.'"
The private school movement received other jolts. In 
Charlottesville and Warren County, Judge Paul enjoined pri­
vate schools from employing publicly paid teachers idled by
118the school closing. Also the Virginia Congress of Parents
and Teachers defeated a resolution supporting massive resis­
tance by a tie vote, 55 7-557. It then adopted a resolution
119m  favor of local option by a narrow 515-513 margin.
These votes came after Almond promised that he would not per­
mit white and colored to be taught together in the public
, , 120 schools.
By mid-October the Virginia press, with, the exception
of the Richmond dailies, had turned against massive resis- 
121tance. Finally in mid-November the News Leader and the
116 -r, .Ibid.
117Richmond Times^Dispatch, November 1, 195 8, p. 1.
118Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, October 9, 1959, p. 1.
119Ibid., October 23, 195 8, p. 1.
1 20Richmond Times-Djspa,tch, Octoher 21, 1958, p. 1.
121Muse, p. 96. In November businessmen also applied 
pressure on Almond to open the schools. Generally they were
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Times-Dispatch called for a change in strategy. Editor 
Kilpatrick wrote that such Supreme Court rulings as Cooper v. 
Aaron meant that Virginia had to abandon its legal position. 
The 1956 laws, he continued, had accomplished their goal 
which was "to deter integration and to buy time." Kilpatrick 
urged Virginia to move in the direction of a private school 
system based on tuition grants. To guarantee the constitu­
tionality of the grants he cautioned that they should not be 
"geared in any way to the integration controversy." The com­
bination of tuition grants and private schools provided Vir­
ginia’s only hope of maintaining "both segregation . . . and
122education m  the indefinite future." Although a private
school policy would damage public education, the editor con­
cluded that considering the threat of integration to society,
123"such a prospect no longer holds great terrors."
Although the News Leader was resigned to the destruc­
tion of the 19 56 legislation, it was not giving up the battle 
against the Supreme Court. One of the keys to the new defen­
sive strategy was a "policy of studied contempt by the State
124for the Supreme Court." In contriving litigation and leg-
concerned about the cost of private education and the regres­
sive effect of closed public schools on the economy (Muse,
pp. 106-10, 120-21).
122Editorial, Richmond News Leader, November 12, 1958,
p. 10.
12 3Ibid., November 13, 1958, p. 12.
1 24 Ibid., November 10, 1958, p. 10.
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islation, Kilpatrick thought in terms of prolonged struggle.
In a debate with Thurgood Marshall, Kilpatrick said:
The hope of the white South is that in time— over 
the next fifteen years or so-—the rest of the country 
will awaken to the damage that is done to constitu­
tional government by the usurpation of the Supreme 
Court.125
Although the South.1 s economy and race relations might be dam­
aged, Kilpatrick, believed this preferable to 1 the evils of 
race mixing." The Richmond editor predicted that Thurgood 
Marshall had "won the last inch of ground he will win 
easily."126
Governor Almond took advantage of the shift in edito­
rial policy to announce a new plan. Responding to a sugges­
tion offered by a Richmond Times-Dispatch editorial, Almond 
said that he would select a new school study commission if
Virginia's school closing laws were knocked down by the 
127courts. Since the laws were, expected to be invalidated,
the prospect of returning to some form of a placement plan 
seemed imminent. Governor Almond, at the last moment, admit­
ted that "it's very probable that there will be Negro chil­
dren in the schools in Norfolk, Charlottesville and perhaps 
everywhere." He confessed that after the massive resistance
125Charleston News and Courier, November 17, 195 8, in 
Facts on Film.
126T, .Ibid.
127Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 13, 195 8, p. 1.
128laws, "I have no weapon left."
Byrd, Tuck and Abbi.tt did not share Almond's resign^-
ation over the fate of massive resistance. Tuck refused to
make any concession and promised to support "every firm and
determined effort to prevent mixing of the races in our
schools. If we shed the armor of principle, there is nothing
129for which to fight." If integration was forced by the
courts, Representative Abbitt thought "the Negro schools 
would be closed and the whites will educate their children in 
private schools. There is plenty of m o n e y . T h e  refusal 
of the organization hierarchy to turn away from massive res­
istance would plague Almond to the end of his administration.
After one year in office, Almond's promise to preserve 
segregated education was all but shattered. The most glaring 
fault of the Governor's first year was his failure to prepare 
the Old Dominion for the end of massive resistance. As a 
lawyer, he recognized the limitations of Virginia's power to 
obstruct a federal court order to desegregate. But, with the 
exception of one brief attempt, at the beginning of Septem^ 
ber, Almond spoke the rhetoric of resistance. In his heart, 
no doubt, Almond wished he could make good his campaign prom­
ises. More importantly, the Governor recognized that to pro­
claim the end of massive resistance meant breaking with.
N^orfolk Virginian^Pllot, January 4, 1959, p. 1. 
129Ibid., November 13, 195 8, p. 1.
~^2^Pbid. , January 4, 1959, p. 1.
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Senator Byrd and the heart of the Democratic organization.
Governor Almond was partly responsible for his predica­
ment. The Governor h.ad led the politicians and the people to 
believe that he had a variety of tactics in his legal arsenal. 
But by 195 8, the federal courts, had cut through, a variety of 
legal obstacles to desegregation which., in turn, triggered 
Virginia's, school closing laws in three communities. Of the 
12,70 0 students barred from their regular classes, 10,000 
were from Norfolk. The resort to makeshift classrooms, espe­
cially in Norfolk, was terribly inadequate. Confronted with 
the consequences of the 1956 legislation, the Governor saw 
that outside of the Southsi.de, most Virginians would not 
accept such chaos. Thus, Almond moved in the direction of a 
return to local assignment and tuition grants. A decision by 
the Virginia Supreme Court was expected to give Almond the 
political leverage to lead Virginia out of massive resistance.
CHAPTER VIII
RETURN TO LOCAL OPTION
On January 19, 1959, the Virginia Supreme Court of Ap­
peals declared the legal foundation of massive resistance un­
constitutional.'*' In a 5-2 decision, the majority of the jus­
tices rejected Attorney General Harrison's argument that a 
conditional relationship existed between Section 129, which 
provided for a statewide system of public schools, and Sec­
tion 140, which had required the separation of races in the 
public schools. Consequently, the court held that when Sec­
tion 140 was invalidated by the Brown decision, Section 129
was left unaffected, since the two sections were "independent 
2
and separable." The court also found that the school clo­
sing and fund cutoff statutes were prohibited by the Consti­
tution of Virginia, since they left the public schools with­
out the support required by Section 129. Virginia, the court 
ruled, "must support such public free schools in the State as 
are necessary to an efficient system, including those in 
which the pupils of both, races are compelled to be enrolled
■^Harrison v. Day, 106 S. E. 2d 6 36 (Va. Sup. Ct. App. ,
1959) .
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and taught together, however unfortunate that situation may 
be." An "efficient system," the court continued, was to be 
determined by the number of teachers and the quality of the 
facilities, rather than by its racial composition. Finally, 
the tuition grant plan was invalidated on the grounds that 
supporting funds ware derived from money normally appropriated 
for the public schools. however, if properly appropriated, 
the. court had no objection to tuition grants per se/ Thus 
the Governor and General Assembly were assured that an amended 
tuition grant plan would be endorsed by the state court. In 
its concluding remarks the court sympathized with Virginia's 
political leaders. The majority opinion attacked the United 
States Supreme Court's "lack of judicial restraint evinced . . 
. in trespassing on the sovereign rights of this Common­
wealth." The legislation passed by the General Assembly was
described as "an understandable effort to diminish the evils
5
expected from the decision in the Brown case."
On the same day that the Virginia Supreme Court issued 
its decision, a three-judge federal district court in James v. 
Almond enjoined the enforcement of the school closing laws in 
Norfolk.^ In a per curiam opinion the court ruled that Vir-
3Id. at 646.
4Id. at 645, 647.
5Id. at 64 7.
^James v. A,lmond, 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va, 1959) .
This suit was instituted by a group of white parents. See 
Paul L. Puryear, "The Implementation of the Desegregation De-
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ginia violated the equal protection and due process clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment by closing some Norfolk public
schools while maintaining others. The court added: "We do
not suggest that, aside from the Constitution of Virginia, the
state must maintain a public school system. That is a matter
7for state determination." But as long as Virginia operated a 
public school system, schools could not be selectively closed 
for racial reasons. Even if Virginia withdrew its support 
from public schools, the court held that while the schools 
relied on public funds, localities would be required to satis-
Q
fy the Fourteenth Amendment.
Governor Almond was expected to acquiese in the state 
court's ruling. The Richmond News Leader accepted the judi­
cial verdict and seemed to be clearing a path for Almond's re­
treat from massive resistance. Editor Kilpatrick wrote:
"The slate is clean now, and for our own part we have no re­
grets. These laws were intended to interpose the power of the 
State between Federal courts and local school officials; the 
laws were intended, in Madison's famous phrase, 'to arrest the
progress of the evil1 and this they have done. Let them rest 
9
m  peace." ■ Yet, to the astonishment of most political anal-
cision in the Federal Courts of Virginia: A Case Study of
Legal Resistance to Federal Authority" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Chicago, 1960), pp. 344-47.
^Id. at 337.
8Id. at 338.
9 .Richmond News Leader, January 20, 1959, p. 10.
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ysts, on the evening of January 20, Governor Almond told a 
state audience that: "We have just begun to fight." The 
Governor said he would not surrender to amalgamationists and 
those who closed "their eyes to the livid stench of sadism, 
sex, immorality and juvenile pregnancy infesting the mixed 
schools of the District of Columbia and elsewhere. . . . "
Once more Almond promised not to "break faith" with the people 
of Virginia who elected him.^
The speech was a political blunder. Besides passing up 
the opportunity provided by Harrison v. Day to retreat grace­
fully, Governor Almond once again raised the false hope that 
somehow desegregation could be prevented. Five years later, 
Almond explained that fatigue and tension were responsible for
the slip. "My underlying thought and motivation was to show
11the people that we had done everything we could do." Byrd,
Tuck, and Abbitt enthusiastically endorsed Almond’s January
. 12remarks.
One week later massive resisters were furious when Gover­
nor Almond reported to an extra session of the General Assembly 
that the state and federal court decisions meant that some 
Virginia public schools would be integrated in February of 
1959. During his speech, Almond recommended the repeal of the 
compulsory school statute, asked for immediate action on
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, January 21, 1959, p. 1. 
^^Ibid., June 9, 1964, p. 1.
^Muse, p. 129; Wilkinson, 146.
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a new tuition grant plan unrelated to public school funds, 
encouraged the development of private education, suggested 
the passage of stricter laws associated with school violence 
and announced his intention to appoint a commission to study 
a variety of problems associated with public education. With 
the exception of his emergency recommendations, Almond asked
the legislature to recess until the commission made its re-
. 13 port.
In addition to outlining his school proposals, Almond 
devoted considerable time to defending his management of mas­
sive resistance. He was most concerned about the charges 
that neither the Governor nor the Attorney General had ex­
hausted their options in maintaining segregated schools. Ex­
ercising the police power, interposing the Pupil Placement 
Board, or locking the school doors, Almond explained, could 
not save Virginia from the effects of a Federal Court order. 
Placing his past promise to save Virginia's segregated 
schools in the background, he said: "I have repeatedly stated 
that I did not possess the power and knew of none that could
be evolved that would enable Virginia to overthrow or negate
14the overriding power of the Federal Government." Anticipa­
ting a fierce struggle in the extra session, the Governor
13"Address to the General Assembly," January 28, 1959, 
in Inaugural Address and Addresses delivered to the General 
Assembly of Virginia by J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., 1958-1962 
(Commonwealth of Virginia: Division of Purchase and Print-
ing,) pp. 3-10.
14Ibid., p . 9.
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hoped that the legislators would not allow their convictions
to jeopardize the future of Virginia. The plea was to no
avail as the General Assembly readied itself for a bitter
ISstruggle on the future of Virginia's public schools.
Except for bitter-end segregationists, Virginians in­
dicated that Almond's position was realistic. The Richmond 
Times-Dispatch applauded the Governor's approach to the 
school problem. "It has taken great courage on the part of 
Governor Almond to accept the reality of our situation, and 
to avoid mere theatrics of resistance, which would accomplish
nothing except the loss of dignity for the state as a 
16whole." Considering the unfavorable reaction throughout 
the nation to continued resistance, the News Leader also sup­
ported the Governor's proposals as "the wise man's course."
Kilpatrick reminded his readers "that it is in the rest of
17the country that ultimately the war must be won."
The Richmond dailies emphasized that some school de­
segregation must not be construed as evidence of a change of 
heart in Virginia. "The simple fact is that we have come to 
another stage in our resistance program," observed the Times-
^5Ibid., p. 10.
"^Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 31,
1959, p. 6. On February 4 the Times-Dispatch published edi­
torials from around the state supporting Governor Almond. On 
February 2 the results of a public opinion poll showed two to 
one support for Almond.
17Editorial, Richmond News Leader, January 29, 1959,
p. 12.
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18
Dispatch. The editor predicted that the experience of 
Washington, D „C. would not be duplicated 1 if Virginia con­
tinues to fight with the will and determination shown in the
19past four years." Echoing the morning newspaper, the News 
Leader added that "Virginia does not submit to integration in
the thought that race-mixing is morally right, because we
. . 20conceive race-mixing to be morally wrong." Virginia, the
editor emphasized, was merely acquiescing to a superior 
force.^
Following Governor Almond's speech, the General Assem­
bly went to work on his recommendations amid rumors that 
rabid segregationists intended to place the blame for dese­
gregation on Almond's shoulders. Nevertheless, legislators 
supporting the Governor easily passed tuition grant legisla­
tion, repealed the compulsory attendance law and made bombing
22threats unlawful. Simultaneously the Almond forces were 
beating back legislative attempts by the segregationist bloc 
to restore massive resistance. A bill sponsored by Garland
18Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 31, 
1959, p. 6.
19,..Ibid.
20Editorial, Richmond News Leader, February 2, 1959,
p. 10.
2L,Ibid.
22Acts of the General Assembly, Chapters 1-4, Extra
Sess., 1959, pp. 3-5, 76,77.
241
Gray which would have placed all school funds in the hands of
the Governor, who was to distribute the money to segregated
23schools only, was killed in the Senate Finance Committee. 
Another bill giving the Governor the power to close ineffi­
cient, in other words integrated schools, was defeated in the
24-Senate by a vote of 17 to 22.
On February 2, the legislature recessed until March 31 
when the assembly reconvened to consider the report of the 
school study commission. On the same day that the legisla­
ture recessed, Negro students, for the first time in Vir­
ginia's history, entered white public schools without inci- 
25dent. Assessing the day's events, the Times-Dispatch 
viewed the lack of violence in Arlington and Norfolk as con­
sistent with "the reputation of Virginia for law and 
2 6order." Virginia's nonviolent tradition combined with 
Governor Almond's program, the editor predicted, would result 
in the "orderly containment of the amount of integration in
23Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 1, 1959, p. 1.
24Ibid., February 3, 1959, p. 1.
25 - .Ibid.
2 6Editorial, Ibid., p. 12. On February 10, Alexandria 
desegregated its public schools. On February 18, Warren Coun 
ty High School opened its doors to 21 Negroes, but none of 
the white students returned. Over four hundred white stu­
dents returned in September, 1959. Southern School News, 
vol. V, No. 9 (March, 1959), p. 14. Charlottesville was per­
mitted to reopen its schools on a segregated basis until Sep­
tember, after submitting an acceptable plan for desegregating 
the schools with the federal courts. Southern School News, 
vol. V, No. 8 (February, 1959), p. 1.
27the schools of the Commonwealth.1
The first victories of the Almond forces and the inte­
gration of the Commonwealth's public schools were bitterly 
received by the Southside delegation. State Senator Mills 
Godwin, who was a champion of massive resistance, believed 
that with the integration of Virginia's public schools "the
2 8rape of our constitutional rights is an accomplished fact."
In reviewing the past three years, Godwin said: "And let it
be firmly understood that those of us who support the massive
resistance laws . . . have no apology to make. We would
gladly do so over again and we believe the people of Virginia
29would give us their full support." Joined by other extreme 
segregationists, Godwin promised to continue the search for 
new anti-integration legislation. The refusal of the con­
servative wing of the Byrd organization to surrender was a 
portent of future legislative battles over school legisla­
tion.
On February 4, Governor Almond appointed forty legis­
lators to devise a program for Virginia's public schools 
which would minimize desegregation. Unlike the Gray Commis­
sion, which had been heavily weighted in favor of the South- 
side, this Commission had four representatives from each
27 'Ibid.
243
congressional district. Almond named Mosby G. Perrow, Jr.,
30of Lynchburg the chairman of the study commission. Senator 
Perrow joined a small cadre of normally loyal organization 
men who supported the Governor throughout the special sess­
ion.
The format of the Perrow Commission was similar to the 
Gray Commission. One public hearing was held, but the subs­
tantive issues were hammered out in private meetings. Ironi­
cally, the conservative leadership of the organization at­
tacked the Commission for its closed meetings. To meet the 
charge, Perrow invited Representatives Tuck and Abbitt to 
appear before the commission and offer their suggestions.
Both men rejected the offer and claimed that no solution 
could be found to Virginia’s problems until the meetings were 
open to the public. Tuck described the "so-called program of
'containment111 as a "subterfuge and another name for integra- 
39tion."
The major objective of the bitter-enders was to per­
suade the Perrow Commission to recommend an amendment re­
pealing Section 129. In a letter to Perrow, Representative 
Howard W. Smith placed all his prestige behind such an ac­
tion. Repeal of 129, Smith argued, would "leave to the elec­
torate and to their elected Legislature complete freedom of
30Ibid., February 5, 1959, p. 1.
^Muse, p. 163.
32 .Norfolk Vircrinian-Pilot, March 5, 1959, p. 1.
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action to determine their future course." Significantly, he 
added that this "would not mean the abolition of public edu­
cation, unless the people of Virginia who have the right to 
make the determination should so decide." Congressman Smith 
thought that Virginia had a choice between "private schools 
with tuition grants from the State, or integration. You and
I know that the agitators from without the State who exert a
33powerful xnfluence will not submit to token integration."
The Richmond News Leader joined the proponents of re­
pealing Section 129. "So long as it remains on the books, 
members of the General Assemhly are caught in a dilemma by 
which they stand legally obligated to support schools that 
they morally cannot support. Abolishing Section 129 was
directly related to the private school movement championed by 
segregationists. As long as the obligation to provide a sys­
tem of public schools remained, Kilpatrick warned that the 
tuition grant plan was in legal trouble. Dropping Section 
129, the News Leader explained, was consistent with Vir­
ginia's effort "to minimize the consequences of these rulings
[Harrison v. Day and James v. Almond] and to delay their im-
35pact until new defensive steps can be taken."
3 3Letter, Howard W. Smith to Mosby G. Perrow, Jr., 
March 5, 1959, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter 
File.
34Editorial, Richmond News Leader, January 20, 1959,
p. 10.
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To editor Kilpatrick, the construction of "genuinely
private schools" offered "a strategic concept on which a pro-
3 6longed war may be waged." Furthermore, private schools 
were glamorized as experiments in progressive education. 
Public schools supposedly would profit from the competition 
provided by private schools. The editor predicted that the 
possible result in ten or twenty years could be "a truly out­
standing system of schools in Virginia— some public, some
37private— and all geared to community wishes."
While massive resisters favored the repeal of Section
129, Governor Almond cautioned the Perrow Commission against
3 8that alternative. Public education, the Governor stressed,
39was vital to Virginia's economic progress. Before the 
Perrow Commission, Almond and Attorney General Harrison urged 
the adoption of a school plan that supported continued public 
education, but which also provided for local option, facili­
tated the development of private schools and generally guar-
40anteed no enforced integration.
While the Perrow Commission met, Roy Wilkins,
^Editorial, Ibid. , January 29, 1959, p. 2.
37Editorial, Ibid., February 11, 19 59, p. 11.
3 8Minutes of the Perrow Commission, February 11, 1959, 
Whitehead Letter File.
39Lorin A. Thompson, "Virginia Education Crisis and 
Its Economic Aspects," New South, 14 (February, 1959), 
pp. 3-8.
40Minutes, Whitehead Letter File.
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Executive Secretary of the NAACP, created a storm by urging
Virginia's Negroes to apply to white schools "not by twos and
41threes, but by the hundreds." Even among Virginia's white
moderates this reminder to Negroes that they could not relax
their efforts following the demise of massive resistance was
considered extremely dangerous. Robert Whitehead, who was
considered a moderate, thought the "NAACP and some of the
Federal judges as dangerous as the die-hard segregation- 
42ists." In a letter to Oliver Hill, Whitehead urged the 
NAACP to be less forceful in its demands and described Wil­
kin's speech as "harmful and detrimental and contrary to the
43best interest of all concerned."
Hill and Wilkins disagreed categorically with White­
head. Wilkins pointed out that in Norfolk, of the 151 Negro 
children who applied for transfers to white schools, only 17 
had been accepted. At this rate, 2500 Negroes would have to 
apply to secure 250 admissions amounting to only two and one- 
half percent of the total white enrollment. The essence of 
Wilkins' argument was that "we must encourage a substantial 
number of applications in order to secure more than a mere
^^Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, February 16 , 1959, p. 1.
42 .Letter, Robert Whitehead to Colonel Francis Pickens
Miller, University of Virginia, Archives, Whitehead Letter
File.
^Letter, Robert Whitehead to Oliver W. Hill, Mr. 
Spottswood W. Robinson, III, Dr. J.M. Tinsley, February 17, 
1959, University of Virginia, Archives, Whitehead Letter 
File.
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trickle of admissions.M^  Hill explained: "For Negroes to
lie quietly and pretend to be satisfied with token desegrega­
tion would not only be dishonest, but it would not accomplish 
anything of a constructive nature." To Hill, the only true 
friends of public education were those who firmly believed
"in our Declaration of Independence . . . guaranteed by the
45Constitution of the United States."
Moderate segregationists, like Robert Whitehead, 
feared the white reaction to Negro objectives would streng­
then the position of the rabid segregationists in the General 
Assembly. For example, State Senator Godwin immediately at­
tacked Wilkins' statement and asked:
Virginia and her leaders to stand fast, resist with 
courage, assert her constitutional rights.
We must be willing to make some sacrifices and 
take such, actions as a deplorable situation demands.
To do less would make us summer patriots and un­
worthy of our heritage as Virginians.46
Other critics of Wilkins seemed to believe that desegregation 
above token levels would precipitate white flight from the 
public schools,. No legislator disagreed with Robert F. Wil­
liams, the Executive Secretary of the Virginia Education 
Association, when he appealed to Negro parents to practice
44Letter, Roy Wilkins to Robert Whitehead, February 26, 
1959, University of Virginia, Archives, Whitehead Letter 
File.
45Letter, Oliver Hill to Robert Whitehead, February 20, 
1959, University of Virginia, Archives, Whitehead Letter 
File.
46Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, February 17, 1959, p. 1.
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"massive voluntary segregation to help insure free mass edu-
47cation." The plea was virtually identical to Governor
Stanley's request in his May, 1954, meeting with Negro
48leaders. The end of massive resistance was reminiscent of 
the reaction to the Brown decision. White leadership con­
tinued to counsel their black counterparts to be satisfied 
with the form rather than the substance of their victory.
The unwillingness of the Negro leaders to drop their 
efforts to make the Brown decision a reality prompted a vic­
ious attack on the NAACP by the News Leader. The assault was 
sparked by Oliver Hill's remark that communication between 
whites and Negroes broken by massive resistance could "easily 
be reunited once the white people decide to work construc­
tively upon the problems, real and fancied, incident to the
49elimination of racial segregation." Editor Kilpatrick ob­
jected that white citizens had done enough since they had 
carried "the social burden of Negro crime, Negro illegiti­
macy, and Negro disease." The responsibility for the break­
down of race relations was Oliver Hill's, asserted Kilpat­
rick, for "coercing the white people, in disrupting their 
schools, in tearing old relationships to shreds." The only
47Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 5, 1959, p. 1.
48~See supra, p. 32.
49Editorial, Richmond News Leader, January 30, 1959, 
p. 10. Hill made the statement during a radio broadcast fol­
lowing Governor Almond's speech of January 20, 1959.
goal of Hill and the NAACP, explained Kilpatrick, was "to ram
total integration down the throats of white people utterly
50unwilling to accept it."
As a result of the furor raised by massive resistance, 
white political leaders demonstrated little confidence in 
Virginia's ability to desegregate beyond a token level. 
Fearful of further exploitation of the race issue, moderate 
segregationists hoped that the NAACP would slow down its 
legal efforts. Simultaneously, segregationists like Kilpat­
rick, continued to describe Virginia's problems as the result 
of the unreasonable policies of the NAACP. On the other 
hand, Negro leaders, given the experience of desegregation, 
were convinced that their goals could be achieved only by 
continued pressure. Oliver Hill promised that there would be
"no let up in the activities of Negroes until we are granted
51the full and unremitted rights of an American citizen."
On March 6, the Perrow Commission held its only public
hearing. Although the entire spectrum of opinion was heard,
the so-called freedom-of-choice plan championed by Leon Dure,
a former journalist turned gentleman farmer, attracted the
52greatest attention. Dure did not attack desegregated
5 0 -T-I .Ibid.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, March 7, 1959, p. 1.
52Muse, 161; Southern School News, Vol. VII, No. 10 
(April, 1961), p. 7. Dure launched a one man campaign on be­
half of "Freedom of choice" and freedom of association.
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education, but argued instead that every student should have 
the opportunity to receive a tuition grant in order to facil­
itate enrollment in a qualified private school, regardless of
religious affiliation, if he desired to leave the public 
53schools. The theoretical basis of freedom of choice, ac­
cording to Dure, was the supposed "right" of association or 
disassociation which Dure contended was guaranteed by the 
First Amendment. As a result of compulsory attendance laws, 
Dure argued, the freedom to associate or disassociate, had 
been surrendered, with the exception of the well-to-do who 
could afford the expense of private education. Tuition 
grants, he believed, would restore freedom of choice and 
negate the advantages of wealth. By distributing the grants 
to the individual student rather than the private school,
Dure believed Virginia could avoid the expanding definition
54of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Freedom of choice was appealing for several reasons. 
First, the idea permitted segregationists to obscure their 
intense racial opposition to desegregation by an appeal to 
more neutral abstract principles. Second, freedom of choice 
financed by tuition grants offered a method of underwriting 
the private school movement. Finally, some were attracted to 
the plan as a means for reducing the opposition to even token
53Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 7, 1959, p. 1.
54Leon Dure, "Individual Freedom Versus State Action," 
Virginia Quarterly Review, 38 (Summer, 1962), pp. 400-09.
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desegregation.
Two University of Virginia law professors, Dean F.D.G. 
Ribble and Hardy Cross Dillard, expressed their doubts con­
cerning the constitutionality of the tuition grant plan.
Dean Ribble predicted the invalidation of the program by the 
federal courts unless it was part of a general scheme to ac­
hieve desegregation. Professor Dillard thought that the 
Supreme Court's decision upholding an Alabama pupil assign­
ment plan offered Virginia a better formula for controlling
55the rate of desegregation. Dillard also believed that the 
federal courts examined the consequences as well as the mo­
tives of school legislation. If the result of the tuition
grant policy was the perpetuation of segregated schools, Dil-
56lard expected the grants to be declared unconstitutional.
The NAACP also registered its objection to the estab­
lishment of a tuition grant program. "No one in a democratic
society has the right to have his private prejudices financed
57at public expense," declared Oliver Hill.
For the remainder of March, the Perrow Commission 
worked on a school plan. At the same time, the massive re­
sisters made one final bid to influence the Governor and the
55Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 7, 1959, p. 1. The 
Alabama case was Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Educa­
tion of Jefferson County, 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
56Hardy Cross Dillard "Freedom of Choice and Democra­
tic Values," Virginia Quarterly Review, 38 (Summer, 1962), 
pp. 410-35.
57Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 7, 1959, p. 1.
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Legislature. Dominated by the Defenders and supported by 
Southside Virginia, an organization entitled the "Bill of 
Rights Crusade" sponsored a march to Richmond. On March 31, 
a crowd estimated at 5,000, mostly from the Southside, occu­
pied Capitol Square demanding the General Assembly to invoke 
the resolution of interposition. The rally proved to be un­
successful and marked the decline in number and influence of
58Defender-type rallies.
The next day, April 1, the Governor released the re­
port of the Perrow Commission signed by thirty-one of the 
forty members. Before making their recommendations the com­
mission members denounced integration, but found that Vir­
ginia had exhausted every legal means of resistance in the
59face of the superior force of the Federal Government. Turn' 
ing to the future of Virginia's schools, the Perrow Commis­
sion recommended a package of bills which permitted the lo­
calities to choose whether or not they wished to desegregate. 
In localities which desegregated, scholarships were to be 
available to students who desired to attend nonsectarian 
private schools.^
Equally significant, the Perrow majority recommended
~^Muse, pp. 160-61; Southern School News, Vol. V,
No. 11 (May, 1959), p. 2.
59Report of the Commission on Education to the Govern­
or of Virginia, Mosby G. Perrow, Chairman (Commonwealth of 
Virginia: Department of Purchases and Supply, 1959), p. 5.
^ Ibid. , pp. 12-18.
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against amending Section 129. According to the majority's 
interpretation of Section 135 of the Virginia Constitution, 
the General Assembly was only required to make a minimum ap­
propriation which was insufficient to support the schools of 
a locality. Believing that the localities were not constitu­
tionally required under Section 136 to provide funds for pub­
lic education, the Perrow forces asserted that communities 
could prevent desegregation without abolishing Section 129.^ 
The Perrow Report tried to insure Virginia's general commit­
ment to public education and simultaneously to calm the fears 
of Southside legislators. The plan virtually duplicated the 
recommendation of the Gray Commission which the legislators
61Ibid., pp. 9-12, Section 135 of the Constitution 
stated: "The General Assembly shall apply the annual inter­
est on the literary fund; that portion of the capitation tax 
provided for in the Constitution to be paid into the State 
treasury, and not returnable to the counties and the cities; 
and an amount equal to the total that would be received from 
an annual tax on property of not less than one nor more than 
five mills on the dollar to the schools of the primary and 
grammar grades, for the equal benefit of all the people of 
the State, to be apportioned on a basis of school population; 
the number of children between the ages of seven and twenty 
years in each school to be the basis of such apportionment. 
And the General Assembly shall make such other appropriations 
for school purpose as it may deem best, to be apportioned on 
a basis provided by law.1 According to the majority report, 
the revenue received from the interest on the literary fund, 
the capitation tax (two-thirds of 1.50), and the property tax 
amounted to only $9,000,000 of a budget of $163, 370, 000. 
Thus the operation of public schools depended on state and 
local money beyond the minimum funds. However, such funds, 
the majority argued, were appropriated at the discretion of 
the General Assembly (Section 135) and the localities (Sec­
tion 136). The Perrow Report held that by tradition, state 
funds were triggered by a local appropriation. By refusing 
to provide money for public schools, the majority report 
thought localities could successfully close their schools.
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had dropped for massive resistance nearly three years ear­
lier.
The dissenting report, signed by nine bitter-end seg­
regationists described the majority report as a containment 
policy which would allow "a locality to proceed with as much
integration as that particular locality desires . . . .  We are
62not willing to strive simply for containment." The 
major recommendation of the minority report was to repeal 
Section 129 and to amend other sections of the Constitution 
so that the General Assembly could "refuse to support any in­
tegrated school and provide for educational and tuition 
grants without restriction."^3
The majority report had constitutional weaknesses 
which the minority Commission members readily pointed out.
Mills Godwin thought that the majority raised a "foolish 
hope" by suggesting that a locality could prevent integration 
by refusing to appropriate funds. Citing Harrison v. Day and 
James v. Almond, which required the operation of all public 
schools under Section 129, the black belt Senator was on firm
^3Ibid., p. 23.
6 3Ibid., p. 24. Delegate James M. Thomson, who signed 
the minority report, also wrote a separate dissenting state­
ment. He revealed that the Commission had turned back a 
proposal to permit a referendum on the question of amending 
Article Nine of the Virginia Constitution [Education and 
Public Instruction] by a vote of 22-16.
legal ground.6^
Anticipating constitutional objections, the Perrow 
majority admitted that the case of Harrison v. Day could in­
validate local school closings. However, after receiving the 
advice of counsel, including Attorney General Harrison, the 
majority was satisfied that its recommendations would be
"upheld by our court, should the question be presented to 
65it." Like the massive resistance legislation, the Perrow 
plan was expected to prompt lengthy and expensive litigation. 
If declared unconstitutional, the time consumed in court was 
expected to delay desegregation in black belt counties for a 
number of years.
With the publication of the Perrow Report, the divi­
sion within the Democratic organization became more apparent. 
Representative Watkins Abbitt considered the Perrow plan a 
"complete surrender to integrationists. Agreeing with
Abbitt, Representative Tuck added that "we need more resis-
6 Vtance, not less." However, Lieutenant Governor A. E. S.
Stephens, a longtime organization stalwart from the South-
side, explained; "It's not capitulation. It's just realism,
6 8drawing up'lines for the next battle in a long, long war."
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, April 2, 1959, p. 1.
65Report of the Commission on Education, p. 9.
^ Richmond News Leader, April 2, 1959, p. 1.
6 7 t , .Ibid.
68Ibid., April 4, 1959, p. 1. Lieutenant Governor
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The News Leader, long the champion of statewide massive re­
sistance, endorsed the switch to local option. Kilpatrick 
wrote: "So long as there was the faintest hope of preserving
a State power to separate the races, it was important to act
as a State; it was imperative that we maintain a Statewide
policy. Now that the state line has been breached, we will
69have to fight a different sort of fight."
On April 6, 1959, Governor Almond asked the General
Assembly to pass into law the proposals offered by the Perrow
Commission. The Commission's plan, the Governor argued, per­
mitted massive resistance to continue on the individual level 
through freedom-of-choice. Believing the repeal of Section 
129 unnecessary, Almond asserted that neither the state nor 
the federal constitution required a locality to support pub­
lic schools. The future of the Perrow Plan, of course,
70rested on the accuracy of this judgement.
In the General Assembly a battle shaped up between the
Almond-Perrow forces and their critics over the assignment 
plan and over a referendum offered by the latter to amend
Stephens stuck by the Perrow-Almond plan during the Extra 
Session. In 1961 he was defeated in the Democratic primary 
for Governor by Attorney General Harrison. During the cam­
paign, Stephens broke with the organization and lashed out at 
its leadership.
69Editorial, Ibid., March 6, 1959, p. 12.
70"Address to the General Assembly," April 6, 1959, m  
Inaugural Address and Addresses delivered to the General As­
sembly of Virginia by J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., 1958-1962, 
(Commonwealth of Virginia: Division of Purchases and Prin­
ting) , p. 4.
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Article IX of the Constitution, which dealt with Education 
and Public Instruction and included Section 129. The opposi- 
tion preferred retaining the three-man placement board rather 
than adopting the local assignment plan advanced by the Per- 
row Commission. A Southside Delegate, Samuel E. Pope, re­
marked: "I can't see any difference between the Perrow and
the Dalton assignment plan. I don't believe a locality
71should have the right to assign a single pupil." Along
with other massive resisters, Delegate Pope thought that "if
there is to be integration, we should make sure the court
72does the assigning." Bitter-end segregationists, in short, 
viewed local assignment as an open invitation to massive de­
segregation. A pupil placement board, composed of "right- 
thinking" men and women, was viewed as a more reliable buffer 
against desegregation, especially in localities outside 
Southside Virginia.
The administration's advocacy of local assignment was 
partly legal and partly practical. The state Pupil Placement 
Act, designed to prevent desegregation, had been rejected by 
three federal district courts. Eventually a new statewide 
assignment plan, which resulted in some desegregation, was 
acceptable to the federal courts. But in 1959, Governor 
Almond contended that the state would have to bear the
71Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 5, 1959, p. 1.
72Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, April 8, 1959, p. 1.
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73unnecessary expense of a permanent state agency. Local 
assignment was not only less expensive, but consistent with 
local initiative in school policy. Advocates of local as­
signment also pointed to the effectiveness of such a policy
in North Carolina, where Negro admissions were limited to
74sixteen m  one year.
The legislative battle over the Perrow Plan was com­
plicated by politics. According to rumors, Governor Almond 
ejxpected to use the victory to capture a wing of the Demo­
cratic organization in order to promote his future political 
fortunes. Simultaneously, the bitter-^end segregationists 
reportedly planned to pin the failure of massive resistance 
on the Governor. They hoped to frustrate Almond's ambitions 
and also to prove their loyalty to massive resistance. Con­
sequently, the entire debate took place in an atmosphere in 
which the very unity of the Democratic organization seemed to 
be at stake.^
The debate over amending Article IX of the Virginia 
Constitution involved a most serious threat to public educa­
tion. On April 9, Delegate W. Stuart Wheatley, a diehard 
massive reslster, introduced a joint resolution to amend Ar­
ticle IX. In effect, the amendment, which included a
^ Address, April 6, 19 59, p. 7.
74Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 24, 1959, p. 2.
75Latimer, unpublished manuscript, p. 93; Richmond 
Times^-Dispatch, April 17, 1959; April 26, 1959.
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provision for repealing Section 129, gave localities the op-
7 £
tion of selecting between public or private schools. Thus 
the massive resisters accepted the inevitability of desegre­
gation in localities which chose to operate public schools. 
But in the black belt the conversion from a public to a pri­
vate school system was to be reinforced by striking out the 
state’s obligation to provide a statewide public school sys­
tem. The major legal flaw in the amendment was that the
state was to continue to provide funds for the institutions
7 7
replacing public schools. Under the expanded definition of 
"state action," such schools were subject to the prohibition 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, even though they were designated 
as private schools. Only the few Southside localities pre­
pared to privately finance their schools could have streng-
7 8thened their legal position from the repeal of Section 129.
The Almond-Perrow forces continued to oppose any revi­
sion of the state's obligation to provide a statewide system 
of public schools. To neutralize the opposition's proposal, 
the Almond-Perrow forces introduced a bill which called for 
an advisory referendum in November of 1959. The referendum
7 £
Journal of the House of Delegates, A.J.R. 23, Extra 
Sess., 1959, p. 114.
^ Ibid. , p. 116.
7 8Prince Edward County, for example, already indicated 
its readiness to drop public education. Whether or not other 
black belt counties would follow suit was still uncertain.
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was to ask the voters to advise the legislators on the ques­
tion of whether or not Virginia should contine to operate
79and support public schools. The question was purposely 
broad so that even higher education was included. The advo­
cates of the bill presumably wrote the resolution to insure
80a large "yes" vote. They hoped the massive resisters would 
lose enthusiasm for their amendment, if faced with the pros­
pect of a referendum designed to serve as a mandate for Vir­
ginia's public schools.
With the aid of some unprecedented parliamentary man­
euvering, the administration was successful in passing its 
assignment bill and blocking the bid to repeal Section 129 of 
the Virginia Constitution. As expected, the Senate Education
Committee, dominated by Southsiders, killed the administra-
81tion's local placement bill. But in the House of Dele­
gates, a similar bill squeezed through its Education Commit-
8 2tee by a 9-8 vote. On April 16, the House passed the bill
83by a narrow 53 to 46 votes. During the House debate, Dele­
gate Whitehead turned to the black belt legislators and said: 
"I know you're up a creek gentlemen . . . .  But the time has
79Journal of the House of Delegates H.B. 104, Extra 
Sess., 1959, p. 151; Richmond Times-Pispatch, April 16, 1959,
p. 1.
80Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 23, 1959, p. 1.
8^Ibid., April 15, 1959, p. 1.
8^Ibid., April 14, 1959, p. 1.
83Journal of the House of Delegates, H.D. 50, p. 164.
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84come when we're going to legislate for all Virginia.1 
Though Whitehead pointed to the numerous safeguards against 
desegregation for the Southside, Delegate Pope considered the 
bill automatically suspect since it had the support of "libe­
rals and integrationi.sts. I say when these people favor it,
we. had better look in the woodpile for the proverbial you- 
85know-what." Convinced that the Senate Education Committee 
planned to smother the House's assignment bill, the Almond- 
Perrow forces successfully converted the Senate into a Com^ - 
mittee of the Whole by a narrow 20-19 vote.^ This parlia­
mentary tactic precipated emotional charges and counter­
charges which threatened to split the Democratic organization 
in half. Leading the criticism was State Senator Harry Byrd, 
Jr., who charged: "This action, we believe, has grave poten­
tial consequences for the future. This action shatters pre-
8 7cedent going back at least seventy-five years." By another 
one vote margin, the Committee of the Whole reported the as­
signment bill to the Senate floor where it was passed by a
8 4Richmond Times-Dispatch., April 16, 1959, p. 1.
o  tr
Norfolk Virginian-vPilot, April 16, 1959, p. 1.
ft 6Journal of the Senate, April 17, 1959, p. 156; 
Richmond Times-Dlspatch, April 19, 1959, p. 1. To give the 
Perrow forces their one vote majority, Senator Stuart B. 
Carter was flown in from Botetourt County where he was recu­
perating from an operation. Senator Robert F. Baldwin, who 
would have supported Almond was in Europe.
8 7Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 23, 1959, p. 1.
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8 8vote of 21-18. As the Committee of the Whole, the Senate
also passed an innocuous bill making compulsory attendance
89optional for each locality.
The Almond-Perrow forces had to make some concessions 
in order to get their placement plan through the legislature. 
Lacking the four-fifths majority to pass the bill as an emer­
gency measure, the administration agreed to accept March 1, 
1960, as the effective date of the measure. In another im­
portant compromise localities were to remain under the autho­
rity of the existing Pupil Placement Board until their school
boards and governing bodies elected to adopt a local assign- 
90ment plan. By retaining the Pupil Placement Board, Vir­
ginia was. left with a dual assignment system. For several 
years school districts continued to operate under the direc­
tion of the Board in order to prolong the assignment process 
and also to escape the onus of admitting Negro children to 
white schools. In practice, the Placement Board dealt prima­
rily with assignments which were appealed from the local 
level. Usually contested assignments involved black students 
who were protesting their assignments to black schools.
The resolution to repeal Section 129 was defeated in 
the House of Delegates by a narrow margin of 45 for to 53
O O
Journal of the Senate, H.B. 50, Extra Sess., 1959,
p. 218.
89Ibid., H.B. 68, Extra Sess., 1959, pp. 201-02.
90Southern School News, Vol. V, No. 11, (May, 19 59},
p. 2.
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91against. Representatives, of urban and white belt Virginia 
combined to defeat the massive resisters. A white belt dele­
gate, Lawrence H. Hoover, argued that no area of Virginia de-
9 2manded a constitutional change except the Southside. Dele­
gate Harrison Mann of Arlington cautioned Southsiders that
when public schools closed their doors "that is the day you
9 3will open up your private schools to integration."
Ironically, the referendum bill, sponsored by the
Almond-Perrow forces, passed the House of Delegates by a 54
to 42 vote, with the massive resisters voting in the nega- 
94tive. Diehard segregationists now were very apprehensive 
about the results of a referendum which asked the people to 
choose between public schools with some integration or con­
tinued massive resistance. In the Senate, the referendum 
bill was buried in the Privileges and Election Committee.
Since the bill had sidetracked the amendment resolution, the 
Perrow forces were not perturbed. The administration pre­
ferred to take the spotlight off the school problem and turn
to other issues, rather than to rekindle emotions by another 
95referendum.
91Journal of the House, H.J.R. 23, Extra Sess., p. 194.
92Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 21, 1959, p. 1.
93Ibid.
94Journal of the House, H.B. 104, Extra Sess., 
pp. 226-^ 27.
95 .Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 23, 1959, p. 1.
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The remainder of the Perrow legislation moved easily 
through the General Assembly. All the measures were designed 
to aid the localities in their efforts to resist desegrega­
tion. Among the most important were the tuition grant plan, 
a procedure for selling public school property, free trans­
portation for pupils attending nonsectarian private schools,
and permission for a locality to cut its budget in thirty 
96days.
The mas.si.ve resisters hoped to make the Perrow legis­
lation the major issue in the July Democratic primary and the 
November, 1959, state election. If moderates were turned out 
of office, the resisters planned to return to the General As­
sembly in January, 1960, with the goal of modifying or re­
pealing the legislation of the 1959 special session. Moder­
ates, however, were not defeated by resisters in the primary
or general elections so that the Perrow legislation remained
97secure during the regular session of the Legislature. The 
only challenge to the administration's package of laws was a 
bill which proposed to delay the effective date of local as­
signment by two years. Passed by the narrowest of margins in 
the House, 50^ -49, the bill was killed in the Senate by a 21
^ Acts of the General Assembly, Chapters 53, 68, 47,
69, Extra Sess., 1959, pp. 52, 56, 91-93.
^ Southern School News, Vol. 6, No. 2 (August, 1959),
p. 13.
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98to 19 vote. New school legislation was limited to several
measures providing greater state and local aid to private
schools. Localities were given the power to appropriate
funds for "educational purposes," and taxpayers were given
local tax deductions for gifts to nonsectarian private
schools. The tuition grant plan was altered so that each
elementary child would receive $250.00 and each secondary
child $275.00, unless per pupil cost of instruction in a
99locality was a smaller figure.
The school issue, oddly enough, produced less excite­
ment than the debate over the three percent sales tax in the 
1960 session of the General Assembly. Generally, legislators 
agreed that Virginia needed more revenue to keep up with the 
costs, of public services demanded by an increasing popula­
tion. However, the sales tax posed a great number of prob­
lems including the sticky matter of distribution between the 
counties and the cities. Moreover, the sales tax had acquired 
the reputation in Virginia as a "last resort" tax.'*'^  The 
conservative wing of the organization, led by Harry Byrd, Jr., 
succeeded in defeating the bill and substituting a patchwork
98Journal of the House of Delegates, H.B. 723, Reg. 
Sess., 1960, p. 617; Journal of the Senate, H.B. 723, Reg. 
Sess., 1960, p. 957.
99Acts of the General Assembly, Chapters 191, 44 8,
461, Reg. Sess., pp. 202-03, 703-05, 721.
^Richmond News Leader, January 27, 1960, p. 1.
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of taxes to provide the needed revenue. In the midst of
the legislative battle, Governor Almond charged that the op­
posing lines were determined by his efforts to save public
. . 102education m  Virginia. Delegate James Thomson replied for
the massive resisters that Almond "might have put it the 
other way— a lot of his opposition is coming from those
103people he let down on the school segregation question.1 
Some segregationists were genuinely distraught because Almond 
had not stood at the school house door. Faithful Byrd Demo­
crats feared that Almond would pose as a public school saver 
to challenge the traditional leadership of the organization. 
After the sales tax was killed by the House Finance Commit­
tee, the naturally combative Almond singled out Speaker E. 
Blackburn Moore and Harry Byrd, Jr., and charged: "If these
gentlemen want to play it rough, that suits me, for the re­
mainder of the administration and for the days to come after 
the close of the administration. in describing the op­
position as unconcerned with the public interest, Governor 
Almond cut himself off from the organization. The break 
marked the end of his political career and plagued him prior 
to his appointment to the Court of Customs and Patent
^ ^Ibid. , March 12, 1960, p. 1.
1 0 2 Ibid., February 1, 1960, p. 1.
103Ibid.
104.Ibid., February 18, 1960, p. 1.
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i 105 Appeals.
Accompanying the legislative events of 1959-1960 were 
important developments in the courts which gave some indica­
tion of the future issues, which would divide white school 
boards and Negro plaintiffs. One stream of litigation dealt 
writh the theory and implementation of placement plans devised 
by local and state school officials. The use of assignment 
criteria had been widely hailed in the press and in the Gene­
ral Assembly as assuring token desegregation. Segregationists 
were, encouraged by the Supreme Court's per curiam decision up­
holding an Alabama Placement Law clearly designed to prevent 
desegregation."*"^ In a series of suits, NAACP lawyers at­
tacked the discriminatory application of assignment plans. 
Their major objective, however, was to persuade the federal 
courts that school districts had an obligation to desegregate 
schools rather than just preventing discrimination.
In 1959 and 1960 the NAACP met with mixed success in
105At the end of his administration, Almond, m  his. 
typically blunt manner, directed some unflattering remarks 
toward the Senator Harry Byrd and the organization. After 
some controversey, he was named to the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals.
■*"^Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education,
35 8 U.S. 101 (.195 8) . The Supreme Court upheld an Alabama 
federal district court which ruled that the Alabama Pupil 
Enrollment Act was more analogous to the North Carolina school 
plan than Virginia's placement plan. Shuttlesworth v Birming- 
ham Board of Education, 162 F. Supp. 372. (N.D. Ala. 195 8).
When the Alabama legislature drafted the plan, individual mem­
bers indicated that their objective was to prevent desegrega­
tion. The plan included a member of vague criteria which 
aimed at preventing desegregation. Southern School News,
Vol. V, No. 6 ('December, 1958), p. 3.
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their assault on the placement law. In reviewing the rejec­
tion of twenty-six Arlington Negroes, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that their "applications for transfers
were subject to tests that were not applied to the applica-
107tions of white students asking transfers." The circuit
court returned the case to the lower court with instructions
that neither the school board's nor the district court's
1 08action should serve as precedents for "future action." On
remand Judge Bryan ordered twelve Negro students previously 
rejected for academic reasons admitted to white schools, since 
white students with comparable achievement scores were admit­
ted to the same schools. However, consistent with the Briggs 
dictum, Judge Bryan refused to order the school board to de­
vise a desegregation plan.^^
In the Norfolk case, Judge Hoffman side-stepped the 
implications of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion 
in rejecting the application of one hundred and thirty-four 
Negro students to white schools.^0 The plaintiffs argued
107Hamm v. County School Board of Arlington County,
264 F. 2d 945, 946 (4th Cir., 1959).
108-r^.^Ibid.
109Thompson v. School Board of Arlington County, 4 
Race Rel. L. Rep. 609, 610-11, (E.D. Va. 1959). In the Ar­
lington case Judge Bryan rejected overcrowding, psychological 
testing and adaptability as suitable assignment criteria, but 
he did uphold geographical and attendance zones.
^^Beckett v. School Board of the City of Norfolk,
Va. 181 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Va. 1959).
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that the Norfolk placement plan was unconstitutional since 
Negro students seeking admission to white schools were auto­
matically subjected to a battery of tests which white stu­
dents applying for the identical school were spared. The 
school board based its distinction on the grounds that an as­
signment leading to desegregation resulted in an "unusual 
111circumstance. 1 Judge Hoffman rejected the plaintiffs'
contention by arguing that the school plan was not unconsti­
tutional unless the assignment criteria were applied in an 
illegal manner. The admission of seventeen Negro students, 
Hoffman believed, was proof that the school board was not at­
tempting to prevent desegregation. In evaluating any assign­
ment plan, Hoffman wrote that the court must balance indivi­
dual rights against the mores of the community. "We are 
dealing not with the individual right, but with the resulting 
condition brought about by the granting of the right. The 
constitutional right lies in the denial of admission because
of race— not in the prerequisite leading up to such
, • n |,H2denial.
One result of Judge Hoffman's ruling was that only a 
limited number of extraordinarily bright Negro children could 
expect to be admitted to white schools. This forecast was 
tempered by the observation that Negro admissions to white 
schools should not "forever be confined to such Negro
111Ic[. at 873-74.
112Id. at 874.
113children who have superior intelligence." Although deseg­
regation was restricted, Judge Hoffman reminded the liti­
gants: "The United States Supreme Court has never suggested
that mass mixing of races is required in the public 
114school." The Norfolk. School Board had devised a plan
which was expected to provide "orderly transition to a ra-
115dally nondiscriminatory school system."
The Hoffman decision complemented the transition in 
Virginia's politics. The Almond-Perrow forces submitted its 
placement plan on the theory that the federal courts would 
restrict desegregation to a mere trickle. The refusal of 
Judge Hoffman to assign any of the Negro plaintiffs streng­
thened the credibility of the Almond-Perrow position. Fur­
thermore, by clinging to the Briggs dictum, Hoffman stated 
that Virginia did not have to provide a desegregated school 
system, but merely a "nondiscriminatory school system." 
Ironically, with the end of massive resistance, Judge Hoffman 
and Governor Almond, antagonists for three years, now found 
themselves agreeing on Virginia's school policy.
To the NAACP lawyers, rulings such as those of Judges
113Id. at 872.
114Id. at 873.
115Ibid. The Fourth. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
Judge Hoffman in Hill v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 282 
F. 2d 473 (,4th CirT 196 0) . The Court gave much weight to 
Judge Hoffman's efforts up to 1959 and the belief that the 
Norfolk plan was merely an interim measure.
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Bryan and Hoffman indicated that with, the end of massive re­
sistance they faced a new but equally difficult road. To 
settle for a "nondiscriminatory school system" meant to sur­
render the substance of the Brown ruling. The obstacles to 
desegregation inherent in placement plans and grade-a-year 
plans prompted Thurgood Marshall, still director-counsel of 
the NAACP1s Legal Defense and Education Fund, to remark:
"Now we're in for real hard legal maneuvering in court, 
counter-motions and back and forth. They're going to try and 
delay. We're going to try and push ahead. It's going to be 
more litigation now than before. We're going into what I 
call a lot of fast play around second base."^^^
As. pupil assignment laws were being scrutinized, Vir­
ginia's statutes permitting localities to close their 
schools, by refusing to appropriate the required funds were 
also about to be tested. On May 5, 1959, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed Judge Sterling Hutcheson's decision 
giving Prince Edward County until 1965 to comply with the 
Brown decision. In a per curiam opinion, the Court ruled 
that Prince Edward County's school officials had been given 
sufficient time to cope with their school problems. Since 
Prince Edward County had taken no action and planned no 
future action, the Court instructed Judge Hutcheson to order 
the Southside county to make plans for desegregating its
Southern School News, Vol. VI, No. 8, (February, 
I960.);, p. 16.
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schools by September, according to the state placement 
117laws.
The Prince Edward County Board of Supervisors answered 
the ruling by refusing to appropriate funds for public 
schools in the budget adopted in June of 1959. Property 
taxes were reduced by fifty-three percent, and the Prince Ed­
ward School Foundation made plans to operate a private school 
for white children. The foundation reported that it had col­
lected about $300,000, or seventy percent of its budget. The 
faculty was to be composed of the same white teachers for­
merly employed by the public schools. Expecting tuition
grants to be declared unconstitutional, the Board of Super-
118visors, at first, made no provisions for such aid. Begin­
ning with the September, 1959, school year, Prince Edward 
County's public schools were to be closed for five years. 
During this period the legislators, lawyers, and judges de­
bated the constitutionality of a county's right to close its 
public schools and the state's constitutional responsibility 
when this occurred. Ironically, Virginia's most infamous ex­
ample of resistance to the Brown decision came after massive 
resistance had been abandoned as a state policy.
Measures adopted by the Norfolk City Council, somewhat 
analogous to Prince Edward County's were declared unconstitu-
117Allen v. School Board of Prince Edward County,
266 F. 2d 507 (4th Cir. 1959).
1 ] o
Southern School News, Vol. VI, No. 1 (July, 1959),
p. 6.
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tional by Judge Walter Hoffman. On January 13, after appro­
ving other actions which restricted the use of public funds 
for education, the City Council passed a resolution declaring 
that it would not authorize the transfer of money to the 
School Board for any class above the sixth grade. Ex­
plained as a measure to preserve the public safety, the deci­
sion was regarded as a vindictive action aimed at the city’s
Negroes who, with the exception of the black plaintiffs, were
120unaffected by the school closures. After issuing a pre­
liminary injunction against the enforcement of the ordinances 
and resolutions, Judge Hoffman refused to lift the order be­
cause ’’Council’s action is tantamount to an evasive scheme or
device seeking to perpetuate the program of massive resis-
121tance m  the public schools of the city of Norfolk." On
May 18, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Judge
Hoffman's ruling that the Council’s action was part of the
122plan of massive resistance. The Court found that the
Council had "invaded the domain of the School Board and at­
tempted to exercise the power to operate the schools vested
123in-the school authorities." Citing Harrison v. Day, the
^^"City Council Resolution of January 13, 1959,”
4 Race Rel. L. Hep. 44.
^^Puryear, p. 351.
191 James v. Duckworth, 17 0 F. Supp. 342, 351 (E.D. Va.
1959) .
1 99Duckworth v. James, 267 F. 2d 224 (4th Cir. 1959).
123Id. at 228.
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opinion emphasized that the highest state court held that
"Section 129 of the State Constitution requires the State to
maintain an efficient system of public schools throughout the 
124State." Applied to Prince Edward County, school closures
also ran the risk of clashing with the state's obligation 
under Section 129.
In September of 1959 eighty-six Negroes in five Vir­
ginia localities reported for their first full year of de­
segregated public school education. Prince Edward County was 
the only locality to completely abandon the operation of 
public schools. In Warren County four hundred white children 
returned to Warren High School after a year of schooling at
the County's private school or assorted schools around the 
125community. Besides Prince Edward and Warren counties,
only Charlottesville and Norfolk were reported to be opera­
ting private schools which were a direct result of an order
126to desegregate public schools.
On October 22, 1958, another vestige of massive resis­
tance was attacked when Judge Hoffman ordered the Norfolk 
School Board to consider all applications for placement
1 o c
Southern School News, Vol. VI, No, 4 (October, 1959), 
p. 14. Besides Warren County, Norfolk, Charlottesville, 
Alexandria and Arlington County were desegregated. Five years 
after the first Brown decision, eighty-six Negroes were 
attending public schools with white children.
126Ibid., Vol. VII, No. 11 (May, 1960), p. 10.
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without reference to the instructions of the Virginia Pupil
1 27Placement Board until its assignment policy was altered.
The State Board's policy of racial assignments, Hoffman 
wrote, not only denied Negro children their rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment but also was an unconstitutional appli-
128cation of the revised Pupil Placement Act, Independent of
the written opinion, Judge Hoffman told the State Placement
Board to assign four Negroes to the Norfolk school "or take
12 9the consequences," On November 2, 1959, fearful of a
contempt citation, the Virginia Pupil Placement Board assigned
four Negroes to white schools for the first time in its three 
130year history. Though massive resisters were bitter, Judge
Hoffman's decision once again complemented the political ob­
jectives of the Almond administration. Admission of a few 
Negroes allowed the Pupil Placement Board to make the legal 
argument that its purpose was not to prohibit desegregation.
At the same time, Negro admissions could be restricted to a 
handful of applicants.
127Beckett v. School Board of Norfolk, 185 F. Supp.
459 (E.D, Va. 1959) . During the hearing one school member 
admitted that he could not conceive of a set of circumstances 
which would permit him to assign a Negro to a white school.
The other board members said they would admit the "perfect 
child" under "perfect conditions,"
1 oo
Id. at 462. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld Judge" Hoffman in Farley v. Turner, 281 F. 2d 131 (4th 
Cir. 1960).
12 9Southern School News, Vol. 6, No. 5 (November,
1959), p. 9.
i Ibid., Vol. VI, No. 6 (December, 1959), p. 2.
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Between January of 1959 and March of 1960, Virginia 
dropped its policy of statewide massive resistance and adopt­
ed a program of containment under the title of "freedom of 
choice." Passive resistance was not a new idea, for Vir­
ginia's leaders had proposed a similar strategy in November 
of 1955, in the form of the Gray Plan. The end of massive 
resistance was not a triumph of integrationists over segrega­
tionists. Instead, moderates within the Democratic organiza­
tion joined by anti-Byrd Democrats and a few Republicans re­
cognized that Virginia had reached the end of its legal rope. 
The confusion precipitated by school closings and the effect 
of such a condition on Virginia's economic program, convinced 
moderate and urban organization politicians that public 
schools must be preserved.
The transition from massive to passive resistance was
bolstered by the successful example of similar programs in
131such states as North Carolina. However, the success of
Virginia's neighbor in restricting desegregation raises the 
question of the effectiveness of massive resistance as a de­
vice for blocking integration. In defense of Virginia's
policy, Mills Godwin, Jr., said that it "gave our people time
132to adjust to what inevitably had to happen." Yet, as of
131 Ibid., Vol. VI, No. 4 (October, 1959), p. 1. In 
September of 1959 North Carolina had seven desegregated 
school districts to five for Virginia.
132M. Carl Andrews, No Higher Honor: The Story of
Mills E. Godwin, Jr. (Richmond: Dietz Press, Inc., 197 0),
p. 42.
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1959, there was no evidence of significant progress over the 
previous five years on the part of Virginians to accept de­
segregation. The major claim of the resisters is that in 
February of 1959 desegregation was not accompanied by vio­
lence. More convincing is the alternative explanation that
Virginia's tradition of non-violence and preventive measures
133taken by the administration prevented disorder. Moreover,
the first localities to desegregate, Norfolk and Arlington, 
offered to take steps to desegregate as early as 1955-1956 
but were blocked by the massive resisters. The tensions cre­
ated in predominately white Warren County and continued re­
sistance in Prince Edward County were examples of escalating 
tensions encouraged by appeals to "transcendent principles." 
The Southsiders who marched to Richmond felt cheated. They 
would have agreed with Danville Councilman John W. Carter
that Governor Almond "surrendered your constitutional rights
134as if he owned them and had a right to give them away."
Resistance based on legislation of doubtful constitu­
tionality and "transcendent principles" had several unfortu­
nate consequences. First, negotiation and compromise were 
impossible. Secondly, false hopes were continually raised 
and regularly disappointed. Consequently, white Virginians 
were convinced that the fault was with the courts. Black
13 3Latimer, 91 1/2; Wilkinson, pp. 150-51.
^Southern School News, Vol. VI, No. 6 (December, 
1959), p. 2.
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Virginians, on the other hand, were disillusioned with the 
unresponsiveness of the legal process. Although subjected to 
much abuse, even Virginia's, most controversial judges stayed 
within the interpretation of the Brown decision rendered by 
Judge Parker in the Briggs and Carson cases. In 1959, deci­
sions in Arlington and Norfolk suggested that Virginia could 
satisfy the federal courts by prohibiting racial discrimina­
tion,; even though, this, did not result in significant desegre­
gation.
The switch to a containment policy placed a severe 
strain on the bonds, of the Democratic organization. The be­
leaguered Governor, a victim of his own ambition and rhe­
toric, became a champion of public education. Formerly 
willing to cut off his right arm to prevent desegregation,
after massive resistance Almond exclaimed that "closing down
135the public schools meant going back to the dark ages."
The threat posed by Almond to the Democratic organization 
proved to be exaggerated. His coalition was too fragile and 
included men with strong ties to the organization. In 1961, 
the Democratic organization selected Attorney General Albertis 
S. Harrisoh, Jr., as its candidate for governor. Highly re­
spected and acceptable to both wings of the organization,
Harrison won a hard-fought Democratic primary and then rolled
136to an easy victory in the general election.
135Ibid., Vol. VI, No. 5 (November, 1959], p. 9.
135Wilkinson, pp. 239-40.
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For the NAACP, Virginia's adoption of the Perrow Plan 
meant another round of litigation in its attempt to make 
school desegregation a reality. The NAACP had successfully 
attacked a variety of constitutional arguments presented by 
the state and defendant school boards to prevent integration. 
The resort to the Eleventh Amendment, to a variety of unrea­
sonable administrative remedies, to threats of community vio­
lence and to the police power all had been knocked down by 
the courts. However, assignment plans, tuition grants and a 
variety of other evasive techniques still faced NAACP lawyers. 
But their foremost legal task was to convince the courts that 
the Brown decision meant that school boards had the positive 
obligation to desegregate rather than the negative duty of 
prohibiting racially discriminatory assignments.
The Negro lawyers of Virginia were still plagued by 
the state's effort to limit their effectiveness through the 
anti-NAACP laws. In NAACP v. Patty, a three-judge federal
court declared Virginia's registration and barratry statutes
137unconstitutional. However, on appeal from the state of
Virginia, the United States Supreme Court, in Harrison v .
13 8NAACP, overruled the lower court in a 6-3 decision. In
the majority's opinion, delivered by Justice John Marshall 
Harlan, the major issue was whether the federal courts should
T 37NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958), 
is discussed on page 199.
^^Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
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have deferred action until the state courts had construed the 
139statutes. After a discussion of the doctrine of absten­
tion, Justice Harlan concluded that the district court had 
acted prematurely in considering the Virginia statutes which 
he considered "fairly open to interpretation.11"*"49 In dissent. 
Justice William Douglas wrote; "We need not— we should not—  
give deference to a state policy that seeks to undermine fed­
eral law." The appeal to the abstention rule, he continued,
was a "delaying tactic that may involve years of time and that
141Inevitably doubles the cost of litigation." Thus, once
again the NAACP would have to return to the state courts, a
legal arena which they tried to avoid.
The Supreme Court's decision appeared to be part of a
"tactical withdrawal" of the Warren Court after a series of
controversial decisions between 1954 and 1957 in civil rights
142and civil liberties. Despite the setback, oddly enough,
NAACP leaders urged that the organization's members no longer 
hide their identity. Before the annual meeting of the Vir­
ginia Conference Oliver Hill said; "We must stop being 
afraid. The time has come for Negroes to stand up and say
139Id. at 176.
140T, . n Ibid.
141Id. at 184.
142Walter P. Murphy, Congress and the Courts: A Case
Study in the American Political Process (Chicago and London; 
The University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 245-46.
143they belong to the NAACP.1
Oliver Hill's exhortations anticipated a new and more
militant stage in the civil rights movement. Soon Negro
students would launch sit-ins in Virginia and throughout the 
144South. The adoption of more militant tactics not only
aggravated whites,, but posed a challenge to the leadership of 
the NAACP, which had struggled to achieve civil rights by re­
lying on the legal process. As the Negro turned to more ag­
gressive tactics, the NAACP, considered subversive during 
massive resistance, gained some respectability in Virginia.
Beginning in 1960, the leaders of the Old Dominion em­
barked on a new course which accepted the prospects of some 
desegregation. At the head of the Democratic organization, 
Senator Harry Byrd still disapproved of this accommodation to 
the Brown decision. At his annual picnic in Berryville, 
Senator Byrd ended his silence on Virginia affairs and de­
clared: "I stand now as. I stood when I first urged massive
resistance. I believe now, as then, that it's either massive
145resistance or massive integration.1
143Southern School News, Vol. VI, No. 5 (November, 
1959), p. Hill still defended the NAACP's right to with­
hold membership lists.
^‘^ Southern School News, Vol. VI, No. 9 (March, 1960),
p. 5.
1 45Ibid., Vol. VI, No. 4 (October, 1959), p. 15.
PART III. THE DESEGREGATION CASES IN VIRGINIA, 1959 to 1972
CHAPTER IX
PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY
Beginning in 1960 the school issue slowly moved off the 
center stage. The gubernatorial victory of Albertis S. 
Harrison, Jr. in 1961 brought a low-keyed official to the 
governor's mansion whose temperament was perfectly suited for 
cooling the fires of massive resistance. With the exception of 
the Prince Edward County suit, the school battle was quietly 
waged in the federal courts for the remainder of the Almond 
administration and during his successor's tenure.
Between 1959 and 1964 state and federal courts struggled 
with several basic questions regarding the Prince Edward 
County school case: Could a state or federal court order a
county to levy taxes to support public schools? What was the 
state's constitutional responsibility in the face of the coun­
ty's inaction? Unfortunately, compromise between white and 
Negro leaders on these questions was difficult, since both 
sides viewed the stalemate as having far-reaching effects on 
desegregation in Virginia and in the South.
The NAACP saw the Prince Edward case as a major test of 
its ability to realize the goal of a desegregated education for 
every Negro child in Virginia. When the white segregationists
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offered to establish private schools for Negro children at the 
end of 1959 with the aid of tuition grants, black leaders ad­
vised against accepting the offer.1 The example of private 
Negro schools subsidized by state money had unpleasant legal 
ramifications for the NAACP. In 1963 W. Lester Banks, execu­
tive -secretary of the Virginia Conference of the NAACP, said: 
"Had there been any wide acceptance of private schools, it would 
have had a disastrous effect on other Negro centers, in the 
Black Belt and elsewhere in the South. Even if the case was 
still prosecuted, the effect would have been disastrous." By 
accepting tuition grants the NAACP's case against the grants 
would have been damaged. By refusing to compromise, the NAACP 
expected that a large number of Negro children would be without 
adequate education for at least two years. The unhappy effects 
of closed schools for blacks children was accepted as part.of 
the sacrifice required to achieve better schools. Also, Negro 
leaders expected Prince Edward's resistance to break in the face 
of economic problems and a hostile state and national public
3
opinion. Oliver Hill told a group of Prince Edward Negroes:
1Southern School News, Vol. VI, No. 7 (January, 1960), 
p. 2. In They Closed Their Schools, Prince Edward County, 
Virginia, 1951-1964~ (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1965), p. 172, Bob Smith wrote that Prince Ed­
ward County's white leaders hoped the Negroes would accept 
tuition grants so that white children could also apply without 
fear of having the grants declared unconstitutional.
^Smith, p. 197.
^Ibid., p . 193.
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"All you will lose will be one or two years of Jim Crow educa­
tion. But at the same time, in your leisure you can gather
more in basic education than you would get in five years of Jim 
4
Crow schools." Unfortunately Hill underestimated the determi­
nation of whites to prevent desegregation and overestimated the 
residual benefits of closed schools.
The white segregationists of Prince Edward argued that 
fundamental constitutional principles were at stake in the 
school issue. The federal courts had ruled that Virginia, as 
long as it operated a public school system, could not close 
some of the state's public schools. But, argued those who wanted
to close the public schools, federal courts could not force a
5locality to appropriate money for public schools. Consequently, 
Prince Edward's lawyers and its only paper, the Farmville 
Herald, published and edited by J. Barrye Wall, held that Prince 
Edward whites were fighting for the principle of no taxation 
without representation. Southsiders featured themselves as 
representing the entire South in a struggle against judicial 
tyranny.^
Prince Edward segregationists had the implicit support 
of Governor Harrison during the course of the court litigation.
^Southern School News, Vol. VII, No. 7 (January, 1960),
p. 2.
"’Smith, p. 152.
^Ibid., p. 189.
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As Attorney General, Harrison thought Virginia would eventu-
7
ally adopt a dual school system--part public and part private. 
After Harrison was elected governor in 19 61, he adopted the 
position that his office and the General Assembly could do 
nothing to solve the plight of school-less Prince Edward County 
Negroes. The Governor held that public schooling was a joint 
state and local effort. If the state stepped in to support 
public education in Prince Edward County it "would necessarily
g
result in a similar type of operation in other counties." 
Virginians, Harrison thought, would not long accept the res­
ponsibility of supporting another county’s burden of educating
9
its school children.
Initially, then, in 1959, segregationists believed that 
a victory for Prince Edward County would facilitate the develop 
ment of private schools throughout the black belt. However, 
due to the economic expense and the success of various assign­
ment plans in frustrating desegregation, other counties did 
not follow the exact example of Prince Edward County. Conse­
quently by 1962, the litigation in question appeared irrelevant
7
Letter, Albertis S. Harrison to Honorable Howard W. 
Smith, July 11, 1958, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith 
Letter File.
o
Letter, Albertis S. Harrison to Honorable John C. Webb, 
April 22, 1963, Virginia State Library, Archives, Harrison 
Letter File.
9Ibid.
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As Bob Smith observed: “What good would it do to prove that
legally counties could raise money and close public schools in 
favor of private schools if none wished to do this?"10 In the 
end Prince Edward whites only managed to postpone the day when 
a few white children, unable to pay the private school tuition, 
would return to public schools with the black children of the 
county.
In the summer of 1960, lawyers for the NAACP asked the 
district court to order Prince Edward County to operate its 
public schools, to prohibit officials from disposing of public 
school property and to prevent the use of public funds for the 
support of private schools. The closing of the county's public 
schools, the plaintiffs argued, denied Negro children a public 
education in violation of Section 129 of the Virginia Constitu­
tion and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu­
tion. In April the district court permitted the NAACP to file
a supplemental complaint which attacked the use of public funds
11m  support of private schools.
Smith, p. 161. The Prince Edward case persuaded other 
rural counties to establish private schools without abandoning 
public schools.
11Southern School News, Vol. VII, No. 1 (July, 1960), 
p. 8; Vol. VII, No. 8 (February, 1961), p. 5; Vol. VII, No. 11 
(May, 1961), p. 5. The next phase of the litigation was handled 
by Judge Oren R. Lewis who replaced Judge Sterling Hutcheson on 
the latter's retirement. Prince Edward County did not use tui­
tion grants during the 1959-1960 school year. But for the 1960- 
1961 school year Prince Edward County supplemented private 
contributions by provisions for state and local tuition grants 
and a twenty-five percent tax credit for contributions to private 
non-secretarian schools (Southern School News, Vol. VI, No. 12 
(June, I960)), p. 12.
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Accompanying the effort to reopen Prince Edward's 
public schools was a vigorous debate over the state tuition 
grant plan. In November the Virginia Education Association 
passed a resolution condemning tuition grant abuses. The 
teacher's organization charged that parents already sending 
their children to nonsectarian private schools were profiting 
from the program. The association wanted grants limited to 
children whose parents objected to their attendance at a dese­
gregated school. Local public school officials were also
fearful of a pupil exodus which would also result in a reduction
12of state funds based on per-pupil attendance. Dr. Edward E.
Haddock, State Senator from Richmond, summed up the fears of
public school educators throughout Virginia when he warned:
"Unless this law is repealed, it will drain the lifeblood out of
our public school system and increase the tax burden even more
13on an already overburdened public."
The defense of tuition grants was led by James J. Kil­
patrick of the Richmond News Leader who joined this debate with 
the same zeal that he demonstrated during the interposition 
controversy. Virginia, Kilpatrick explained, was embarking upon 
an experiment in progressive education. For the first time in 
American history, wrote Kilpatrick, "a State has given up,
12Ibid., Vol. VII, No. 6 (December, 1960), p. 6.
12Ibid., Vol. VII, No. 7 (January, 1961), p. 7.
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voluntarily, its monopoly in education that came about by the 
use . . .  of tax money in public institutions only."14 The 
editor reasoned that "the State's proper interest is in the 
education of its children— not necessarily in the public edu­
cation of its children, and not in the segregated education of
its children— but simply in any education that meets State
15academic requirements." In response to those who feared the
collapse of public education, Kilpatrick countered by arguing
that the impact of the new private schools would be "wonderfully
good." Competition, he thought, would have the same salubrious
effect on public education as in other aspects of American
life.1  ^ Thus, Kilpatrick and other proponents of "freedom of
choice" asserted that a bona fide plan must provide grants for
all applicants, even those attending private schools established
17before the desegregation decision.
The emphasis on educational pioneering had a practical 
side. Adherents of freedom of choice, subsidized by tuition 
grants, knew that the plan faced difficulty in the federal courts 
as long as it was identified with the desegregation controversy.
14 •Editorial, Richmond News Leader, April 4, 1960, p. 12.
15Ibid., December 8, 1959, p. 12. Today this argument has 
been taken up by the proponents of tuition vouchers.
1^Ibid., June 24, 1960, p. 12.
^ Southern School News, Vol. VII, No. 7 (January, 1961), 
pp. 7-11.
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■Thus, when Kilpatrick discussed the accomplishments of the 1959 
extra session of the General Assembly he completely misrepre­
sented its objective. He wrote: "The program reflected the
1 ftGeneral Assembly’s proper interest in education totally."
Turning to the actual application of the tuition grant program 
editor Kilpatrick stressed that the "questions of racial inte­
gration . . .  no longer have anything to do with the granting
19of pupil scholarships." Yet, statistics provided by a News 
Leader survey disproved the editor's claim. In November of 
I960, the survey showed that 6,104 scholarships had been 
approved by localities. Significantly, 4,863 of the grant re­
cipients were located in communities involved in desegregation 
suits. At least 3,158 of the students in desegregated com­
munities were using their grants to attend newly established
20private schools. Neither the history nor the implementation 
of the tuition grant plan supported the thesis that scholar­
ships were independent of the desegregation controversy.
Tuition grants and the Prince Edward case were issues in 
the 1961 Democratic primary. Harrison, the organization
18Editorial, Richmond News Leader, December 5, 1960, p. 12.
19Ibid.
20 .Richmond News Leader, November 30, 1960, p. 1. Between 
1959 and 1960, the number of grants approved had increased by 
1,599. However much of this increase was due to the approval of 
1,324 tuition grants in Prince Edward County. Norfolk did not 
report whether the students who received grants used them to 
attend private or public schools.
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candidate, was opposed by Lieutenant Governor A. E. S.
Stephens, a Southsider who unexpectedly attacked the organiza­
tion in the fashion of an anti-Byrd Democrat. Stephens' 
running mates were Armistead Boothe, for Lieutenant Governor, 
and T. Munford Boyd, a University of Virginia law professor for 
Attorney General. Joining Harrison were Mills Godwin and 
Robert Button, both identified with the conservative wing of 
the organization. The organization candidates endorsed the 
tuition grants without qualification and believed that Prince 
Edward County should be allowed to handle its school problems 
without state interference. The Stephens-Boothe-Boyd slate
21endorsed tuition grant plans but were critical of its abuses.
"They were not meant for people already in private schools,"
22Boothe explained. The Stephens slate also favored reopening
Prince Edward's public schools, even if the governor and the
23General Assembly were required to intervene. As the campaign 
developed, the most interesting contest proved to be between 
Armistead Boothe and Mills Godwin since their records on the 
school issue were most distinguishable.
Byrd Democrats received unexpected help during the cam­
paign from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and the Justice
^ Southern School News, Vol. VII, No. 10 (April, 1961),
p. 7.
9 9Ibid., Vol. VII, No. 11 (May, 1961), p. 6.
23Ibid., Vol. VIII, No. 1 (July, 1961), p. 2.
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Department. On April 26, 19 61, the Attorney General filed a 
petition with Judge Oren B. Lewis of the federal district court 
asking him to permit the Justice Department to enter the Prince 
Edward case as a co-plaintiff. The request marked the first 
time that the federal government took the role of a complain­
ing party in a desegregation suit. The Justice Department 
asked the court to stop payment of state and county grants 
to the county's private school, to prohibit local tax credits 
in favor of Prince Edward's private schools and to 
order the county's officials to reopen the public school.
Until the public schools of Prince Edward were reopened, the 
Justice Department requested that the court order the state to 
withhold funds from all Virginia localities. The legal basis 
of the Justice Department's intervention was its interest in 
preserving the judicial process and administration of justice
against attempts to undermine them by circumvention and nulli- 
24fication.
Attorney General Kennedy's intervention was condemned 
by all of Virginia's political leaders. Although the Justice 
Department's objective was to open Prince Edward's public 
schools and not to close Virginia's public schools, Byrd Demo­
crats emphasized the ramifications of the latter possibility.
By opposing the Justice Department, organization Democrats were 
placed in the unfamiliar role of public school savers. Byrd
24Ibid., Vol. VII, No. 11 (May, 1961), p. 1.
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Democrats predicted that to give in on the Prince Edward case 
would merely invite greater federal tyranny. Representative 
Watkins M. Abbitt, Jr. described the intervention as "an 
attempt by totalitarian executive action and judicial usurpa­
tion of power to make hollow shells of our state and local
government and assume dictatorial control over purely local 
25functions." The News Leader denied that Prince Edward County 
was disobeying any court order. "The federal courts have no 
right to command Prince Edward County to operate any particu­
lar schools. All the courts can lawfully do is to say to
Prince Edward County, 'You must treat all residents of the 
26county alike.1" Since all students were prevented from
attending the public school and all students were qualified to
receive tuition grants, Kilpatrick reasoned that there was no
discrimination.
On June 24, Judge Oren Lewis denied the request of the
27United States to enter the Prince Edward case. In his
opinion, Judge Lewis held that neither the Rules of Civil
Procedure nor federal statutes gave the Justice Department the
28authority to intervene in the case. Moreover, Judge Lewis 
rejected the major contention of the Justice Department which
2^Ibid., p. 5.
26Editorial, Richmond News Leader, April 27, 1961, p. 10.
27Allen v. School Board of Prince Edward County, VI Race 
Rel. L. Rep. 432 (E.D. Va. 1961).
28Id. at 434.
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was that Virginia's conduct was comparable to that of Little
Rock or New Orleans and thus in contravention of a federal
court order. In Virginia and Prince Edward County, "there has
2 9been no known defiance of this Court's orders." In contrast
to the use of violence, Judge Lewis wrote that the court had
not yet determined whether or not a community violated an order
to prohibit assignments based on race by closing its schools.
Until it was determined that a court order was violated, Judge
Lewis found no justification for the intervention of the United
States. Furthermore, Judge Lewis was of the opinion that he
could not rule on the validity of Prince Edward's action until
Virginia's courts had construed the county's obligation under
30the state constitution. Finally, in spite of the Justice 
Department's denials that it did not want to close all of 
Virginia's schools, Judge Lewis wrote that to permit the fede­
ral government to intervene "could jeopardize the education of
31several hundred thousand Virginia children."
The attempted intervention by the Justice Department 
played directly into the hands of the old massive resisters. 
Though it attempted to underscore the plight of the Negro chil­
dren, the Justice Department gave ardent segregationists another
29 Id. at 435.
30Id. at 435, 438.
^Id. at 438.
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opportunity to assert their argument that the defense of local 
rights rather than desegregation was the issue in the Prince 
Edward case. Federal intervention also undermined the position 
of the Stephens slate which had indicated greater determination 
to use state power to open Prince Edward's public schools.
On July 11, Albertis Harrison won the Democratic guber­
natorial primary by defeating A. E. S. Stephens by a vote of 
199,519 to 152,639. Mills Godwin and Robert Button won by 
slightly smaller margins. While the organization seemingly was 
as strong as ever, the voting returns demonstrated that it was 
relying more heavily than ever on the dwindling rural white 
vote. Harrison received only fifty-three percent of the urban 
vote but won an impressive seventy-one percent in the Southside. 
Godwin's margin of victory in the cities was slightly over a 
thousand votes, but he also carried the Southside by a lopsided 
margin. The results of the election suggested that the school 
issue had lost its political value. With the establishment of 
a consensus that Virginia could not return to massive resistance,
the elections of the 1960's would hinge more on differences be-
32tween urban and rural interests.
On August 25, 1961, Judge Lewis issued his ruling on the 
two questions raised by the NAACP in the Prince Edward litiga­
tion. As expected, Judge Lewis refused to deal with questions 
of the constitutionality of Prince Edward County's decision to 
close the public schools. In reviewing the previous holdings,
3 2Wilkinson, Harry Byrd, pp. 239-240. Harrison easily 
defeated the Republican candidate, H. Clyde Pearson.
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Lewis indicated that in construing Section 129 of the state 
constitution, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Harri­
son v. Day appeared to determine "that public schools must be
33maintained m  Prince Edward County, Virginia." But the Judge 
believed that the defense's contention that public education 
was a local rather than a state responsibility under the Vir­
ginia Constitution must be settled. Since the question of 
authority over public schools involved interpreting the Virginia
Constitution, Judge Lewis decided to defer a ruling on this
■ 34matter until the state courts had acted.
Turning to the issue of local tax credits and state and
local tuition grants, Judge Lewis found them to be unlawful as
long as Prince Edward County refused to operate its public 
35schools. Judge Lewis did not say that state and local aid to a
private school was illegal per se. In Prince Edward County
local grants and tax credits became "unlawful when used to
accomplish an unlawful end, (the perpetuation of segregated
3 6schooling in Prince Edward County)."
A number of Virginia's editors saw Lewis's decision as 
an opportunity to end the Prince Edward litigation. Their hope
33Allen v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,
198 F. Supp. 497, 500 (E.D. Va. 1961).
34Id. at 500-01.
35Id. at 504.
36Id. at 503.
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was that Prince Edward County would reopen some of its public 
schools in order to solidify the tuition grant plan.37 Lead­
ing the editorialists was James Kilpatrick, one of Prince 
Edward County's staunchest admirers. In urging county offi­
cials to open a few public schools, Kilpatrick reasoned: "It
would be good for white and Negro children (if for different 
reasons); it would be good for the county's economy, and it
would be good for the rest of Virginia in the stability it
3 8would give the 'Freedom of Choice' plan." By eliminating 
blatant violations of freedom of choice in Virginia, Kilpatrick 
thought the state would strengthen its case for tuition grants 
in the federal courts. Since the white children of Prince 
Edward County would continue to attend private schools, Kil­
patrick reminded the county that its social and educational 
goals were not compromised by reopening some public schools. 
Finally, Kilpatrick suggested that to win the right to close 
public schools was ultimately self-destructive. Though not 
belittling the county's legal struggle, Kilpatrick observed
37Editorials, Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 30, 1961, 
p. 20. In .its survey of editorial response to Judge Lewis' 
decision the Charlottesville Daily Progress, Lynchburg News, 
Roanoke Times, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot joined the Times-Dis-
patch and News Leader in hoping that Prince Edward would open
its public schools in order to save the tuition grant plan.
3 8Editorial, Richmond News Leader, August 30, 1961,
p . 12.
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that "beyond the delimited area of what is right; a course of
action can be legal and still be, in a deeper sense, wrong.
The leaders of Prince Edward County refused to budge
from their position that principle precluded any compromise.
In analyzing the Lewis opinion, J. Barrye Wall, editor of the
Farmville Herald, believed that the Virginia Supreme Court must
settle the question of Prince Edward's authority over public
schools. Furthermore, Wall stressed the fact that Lewis did
not specifically rule that tuition grants to segregated private
40schools would be upheld if the public schools were reopened. 
Determined to preserve its private schools without opening 
public schools which permitted desegregation, the Prince Edward 
School Foundation launched a statewide campaign for private 
contributions to subsidize students unable to pay tuition 
fees.^
Following Judge Lewis' opinion the NAACP asked the Vir­
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus directing
the Prince Edward County Board of Supervisors to levy taxes and
42appropriate funds for the operation of public schools. The 
crux of the NAACP1s argument was that under Section 129 of the 
Constitution Virginia was required to operate public schools. 
Boards of Supervisors, the plaintiffs argued, were "mere
39Ibid., August 25, 1961, p. 12.
^ Farmville Herald, August 29, 1961, p. 4-A.
^ Richmond News Leader, August 28, 1961, p. 1.
A 9Southern School News, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (October, 1961),
p. 4.
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administrative agencies of the State," and could not be re­
lieved of their duties under Section 136 to provide funds for 
43public schools. In reply, the state and the county argued
that Section 136 authorized but did not require localities to
44appropriate funds for public schools. The defense also con­
tended that to order the board of supervisors to finance public 
education would destroy the principle that citizens cannot be
4 5taxed without their consent or that of their representatives.
While the Virginia Supreme Court weighed the presenta­
tions of the litigants, the General Assembly gathered in Rich­
mond for its regular biennial session. Unlike the previous 
three regular sessions, the desegregation question was virtually 
neglected. Toward the end of the session, John C. Webb of Fair­
fax made an effort to amend the budget bill in the House of 
Delegates so that state funds could be provided to "correct the 
appalling condition" of Prince Edward County. The amendment 
was defeated by a voice vote of the House members. Inaction 
was defended on the grounds that the problem was a county matter
and that nothing should be done to interfere with the litigation
46before the state and federal courts.
43Ibid., Vol. VIII, No. 5 (January, 1962), p. 8.
44t, . ,Ibid.
4 5Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 9, 1962, p. 3.
4^Southern School News, Vol. VIII, No. 9 (March, 1962), 
p. 1. Governor Harrison joined the General Assembly in champion­
ing a "hands off" policy.
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On March 5, 1962, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, 
in a unanimous decision ruled that the Virginia Constitution 
imposed no duty on the county's board of supervisors to levy
47taxes or appropriate money for the support of public schools.
The court held that the board of supervisors was a legislative
body and that taxing was a legislative function not subject to
. . 48judicial control. The court emphasized that under Section
136 a locality was authorized but not required to raise money 
for public schools. Regardless of the meaning of Section 129, 
the court found that this section was aimed at the General
49Assembly and therefore, irrelevant to the present proceedings.
Southside legislators and Governor Harrison were pleased
. . 50with the state court's decision. The decision, however, did
not point to any solution to the school problem. Rumors spread
that the county would voluntarily open its school in order to
receive tuition grants, since they seemed to have won the legal
issue. However, if the county intended to open the public
schools, it had no intention to reopen them on a desegregated
basis. Rather than reopening the entire school system, the
Board of Supervisors was reported to be willing to appropriate
51money for a few Negro schools.
47Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County, 
124 S.E. 2d 227 (Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1962).
48Id. at 233.
49Id. at 231-3 2.
50Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 6, 1962, p. 2.
^Ibid., March 11, 1962, p. B-l.
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But any such plan was dropped when the attorneys for the Negro 
plaintiffs announced that they would renew their fight in the 
federal courts. Believing that they had satisfied Judge Lewis' 
instructions to test certain sections of the Virginia Constitu­
tion in the state courts, the Negro attorneys returned to his 
court asking him to rule on the federal constitutional issues. 
Besides seeking an order reopening the public schools, the
NAACP requested that the temporary injunction on tuition grants
52be made permanent. With the legal issues unresolved, Prince
Edward's Board of Supervisors for the fourth consecutive year,
53decided against appropriating funds for public schools.
In May of 1962 when the case was reargued before Judge
Lewis, he was critical of the NAACP lawyers. During a lengthy
oral argument, the Judge charged that the NAACP attorneys had
54failed to follow his directions prescribed in August. Accord­
ing to Judge Lewis, they had been instructed to ask the Virginia 
Supreme Court whether Prince Edward County had violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Section 129 of the Virginia Constitu­
tion. Counsel for the plaintiffs argued that no agreement was
52Southern School News, Vol. VIII, No. 10 (April, 1962), 
p. 16. Judge Lewis had implied that tuition grants would be 
enjoined only until public schools were reopened. The NAACP 
appealed this decision in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
on the grounds that public funds converted the private schools 
into de facto public schools. On April 4 Judge Lewis extended 
the injunction of tuition grants until public schools were 
reopened.
53Ibid., Vol. IX, No. 1 (July, 1962), p. 1.
54Judge Lewis' directions are found in Allen v. County 
School Board of Prince Edward County, 198 F. Supp. 497 501 
(E.D. Va. 1961). See page 295.
302
made to raise federal issues in the state court. After a
sharp exchange with Judge Lewis, Robert L. Carter, of New York,
said that any order to argue a federal issue before a Virginia
state court would be appealed. The NAACP position on Section
12 9 was that it operated on the General Assembly and not the 
55county. Judge Lewis took the position that the "paramount
issue" was whether county schools "can be closed in the face of
5 6129. This should have been answered five years ago." Yet in 
Harrison v. Day, decided in January of 1959, the Virginia Su­
preme Court of Appeals supposedly decided this question.
Judge Lewis himself acknowledged as much in his August, 1961, 
ruling when he wrote, "it would appear from this decision that 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia had determined that
public schools must be maintained in Prince Edward County,
. . 57Virginia." Unlike Judge Lewis, Robert L. Carter believed 
that instead of Prince Edward's obligation under Section 129, 
the primary question was "whether the closed schools violate
5 8the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment."
Judge Lewis' comments led numerous observers to believe
that he would order the Negro plaintiffs to return to the state 
59court. However, on July 25, 1962, Lewis held that Prince
55Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 19, 1962, p. 1.
^^Ibid.
57Allen v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 
198 F. Supp. “497 , 500 (E.D. Va. 1961).
c o
Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 19, 1962, p. 1.
5^Southern School News, Vol. VIII, No. 12 (June, 1962),
p . 10.
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Edward County's public schools "may not be closed while the
Commonwealth of Virginia permits other public schools to re-
60m a m  open at the expense of the taxpayers." In his opinion, 
the Judge neatly summarized the major issues of fact and law. 
In examining the purpose of closing its schools, Judge Lewis 
asserted that without question the object of Prince Edward was 
to defy the Brown decisions. After citing the pertinent sec­
tions of the Virginia Constitution, and the tradition of state 
and local responsibility for operating public schools, Lewis 
found no basis for the county's claim that public schools were 
strictly a local matter outside the purview of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Furthermore, Judge Lewis thought Prince Edward's 
defiance was not strictly limited to the community, since it 
had the approval of state school officials and state attor­
neys.^ Finally, Judge Lewis considered the county as
an agency or arm of the state government. The United 
States Constitution recognizes no governing units except 
the federal government and the states. A contrary posi­
tion would allow a state to evade its constitutional 
responsibilities by carve-outs of small units. At least 
in the area of constitutional rights, specifically with 
respect to education, a state can no more delegate to 
its subdivision the power to discriminate than it can it­
self directly establish inequalities.62
^ Allen v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,
207 F. Supp. 349, 355 (E.D. Va. 1962).
61Id. at 3 52, 3 53.
62Id. at 354.
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Judge Lewis ordered Prince Edward County to open its
schools in September, 1962. As an incentive, Judge Lewis
wrote that the injunction placed on tuition grants would be
63lifted with the resumption of classes in public schools.
The leading state newspapers urged Prince Edward County
64to submit to the federal court's ruling. Editorialists united
in the view that the Prince Edward stalemate was resulting in 
irreparable damage to the Negro children as well as to the 
image of Virginia in the nation and the world. Pragmatically,
the resumption of classes was advised, once again, as a method
65of strengthening the tuition grant plan. But Prince Edward
remained intransigent as its editorial spokesman, J. Barrye 
Wall, reminded his readers that the county's position was 
"fundamental to the perpetuation of the republic.
Judge Lewis' ruling failed to end the deadlock in Prince 
Edward County. The lawyers for the school board appealed the 
district court's ruling to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
and simultaneously asked for a ruling in the state circuit court
63Id. at 3 55.
64Editorials, Richmond News Leader, July 27, 1962, p. 8; 
Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 27, 1962, p. 8; Lynchburcr News,
July 27, 1962, p. 6; Norfolk Virginia-Pilot, July 27, 1962, 
p. 4; Roanoke Times, July 27, 1962, p. 6.
65In July the State Department of Education reported that 
8,518 grants were approved during the 1961-1962 school year val­
ued at $2,074,690. This amounted to 391 more grants than the 
previous year. The figures were found in the Southern School News, 
Vol. IX, No. 2 (August, 1962), p. 3.
66Editorial, Farmville Herald, July 27, 1962, p. 1.
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6 7of Richmond on Section 129. When Judge Lewis stayed the
execution of his order pending action by higher federal courts,
Prince Edward's schools were closed for the fourth consecutive 
68year.
While the Prince Edward case was lodged in the federal
court for almost a year, similar issues were raised in Powhatan
County, where the school population was almost evenly divided
between Negro and white students. In the face of rumored school
closures, a desegregation suit was instituted on behalf of
Negro school children. On January 2, 1963, Federal District
Judge John D. Butzner ordered that three plaintiffs be admitted
to white schools and enjoined the Powhatan School Board from
69making assignments based on race. Moreover, Judge Butzner,
after citing the Prince Edward case, entered an injunction pro-
7 0habiting the closing of public schools. Although the Butz­
ner ruling may have prevented a repetition of the Prince Edward 
disaster, his decision met with a mixed reaction. The moderate
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot praised Butzner's wisdom in preventing
71 . .another school closing. However, the Richmond dailies were
6 7Southern School News, Vol. IX, No. 2 (September, 1962),
p . 3.
^Allen v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,
7 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1080 (E.D. Va. 1962).
69Bell v. County School Board of Powhatan County, 7 
Race Rel. L . Rep. 1083 (E.D. Va. 1963).
70Id. at 1087. The next day Butzner stayed the desegra- 
gation order but remained firm on the injunction against school 
closings.
71Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, January 5, 1963, p. 4.
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furious with Butzner1s decision to prevent local officials from
withdrawing financial support from the public schools. "The
issue (.taxation without representation) is greater than whether
or not there shall be public schools in any county," wrote the 
72Trmes-Dispatch.
Something equally fundamental was also bothering segre­
gationists. In the Powhatan case, as in desegregation suits 
throughout the state, the NAACP attorneys were beginning to
argue that ever since 1955 every school board had a duty to 
73desegregate. The objective was to smash the well-known dic­
tum enunciated by Judge Parker in Briggs v. Elliot. In the
Powhatan case, Judge Butzner refused to issue an order requir-
74m g  the school board to desegregate the schools. Yet, if the 
court could prevent a school from closing, the News Leader, 
for one wondered why the same court could not order school 
boards to take steps to ensure the desegregation of all public 
schools. "The next step is an injunction directed to white 
parents of the county, commanding them to march their children 
by lockstep into the school rooms, lest the three Negro
72Editorial, Richmond-Times-Dispatch, January 5, 1963,
p. 4.
7 3This point will be developed in the next chapter. Not 
until 19 65 did Negro attorney ask for an order which required a 
school district to insure a desegregated education for every 
black student.
^^Bell v. County School Board of Powhatan County, 7 Race 
Rel. L. Rep.' 1083, 1086 (E.D. Va. 1963).
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plaintiffs be forever wounded in their hearts and minds for
7 5want of white companionship." Editor Kilpatrick, to his 
regret, proved to be an able forecaster of the future court 
holdings requiring school boards to draft plans for desegrega­
ting public schools. No matter what the federal courts said, 
Kilpatrick and his approving readers believed that desegregation 
trampled upon the so-called right of white parents to send their 
children to schools which were overwhelmingly white.
The futility and confusion surrounding the Prince Ed­
ward case were magnified in 1963. The attorneys for Prince 
Edward County went to the state courts in order to obtain a de­
cision on the county's responsibility to provide public schools 
under state or federal law. The strategy of the Prince Edward 
lawyers was based on the hope that higher federal courts would
be influenced by a judgment made by the highest court of Virgin- 
7 6ia. In the Richmond Circuit Court, the county's position was
upheld by Judge John Wingo Knowles. Finding no federal statute
requiring a state to operate a public school, Judge Knowles
emphasized that in Virginia, public education was based upon
77"the theory of home rule and local option." He upheld tuition 
grants for the same reason.
75Editorial, Richmond News Leader, January 4, 1963, p. 8. 
^ Southern School News, Vol. IX, No. 10 (April, 1963),
p. 5.
77Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County v. Gnffrn, 
(Circuit Court, City of Richmond) 8 Race Rel. L. Rep. 94,
109-10.
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Though in agreement with Judge Knowles' reasoning, both
Richmond newspapers continued to urge Prince Edward County to
open its public schools. After praising Knowles' judicial
reasoning, Editor Kilpatrick concluded that the time had come
"to think a little less about rights, and to think a little
7 8more about wrongs." His counterpart on the morning paper,
Virginius Dabney, made the same plea. Dabney also correctly
predicted that the Knowles decision was bound to be overruled
79by a higher federal court. Governor Harrison meanwhile re­
mained immovable in the face of the growing criticism of his do 
nothing policy while the case was in the courts. He broke his
silence only to point out that Judge Knowles' ruling vindicated
8 0the state's position. To intervene, Harrison remarked again,
meant "extensive and far-reaching revision of laws relating to
81public schools and taxation." In retrospect, the plea of 
helplessness lacked credibility. In 1956, Harrison played a key 
role in "extensive" legislation which prevented a locality from 
opening its schools against the wishes of the state. A major 
assumption of massive resistance was that education was a state 
rather than a local responsibility. In 1959, Virginia legis­
lators once again passed "extensive" legislation to ensure token
7 8Editorial, Richmond News Leader, March 29, 1963, p. 10.
79Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 29, 1963,
p. 10.
^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 21, 1963, p. 2; March 18, 
1963, p. 5.
o •]
Ibid. March 29, 1963, p. 5.
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desegregation. One of the saddest ironies of the Virginia 
school crisis was that the legislators were willing to pass 
"extensive" legislation to close a maverick school, but were 
unable to pass "extensive" legislation to keep a school open.
One perceptive explanation for the governor1s inaction
was given by the editor of the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. "Mr.
Harrison, the NAACP, Prince Edward authorities, and the people
of Virginia are waiting for the Supreme Court to make them do 
8 2their duty." Paradoxically, a state which cherished home rule 
and vilified the Supreme Court had placed itself in a position 
in which only the Supreme Court could open the schools of Prince 
Edward County. Politically a court solution had several ad­
vantages. First, the public schools would be opened, an objec­
tive which most state political leaders and editorialists 
publicly supported. Second, the Governor, a Southsider, would 
have to make no apologies to his colleagues within the organi­
zation once classes resumed. The state government had supported 
Prince Edward County to the end of the judicial rope. Finally, 
court action would permit the organization to once again lead 
the way in crying out against judicial legislation.
On August 12, 1963, after a delay of a year, the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Judge Lewis1 ruling that Prince 
Edward County must be reopened as long as Virginia's public 
schools were open in the remainder of the state. The three- 
judge panel split 2-1, with the majority holding that the
o 9
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, March 22, 1963, p. 4.
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district court should have abstained until state courts had
8 3decided questions of state law. In the majority opinion,
Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. subscribed to three major ar­
guments consistently made by Virginia segregationists. First, 
he cited Briggs v. Elliot and repeated the familiar dictum that 
neither a state nor a locality was required to integrate its 
schools as long as admission policies were not racially dis­
criminatory. As if to put the legal debate over the Briggs 
dictum to rest, Judge Haynsworth implied it was no longer an
issue since "the negative application of the Fourteenth Amend-
84ment is too well settled for argument." Judge Haynsworth 
believed that the school closings were not a violation of a 
court order since the county had "abandoned discriminatory ad­
mission practices when they closed all schools as fully as if
they had continued to operate schools, but without discrimina- 
8 5tion." Third, Haynsworth considered Prince Edward's private 
school effort genuinely independent rather than a clever
8 6evasion of the Brown ruling in which the state conspired. 
Ultimately the question of the "state action", according to the 
Judge, rested on a "determination, under state law of Virginia's
8 3Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County,
322 F. 2d 332 (4th Cir. 1963).
84Id. at 336.
85x, . j Ibid.
86Id. at 337-38.
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role in the operation of public schools in Virginia "by the
o n
Supreme Court of Appeals1.'
In a brief dissenting opinion, Judge J. Spencer Bell
wrote that public education was indisputably a state function
in Virginia as evidenced by provisions for state funding, a
State Board of Education, and State Superintendent of Public 
8 8Instruction. Judge Bell objected strenuously to the major­
ity's opinion that school closing was "a permissible compliance
8 9with the Supreme Court's order." Then, significantly, he
took issue with the Briggs dictum. "Equal educational oppor­
tunity through access to nonsegregated public schools is secured 
by the Constitution. The state has an affirmative duty to
accord to all persons within its jurisdiction the benefits of
90that constitutional guarantee."
An appeal was made by the NAACP to the United States 
Supreme Court. However, before the Supreme Court acted the Vir­
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled on the appeal from the
state circuit court. In a 6-1 decision the highest Virginia
91Court upheld the lower state court. Prince Edward could not
o 7
Id. at 340.
88Id. at 345.
89 Id. at 348.
90TU. .Ibid.
91 ■County School Board of Prince Edward County v. Griffin,
133 S.E. 2d. 565 (Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1963).
be compelled to appropriate funds "by the General Assembly, by 
this court or by any authority except its own people."92 Lo­
calities, the court held, were merely "authorized" to appropriate
93local funds which then triggered state aid. In a semantical 
argument, the majority held that Section 129 required the 
General Assembly to provide an "efficient system" of public
94schools but not a particular school or group of public schools.
To permit the General Assembly to assume the county's responsi­
bility would result in a "centralization of control and of
operation foreign to the spirit as well as to the letter of the 
95Constitution." The majority also upheld tuition grants to
Prince Edward students and saw no violation of the Fourteenth 
96Amendment.
Chief Justice John W. Eggleston wrote a sharp dissent. 
Interpreting Section 129 literally, Judge Eggleston argued that 
the General Assembly had the responsibility not only to establish 
but to maintain a public school system. By providing funds to 
the local school board, the General Assembly, wrote Judge 
Eggleston, in no way interfered with local operation. To the
Chief Justice the local-state distinction made by the majority
97 . .was contrived. Since he viewed the localities as agents of
the state, Judge Eggleston saw the school closing as a direct 
violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
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Amendment. In a prophetic conclusion, the Chief Justice pre­
dicted: "The refusal of the highest court of this State to
recognize here the rights of the citizens of Prince Edward 
County, guaranteed to them under the Constitution of the United 
States, is a clear invitation to the federal courts to step in
and enforce such rights. I am sure that that invitation will
99be promptly accepted. We shall see!"
The Fourth Circuit and Virginia’s Supreme Court decisions 
brought Virginia no closer to a solution of the Prince Edward 
problem. The Roanoke and Norfolk papers were critical of the 
state and federal court decisions. Although the Richmond 
papers approved of the decisions, they remained firm in their 
belief that legal victories were self-defeating.'*'^ In Septem­
ber of 1963, however, Negro children attended full time schools 
for the first time in four years under the direction of the 
Prince Edward Free School Association, the result of cooperation 
of federal, state and local leaders. Using public school build­
ings and financed by private donations, the schools were viewed 
as a stop-gap measure aimed at ending the educational drought
98Id. at 584.
9 9Ibid.
^Editorials, Roanoke Times, August 14, 1963, p. 6;
December 4, 1963, p. 6; Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, December 3, 1963, p. 
A-4; Richmond News Leader, August 13, 1963, p. 10, December 3,
1963, p. 18; Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 13, 1963, p. 12, 
December 3, 1963, p. 22.
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for black children. Negro leaders gave their support on the 
condition that they would not be expected to relax their 
effort to win a favorable court decision.'^'*"
On May 25, 1964, ten years after the first Brown deci­
sion, the United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. School 
Board of Prince Edward County held that Prince Edward County
had violated the Fourteenth Amendment by closing its public 
102schools. Writing for the majority, Justice Black found that
the public schools had clearly been closed with the intent of
preventing desegregation. If a state permitted its public
schools to be closed, he emphasized that the "object must be a
constitutional one, and grounds of race and opposition to deseg-
103regation do not qualify as constitutional.1 Black agreed
with the district court's order enjoining tuition grants and 
tax credits as long as public schools were closed. Furthermore, 
he suggested that the district court, in order to prevent dis­
crimination, "may" require the Board of Supervisors to levy
104taxes for the support of public schools. On this controver­
sial point of the decision, Justices Clark and Harlan registered 
105dissents. Ihe threat of such an unprecedented order probably
~^4Southern School News, Vol. X, No. 4 (October, 1963), 
p. 3. Bob Smith has a good discussion of the background events 
in They Closed Iheir Schools, pp. 236-40.
102Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 
377 U.S. 218 (1964).
103Id. at 231.
104Id. at 23 2-33.
105°Id. at 234.
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was influenced by the case's long and complicated history. 
Justice Black observed: "The time for mere 'deliberate speed'
has run out, and that phrase can no longer justify denying 
these Prince Edward County school children their constitu­
tional rights to an education equal to that afforded by public
10 6schools in other parts of Virginia."
The Virginia reaction to the Griffin decision was not
monolithic. Congressman Watkins Abbitt, who represented Prince
Edward County, immediately introduced a bill in the House of Rep
resentatives which would have prohibited a federal court from
requiring a state or a locality to levy a tax. Crying out
against "brazen power" and "judicial dictatorship," Abbitt charg
ed that the Griffin decision destroyed "the separation doctrine.
Temporarily, he was joined by the News Leader which said
that the Supreme Court's decision amounted to a "dictatorship
imposed by judicial oligarchy" since it undermined the principle
108of "no taxation without representation." However, the Roa­
noke Times and Norfolk Virginian-Pilot were more critical of the
inactivity of Prince Edward County and generally supported the 
109decision. To Governor Harrison, the most significant aspect
^ ^ Southern School News, Vol. X, No. 12 (June, 1964),
p . 10.
^Editorial, Richmond News Leader, May 26, 1964, p. 10. 
‘'■^Editorial, Roanoke Times, May 26, 1964, p. 6.
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of the ruling was that the Supreme Court's opinion did not 
categorically rule out the use of tuition grants. "If the Court 
wanted to say they [tuition grants] were illegal, it had a won­
derful opportunity to do so," commented the Governor.110 Roa­
noke, Norfolk, and Richmond papers joined Governor Harrison in 
emphasizing that the most important issue related to the Prince 
Edward case was the future of the tuition grant plan.111 Editor 
Kilpatrick saw a splendid opportunity for a trade in which 
Prince Edward would voluntarily reopen its classes in return for
a resumption of tuition grants and a Negro promise to keep hands
112off the Prince Edward School Foundation.
Because of the great concern for preserving the tuition 
grant plan, Virginians were concentrating their attention on 
another Southside county case which raised some of the same 
issues found in the Prince Edward litigation. In August of 1963, 
the Surry County School Board elected to close its white public 
school following instructions from the State Pupil Placement 
Board to enroll seven Negro students. White students, with the 
aid of tuition grants, enrolled in the newly created white pri­
vate schools. Unlike the Prince Edward case, however, the county 
continued to operate its two Negro public schools. The Negro
110Southern School News, Vol. X, No. 12 (June, 1964),
p. 10.
111Ibid. and Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 26,
1964, p. 18; Editorial, Richmond News Leader, May 29, 1964, 
p. 14 .
112Editorial, Richmond News Leader, May 29, 1964,
p . 14 .
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plaintiffs immediately asked for an injunction requiring the
reopening of the closed public school and restraining the pay-
113ment of tuition grants. Advocates of the tuition grant
plan were under the impression that federal courts would uphold
the plan provided that public schools were available for Negro
students. The Surry County Case was accordingly viewed as an
114important test case.
On June 18, 1964, Federal District Judge John D. Butzner
ordered the school board to reopen its white school and enjoined
115further tuition grants. In comparing the Surry case to the
Prince Edward case, the availability of Negro public schools 
was not considered a significant distinction. Butzner wrote: 
"Both situations are variations upon the same theme. State and 
County funds are used to perpetuate racial segregation in the 
schools of Surry C o u n t y . T h e  effect of Butzner's decision 
was limited by his conclusion that the order applied specifi­
cally to Surry County and not to any other communities or the
. . 117tuition grant plan itself.
Both admirers and critics of Butzner recognized that his
decision was a big step in the direction of overturning the
113Southern School News, Vol. X, No. 3 (September, 1963), 
p. 18; Vol. X, No. 4 (October, 1963), p. 3.
114Editorial, Richmond News Leader, June 4, 1964, p. 10. 
Editor Kilpatrick entitled his editorial "The Big Case" in which 
he defended the tuition grant plan.
115Pettaway v. County School Board of Surry County, 23 0 
F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Va. 1964).
116Id. at 485-86.
117Id. at 486-87.
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the tuition grant program. Editor Kilpatrick viewed the ruling
as "the worst yet" of a series of rulings amounting to a "rape"
118of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Norfolk Virgin-
ian-Pilot praised the "courageous” Butzner for shattering "the
hopes of the Deep South and Southside Virginia of setting up a
device where an entire white public school system would simply
119put on a private guise to perpetuate segregation."
Following the Butzner decision, the NAACP continued to 
attack the tuition grant plan until it was declared unconstitu­
tional in 1969. Although Prince Edward County finally opened 
its public schools in the fall of 1964, Negro attorneys asked 
the district court to prohibit tuition grants for the 1964-1965 
school year. Judge Lewis agreed to enjoin retroactive tuition 
grants but not payments for the coming school year. He cited
the Supreme Court's failure to rule on tuition grants in Griffin
120as authority for his decision. The Negro plaintiffs, there­
upon, appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals which
consolidated the Prince Edward and Surry County cases since
121they dealt with the same issues.
Editorial, Richmond News Leader, June 22, 1964, p. 12.
1 1 9 Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, July 20, 1964,
p . 10.
12 0Allen v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, ix 
Race Rel. L7 Rep". 1313 CE.D. Va. 1964) . ~~~
121The Surry School Board appealed Butzner's ruling pro­
hibiting tuition grants and ordering attorney's fees.
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On December 2, 1964, in a unanimous decision of five 
judges, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that tui­
tion grants to Surry County and Prince Edward County were uncon- 
122stitutional. in an opinion written by Judge Simon Sobeloff,
the court dealt with several key aspects of the tuition grant
debate. Accepting the argument of the Negro attorneys, the
court found: "The involvement of public officials and public
funds so essentially characterizes the enterprise in each of the
counties that the Foundation schools must be regarded as public
facilities in which discrimination on racial lines is constitu-
123tionally impossible." Knocking down a basic argument of the
defenders of tuition grants, the court said: "It is of no
importance whether grants are made directly to Foundation schools
or indirectly through the conduit of pupil subventions for
restricted use as tuition fees. In the circumstances disclosed
in the present cases there is a transparent evasion of the Four-
124teenth Amendment." Finally, the court dismissed the argument
that tuition grants were guaranteed by the right of freedom of 
association. "The clear and unavoidable implication of the Brown 
decision is that white persons have no constitutional right to 
associate in publicly maintained facilities on a segregated 
basis. We do not deal here with the right of persons to send
122Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County, 
339 F. 2d 486 (4th Cir. 1964)
123Id. at 492.
124..,Ibid.
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their children to segregated schools at their own expense."125 
The decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals applied 
only to Prince Edward and Surry counties, but held out little 
hope for other localities employing public funds in segregated 
schools.
After the victory in the Fourth Circuit, the Negro
attorneys attacked the tuition grant laws "on their face" in a
suit against the State Board of Education and ten localities.
In Griffin v. State Board of Education a three-judge district
court held that tuition grants were not automatically unconsti- 
X 2 6tutional. Tuition grants to private schools, the court ruled,
only violated the equal protection clause when they represented
the "preponderant", "main", or "greater part" of the financial 
127support. In the case at hand the court found that Virginia
was "nurturing segregated schools" and enjoined further grants
as long as the private schools excluded Negroes and received pre-
128ponderant financial support from the state.
In response to the legal attack, the General Assembly 
met in December of 1964 at the request of the Governor to 
"purify" the tuition grant plan. New legislation was passed
125Id. at 493.
12^Griffin v. State Board of Education, 23 9 F. Supp. 560 
(E.D. Va. 1965)”
12^Id. at 565.
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which provided that grants could not exceed the per-pupil cost 
behind public school pupils and that teachers in all private 
nonsectarian schools were eligible for state retirement benefits, 
not just the teachers in private nonsectarian schools organized 
after 1956. The legislators also repealed a series of laws 
which had been passed to facilitate the construction of private 
schools. Private schools would no longer benefit from laws per­
mitting them to ignore zoning and building ordinances, allowing 
local tax credits to citizens contributing to private schools,
and providing transportation grants in order to bus private 
129school children.
The Negro attorneys were not satisfied with either the 
legislation or the judicial action concerning tuition grants. 
Almost immediately private schools recognized that they could 
easily circumvent the ruling by establishing a quota of tuition 
grant students which would be below fifty percent. Consequently, 
the newly created private schools figured to receive substan­
tial benefits from the grant program without falling under the 
court's preponderant rule. However, the chairman of the NAACP's 
legal staff, S. W. Tucker, was determined to press the case 
against tuition grants until the presence of only one tuition-
grant child in a segregated school was construed as an unconsti-
130tutional state action. In February, 1969, four years after
"lOQ
Southern School News, Vol. XI, No. 6 (December, 1964),
p . 11.
130Ibid., Vol. XI, No. 10 (April, 1965), p. 7.
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Tucker had designated his goal, the same three judges who had
established the "preponderant" rule declared the tuition grant
131statutes unconstitutional. In re-evaluating the 1965 deci­
sion, the court emphasized that its old ruling had to be adjusted 
in accordance with two intervening United States Supreme Court
rulings upholding federal district court decisions in Louisiana
132and South Carolina. Based upon the interpretation of these
cases, the district court found that "any assist whatever by
the State towards provision of a racially segregated education
133exceeds the pale of tolerance demarked by the Constitution."
Thus, the tuition grant statutes were put to rest almost ten
years after they were introduced as an integral part of a plan
134to prevent "enforced desegregation."
As of the fall of 197 0, only a handful of white students 
attended Prince Edward County's public schools. The outcome 
of the litigation in 19 64 did not undermine the community's 
commitment to segregated education or to its private schools. 
Likewise, for Negroes, the legal victory did not result in de­
segregation. Only the future can tell whether white students
131 Griffin v. State Board of Education, 296 F. Supp.
1178 (E.D. Va. 1969).
13 2 . . .Louisiana Financial Assistance Commission v. Poin-
dexter, 38 9 U.S. 571 (,1968) ; South Carolina State Board of 
Education v . Brown, 393 U.S. 222 (1968).
13 3Griffin v. State Board of Education, 296 F. Supp.
1178, 1181.
■^^Southern School News, Vol. XI, No. 6 (December,
1964), p. n
323
will ever return in significant numbers to the public schools.
The Prince Edward case demonstrated the limitations of the 
judicial process in cases where a community's opposition to 
desegregation was extreme and either implicitly or explicitly 
supported by the state's political leaders. Prince Edward 
County also showed that the policy of passive resistance 
based on local differences could be as effective in prohibiting 
desegregation as the earlier strategy of massive resistance.
In their zeal to defend local rights, Virginia's leading news­
papers parted company with Prince Edward for several reasons. 
First, they saw the litigation as senseless, since, win or 
lose, the schools would remain segregated in the county. Second, 
they wanted Negro children in school and an end to unfavorable 
national publicity. Finally, Prince Edward's resistance 
jeopardized the tuition grant plan which was the heart of the 
freedom to choose a segregated education, especially in rural 
Virginia.
CHAPTER X
LITIGATION, 1959-1964
The stalemate in Prince Edward County dominated the 
publicity given to the segregation activities in Virginia from 
19 59 to 196 4. However, in the Old Dominion, the extreme mea­
sures adopted by Prince Edward County were the exception and 
not the rule. Nevertheless, by employing more subtle tech­
niques, desegregation progressed at a snail's pace following 
the collapse of massive resistance. By the fall of 196 3, only 
3,720 or 1.63 percent of Virginia's Negroes were attending 
schools with white children.^ After 1959 school boards found 
a variety of techniques for upsetting Negro efforts to enter 
white schools. This chapter will trace the stream of litigation 
instituted by black attorneys as they attempted to knock down 
the evasive devices of token desegregation.
Between 1959 and 196 4, the NAACP lawyers had their 
greatest success in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. In a 
number of cases the district court judges upheld plans which, on 
their face, were not discriminatory, but which had the result of 
perpetuating token desegration. On appeal the Fourth Circuit 
Court frequently overturned the lower courts and, in turn,
^Southern School News, Vol. X, No. 11 (May, 1964), p. 1.
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forced school boards to draw up more liberal desegregation 
plans. The case for tokenism was built on the apparently un- 
shakeable dictum enunciated in Briggs v. Elliott by a three- 
judge federal district court in South Carolina which included 
Judge John J. Parker, the South's leading jurist at the time. 
This court wrote that Brown did not order integration but re­
quired merely the prohibition of student assignments based on
3
race. Under this dictum, racially separate schools did not 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment as long as an assignment was 
racially neutral on its face. Judge Parker's prestige in the 
South, the long accepted theory that a state's obligation under 
the Fourteenth Amendment was negative rather than positive, 
and the favorable results from a Southern white viewpoint made 
^ le Briggs opinion a formidable legal obstacle to desegregation. 
Consequently, school boards utilized a variety of placement 
methods which superficially were unrelated to race, in order 
to limit desegregation. Academic testing, grade-a-year plans, 
dual attendance zones, minority transfers, and the neighborhood 
school were a few of the assignment techniques used to restrict 
black enrollment. The black students who initially succeeded 
in passing through this maize were usually of the highest cali­
bre. The official rationale for this policy was that most Negro
^Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. supp. 776 (E.D. S.C. 1955). 
3Id. at 777.
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children would suffer psychologically if they were placed in 
more competitive schools. Unofficially, white school officials 
and parents believed that their children were spared the sup­
posed threat to quality education resulting from desegregation. 
As a result, in the early 1960's desegregation was limited to 
brighter and usually older black children. But legally and 
educationally such a policy was intolerable to the NAACP.
The State Pupil Placement Board ably assisted local 
school boards in their efforts to slow the pace of school de­
segregation. The Board, controlled by massive resisters from 
its inception in 1956, was reformed in July of 1960. Three 
members were appointed by Governor Almond, since the previous 
threesome was unwilling to bridge the gap from a policy of 
massive resistance to passive resistance. The new Placement 
Board recognized that its legal viability depended on assign­
ing a few Negroes to white schools, and in July, for the first 
time in its history, the Board reflected Virginia's new school 
policy and voluntarily assigned a Negro to a white school. 
However, the Board's conservative position on desegregation was 
insured by its carefully selected membership, which included 
Dr. E. J. Oglesby, a mathematics professor at the University of 
Virginia and president of the Albermarle-Charlottesville chap­
ter of the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Li­
berties . ^
^Southern School News, Vol. VII, No. 2 (August, 1960),
p. 10.
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The Pupil Placement Board, in theory, handled all the 
assignments of Virginia's public schools unless a school dis­
trict at the request of its school board and governing body, 
chose to withdraw from its authority. In practice, the Board 
rubber-stamped most assignment recommendations by the local 
officials and considered carefully only contested assignments. 
Usually these were black students who desired to enter a white 
school. As a result, the desegregation procedure was more 
complicated and also had the effect of shifting the responsi­
bility for desegregation away from local school officials on 
controversial cases.
Beginning in 1959 and 1960, Negro attorneys conducted 
litigation which directed the school boards to apply assign­
ment criteria equally to white and black children. As early 
as March of 1959, in Hamm v. County School Board of Arlington 
County (19 59), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
Negro applications for transfer were not to be subjected to 
tests which were not applied to white students.^ The following 
year, in April, the Fourth Circuit of Appeals forcefully re­
iterated this rule regarding the use of residence and academic
5 . . .Local school officials preferred to have the Virginia
Placement Board take the responsibility for assigning black 
children to white schools. Not until 1961 did the first school 
districts withdraw from the supervision of the Placement Board. 
Following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 196 4, this 
trend accelerated until the Placement Board was dissolved in 
1966.
^Hamm v. County School Board of Arlington County, 26 4 
F. 2d 945 (4th Cir. 1959).
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• • 7achievement m  Jones v. School Board of Alexandria (1960).
However, the court carefully added that both criteria "could
be properly used as a plan to bring about racial desegregation
O
m  accordance with the Supreme Court's directive." Further­
more, in line with the Briggs dictum, the court saw no reason 
to order "the complete reassignment of all pupils in the pub-
9
lie schools of Alexandria."
In Blackwell v. Fairfax County School Board (1960) ,
Negro plaintiffs charged that the Fairfax grade-a-year plan 
was discriminatory and dilatory.'1'0 Fifteen Negro children had 
been refused admission to white schools because they did not 
fall within the prescribed grades of the School Board's assign­
ment plan. The plaintiffs contended successfully that the speed 
of desegregation was too slow under the school board's plan.
In accepting the plaintiff's argument, District Judge Albert V. 
Bryan did not categorically rule out such plans. Instead, 
he emphasized that they must be judged according to the char­
acter of the community. Since the Negro school population of
7
Jones v. School Board of City of Alexandria, 278 F.
2d. 72, 77 (4th Cir. 1960).
^Ibid.
°Id. at 76.
^°Blackwell v. Fairfax County School Board, 5 Race Rel.
L. Rep. 1056 (E.D. Va. 1960).
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Fairfax County was less than four percent, Bryan considered
the fear of racial friction an unacceptable justification for
11such a cautious desegregation plan.
Another scheme for delaying desegregation in Virginia
was the minority transfer plan. The Charlottesville Board of
Education was the first of Virginia's school boards to have its
12minority transfer plan tested m  the federal courts. The 
Charlottesville assignment plan placed all elementary school 
students in the school of their residential district. However, 
any student assigned to a school where the other race predomi­
nated was permitted to transfer to a school where his or her 
race prevailed. The minority transfer was designed to rescue 
white elementary students located in the city's only predomi­
nately black residential district. The assignment plan for 
secondary students also worked to the disadvantage of Negro 
students. White students attended the only white public high 
school in the city whereas black students were required to at­
tend the black high school unless they lived closer to the
13white school and passed an aptitude test.
On December 18, 1961, in Allen v. School Board of 
Charlottesville, (1961), Judge Paul upheld the minority transfer
11Id. at 1058. Three years later the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled in Jackson v. School Board of City of 
Lynchburg, 321 F. 2d 230, 233 (4th Cir. 1963), that grade-a- 
year plans were not acceptable in Virginia.
12Allen v. School Board of City of Charlottesville, 203 
F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Va. 1961).
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plan for elementary schools, but found the high school plan 
14discriminatory. in evaluating the elementary school plan,
Paul acknowledged that it fell "far short of any complete or
enforced integration. In fact, it contemplates that there
should be no compulsory integration. Nevertheless, this court
15feels it is permissible and is not discriminatory." Judge 
Paul found no evidence of discrimination in the minority trans­
fer plan because both white and black children were permitted 
to exercise this option. However, Negro attorneys objected 
that black children residing in the predominately Negro ele­
mentary school district should be allowed to transfer out like 
their white counterparts. In reply, Judge Paul explained:
"In insisting that Negroes resident in Jefferson district (the 
Negro district) attend Jefferson school the authorities are 
merely following the principle of requiring pupils to attend 
the school within their area of residence."^  Judge Paul 
firmly believed that the law did not require forced integra­
tion and thought the majority of both races supported this 
17view.
In overturning the high school plan and ordering free­
dom of choice for secondary students, Judge Paul contradicted 
his emphasis on the neighborhood principle and minority trans­
fer used in upholding the elementary school plan. The most
14Ibid.
15Id. at 227.
16Ibid.
■^Ibid.
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objectionable part of the secondary assignment plan, to Judge
Paul, was its discriminatory use of academic testing. As a
result only above average Negro students were automatically 
18enrolled. Judge Paul gave no explanation for adopting a 
freedom of choice plan for the high schools. However, he re­
jected freedom of choice on the elementary level because he
thought the result "would be chaotic with some schools practi-
19cally deserted and others crowded beyond capacity."
The Charlottesville precedent was adopted by other
federal district court judges in Virginia. In Arlington Judge
Oren B. Lewis upheld a minority transfer provision which was
20combined with a neighborhood assignment plan. Relying heavily 
on Judge Paul's opinion, Lewis wrote: "To prohibit the right
of transfer, granted both Negro and white pupils under like 
condition, would be to require assignment of all pupils sole­
ly on the basis of residence, resulting in the enforced inte-
21gration of all public schools." The law, Lewis held, did not 
require integration, and, he added, "a substantial number of 
both Negro and white parents desire the right to send their
22children to a school in which a majority of their race attend."
18Id. at 228-29.
19Id. at 227.
70Thompson v. County School Board of Arlington County,
7 Race Rel. L." Rep. 45 (E.D. Va. 1962).
21Id. at 49.
22zzIbid.
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Judge Lewis agreed with Judge Paul that freedom of choice in­
vited administrative chaos.
In Jackson v. Lynchburg, (1962), Judge Thomas J. Michie
2 3reached the same conclusion as Judges Paul and Lewis. Judge
Michie believed that without a minority transfer plan white
parents would abandon public schools in Lynchburg and through- 
24out the South.
The minority transfer in combination with neighborhood 
school assignments was widely viewed as the best method for 
achieving Virginia's goal of no enforced desegregation. Fol­
lowing the Charlottesville and Arlington decisions the Rich- 
mond-Times-Dispatch approvingly observed: "If the rulings of
Judges Lewis and Paul continue to prevail in Virginia, no
child in this state will ever be forced to attend a school in
25which most of the other students are of another race." By 
1962, schools boards had found out that the minority transfer 
and residential assignments were the best means of satisfying 
the courts' prohibition against discrimination and restricting 
desegregation in Virginia's public schools. School officials 
dropped other assignment criteria such as achievement tests 
rather than applying them to white children which risked 
greater desegregation.
2 3Jackson v. School Board of City of Lynchburg, 203 F. 
Supp. 701 (W.D. Va. 1962).
24Id. at 705.
2"*Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 23, 1962,
p. 10.
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In Dillard v. School Board of Charlottesville (1962),
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in a narrow 3-2 decision held
0 £
unconstitutional the use of minority transfers. In Charlottes­
ville all 149 white elementary students who would have attended 
the Negro elementary school exercised their option to transfer 
out of the school. The school board argued that the transfers 
were not discriminatory, since all the children had the same 
opportunity to exercise the option to transfer.
In a per curiam opinion, the majority held that the 
apparent equality of the minority transfer plan was not signifi­
cant "if the purpose and effect of the arrangement is to retard
27integration and retain the segregation of the races." Enroll­
ment statistics proved to the majority's satisfaction, that
2 8"the actual effect of the rule is unequal and discriminatory." 
Finally the court held that personal preferences of both races 
were more equitably honored "not by restricting the right of
transfer but by a system which eliminates restrictions for the
29 . . . .right." The majority indicated that its decision was m  line
with rulings by the Fifth Circuit Court which had already in­
validated a minority transfer plan and the Sixth Circuit which 
had warned that the minority transfer plan could become uncon-
Dillard v. School Board of City of Charlottesville,
308 F. 2d 920 (4th Cir. 1962).
27Id. at 923.
2 8-r-u • A Ibid.
29Id. at 923-24.
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30stitutional if it perpetuated segregation.
There were separate dissenting opinions by Judge Albert
V. Bryan, recently elevated to the circuit court, and Judge
Clement Haynsworth, Jr. Though desegregation was retarded,
Judge Bryan did not consider the result a violation of the
Brown decision. The Fourteenth Amendment, Bryan held, did not
31"guarantee a student an integrated school to attend." The
concentration of Negroes in one elementary school, Bryan wrote,
was not by design but by residence. Until housing patterns
changed, Judge Bryan argued that Negroes "must abide by rules
3 2and regulations based on just and fair district lines."
Bryan defended the minority transfer rule as "permitting a
child to express his wishes . . . even though his wishes be
33based on racial grounds." Yet such a rule, countered the Ne­
gro plaintiffs, did not permit a Negro living in the same dis­
trict to exercise his choice.
Judge Haynsworth elected to discuss the psychological 
basis for the minority transfer. Haynsworth believed that com­
pared to segregated education, attending a school with a major-
34ity of another race was "a much more searing experience."
30Id. at 923. The cases cited by the court were Boson v. 
Rippy, 285 F. 2d 43 (5th Cir. 1960); Goss v. Board of Education 
of City of Knoxville, 301 F. 2d 164 (6th Cir. 1962).
34Id. at 925.
32Id. at 926.
33Id. at 927.
34Id. at 928.
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Though he believed that the problem of adjustment existed for
both races, Haynsworth, in effect, saw the minority transfer
as necessary to retain the support of the white community for 
35public schools.
Virginia's Attorney General Robert Y. Button considered 
the Dillard decision "one of the most far-reaching decisions 
entered by any court involving segregation in schools since
Of
Brown v. Board of Education.1 Considering the decisions al­
ready handed down in the Fifth and Sixth Circuit Courts of
37Appeal, the claim was an exaggeration. Moreover, the major­
ity's opinion did not upset the Briggs dictum. In voiding the 
minority transfer, the Fourth Circuit said it preferred a plan 
which eliminated all restrictions on transfers. This was free­
dom of choice, but not a holding which required desegregation. 
Thus, the Dillard decision dealt a blow to school boards using
the minority transfer but was narrow enough to permit the adop-
3 8tion of other evasive assignment plans by school authorities.
On May 22, 1962, in Green v. School Board of Roanoke, 
(1962), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed another 
district court decision when it rejected an assignment plan
35Id. at 929.
^ Southern School News, Vol. IX, No. 4 (October, 1962)
p. 2.
^ Boson v. Rippy, 285 F. 2d 43 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Goss v. 
v. Knoxville, 301 F. 2d 164 (6th Cir. 1962).
38Southern School News, Vol. IX, No. 4 (October, 1962)
p. 2.
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which included dual attendance zones and a "feeder system" de-
39vised by the City of Roanoke. Initially all black children, 
regardless of residence, were placed in segregated schools. 
Negroes, who attended the black elementary schools in one sec­
tion of the city, were, on graduation, automatically placed in 
black schools which served this zone exclusively. As a result 
of the so-called "feeder system," a black child once again was 
placed in a segregated school even if he lived closer to a 
white school. A Negro child who requested a transfer to the 
closer white school faced two more hurdles. First, the student 
had to score "well above" the median of the white class to which 
he or she sought enrollment. Even if successful, the applica­
tion was refused if the child's brother or sister were not 
above the median of the classes which they chose to enter. Cit­
ing its opinions in cases from Charlottesville, Norfolk, and 
Alexandria which held that assignment and transfer criteria must
be applied equally, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had no
. . . 40difficulty voiding the Roanoke pupil assignment plan.
In the Roanoke case, the Fourth Circuit Court also
singled out the State Pupil Placement Board for special criticism.
Technically the State Board made all the assignments for Roanoke.
In actual practice the court showed that the State Board
•3Q
Green v. School Board of City of Roanoke, 304 F. 2d 
118 (4th Cir. 1962). Dual attendance zones referred to a prac­
tice where a school district had one set of attendance lines for 
black children and another set for white children.
40Id. at 122-23.
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considered only local assignments which were protested. On 
contested Negro applications, the court found that the State 
Board "wanted to know if there were any Negro pupils who cannot 
be excluded from attending white schools except for race."^1 
The court's conclusion was that the State Board was preoccupied 
with race, "and its approach was to find some excuse for deny­
ing the Negroes' applications for transfers.
The decisions nullifying dual attendance zones, academic 
tests for Negroes only, and the minority transfer led to an ad­
justment in assignment policy by the State Pupil Placement Board 
and local school boards in the direction of freedom of choice.
On May 14, 1963, E. J. Oglesby reported that the distance a 
Negro lived from a white school and academic qualifications 
were no longer to be considered in placing a Negro student.
Oglesby promised: "If a Negro child wants to attend a school on
the opposite side of the county, he will be assigned to that
school if a white child in his area is entitled to attend the 
43same school."
Although the thrust of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals'
decisions was to force school authorities to adopt freedom of
choice assignment plans, this court refused to abandon the Briggs
dictum as demonstrated in the Richmond school case Bradley v.
44School Board of Richmond. The fear of black engulfment was
41Id. at 123.
42* Ibid.
4 3Southern School News, Vol. IX, No. 12 (June, 1963), p. 19.
44 .Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 317 F.
2d 429 (4th Cir. 1963).
especially pronounced in the capital city where, by 1960,
black enrollment exceeded white enrollment in the public 
45schools. The Richmond school officials, however, were very
successful in limiting desegregation to a token number through
the employment of dual attendance zones, a feeder system and
46a discriminatory use of achievement tests. Furthermore,
the Richmond school officials disclaimed any responsibility for
integrating the schools by arguing that this responsibility be-
47longed to the Pupil Placement Board. On May 10, 1963, the 
Fourth Circuit Court enjoined Richmond's discriminatory prac­
tices and registered its disbelief that school authorities were 
unaware of the decisions in Charlottesville, Norfolk, Alexan­
dria and Roanoke which had spoken on these issues.48 In criti­
cizing the Richmond school officials, the court charged that 
their assignment plan was not only discriminatory, but that the
plan also "demonstrated its potential as an effective instru-
. . . 49mentality for creating and maintaining racial segregation."
Thus, the court suggested that the Brown decision meant that 
school officials must attack segregation as well as discrimi­
nation. However, in its conclusion, the court returned to the
45 . . .Staff Reports submitted to the United States Commission
of Civil Rights, Civil Rights U.S.A., Public Schools Southern 
States, 1962, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1962), pp. 185-88.
46Bradlev, 317 F. 2d 429, 31-34.
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guidelines of Briggs v. Elliot. The plaintiffs, the court
held, were not "entitled to an order requiring the defendants
^° a general intermixture of the races in the schools but they
are entitled to an order enjoining the defendants from refusing
admission to any school of any pupil because of the pupil's
5 0race." (the court's emphasis)
By the fall of 196 3, the NAACP litigation was yielding
steady but not dramatic results. In February of 1959 Negroes
entered white schools in Virginia for the first time, a total
of thirty blacks being so enrolled. In September of 1963, the
beginning of the fifth school year since the end of massive
resistance, this number increased to 3,721 or a mere 1.57 per-
51cent of the black students enrolled in Virginia's, schools. 
However, Negro lawyers had successfully overturned a number of 
devices to perpetuate token desegregation such as the dual 
attendance zones, feeder systems, discriminatory achievement 
tests and minority transfer plans. With these victories in the 
background and the most extensive civil rights bill in the 
nation's history before Congress, Virginia's Negro leaders were 
ready to attack what Roy Wilkins described as "the largest and
Cjfl ,
Id. at 438. On March 18, 1963, in anticipation of the 
Fourth Circuit Court's order the Richmond School Board dropped 
dual attendance zones and the feeder system for a "freedom of 
choice" plan.
5 1Southern School News, Vol. X, No. 6 (December, 1963),
pp. 1, 5.
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and most successful token integration program in the country."
S. W. Tucker, chief attorney for the Virginia NAACP, promised 
a "big push" to end all segregation in Virginia. The NAACP1s 
effort would end, Tucker promised, "only when there are no
c 3
white and Negro schools in Virginia, only public schools."
As a first step toward implementing this goal, W. Lester Banks,
executive-secretary of the NAACP announced that petitions were
to be sent to all 128 biracial schools districts asking them to
54desegregate their schools.
Consistent with their strategy to end all segregated 
schools, the NAACP initiated suits against school districts 
which it believed had not gone far enough in eliminating 
segregation. In pursuing this litigation, the black lawyers 
continually advanced the argument that the Brown decision 
prohibited segregation as well as discrimination. In Fairfax 
County, with a sparse Negro population, the plaintiffs argued 
that the existence of all Negro schools was evidence of dis­
crimination. Judge Lewis, in Blakeney v. Fairfax County School 
Board, (1964), disagreed and found that children attended all-
Negro schools "solely on account of their place of residence or
• 55by choice." When the Negro plaintiffs appealed the decision,
52Ibid., Vol. X, No. 5 (November, 1963), p. 8.
53Ibid., Vol. X, No. 7 (January, 1964), p. 2.
54Ibid., Vol. X, No. 11 (May, 1964), p. 4-A.
C C
Blakeney v. Fairfax County School Board, 226 F. Supp. 
713, 715 (E.D. Va. 1964).
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the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote that "the injunction
to prohibit a system of segregated schools . . . should have 
56been granted." On remand, Judge Lewis found the question moot
since all the plaintiffs had been assigned to white schools and
all Negro children were permitted to attend the closest white
5 7school upon request. Judge Lewis denied that the school
board had to choose between integrating or closing white schools,
as the plaintiffs demanded. "The Supreme Court, he emphasized,
had not ordered enforced integration. It has outlawed discri- 
5 8mination." Anticipating the future course of the litigation,
Judge Lewis added that school authorities would never have to
transport students "for the purpose of integrating those segre- 
59gated schools."
In Beckett v. School Board of Norfolk, (1964), Judge 
Walter Hoffman adopted the same position as Judge Lewis in up­
holding a desegregation plan which utilized a combination of 
freedom of choice and neighborhood assignments.89 The Negro
Blakeney v. Fairfax County School Board, 334 F. 2d 
239, 240 (4th Cir. 1964).
c 7
Blakeney v. Fairfax County School Board, 2 31 F. Supp. 
1006 (E.D. Va. 1964).
58Id. at 1009.
59Ibid.
80Beckett v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 9 Race 
Rel. L. Rep. 1315 (E.D. Va. 1964).
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attorneys, who pressed for the elimination of all identifiable 
Negro schools, argued that Norfolk's plan was not adequate un­
til both faculties and student bodies were racially balanced. 
Judge Hoffman made no apologies for the schools which were 
still segregated. "This is the principle of the neighborhood 
school which had received at least tacit approval of the 
United States Supreme Court when certiorari was denied in Bell 
v. City of Gary."^ Continuing, Hoffman thought that "a free­
dom of choice plan, so long as all children living within a
designated area have an equal choice available, is constitution- 
6 2al." Finally, Hoffman emphasized: "A racially desegregated
school system was not intended to correct racial imbalance in
6 3certain schools." Judge Hoffman argued that desegregation in 
Norfolk was de facto rather than de jure. Implicit in Hoffman's 
opinion was the belief that the law of desegregation should not 
treat Norfolk any differently than a northern city such as Gary.
The demand to desegregate faculties had several objec­
tives. First, the Negro attorneys argued that the racial com­
position of a faculty contributed significantly to the identifi­
cation of a school as a white or black school. Second, lawyers
^Id. at 1317. See Bell v. City of Gary, 324 F. 2d 209 
(7th Cir.T963) cert, denied 377 U.S. 924 (1963) in which the 
federal courts upheld a neighborhood school plan for Gary, 
Indiana.
62Ibid.
63Ibid.
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hoped to protect black teachers and administrators who were
often released following the implementation of a desegregation 
64order. There were a number of educational and sociological 
reasons for demanding desegregated faculties. The ability of 
black and white faculty members to work together was, and is 
still viewed as indispensable in achieving an integrated, as 
compared to a desegregated, school system. Also, many educa­
tors considered it necessary for black children to see Negroes
65m  administrative and supervisory positions. However, the 
Negro attorneys met stiff resistance in their advocacy of de­
segregated faculties. Judge Hoffman remarked: "If it is not
incumbent upon a school board to 'force' integration among the
pupils, why is it required that a school board 'force' integra-
• - 6 6  tion upon the school faculties."
The tenacity of the Negro attorneys reaped some results 
in the number of Negroes entering white schools in the fall of 
1964. The 11,833 Negroes who attended classes with white stu­
dents far exceeded earlier expectations for that year. Of all 
the southern states only Texas had more black students in white 
schools. Nevertheless only 5.07 percent of Virginia's black
f.A
Southern School News, Vol. XI, No. 2 (August, 1964),
p. 5.
65Interview, Dr. Robert T. Greene, director of the Tech­
nical Assistance Program to assist Virginia School Divisions 
on Problems Relating to Desegregation.
Beckett v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 9 Race 
Rel. L. Rep. 1315 (E.D. Va. 1964).
344
67enrollment was m  white schools. In terms of numbers, the 
NAACP strategy of massive litigation was not successful.
The time-consuming legal process, as Virginia's leadership 
expected, worked to the advantage of segregationists. However, 
the NAACP did succeed in maintaining a steady pressure upon 
Virginia to integrate its schools. When Congress passed the 
1964 Civil Rights Act the NAACP was prepared to take advantage 
of the federal legislation.
By 1964 the status of the Virginia Conference of the 
NAACP, as an organization within Virginia, was more secure.
For several reasons the campaign to limit the Virginia NAACP's 
effectiveness had failed. First, the anti-NAACP laws of 1956 
and 1959, because of their rather poorly disguised purpose, 
never received broad editorial support from Virginia's news­
papers. Second, the lawyers for the NAACP were never convicted 
of any gross indiscretions regarding the practice of law.
Finally, as a result of the litigation testing the anti-NAACP 
laws, the activities of this civil rights organization won
broad guarantees from the Supreme Court protecting its activi-
68ties. In NAACP v. Button (1963), the Supreme Court declared 
^ Southern School News, Vol. XI, No. 6 (December, 1964),
p. 1.
^ N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). The other 
anti-NAACP laws were declared unconstitutional by the Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals in NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142 (1960), 
116 S.E. 2d 55 (1960) and the circuit court of Richmond in NAACP 
Lecral Defense and Education Fund v. Harrison, 7 Race Rel. L.
Rep. 864 (1962).
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declared unconstitutional the last Virginia statute aimed at
thwarting the NAACP, and took a big step in the direction of
making the supervision of litigation a constitutionally priv-
69ileged activity under the Fourtheenth Amendment. This law 
prohibited attorneys from accepting employment or compensations 
from persons or organizations which were not parties to judi­
cial proceedings. In the Supreme Court's opinion written by 
Justice Brennan, the Court said "the activities of the NAACP, 
its affiliates and legal staff are modes of expression and 
association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
which Virginia may not prohibit, under its power to regulate
70the legal profession. . . . "  Thus as the Negro Revolution 
in the United States entered a more militant phase, the NAACP 
appeared decidedly more respectable to white Virginians. On 
the ninth anniversary of the Brown decision the Norfolk Vir­
ginian-Pilot wrote it was "time to re-evaluate the entire 
civil rights scene." In comparison to the Black Muslims and
Martin Luther King, the editor thought: "The NAACP . . .
71now seems conservative m  its reliance on the courts."
69Harry P. Kalven, The Negro and the First Amendment 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 75-86.
7QId. at 428-29.
"^Editorial, Norfolk Virginia-Pilot, May 17, 1963,
p. 10.
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In the Fall of 1964, with its legal position strength­
ened and its spirits buoyed by legal victories and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, S. W. Tucker, Chairman of the legal staff 
of the Virginia NAACP announced that suits would be filed ask­
ing the courts to order school boards to initiate plans to end 
segregation. Beginning in 1965, Negro attorneys embarked on
a legal campaign to place every black child in an integrated
1 72classroom.
^ Southern School News, Vol. XI, No. 5 (November, 1964),
p. 8.
CHAPTER XI
THE ATTACK UPON FREEDOM OF CHOICE
Beginning in 1965 the NAACP concentrated its legal effort 
on persuading the federal courts that the Brown decision meant 
all Negro children had the right to attend desegregated public 
schools. After unsuccessfully petitioning Virginia school 
boards to draw up voluntary desegregation plans, in March of 
19 65 Negro lawyers filed eight law suits asking the courts to 
order the defendant school boards to take the initiative in 
desegregating their classrooms. Negro lawyers promised as many 
as fifty such suits in Virginia until the responsibility for 
desegregation was shifted from solitary Negroes to the respec­
tive school boards.'*'
By 1965 the greatest legal obstacle to desegregation was 
the freedom of choice plan. Although it permitted students to 
enroll in any school within a school district, the initiative 
for admission and the burden of transportation were placed with 
the Negro parent or child. In other words, responsibility for 
desegregating the public schools still rested with the blacks 
rather than the school officials. Black leaders feared a cas­
ual acceptance of freedom of choice for two reasons. First,
^Southern School News, Vol. XI, No. 10 (April, 1965),
p . 7 .
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they were convinced that parental inertia meant that actual 
desegregation would be negligible. W. Lester Banks, executive 
secretary of the Virginia Conference of the NAACP, wrote to 
the state branches that white school officials were aware that 
"Negro parents are too indifferent, too afraid and too satis­
fied and contented to accept the responsibility of helping
their children escape from the damaging effects of a Jim Crow
2educational system." Secondly, without white students in 
"black" schools, Negro leaders were persuaded that the "black" 
schools would not receive the same financial support as "white" 
schools.2
On April 7, 1965, in a 3 to 2 decision a freedom of 
choice plan was upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond.^  In 1963 
the city's school officials erased all school boundaries, al­
though free choice was limited by the enrollment capacity of 
the school which the student desired to attend. The Negro 
plaintiffs did not question the existence of a freedom of 
choice plan, but argued that the plan failed to eliminate se­
gregation. However, in the opinion of the majority, written
2Ibid., Vol. XI, No. 12 (June, 1965), p. 5.
3
Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 18, 19 71, p. C-l. 
Financial statistics reported by the Citizens for Excellent 
Public Schools, a Richmond biracial organization dedicated to 
strong public education, supported this argument.
^Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 345 F. 
2d 310 (4th Cir. 1965).
by Judge Clement Haynsworth, the Briggs dictum still governed 
desegregation suits. "It has been held again and again . . .
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibition is not against se­
gregation as such. The proscription is against discrimi-
5
nation," wrote Haynsworth. Within the boundaries of the 
Briggs dictum, it followed logically that freedom of choice 
was a perfectly "acceptable device for achieving a legal de­
segregation of schools."^ Although free choice resulted in 
little desegregation, Haynsworth found this the result of 
"voluntary associations” which were not prohibited by the law.
Failing to see any mandate under the Constitution to 
order actual desegregation, Judge Haynsworth also saw the 
plaintiffs plea for desegregated faculties as irrelevant in 
this case. The plaintiffs, he wrote, had failed to demonstrate 
any relationships between teacher assignments and pupil discri­
mination. Curiously, although Haynsworth saw the connection 
between teacher-pupil desegregation as "speculative," he pre­
dicted that desegregation in teacher placement would be
g
achieved after the elimination of pupil discrimination.
The dissent, written by Judge Simon Sobeloff, doubted 
that the Richmond scheme was "a plan of desegregation." The 
test of any desegregation plan, Sobeloff argued, depended on 
whether the initiative came from the school board and whether
350
the plan achieved actual results.9 Sobeloff suggested that 
freedom of choice might be just another "strategic retreat 
to a new position behind which the forces of opposition will 
regroup."10 His opinion was predicated on the testimony of a 
Richmond school official who saw no obligation to integrate 
schools, and on Richmond's long record of resistance to deseg­
regation. Considering the history of lost opportunity,
Sobeloff charged that school administrators must "bestow extra 
effort and expense to bring the deprived pupils up to the
level where they can avail themselves of the choice in fact as
11well as m  theory." On the subject of faculty desegregation, 
Sobeloff saw a direct relationship between the racial composi­
tion of faculty and student bodies. The racial complexion of 
the faculty, he explained, contributed to the identification 
of schools as either "white" or "black." Sobeloff envisioned
no obstacle to simultaneously desegregating teachers and
. . 12 pupils.
On the same day that the Richmond school plan was accept­
ed, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a school assign-
13ment plan based on geographic zoning m  the city of Hopewell.
9Id. at 321.
1QId. at 322.
i;LIbid.
12Id. at 324.
12Gilliam v. School Board of the City of Hopewell, 345 F.
2d 325 (4th Cir. 1965).
351
The plaintiffs had claimed that some of the school lines were
gerrymandered to preserve segregation and that the general
result of the assignment plan was to promote segregation.
However, the Court, through Haynsworth, found that the school
boundaries were not gerrymandered to perpetuate segregation. ‘*‘4
Haynsworth agreed that segregation was increased but added that
this was not because of school board policy but because of
15existing "residential segregation." More importantly„ Judge 
Haynsworth believed that the law offered no legal method of 
destroying segregated schools in Hopewell or similar school 
systems. "The Constitution," he wrote, "does not require the 
abandonment of neighborhood schools and the transportation of 
pupils from one area to another solely for the purpose of mix­
ing the races in the schools.
Judges Simon Sobeloff and J. Spencer Bell in a separate 
concurring opinion accepted the concept of a neighborhood 
system but with a significant reservation. They counseled:
"In applying the neighborhood school concept, the school 
board . . . must keep in mind its paramount duty to afford
equal educational opportunity to all children without dis­
crimination; otherwise, school building plans may be employed
i ! 7
to perpetuate and promote segregation.1 By inference, the
14Id. at 328. 15Ibid.
16Ibid. 17Id. at 329.
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Sobeloff-Bell qualification meant that the neighborhood school, 
though convenient, was not sacred when it interfered with 
equalizing educational opportunity.
The Haynsworth-Sobeloff exchange presented, in microcosm, 
the two poles of the school debate from 1965 to 1972. Judge 
Haynsworth accepted freedom of choice assignment plans, en­
dorsed the neighborhood school, and opposed techniques for 
ensuring actual desegregation. Judge Sobeloff thought that the 
true test of any school plan under the Brown decision was its 
contribution to desegregating the schools. The logical exten­
sion of this position was an approval of faculty desegregation, 
busing, consolidation, or any other technique which seemed to 
increase the probability of school desegregation.
The Richmond Times-Dispatch approved of the Fourth Cir­
cuit's decision in Bradley and warned that "unless it wants to 
break new ground and go beyond the 1954 ruling, the high tri­
bunal will uphold the view so soundly presented yesterday by
18the Fourth Circuit majority." However, when the NAACP pro­
ceeded immediately to appeal the Bradley and Gilliam cases,
the Warren Court responded by indicating a readiness to explore
19techniques for maximizing school desegregating. In granting 
certiorari, the Supreme Court consolidated the Bradley and
18Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 8, 1965, 
p. A-16.
19Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 382 
U.S. 10 3 (1965)“ — —
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Gilliam cases for the limited purpose of determining whether 
the Fourth Circuit could approve school plans without con­
sidering, in a full hearing, the effect of alleged racial dis­
crimination in faculty apportionment on the student assignment 
plans. On November 15, 1965, the Supreme Court found "no merit 
to the suggestion [by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals] 
that the relation between faculty allocation on an alleged
racial basis and the adequacy of the desegregation plans is
20entirely speculative." Thus, the Court remanded the case to
the district court for full evidentiary hearings on this issue.
In March of 1966, Judge John D. Butzner, Jr. approved a faculty
desegregation plan for Richmond which provided for recruitment
21and assignment policies aimed at desegregation.
In seeing a symbiotic relationship between faculty and
student segregation, the Supreme Court, for the first time,
went beyond affirming Brown I to engage cautiously in the de-
22tails of desegregation. Although it restricted the hearing 
in the Bradley and Gilliam cases to faculty assignments, the
20Id. at 105.
21Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, XI 
Race RelT L . Rep. 1289 (E.D. Va. 1966).
22Jack Greenberg, "The Supreme Court, Civil Rights and 
Civil Dissonance," Yale Law Journal, 77 (July, 1968), 1520. 
Greenberg saw the Bradley case as the Supreme Court's first 
attempt at outlining the details of desegregation. He sug­
gested that the Civil Rights Act of 196 4, by giving school 
desegregation legislative support, sparked greater judicial 
activism in implementing Brown I.
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Supreme Court wrote that this did not preclude further exami­
nation of the school plans. Furthermore, it warned: "Delays
23m  desegregating school systems are no longer tolerable."
Thus, the Supreme Court gave notice of its impatience with
"deliberate speed" and forewarned its subsequent disapproval
of school plans which did not lead to desegregation.
The attempt to make desegregated education a reality in
Virginia and elsewhere, gained impetus from the passage of the
24Civil Rights Act of 1964. Up to 1964 the burden of desegre­
gation had rested completely on the shoulders of black children 
and the courts. However, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided 
the federal government with an administrative method of attack­
ing segregated schools. Title VI of this law prohibited dis-
25crimination in federally funded programs. Refusal to comply
2 6triggered a procedure for termination of federal funds. Thus, 
the Office of Education in the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare, to which was delegated the responsibility of pro­
moting desegregation, was armed with a powerful financial 
weapon in its assault on dual school systems. To Southerners 
the federal government's financial leverage appeared even more
^Bradley, 382 U.S. at 105.
2478 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. 2000 a-1 C1964).
2^Civil Rights Act of 1964, sec. 601, 78 Stat. 241 
(1964), 42 U.S.C. 2 000d C1964).
2^Civil Rights Act of 1964, sec. 602, 78 Stat. 241 
(1964), 42 U.S.C. 2 000d-l (1964).
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ominous when Congress increased the amount of federal funds
for southern schools in the Elementary and Secondary Education 
27Acts of 1965. Finally, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pro­
vided a mechanism by which the United States Attorney General 
was permitted to initiate suits against stubborn school 
boards.23
The story of HEW's educational victories and defeats in
29Virginia has already been told by Gary Orfield. At first
glance, the results of the federal government's effort, when
contrasted with the first ten years of implementation, were
dramatic. The percentage of Negro students in desegregated
schools jumped from five percent in 196 4, to eleven percent
30in 1965, to twenty percent m  1966. However, this picture 
of relatively impressive progress in the rate of desegregation 
in Virginia was in fact distorted, since HEW was most success­
ful in the less resistant areas of Virginia, where the Negro
31 . . .population was small. By contrast, desegregation m  Vir­
ginia's black belt counties, following three years of freedom
2779 Stat. 27 (1965), 20 U.S.C. 236 (1965).
23Civil Rights Act of 1964, sec. 407, 78 Stat. 241 
(1964), 42 U.S.C. 2000 c-6 (1964).
9 QGary Orfield, The Reconstruction of Southern Educa- 
tion (. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1969) , pp. 2 08-63 .
3QIbid., 227, 250-57.
31Ibid. 227.
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32of choice, was frozen at token levels.
There were four broad explanations for the failure of 
the federal government in Tidewater and Southside Virginia. 
First, federal implementation of desegregation guidelines was 
not vigorous. HEW, for example, used its most potent weapon, 
the fund cutoff, infrequently and reluctantly. This caution 
was partially explained by the political pressure applied by 
Southern politicians on HEW to relax the enforcement of de­
segregation guidelines. Equally important, however, HEW 
officials believed that the fund cutoff worked its greatest 
damage on the poor and the black who desperately needed feder­
al funds. Politically and educationally, in other words, the
33fund cutoff technique had serious strategic drawbacks. Also 
contributing to the ineffectiveness of the federal government 
in Virginia was the poor record of the Justice Department in 
instituting desegregation suits. Limited staffing, concentra­
tion on the Deep South, and cumbersome public complaint pro­
cedures were factors in the Justice Department's inactivity in
. . 34Virginia.
A second obstacle to desegregation was the freedom of 
choice plan. Although HEW considered the elimination of
3 2Report of the Virginia State Advisory Committee to the 
United States Commission on Civil Rights, "The Federal Role In 
School Desegregation In Selected Virginia Districts," 1968, 
pp. 24-25. (Mimeographed.)
330rfield, Southern Education, pp. 259-63.
"^Ibid. , p. 256
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desegrated schools its ultimate objective, local officials
interpreted the adoption of freedom of choice plans, what-
35ever the result, to be legal and final. Thus, by initially
accepting freedom of choice, HEW officials lost their capacity
to negotiate new school plans which would provide for greater
desegregation.
Thirdly, state and local officials played an important
role in the failure of desegregation in the black belt counties.
The Virginia State Advisory Committee to the Commission on
Civil Rights found that one of the keys to destroying dual
school systems involved changing the attitude of local school
officials. In black belt counties, the Committee reported
that school officials took no initiative to end discrimination
3 6until there was a complaint. On the state level, the Depart­
ment of Public Instruction did not prod local officials to 
increase the pace of desegregation. The deputy superintendent 
of the State Department of Education, Harry Elmore, who ad­
ministered the state's compliance with the 196 4 Civil Right's 
Act, thought that it was unwise "politically or otherwise. . .
3 7
for our department to align itself with the federal government." 
Furthermore, Elmore refused to allow his office to become "a means
3 SIbid., p. 244; Virginia State Advisory Comm., pp. 13,
21.
o r
Virginia State Advisory Comm., pp. 9, 22-23.
37Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 338
F. Supp. "67, 153 (E.D. Va. 1972).
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of getting information that HEW should get from the locality."
Although the state officials, according to Gary Orfield, saw
3 9themselves as "neutral bystanders, conveying information, 1 
their "neutrality" benefited local officials opposed to dese- 
gregation.
Finally, federal implementation of desegregation guide­
lines in Virginia was hindered by national disaffection with 
the civil rights movement. Initially, in Virginia, HEW won 
its early desegregation victories by capitalizing on the last 
stages of the national drive for civil rights and the move­
ment's impact on Virginia's politics. The grip of the rural 
leadership over the fortunes of the Democratic party was final­
ly weakened by the rapid increase of the Negro vote and the 
steady growth of the urban delegation to the state’s General
Assembly. Virginia's blacks also benefited from federal action
4 0which facilitated voter registration. Likewise, urban Vir­
ginia picked up eleven seats in the 196 4 General Assembly as
an aftermath to the Supreme Court reapportionment ruling in
41Reynolds v. Sims.
38ld. at 152. It was not until 1970 that the Virginia 
Department of Education applied for a federal grant to establish 
a staff trained to assist school boards in the transition from a 
dual to unitary school systems. Id. at 154.
3^Orfield, p. 220.
40Buni, Negro in Virginia Politics, p. 229; Wilkinson, 
Harry Byrd, pp. 258-59, 334.
41337 U.S. 533 (1964); Wilkinson, p. 248.
The impact of the new voting trends was best repre­
sented in the 1965 race for governor which was won by Mills 
Godwin, a former massive resister. The Godwin platform made 
education Virginia's highest priority and won the endorsement
of labor, Negroes, conservative businessmen, and organization 
42stalwarts. By 1967, however, it was politically possible, 
for various reasons, to take a stand against desegregation 
guidelines that extended beyond freedom of choice. First, the 
waning of the national civil rights movement removed a source 
of important pressure of Virginia's politicians. Second, re­
segregation in the northern cities made Virginia's relative 
progress in school desegregation appear more dramatic and de­
fensible. This was especially so since freedom of choice was 
considered the limit of the law. Thirdly, in view of national 
racial problems, the attempt by the federal government to go 
beyond freedom of choice encouraged a conservative rural-subur 
ban voting coalition against further desegregation techniques. 
This convergence of the national mood with state opposition to 
steps beyond freedom of choice threatened to bring desegrega­
tion to a standstill. Fearing such a result, the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Education Fund and the Virginia Conference of the
NAACP looked to the courts for rulings which would break the 
44stalemate.
4 7Wilkinson, pp. 263-84. 
^Orfield, pp. 260-63.
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After the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld free­
dom of choice in the Richmond case, civil rights lawyers 
consistently asked the courts to move beyond freedom of choice 
to increase the speed of school desegregation. Between 1965 
and 1967 the assault upon freedom of choice made some headway 
in western and northern Virginia where the Negro population was 
small. In these "pepper and salt" areas, the black lawyers 
argued that there was no administrative obstacle to complete 
desegregation. Freedom of choice, they submitted, applied only
to urban areas. For example, in Bell v. School Board of the 
45City of Staunton the black plaintiffs won an important vic­
tory when the city schools were ordered to close all "Negro"
schools and to assign all students according to non-racial
46geographic zones. Although Judge Thomas J. Michie did not 
reject the principle of freedom of choice, he thought geo­
graphic zones were superior in areas of sparse Negro popula- 
47tion.
The breakthrough in the campaign against freedom of 
choice was achieved on May 27, 19 68, in the Supreme Court's
48decision m  Green v. County School Board of New Kent County.
New Kent County was a sparsely populated black belt county east
45Bell v. School Board of the City of Staunton, 249 F.
Supp. 249 (W.D. Va. 1966).
46Id. at 251.
4^Ibid.
48391 U.S. 430 (1968).
of Richmond, in which white and black students were bused to 
segregated schools located at opposite ends of the county.
Since freedom of choice had not succeeded in desegregating the 
public schools, the plaintiffs asked for assignment plans based 
on geographical zoning. Justice William J. Brennan's opinion 
laid to rest the dictum that the Brown decision merely prohibi­
ted discrimination as Judge Parker had written in Briggs v. 
Elliott. Instead, Justice Brennan asserted, "the transition to
a unitary, nonracial system of public education was and is the
49ultimate end to be brought about." Moreover, the school
boards, rather than the parents, were "clearly charged with the
affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to
convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would
50be eliminated root and branch." A school board, the Court
51held, must produce a plan that promised "to work now" rather
than at some distant undetermined point in the future.
The Supreme Court did not categorically rule out the 
use of freedom of choice as a technique for attacking segrega­
tion. However, freedom of choice was reduced to only one of a 
number of means potentially useful in desegregating public
schools. If other methods promised to be more effective, the
52Court said, "freedom of choice must be held unacceptable."
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In Richmond, whose schools had been operating under a 
freedom of choice plan since 1965, the News Leader blasted the 
Supreme Court for trying "to satisfy the capricious appetites 
of sociology gone mad." The ruling, the editorial continued, 
was"merely the logical extension of the mistaken notions of 
equalitarianism that have affected the Court for years." In 
undermining the so-called principle of free choice in public 
education, the paper contended that the Court 1 denied the 
ability of parents— white and black— to select the schools 
their children will attend." Finally, contrary to the "soci­
ology of the New Left," the News Leader explained that de facto
53segregation was the "will of the people, black and white."
The shock registered by the News Leader was not shared 
by the more moderate Virginian-Pilot. The Norfolk paper re­
minded its readers that the circuit courts and the "Supreme
Court Justices have been indicating that the Brown rules are no
5 4longer adequate." However, the Virginian-Pilot doubted the
wisdom of the broad condemnation of identifiably Negro schools.
From the perspective of the city, the New Kent case was easy
since that county's housing was, in effect, already integrated.
But, the advantages of massive desegregation in Norfolk were
outweighed by the costs of achieving this goal, according to
55the Virginian-Pilot.
53Editorial, Richmond News Leader, May 28, 1968, p. 14. 
^Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, May 28, 1968, p. 14.
33Ibid., June 3, 1968, p. 16.
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Following the Green decision, the desegregation contro­
versy was centered in Virginia's cities, especially Norfolk 
and Richmond, which had large black populations. The NAACP 
asked the courts to order the school boards to devise assign­
ment plans which eliminated black schools. As a guideline, the 
NAACP lawyers thought that the ratio of black to white students 
in each school should reflect the racial composition of the 
entire school system. In order to achieve this goal, where 
housing patterns served as obstacles to integration, the black 
plaintiffs considered bus transportation a legitimate desegre­
gation tool. The appeal to destroy barriers to desegregation 
through busing, however, touched off an emotional response which 
paralleled the reaction to Brown I.
In the federal district court, black plaintiffs chal­
lenged the Norfolk assignment plan which left large percentages 
of Negro children in all black schools. The plaintiffs argued 
that the law required the elimination of all black schools and 
that busing was a legally acceptable means of achieving this 
goal. In Beckett v. School Board of Norfolk (1969), Judge Walter 
Hoffman held that constitutional principles did not require
racial balancing in each individual school when busing was re-
56quired to accomplish this end. Although Hoffman recognized
the adverse effects of segregation, its remedy, he wrote, had to
57be consistent "with a sound educational system." In his 
56Beckett v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 308 F. Supp. 
1274, 1276 (E.D. Va. 1969).
57Id. at 1283.
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judgment, busing was an obnoxious remedy particularly when it
involved young children. In addition to the expense of busing,
its "principle [sic] vice," Hoffman wrote, was "the time re-
58quired m  getting to and from school."
In Norfolk, the school board defended its assignment
plan by arguing that the board was guided by the most recent
social science data. The perpetuation of black schools was
defended by the school board on the grounds that the social class
mix of the student body, rather than race was the most important
factor in determining school assignments. This contention was
based on the famous study, Equality of Educational Opportunity,
better known as the Coleman Report, which found that the most
significant correlate of educational achievement for all chil-
59dren was the social class mix of the student body. More im­
portantly , the Coleman Report found that the student milieu had 
its greatest "effect on those [students] from educationally de­
ficient backgrounds."69 In Beckett v. Norfolk (1969), Hoffman 
accepted the information regarding the influence of social 
class as evidence against the advisability of correcting racial 
imbalances. As far as educational achievement was concerned, 
he considered race "definitely a secondary factor."61 In fash­
ioning an assignment plan for Norfolk, Hoffman observed: "We
58Id. at 1302.
59James S. Coleman et al., Equality of Educational Oppor- 
tunity (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, iyb6),
p . 304.
60Ibid.
61Becket 308 F. Supp. 1274, 1285.
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cannot believe that the Supreme Court, in requiring 'desegre­
gation,1 has merely ordered a mixing of racial bodies without
r 9
consideration of the social class factor."
The assumption that attainment of the best social class 
mix was a primary objective also served as an argument against 
busing and eliminating all black schools. Forcing desegrega­
tion, Judge Hoffman stressed, led to the flight of the white 
middle class from the city. As a result, he concluded, the
best educational mix would be permanently unobtainable in Nor- 
6 3folk schools. Furthermore, Hoffman saw nothing objection­
able in all-black schools when the majority of their enrollment
64was middle class. He bolstered his case for retaining all­
black schools by citing the evidence of educational experts 
who thought desegregation worked best in schools which were 
sixty to seventy percent white.^
In fashioning a busing plan for Norfolk, Judge Hoffman 
made a plea for a national application of the desegregation 
laws. "We cannot believe that the Constitution may be inter­
preted one way for a group of states, and still another way for
62Ibid.
63Id. at 1287-88.
^Id. at 1285. This contradicted the findings of Racial
Isolation which indicated that middle-class black students
benefited academically from integrated classrooms.
65Id. at 1290-91.
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the remaining s t a t e s . T h e  target of Hoffman's dissatis­
faction was the de facto "escape hatch" of Northern cities.
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited busing to
6 7achieve racial balance, the courts held that this provision
6 8only applied to situations of de facto segregation. However,
Hoffman declared that all school segregation— North and South—
was essentially de jure. Listing discriminatory legislation
69m  state after state prior to 1954, Hoffman concluded:
"Even when such statutes were repealed prior to 1954, the
pattern of segregation may have been so well established that
70its continued existence could only be de jure." Thus Hoffman
proposed that the courts should no longer consider the "de
jure - de facto issue . . .  a determinative factor in arriving
71at what is required under Brown I." Instead, Hoffman sug­
gested that the affirmative mandate to desegregate must fit
66Id. at 1305.
^7Civil Rights Act of 1964, sec 407 (a) (2) Stat. 241
(1964), 42 U.S.C. 2000 c-6 (1964).
68U.S. v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.
2d. 836, 878-86 (5th Cir. 1966); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education, 402 U.S.l, 17 (1971).
^Beckett, 308 F. Supp. 1274, 1311-1315.
70Id. at 1304.
7^Id. at 1305.
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7 2the circumstances of the school systems. Courts were not
required to order the "impossible . . . unreasonable, unpracti-
73cable." Applying this rule to Norfolk, Hoffman refused to
order busing in the first three grades or to erase all of
74Norfolk's black schools.
The case that Judge Hoffman made for sectional equity
was a powerful one. Reasonable men also were impressed by his
logic that the attempt to achieve the perfectly desegregated
school system was self-defeating, given the willingness of
white parents to leave the system. The moderate Virginian-
Pilot agreed with Hoffman's thesis that the distinction between
de jure and de facto segregation was "a distinction without a
difference." An editorial saw Hoffman's views as a "return
75to sanity." Virginia also hoped that a tougher policy toward 
the North might bring relief to the South. But the most signifi­
cant aspect of Hoffman's opinion was his use of social science 
data to defeat desegregation. Hoffman justified continuation 
of all-black schools as consistent "with sound educational 
principles." Thus, Judge Hoffman's opinion realized the fears 
of earlier commentators of the first Brown decision. Some legal 
scholars were apprehensive that Brown I rested too heavily on
7 I^d.. at 1278.
74Id. at 1279.
7“^ Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, January 1, 1970,
p . A-8.
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social science evidence. New evidence, they had feared, might
be used to slow or stop the desegregation process.^
To the plaintiffs in the Norfolk case, Hoffman's ruling
was totally unacceptable, and in the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals they immediately appealed Hoffman's decision refusing
to order busing in the first three grades and limiting deseg-
77regation to schools which were sixty percent white. The 
Fourth Circuit found Hoffman's order impermissable in view 
of the Supreme Court's decisions in Green v. New Kent County
and Alexander v. Holmes and ordered the school boards to devise
a plan so that "no pupil is excluded because of his race from
7 8a desegregated school." Moreover, the Court held that the
7 6Edmond Cahn, "Jurisprudence," New York University Law 
Review, 30 (January, 1955), 150. Professor Cahn did not find 
Brown I determined on social scientific evidence, but he warned 
of the dangers of basing constitutional rights on such evidence. 
Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral, Principles of Constitutional 
Law," Harvard Law Review, 73 (November, 1959), 31-35. Professor 
Wechsler like Cahn 'did hot think Brown I was decided on social 
science data, but did point out the legal problems raised by 
such evidence.
7 7Brewer v. School Board of the City of Norfolk, 434 F.
2d. 408 (4th Cir. 1970).
7 8Id. at 1410. The Court found nineteen black elemen­
tary schooTs, eleven all white elementary schools, three all 
black junior high schools and one all white senior high school 
in Norfolk. In Alexander v. Holmes, 396 U.S. 19 (1969), a
Mississippi desegregation case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
the Green decision by holding that the "obligation of every 
school district is to terminate dual school systems at once 
and to operate hereafter only unitary schools."
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legal ramifications of the social science data were unconsti­
tutional. A "rigid adherence to quotas," wrote the Court,
7 9"preserves traditional racial characteristics of its schools."
8 0The result "is the antithesis of a racially unitary system."
In August of 1970, Judge Hoffman accepted a Norfolk de^ -
segregation plan which provided for more extensive busing in
order to desegregate the schools. Although he authorized the
new school plan, Hoffman caustically observed that it was
81accomplished with "a gun at my back." In other words, his 
freedom of action was restricted by the higher courts. Pre­
dictably, Judge Hoffman could not resist one more parting ver­
bal slap at the NAACP and the federal government who, he charg­
ed, were "forcing integration solely for the purpose of mixing 
bodies."83
As the federal courts ordered school boards to make de­
segregation a reality in Norfolk, the school controversy return­
ed to Richmond, where on March 10, 1970, black plaintiffs asked 
that freedom of choice be abandoned for a unitary school sys­
tem. Since freedom of choice failed to desegregate the schools 
the plaintiffs asked the court to accept a busing plan which,
8 3
they hoped,- would destroy the dual school system in Richmond.
79Id. at 411.
80t, ■ ■,Ibid.
81Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, August 13, 1970, p. 1.
82t i . ,Ibid.
83Richmond News Leader, March 10, 1970, p. 1.
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This plea touched off an explosion. Although opposi­
tion to busing was vigorous in every Virginia city, Richmond's 
past and present combined to set off a reaction reminiscent of 
massive resistance. Since 1954, the capitol city, especially 
through its daily newspapers, had provided a stream of argu­
ments protesting the invasion of states' rights by the federal 
judiciary. As the voice of Richmond's conservative white West- 
end, the editorial pages of the city's jointly-owned newspapers 
lashed out at busing and the courts.
The defense of individual liberty and states' rights 
explained only a part of the city's reaction. Beneath the 
rhetoric was the more fundamental question of whether or not 
Richmond was on the verge of becoming a black city. Unlike
Lynchburg, Roanoke, or Norfolk, black students already made up
84a majority of the school population. In 1970, the total
white population of the city, supplemented by a contested an-
85 . .nexation, barely exceeded the Negro population. The critics 
of busing correctly viewed the composition of the schools as a 
factor in maintaining the white balance. They recognized that, 
between 1965 and 1970, freedom of choice had played an important 
role in perpetuating white schools and checking white flight. 
Thus, crosstown busing to achieve desegregation was not only
^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 24, 1970, p. A-l. When 
the suit was reopened, sixty percent of the 50,000 Richmond 
public school system was black, Norfolk's schools included 
24,000 Negro students, or approximately forty-two percent of 
the total enrollment.
85Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 10, 1971, B-l.
an educational problem, but a vital issue in the political, 
social, and economic future of the city.
In the spring and summer of 1970, as the Richmond School 
case was considered by the federal district court, the Richmond 
newspapers flailed away at the concept of enforced desegrega­
tion. In developing their case, the Times-Dispatch and News 
Leader emphasized several major themes. First, in opposing 
busing, the Richmond dailies attempted to disconnect their pro­
test from the heritage of massive resistance. They formulated 
an argument which offered a broad urban appeal rather than one 
that was narrowly southern. In March of 1970, for example, 
the News Leader charged: "Integration is one thing: By and
large the nation accepts it. But busing is quite another thing 
Busing for the purpose of integration is unacceptable to most 
Americans .1 88 Secondly, the editorials vehemently attacked 
the claims of educators who claimed that integration increased 
educational achievement. A News Leader editorial reported: 
"Scientific thought remains divided. Some sociologists believe 
that white children suffer when educated in all black schools;
others believe that black children who attend integrated school
8 7lose their sense of racial identity and pride." The Times- 
Dispatch preferred "to educate children where they are, with 
special attention to basic educational needs . . . over
^Editorial, Richmond News Leader, March 16, 1970r p. 8. 
87Ibid., July 29, 1970, p. 10.
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o o
feather-brained machinations to juggle racial percentages."
Thirdly, the Richmond papers passed as defenders of black
culture. A News Leader editorial explained that: "Now, through
forced integration Negroes find their racial culture and their
racial identity threatened and increasing numbers of them no
longer want forced togetherness. They want their own schools,
in which their culture can be preserved, and they want to exer-
89 ■cise control over their schools." Mimicking the rhetoric of 
black nationalists, the News Leader claimed that: "It is rac­
ist to contend that a child cannot get a good education unless
he is in a class with X or Y or Z number of children of 
90another race." Finally, the editorials played on the arbi­
trary nature of the federal judiciary. The editors embellished 
the principle of free choice and asked Virginia's leaders to
make their stand on this issue. "Freedom of choice does not
91smack of massive resistance," wrote the News Leader. It is
92"what makes this country tick," claimed the Times-Dispatch.
Two years after the Green decision, the News Leader still 
claimed that "Richmond's school problems . . . stem from a lack
p p
Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 13, 1970,
p. F-6.
o g
Editorial, Richmond News Leader, July 22, 1970,
p. 12.
9QIbid., July 24, 1970, p. 10.
9^Ibid., July 30, 1970, p. 10.
92Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 19, 1970,
p. F-6.
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of clear definitions and constitutional interpretations of
9 3the Supreme Court of the United States."
Between March and August of 1970, the opponents of 
busing received two major setbacks. First, an effort by four­
teen Virginia legislators to persuade Governor Linwood Holton 
to direct the state to intervene in all desegregation suits
and to suspend all desegregation plans until the Supreme Court
94ruled on racial balance was a failure. Recalling the past,
the petition of the legislators, some of whom were veteran
"massives," held that "the state is primarily responsible for
95the operation of an efficient public school system." The
News Leader which supported their strategy, wrote, "The public
hears time and again that in Virginia, the localities are
creatures of the State. By the same reasoning, the State is
the level of government to stand firmly on freedom of choice
96especially as the doctrine has been practiced in Richmond."
But Governor Holton resisted the pressure to make Virginia a
party to the Richmond suit. Urging calmness and rationality,
Holton counseled against dragging the schools into the thicket
97of political expediency.
9 3Editorial, Richmond News Leader, August 26, 1970, p. 10. 
^ Richmond News Leader, July 29 , 1970 , p. 1.
95Ibid.
96Editorial, Ibid., July 30, 1970, p. 1.
^7Richmond News Leader, August 4, 1970, p. 1.
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The second defeat for the antibusing forces was in^ - 
flicted by a new federal district court decision which con­
cluded that transportation was "an acceptable tool" for
9 8achieving a unitary school system. Judge Robert R. Mehrige, 
Jr. rested his opinion on three major points. First, he demon­
strated that the change in the racial composition of the public
schools since the adoption of freedom of choice in 1965 was 
. . 99minimal. The Mehrige opinion on this point was especially 
strong, since the Richmond School Board admitted that it was 
not operating a unitary school s y s t e m . N e x t ,  Mehrige held 
that Richmond's segregation was de jure. Racially restricted 
covenants, public housing, and urban renewal projects, he 
wrote, were designed to perpetuate segregation. The Judge con­
cluded: "Negroes in Richmond live where they do because they
have no c h o i c e . S i n c e  "residence in a neighborhood is de­
nied to Negro pupils solely on the ground of color," he re­
jected a neighborhood school plan as an acceptable alternative 
10 2to busing. Finally, Judge Mehrige wrote that since the
" Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 317 
F. Supp. 555, 576 (E.D. Va. 1970). The interim mixing plan 
ordered in this decision called for the transportation of 
approximately 13,000 students. On April 5, 1971, Judge Mehrige 
approved a plan which added another 8,000 students to those 
already bused to school.
"id. at 560-61.
^"id. at 558.
101Id. at 564.
102Id. at 566.
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Green decision school officials had the affirmative duty to
10 3dismantle dual school systems.
The Mehrige opinion carefully defined the terms which 
had evolved in the course of the school litigation. In the 
Norfolk case, Judge Hoffman had used the findings of educa­
tional testing to argue for white majorities in desegregated 
schools. However, Judge Mehrige now argued that the establish­
ment of majority white classrooms had no relation to the re­
quirements of the law. Richmond's constitutional responsibil­
ity was to create a unitary school system, and, to effectuate
104a unitary school system "a racial balance is not required."
But what was a unitary school system? According to Judge
Mehrige it was a school system in which the "racial identities
105of the schools" were not "readily discernible."
Judge Mehrige's decision made him the most unpopular
public official in the Richmond area. Yet, his ruling was the
logical culmination of the Brown decision. The dilemma of
federal judges, like Mehrige, was capsulized by Alexander M.
Bickel, Yale Professor of Law and a critic of busing. Federal
judges who wished to guarantee equal educational opportunity,
he observed', ordered busing "because that's all a court knows
106how to do" to achieve this goal under the Constitution.
103Id. at 576.
1Q4Id. at 564.
105 , . -j Ibid.
106Bill Connelly, "Bickel, Busing Foe, Hits Amendment," 
Media General News Service in Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 3, 
1972, p. A-4.
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However, when the Supreme Court in 1971 upheld busing as a 
method for achieving desegregation, Judge Mehrige's opinion 
and his refusal to stay his busing order were vindicated.
Between 196 5 and 1970 the campaign to eliminate segre­
gated schools scored several important victories in Virginia 
and the South. The most important was the Green v. New Kent 
County decision which held that school boards had an "affirma­
tive duty" to create unitary school systems. With this ruling 
the Supreme Court put to rest the Briggs dictum which held that 
under Brown school boards merely had to prohibit discrimination. 
Once the Supreme Court announced that school boards had to take 
all steps necessary to destroy dual school systems, busing de­
cisions followed and were ultimately upheld in the Swann
. . . 108 decision.
These legal victories for desegregation, substantial as 
they were, were nonetheless, paralleled by a dramatic change in 
the nation's mood on racial matters. For a moment, in 1965 and 
1966, the federal government worked in tandem with the state's 
energetic NAACP, in spite of a national decline in civil rights 
enthusiasm. By 1967, however, the federal government responded 
to the general deterioration in race relations by attacking se­
gregation less aggressively. Against this background, the 
responsibility for destroying segregation in Virginia's most
107Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
108-,.,Ibid.
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resistant regions, the cities and the black belt, once again 
rested with black plaintiffs and the courts.
In Virginia, the desegregation struggle focused on 
Norfolk and Richmond. Judges Hoffman and Mehrige were confront­
ed with the problems of desegregating cities with difficult 
administrative problems due to racial housing patterns. Judge 
Hoffman adopted the position that the requirements of the law 
must be adjusted to the situation. He disliked busing and 
predicted that resegregation would neutralize the effects of 
busing. Although overruled by the higher courts, Hoffman's 
position won approval in the state. To legal realists, Hoffman's 
rulings offered a common sense approach. Yet to the black 
plaintiffs, his decision menant a denial of desegregated edu­
cation to Negro children. Since no alternative means of dese­
gregating schools was proposed, the plaintiffs doggedly pressed 
for and won a busing order.
In Richmond, Judge Mehrige argued that regardless of the 
obstacles to desegregation presented by a city, the Brown de­
cision demanded the immediate creation of a unitary school 
system. Yet, his opinion was so unpopular that it prompted 
another wave of white departures from the already majority 
black public schools. Consequently, both the Richmond School 
Board and black plaintiffs saw a consolidation with two neigh­
boring counties, Henrico and Chesterfield, as the only means
of assuring a desegregated school system in Richmond and the 
metropolitan area. Thus, the intractable school problem 
invited solutions which seemed totalitarian and self-destruc­
tive to some and necessary to others. The federal courts, in 
turn, seemed to be irresistably bound to a course which invited 
a constitutional crisis. For Richmond, the explosion occurred 
on January 10, 1972, when Judge Mehrige ordered the consolida­
tion of Richmond, Henrico and Chesterfield public schools.
CHAPTER XII
THE RICHMOND CONSOLIDATION CASE
The decision by Judge Robert Mehrige, Jr. to permit 
busing as a technique for achieving a unitary school system 
did not conclude the Richmond litigation. Instead, Judge 
Mehrige's ruling prompted the Richmond School Board and the 
black plaintiffs to seek still another remedy for Richmond's 
predominately black school system. In order to insure Rich­
mond students an integrated education, they asked the dis­
trict court to order the State Board of Education to merge 
the city school system with those of the adjoining counties 
of Henrico and Chesterfield. The consolidation case had 
nationwide significance, since it offered a possible method 
of combating urban resegregation by crossing political bound­
aries to desegregate several school systems with one judicial 
stroke. Ironically, after ten years of litigation, the major 
parties in the Richmond case were united in one of the most 
controversial school cases in Virginia and the nation since 
Brown I.
With the busing decision, the interests of the school 
board and the black plaintiffs had become almost identical.
The Richmond city schools were already sixty-four percent black 
and school officials expected the busing order to accelerate
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white flight and resegregation. The end result of this pro­
cess, in the school board’s judgment, was a loss of confidence 
in the Richmond public schools.'*' Black leaders shared the 
school board's concern for the future of Richmond's schools. 
They expected the school merger to broaden the economic base
of the school system and to increase the opportunities of black
2
and white children to receive a desegregated education.
Underlying the school problem was also a concern for 
the future stability of Richmond. The reality of rising ex­
penditures and the spector of a shrinking tax base, (an urban 
dilemma throughout the nation), threatened the future of Vir­
ginia' s capitol. School merger was viewed by some as a method 
of fostering greater regional planning, as a means of slowing 
white flight, and as a way of encouraging open housing. If 
the citizens of the metropolitan area were unable to escape 
the city's problems, according to this theory, self-interest 
would dictate positive action to insure the city's continued 
vitality. Leading black and white spokesmen also hope that 
a merger would persuade whites to open their neighborhoods as
^Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 20, 19 71, p. A-l.
School Superintendent L. D. Adams accounted for the poor read­
ing and achievement scores of city students by their low "so­
cioeconomic level." The proposed metro school system contem­
plated 105,000 students, of which 78,000 would be bused. The 
new school system was expected to be about thirty-four percent 
black. Before the trial Henrico schools were eight percent 
black and Chesterfield schools nine percent black.
2Richmond News Leader, .February 4, 1971, p. 20.
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3a means of avoiding busing. To the plaintiffs, the future of
the city and its schools were inseparable. With the help of
the federal courts, they hoped to persuade the counties that
a healthy city was worth the cost of the inconvenience accom-
4p any m g  consolidation.
The action taken by the Richmond School Board, however,
only escalated the ill-will existing between the city and the
counties. In the 1971 meeting of the General Assembly, both
Henrico and Chesterfield counties, the principal targets of
Richmond1s school consolidation suit, made applications for
city charters. The motivation of the counties was twofold.
First, they hoped that city status might prove useful in
fighting a school merger. Before a joint hearing of the
Senate and House committees on counties, cities and towns,
Linwood E. Toombs, a member of the Henrico County Board of
Supervisors, said: "I wouldn't deny for one moment that one
of the large considerations in this charter bill was the cur-
5xent joinder motion that the city filed." Secondly, city 
status offered a guarantee against future annexation suits
3
Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 17, 19 71, p. A-l.
Thomas C. Little, Richmond's associate superintendent testi­
fied that merger would spark open neighborhoods; Richmond Afro- 
American, January 15, 19 72, p. 1. Henry L. Marsh III, Rich­
mond's black Vice-Mayor predicted that Judge Mehrige's deci­
sion would help remove discrimination in housing and jobs.
^Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 17, 1971, p. A-l.
r
Richmond News Leader, February 4, 19 71, p. 20.
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planned by Richmond.^ Many county residents did not want to
be absorbed by the city, especially after Judge Mehrige's
busing decision. The urgent request by the counties for a
city charter was one expression of the volatility of the
emotion-laden school issue. The General Assembly's solution
was a compromise which imposed a five year moratorium on
annexations and on granting city charters in the Richmond 
7
area. It hoped that time and study* might afford the Richmond 
area and the state an opportunity to deal with this problem in 
a calmer atmosphere.
As the metropolitan area waited for the consolidation 
trial, it turned its attention to the busing controversy. The 
Richmond newspapers represented the position of the antibusing 
forces as they surveyed the busing experiment in Richmond and 
the nation. Regarding the city's experiment, most of their 
attention was focused on administrative breakdowns and racial 
tensions which accompanied the transition from freedom of 
choice to crosstown busing. School violence, a sensitive pub­
lic issue, received special treatment in the News Leader. An 
editorial entitled "The School Decline," included a list of 
violent acts by race which showed that white students were
0
always the victims of interracial conflict. Although the 
News Leader offered several explanations for the disorders,
^Ibid.
^Acts of the General Assembly, Chapter 234, Reg. Sess. 
1971, p. 466.
^Editorial, Richmond News Leader, March 8, 1971, p. 10.
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the editorial had the effect of confirming white opinion that 
racial harmony was best achieved through separation. The 
Richmond School Board, in turn, recognized that a crucial 
factor in winning the public1s confidence in the schools rest­
ed on its ability to insure the safety of city students.
In their efforts to record the failure of busing, the
Richmond newspapers frequently clashed with Governor Linwood
Holton, who repeatedly rejected the dismal picture painted
in their editorials. Although he opposed forced busing to
achieve racial balance, he stated that because of the efforts
of "young people", busing was making a positive contribution
9to race relations in Virginia. As the father of four chil­
dren in Richmond's public schools, the Governor said: "I am
seeing my children learn, as they can in no other way, how to 
get along with children from backgrounds completely different 
from our own. I am seeing young people getting along, enjoy­
ing themselves, and incidentally, setting an example from which 
we parents and politicians could well benefit."^9 Given the 
undoubted inconvenience and racial tensions, the Governor 
offered Virginians and the nation another side of the story.
Holton's stance also was taken at a significant poli­
tical risk. Conservative Democrats, who were drifting into 
the Republican party or voting an Independent ticket, reminded
9Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 12, 1971, p. B-l
10Quoted in Editorial, Richmond News Leader, October 1, 
1971, p. 18.
him that their votes had helped to put him in o f f i c e . A
dramatic, forceful stand against busing by Holton might have
opened the possibility of higher office as the champion of a
Republican-Conservative Democratic coalition. Instead,
Holton's moderate leadership of the Republican party faced a
strong challenge from the conservative wing of his party.
On April 20, 1971, Virginia learned that the resort to
the United States Supreme Court offered no immediate relief
to the critics of busing. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
12Board of Education, the Court appeared unruffled by the 
waves made by the antibusing forces. The Court found "no ba­
sis for holding that the local school authorities may not be 
required to employ bus transportation as one tool of school
desegregation. Desegregation plans cannot be limited to the
13walk-in school." The pronouncement against busing in Title
IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, a hope of busing foes, was
limited to "the situation of so-called 'de facto segregation.1"
The Court's objective, as in 1954, remained "to eliminate from
„ 15public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.
11
Editorial, Richmond News Leader, May 11, 1970, p. 11.
In the 1969 election conservative Democrats supported Holton 
instead of the Democratic party's candidate, William Battle, 
who was considered too liberal.
12402 U.S. 1 (1971).
The initial response of Richmond newspapers was to de^ 
nounce the Supreme Court decision. Criticizing the Court's 
"grotesque logic," the Times Dispatch wrote that Swann es­
tablished a "dual standard on school integration in this 
country."16 Swann was just one more "assault upon the hated 
South," screamed the News Leader. The Court's decision, it 
continued, destroyed "freedom of choice" in the South and 
threatened this liberty in the entire nation.17
Although Swann apparently offered the South no relief,
portions of the opinion were construed as "weak beacons of 
18
hope." The Supreme Court, a Times-Dispatch editorial re­
ported, said objections to busing "may have validity" when 
busing endangered a child's health or hindered his education.19 
This qualification was viewed as a possible issue in any bus­
ing case. The editorial also found encouragement for the 
fight against school merger. It reported the Supreme Court's 
objections to racial balancing and to yearly desegregation ad­
justments by school authorities "once the affirmative duty to
desegregate has been accomplished," unless there was subsequent
20discriminatory action. Since the newspaper argued that the
16Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 21, 1971,
p . 10.
17Editorial, Richmond News Leader, April 10, 1971, p. 10.
18Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 25, 1971,
p. 8.
19Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402
U.S. 1 (.1971) quoted in Ibid.
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city and county schools were desegregated already and that
the counties had not drawn their political boundaries to
preserve segregation, it saw no requirement for further action
under Swann. The Court's statement that racial balancing was
not required, the Times-Dispatch believed, provided the crux
21of the case against school consolidation. As subsequent 
events demonstrated, the defense lawyers liked the editor's 
analysis.
After the Swann decision the only hope for the antibus­
ing forces was federal legislation or a constitutional amend­
ment which would prohibit busing to achieve desegregation.
Of the two approaches, the Richmond newspapers preferred the 
amending process. Even President Richard Nixon's proposed
antibusing legislation, which included permanent restraints
22of questionable constitutionality on busing, was considered
less attractive than an antibusing amendment. The Times-
Dispatch viewed Nixon's antibusing program as "a commendable
23attempt" to remedy the busing issue. However, even if the
Nixon plan got through Congress and the current Supreme Court,
the editorial sought the "more lasting relief" of an antibus- 
24ing amendment.
22Professor Alexander Bickel discussed the constitutional
infirmities of President Richard Nixon's proposed busing legis­
lation in "What's Wrong With Nixon's Busing Bill?" The New 
Republic, April, 1972, pp. 19-22.
23Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 19, 1972, p. 6.
24Ibid.
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The support of the Richmond newspapers for the amend­
ing process was not limited to antibusing action. The Richmond 
dailies also advocated a direct attack on the Supreme Court's 
power of judicial review and the concept of an independent 
judiciary. The News Leader asked President Nixon to propose 
a constitutional amendment empowering Congress to send all 
"dubious decisions" cf the Supreme Court to the highest appel­
late courts of the states. If a majority of the fifty high­
est state courts differed with the Supreme Court's ruling,
25then the judgment was to be reversed.
A second technique for curbing the federal courts was 
sponsored by Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr. and endorsed by the 
Times-Dispatch. Senator Byrd's proposed constitutional amend­
ment provided for the reconfirmation of all federal judges
every eight years. The Times-Dispatch argued that this was
2 6the only method of checking "judicial autocrats." The 
paper's enthusiasm for the Byrd amendment was increased by the 
expectation that the plan offered a way of removing Judge 
Robert Mehrige from the bench. The proposals discussed by the 
Richmond newspapers were not new, but rather amounted to hy­
brid forms- of past attempts to restrict the Supreme Court's 
judicial power. Nonetheless, school cases involving measures 
which attacked the most stubborn obstacles to desegregation
25Editorial, Richmond News Leader, March 13, 1972, p. 14.
^Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 25, 1972,
p . 14.
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risked the Court’s prestige and raised fears of a constitu­
tional crisis.
Another consequence of the decision to press for an 
antibusing amendment was a schizophrenic reaction in Richmond 
to the outcry against busing in northern cities like Detroit, 
Pontiac, Boston, and Indianapolis. On the one hand, there 
was an undisguised sense of vindication. The News Leader
wondered why the national media did hot portray the events as
27"symptoms of regional hysteria and sickly racist minds."
After the Department of Health, Education and Welfare accused
Boston of operating segregated schools, the satisfaction of
the antibusers was complete. To the Richmond papers, Boston
represented the citadel of "sociology gone wild" and "do 
28gooderism." The problems of Boston, according to a Times-
Dispatch editorial, had "its delicious ironies, as savored
29from a Southern perspective."
Although they relished the accounts of northern turmoil, 
the Richmond newspapers urged their readers to shun vindic­
tiveness. The Times-Dispatch advised that "too much is at 
stake to wallow in the ironies of the situation."30 Instead, 
Virginians were urged by the News Leader to recognize that 
"compulsory busing" would "become a thing of the past," only
27Editorial, Richmond News Leader, September 22, 1971,
p. 10.
28Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 4, 1971,
p. 14.
29Ibid.
30Ibid., October 28, 1971, p. 14.
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31if it were made a national issue. "With the Supreme Court
sticking by its interpretation that the Constitution requires
children to be assigned on the criterion of color," wrote
the Times-Dispatch "there becomes but one alternative for
citizens who believe in the rule of law and opposing busing.
32And that is to amend the Constitution." The strategy of
the South was grounded on a faith in history which also had
guided Virginia's massive resisters in the 1950's. This was
the belief that, as in the First Reconstruction, the South's
salvation was in the North.
In the summer of 1971 the attention given to busing
gave way to an individual concentration on the consolidation
trial. In opposing consolidation, the Richmond newspapers
alternated between playing on emotions and demanding judicial
restraint. In tones mildly reminiscent of Massive Resistance,
the News Leader condemned the proposed merger as ill-advised,
since the Richmond School Board and the NAACP were on the same
side of the argument. The former was described as a "virtual
33lackey of the NAACP." Consolidation was variously described 
as a "capitulation to perversity," "pernicious racism" and a
31Editorial, Richmond News Leader, September 22, 1971,
p*
o
 
1 —1
32Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 28, 1971,
p- 14.
"^Editorial, Richmond News Leader, August 30, 1971,
p . 10.
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3 4luxuriant crop of bosh." However, the papers also argued 
that merger raised an unprecedented constitutional question.
The Times-Dispatch warned that, if upheld, consolidation 
would establish the principle "that an unelected judge could 
ignore at will the political jurisdictions the people , act­
ing through their democratic institutions, have set for them- 
35selves." Given the urban dilemma, it suggested that a
better "way to tackle this problem is to make possible orderly
growth of the cities through procedures that elected represen-
3 6tatives provide." Finally, the Times-Dispatch insisted that 
white majority schools, one objective of consolidation, ex­
ceeded the Court’s desegregation requirements, humiliated
Negroes and required unreasonable personal sacrifice without
37ensuring an increase in educational achievement. Thus the 
Richmond newspapers presented an argument that appealed to 
white segregationists, black separatists, disgruntled subur­
banites and advocates of judicial restraint.
In August and September of 1971, the Richmond School 
Board and the black plaintiffs answered their critics before 
Judge Mehrige. The plaintiffs' argument was grounded on the 
charge that, due to housing patterns, the Richmond metropolitan
34Ibid., May 5, 1971, p. 14; August 30, 1971, p. 10.
3^Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 6, 1971, p. 12
3 6-r-i ■ -J Ibid.
37Ibid.
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area operated a racially dual school system. Moreover, the 
appellants argued that state action contributed to the resi­
dential segregation upon which the schools were built. They 
contended that the State Board of Education had the authority 
and responsibility to ignore political boundaries in order to 
insure rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. finally, the 
plaintiffs believed that for academic and social reasons the 
racial composition of the schools should reflect the racial 
ratio of the larger community. The metro area, they urged,
shared a community of interest which included providing a de-
3 8segregated education for all its children.
In making its argument for establishing majority white 
schools, the plaintiffs relied heavily on the testimony of 
Richmond born Thomas Pettigrewr Harvard Professor of Social 
Psychology. A persuasive advocate of integration, Professor 
Pettigrew joined Judge Mehrige and Governor Holton as a major 
villain of the antibusing-consolidation forces. Pettigrew 
supported school consolidation for academic and non-academic 
reasons. As an educator, he was persuaded by all the major 
studies of desegregation, such as Equality of Educational 
Opportunity and Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, that 
integrated schools increased the achievement of black students. 
However, the mere mixing of bodies or desegregation, Pettigrew 
cautioned, was not necessarily productive educationally.
^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 17, 1971, p. 1,
August 19„ 1971, p. 1.
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Integrated education was achieved only when desegregation was
combined with "a climate of interracial acceptance." Studies
suggested that "interracial acceptance" was the variable which
accounted for the consistently better performance of Negroes
39m  integrated schools. The stability required for meaning­
ful integration, Pettigrew testified, was enhanced by the 
metro provision to keep the Negro enrollment between twenty 
and forty percent in all schools. Whereas black attendance 
below twenty percent was considered tokenism, black enrollment 
above forty percent precipitated white flight. The implemen­
tation of the merger, Pettigrew believed, would make Richmond
40the envy of urban America.
Given the controversy generated by the conclusions
41regarding the academic value of integration, both methodo­
logical and emotional, Pettigrew also offered several non- 
academic reasons for supporting consolidation. The elimination
39Thomas F. Pettigrew, Racially Separate or Together?
(New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1971), pp. 64-66. Professor
Pettigrew made the same argument in his testimony during the 
Richmond consolidation trial which was reported in the Rich­
mond Times-Dispatch, August 19, 1971, p. 1. Professor Pettigrew 
endorsed the findings of Equality of Educational Opportunity or 
the Coleman Report which concluded that the most important 
factor in determining academic achievement was the student's 
family class background. Since only one-fourth of America's 
Negroes were middle-class, Pettigrew saw the dividends of the 
social class mix as another argument for school integration.
See Racially Separate or Together, pp. 57-67.
4QRichmond Times-Dispatch, August 19, 1971, p. A-l.
41For a discussion of the Coleman Report by educators 
who support and attack its findings see Vol. 38, No. 1 of 
the Harvard Educational Review (1968).
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of majority black schools, he emphasized, was the surest
method of changing the community's unfavorable opinion of
these schools. Furthermore, in an integrated school, Negro
students acquired experience in dealing with white people and
white institutions. Both, according to Pettigrew, contri-
42buted to the post-school success of Negro students. Above 
all, integrated education provided the best method of prepar­
ing all children to live in an interracial world. For this
reason, Pettigrew stressed, it was as important for white
43students as black students to attend integrated schools.
The county and state defendants rebutted the plain­
tiffs' case point by point. They asserted that the counties 
and the city already operated unitary school systems. Neither 
a meaningful integration nor a racial balance was required 
by the law. Residential housing patterns, including Richmond's 
black ghetto, were considered the result of private choice.
The defense denied that a community of interest existed be­
tween the counties and the city. Besides, argued Henrico 
lawyer R. D* Mcllwaine, III., a "community of interest" lacked 
"constitutional standing" and standards of measurement.
Finally, the defendants found no authority giving the State 
Board of Education the power to merge the school systems without
A p
Lecture given by Professor Thomas Pettigrew at the 
University of Richmond, April 24, 1972.
43Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 19, 1971, p. A-l.
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their consent. According to this argument, education was a
local rather than a state responsibility.44
One central theme of the defense’s case was that the 
city's objective was political rather than educational. Mer­
ger, Henrico County Manager E. A. Beck claimed, was "an
annexation attempt . . .  a way to accomplish by the back door
45what they couldn't by the front door." The counties not 
only refused to see a community of interest, but also viewed
their struggle as a defense of local government.
The defense also attempted to nullify the testimony of 
Professor Pettigrew. Their expert witness was Professor 
Clifford P. Hooker, a white education-finance specialist from 
the University of Minnesota. Claiming no expertise in edu­
cational psychology, Professor Hooker offered the observation
that establishing majority white schools was "racist” and
4 6"paternalistic.” Furthermore, he thought it "insulting" to 
Negroes when white researchers identified black schools as
sub-standard and claimed some knowledge for remedying the
47 •situation. In effect, Dr. Hooker adopted the position
44Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 15, 1971, p. A-l.
45Ibid.
4^Ibid. September 10, 1971, p. A-l.
47From a portion of a brief submitted by the State of 
Virginia and the Counties of Henrico and Chesterfield to the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and published, in part, by 
the Richmond News Leader, April 13, 1972, pp. 16-17.
advanced by black separatists that white educators were 
incompetent to deal with Negro educational problems.
Almost four months after the trial, on January 10, 1972, 
Judge Robert R. Mehrige, Jr., ordered the consolidation of the 
Richmond, Henrico and Chesterfield school systems,48 Each of 
the major questions raised during the trial was settled in 
favor of the plaintiffs. First, Judge Mehrige found "indivi­
dual facilities and entire [school] systems racially identi­
fiable" in the metropolitan area.4  ^ Pursuance of desegrega­
tion policies and the achievement of "some results," the claim
of the counties, did not "relieve them of the remainder of
50their affirmative obligation." Secondly, the court declared
that racial differences in public school enrollment were
directly related to public and private discrimination in the
51sale of housing. Although, he did not charge that school
officials had gerrymandered school boundaries, Mehrige found
that school construction "contributed substantially" to school 
52segregation. School authorities, he emphasized, "may not" 
be constitutionally permitted "to reproduce in school facilities
48Bradley v. The Board of the City of Richmond, 338 F.
Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972).
the prevalent pattern of housing segregation." To do so,
5 4was to prolong by state action "the effects of discrimination."
Finally, Judge Mehrige ruled that the State Board of Education
had the legal authority and constitutional responsibility to
merge the school districts. The State Board's involvement in
55local education was extensive and, in the past, had ignored
56political boundaries for educational purposes. In Mehrige's 
judgment, political boundaries, when’unrelated to educational 
needs, did not prevent the Court or the State Board from cross­
ing school lines to secure the rights of Negroes under the
57Fourteenth Amendment.
In ordering a merger, Judge Mehrige was impressed by
the evidence of educators that black schools, in white areas,
58were "perceived as inferior." This stigma, he was persuaded
by educational experts, not only penalized the child in school,
59but accompanied the individual throughout life. However,
Mehrige emphasized that racial identifiability, of concern to
educators, was also "a legal concept— a conclusion of law,
ultimately. . . . I|6° In this case, the "law's demands parallel
61those of educators." Thus, he concluded, that "meaningful
integration in a bi-racial community is essential to equality
of education, and the failure to provide it is violative of
6 2
the Constitution of the United States."
54Ibid. 55Id. at 116-19.
57Ibid. 58I!- at 81.
60 -r _  4_ on
53Id. at 84.
56Id. at 83.
Judge Mehrige devoted a large portion of his opinion
to the topics of busing and racial balance. Concerning the
former, Mehrige accumulated significant data supporting the
argument, that for reasons unrelated to desegregation, busing
was already extensive in the counties. In the 1969-1970 school
year the counties bused over forty-seven thousand students at
G 3an expense approaching a million and a half dollars. Al­
though the metro plan expected to bus an estimated seventy- 
eight thousand students in 1971-1972, sixty-eight thousand
students already were transported to schools in the three
64school districts. Even the time of the bus rides, limited to
one hour-one way, under the metro plan, seemed less excessive
when compared to past practices. In 1942, for example, the
State Board of Education permitted a one way bus ride of ninety
65minutes for secondary students.
Regarding racial ratios, Judge Mehrige believed that a 
twenty to forty percent black enrollment promised the greatest 
stability for the new school system.66 The court did not 
consider this figure arbitrary, but, instead, "established by
r  —i
the Richmond area." Thus, the court accepted the goal of 
civil rights lawyers that school assignments should reflect
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the racial composition of the larger population.68 With the 
establishment of racially stable schools, Mehrige believed 
"there seems to be beneficial effect upon community percep­
tions of the faculty, the teachers' expectations, and even the 
. . . 69administration." Integration, still offered "each race . . .
a substantially greater opportunity to develop realistic
attitudes toward the other race, productive of friendships and
7 0positive social behavior. Finally/ although impressed with
the educational impact of majority white middle-class schools,
Mehrige emphasized that consolidation was ordered so that
71"racial desegregation would be made possible."
The Richmond newspapers described the decision as a
"bugle call for what could be the final, decisive battle in
the agonizing fight to preserve locally-controlled neighbor-
72hood public schools in America." Although differing with 
Mehrige on points of law and fact, the newspapers concentrated 
their attack on the social objectives of his decision. The 
Times-Dispatch wrote that the opinion "warmly endorsed the
68Id. at 194. On this point Mehrige quoted with approval 
Professor~Pettigrew's statement that he would not adhere to 
the forty percent maximum where the Negro population exceeded 
forty percent.
69Id. at 186.
7 8Id. at 195 .
7^Id. at 196.
72Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 25, 1972,
p. A-12.
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pernicious gibberish of those social engineers who argue, in 
effect, that a school system's primary function is to pro­
mote racial togetherness, not to give children the best pos-
73sible academic education." The paper reminded Negroes that
74the decision "was insulting to black children in particular.1
7 5When combined with the promise to "bus dollars,” the appeal
to black pride sounded like a subtle bribe to exchange money
for a cessation of the integration campaign.
The Richmond Afro-American, the city's black weekly,
applauded the Mehrige decision. If upheld, the order meant
that whites could no longer "run across a city or county line
in order to escape desegregated schools." The editor rejected
the nostrums of segregationists and separatists and reasoned
that: "Unless black and white work together to eliminate the
massive problems in both equal and quality education, they
cannot be solved. Only ignorance and bitterness grow out of
the efforts to run away." The Afro-American reminded its
readers that: "A major facet of education is teaching young
Americans what many of their parents never learned— how to
77live with each other in mutual respect."
7^Ibid. January 11, 1972, p. A-14.
74Ibid.
7^Ibid. December 4, 1971, p. A-14.
76Editorial, Richmond Afro-American, January 22, 1972,
p. 4.
77Ibid. March 18, 1972, p. 4.
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The commitment to school integration championed by the 
NAACP and the Afro-American, however, was challenged by Ne­
groes who were disenchanted with that goal. Roy Innis, nation­
al director of the Congress of Racial Equality, announced that
his organization intended to file "friend of court" briefs in
7 8the higher courts on the side of the state and counties. In­
stead of integration, CORE demanded black community controlled 
schools. Integrated schools were attacked by Innis on the 
grounds that they implied "blackness was bad," aimed at "whiten
ing black minds" and prevented the improvement of black cul- 
79ture. The appeal to emotions was combined with an argument
that community controlled schools permitted Negroes "to maxi-
80mize resources." The school described by Innis was, in
effect, an instrument of black community action.
The debate between CORE and the NAACP over educational
policy was only a facet of CORE'S challenge to the NAACP leader
ship of the black community. Although Innis commended the
NAACP's contribution to the civil rights movement, he thought
it was blinded by white defiance to alternative strategies
81for equal educational opportunity. Moreover, CORE rejected 
7 RRichmond Times-Dispatch, January 16, 1972, p. B-l.
79Tape recording of a debate between Roy Innis and 
Henry Marsh, III, Richmond Vice-Mayor, Virginia Union Uni­
versity, January 26, 1972.
80t, . .Ibid.
81_, . nIbid.
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the NAACP's goal of an interracial society. "Let's face it,"
Innis exclaimed, "black and white life styles are basically 
82different." To Richmond's black leaders, community control
was viewed as a return to the past. Their apprehensions were
not relieved by the voluntary nature of the act— separatism
rather than segregation. The CORE proposal raised too many
unanswered questions. How long and how generously would
whites support black controlled schools? How could racial
8 3myths be changed through separation? Nevertheless, a size­
able number of young blacks, frustrated by delay, viewed in­
tegration suspiciously. They, along with their leaders, 
presented a new dimension to the school struggle in Virginia.
In the counties, the consolidation decision was fol­
lowed by several protest demonstrations and by reports of 
newly formulated plans to send children to private schools. 
However, the focus of attention was on the courts where the 
school merger battle was expected to be won or lost. As pre­
dicted by most observers, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
84reversed the Mehrige ruling in a 5-1 decision. The majority 
found that the city and the county had eliminated "the last 
vestiges of state-imposed segregation" and had established
8 3_-,.I hid.
84Excerpts of the Fourth Circuit's opinion printed by
the Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 7, 1972, p. A-6.
402
O C
"unitary school systems." Since the Constitution was not
violated, Judge Mehrige "had exceeded his power of interven- 
8 6tion." Although the majority agreed that Negroes had been 
past victims of housing discrimination, it saw no "interac­
tion between any two of the units involved (or by higher state
officers) for the purpose of keeping one unit relatively white
8 7by confining blacks to another." Finally, the majority 
judges thought Judge Mehrige's zeal for desegregation led to 
a remedy which went beyond the authority of the courts. The 
majority chastized Mehrige for failing to "sufficiently con­
sider . . .  a fundamental principle of federalism incorporated
8 8in the Tenth Amendment." The Fourth Circuit's ruling left 
the next move of legal strategy to the Richmond School Board.
As a result of the Fourth Circuit Court's action, consolidation 
was postponed, but the ultimate fate of metropolitan schools 
hinged on the results of the School Board's appeal to the 
Supreme Court.
In the Richmond case, Judge Mehrige held that political 
boundaries must fall where there were great discrepancies in 
the racial identities of adjacent political units. School 
officials,•he believed, could not constitutionally superimpose 
school districts over residential areas which were segregated 
by public or private action. The major question, not decided
85Ibid. 86Ibid.
87Ibid. 88Ibid.
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■*"n Swann but raised in Richmond, was whether school segrega­
tion as a "consequence of other types of action, without any 
scriminatory action by school authorities, is a constitu­
tional violation requiring remedial action by a school desegre— 
89
gation decree. The answer had nationwide ramifications
since it was applicable to urban centers throughout America.
In ordering a school merger, Judge Mehrige stressed the con­
tinuity between Bradley and Brown. The central role of public 
education in preparing Americans to live economically and 
socially productive lives, found in Brown, was reaffirmed by 
Mehrige. However, he emphasized that his decision was not 
tied to social science data but to the Constitution. Consoli­
dation, Mehrige wrote, was the "first, reasonable and feasible
step toward the eradication of the effects of past unlawful 
90discrimination."
In opposing the school merger, anticonsolidationists 
relied on themes familiar to the school controversy since 
1954. However, in 19 72, the prospect of a segregationist 
victory on the merger issue was enhanced also by several im­
portant developments. First, the angry reaction to efforts 
to destroy - racial isolation in northern cities won new allies 
for the South. The demand for equity in the application of
89Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1, 22 (1972).
90Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 338
F. Supp. 67, 105 (E.D. Va. 1972).
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desegregation laws was finally heard, as anxiety over busing 
was translated into legislative and executive action aimed 
at relieving school boards. Secondly, segregationists 
attempted to exploit the division among blacks over school 
policy. The rejection of integration by black separatists was 
used as evidence by the Richmond newspapers to challenge the 
continued legitimacy of the NAACP's leadership in the school 
issue. Lastly, segregationists hoped' the politics of desegre­
gation would force a judicial retreat by the Supreme Court. 
After a second reading of the Swann opinion, the Court's foes 
found reasons for guarded optimism. The Court's pronounce­
ments against racial balancing and yearly adjustment of racial 
ratios after "official action" to eliminate discrimination 
were considered especially important by the defense. In the 
spring of 1972 the interaction of national politics and 
judicial policy making weighed heavily on the minds of many 
Virginians as they awaited the next stage of the desegregation 
controversy.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
After eighteen years, the struggle to desegregate Vir­
ginia's schools had made great headway but was far from over. 
Statistics showed that in 1971-72, 99.4 percent of Virginia's 
black students were in integrated schools.^ However, the 
significance of this achievement was diminished by the large 
number of desegregated schools where white students were al­
most negligible. For example, thirteen hundred Surry County 
Negroes were counted as attending racially mixed schools, 
although there were only seventeen white students in atten­
dance. In the cities, where busing accounted for the greatest 
increase in desegregation over the previous year, predomi­
nantly black schools existed and white flight threatened to 
increase their numbers. The present obstacles to desegrega­
tion in black belt counties and large cities indicated that 
the future of public school integration was not assured, des­
pite rosy statistics. This chapter will identify the factors 
which have' shaped Virginia's reluctant accommodation with the 
Brown decision.
The traditional structure of Virginia's political en­
vironment played a vital role in determining the state's
^Richmond News Leader, April 25, 1972, p. 19. In 1970- 
71, 87.2 percent of Virginia's Negroes were listed in inte­
grated schools.
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response to the segregation cases. In 1954, some sections of 
the Old Dominion, where the Negro population was small, were 
prepared to desegregate the public schools by mixing the 
students and dropping Negro teachers. In the cities, Vir­
ginia’s leaders expected shifting residential patterns to neu­
tralize the Brown decision. From the beginning however, the 
leadership believed a different solution had to be worked out 
for Southside Virginia, where white s'upremacy had its deepest 
roots. After some deliberation, the Gray Commission recommended 
a local option plan which provided a flexible approach to school 
desegregation. This approach was unfortunately discarded, 
not because of a state-wide grass roots rebellion, but because 
of a decision made by the state's governing elite.
The switch in strategy was possible only because of the 
structure of Virginia's politics. As a result of discrimina­
tory voting laws, malapportioned electoral districts, and 
effective political organization, decision-making was monopo­
lized by the Byrd wing of the Virginia Democratic party. At 
this level, black belt politicians had extraordinary influence. 
This advantage was used to press for a state-wide policy to 
resist desegregation. More importantly, the closed nature of 
the political process permitted Byrd Democrats considerable 
manuverability which facilitated the co-ordination of an 
effective resistence campaign.
In shifting to Massive Resistance, the Byrd Machine 
saw an opportunity to strengthen its position in Virginia and, 
for a moment, believed it could defeat the Supreme Court in
408
the school battle. Hope for a victory over the Court was 
encouraged by the belief that the federal government did not 
have the resources nor the inclination to challenge massive 
school closings. Also, the Organization believed that Vir­
ginia's reputation for moderation in race relations would give 
its unequivocal rejection of school desegregation tremendous 
influence throughout the nation. The first step in this plan, 
which was easily accomplished, was to win a mandate for segre­
gation in Virginia. Appeals to white supremacy and the 
defense of states' rights accounted for a series of segrega­
tionist victories which culminated in the passage of the 
school closing laws and the gubernatorial victory of Lindsay 
Almond in 1957. However, in 195 9, Massive Resistance crumbled 
after federal judges, despite local pressure, assigned black 
children to white schools and after the school closing laws 
failed to win support outside the South. When Governor Almond 
announced that Virginia would obey the law, the Organization 
was left badly divided.
Massive Resistance did not end Virginia's struggle to 
keep its public schools white. In 1959-60 the school closing 
laws were replaced by legislation designed to contain integra­
tion. A pupil placement board and a tuition grant law were 
the backbone of the new program. In addition to giving 
immediate relief to white parents, the new legislation was 
expected to tie up the desegregation process in the federal 
courts, where the state and the localities were well-equipped 
to provide the manpower and financial resources to defend
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school boards. The return to local option was not accompa­
nied by a change of heart regarding racial separation but 
was expected to buy time and to slow integration until the 
national mood proved more favorable to the segregationists' 
cause.
Passive resistance proved to be eminently successful. 
Five years after Massive Resistance, less than two percent 
of Virginia's Negroes were in schools- with white children. 
Virginia's skill in blocking integration demonstrated that 
the courts, by themselves, were incapable of desegregating 
Virginia's public schools. In part, the problem of the courts 
was inherent to the judicial system. Black lawyers flooded 
Virginia's courts with suits testing assignment plans. Liti­
gation moved slowly and the courts lacked broad powers of 
enforcement. Moreover, the loose language of BrownII played 
into the hands of segregationists. By failing to establish 
clear desegregation guidelines, the Supreme Court invited 
litigation and seemed to sympathize with the white South. 
Although Virginia judges (with one notable exception, Judge 
Sterling Hutcheson) assigned Negroes to white schools, they 
consistently held that school boards were not required to 
integrate schools but to prohibit discrimination. This prin­
ciple spawned devious assignment plans and invited criticism 
of the later affirmative order to desegregate, enunciated in 
Green v. County Board of New Kent County. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, Virginians simply contested the legitimacy
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of the federal courts' authority to revolutionize the tradi­
tional pattern of race relations in the South. This argument 
was strengthened by the contention that, in Brown I, the 
Supreme Court abandoned the rules of jurisprudence to legislate 
social attitudes.
The plodding pace of desegregation was finally jolted 
by the active intervention of the federal government in 19 64.
In the 1950's, massive resisters benefited from President 
Eisenhower's refusal to publicly endorse the Brown I decision. 
However, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 placed the power of the 
federal government behind school desegregation. The ability 
to regulate the flow of large amounts of federal money into 
Virginia's schools contributed to a sharp increase in school 
desegregation. When the administrative effort bogged down 
on the acceptability of "freedom of choice" assignment plans, 
the Supreme Court freed it in Green v. County Board of New 
Kent County. The administrative-legal assault on segregation 
was aided by an upheaval in Virginia politics. Largely due 
to federal legislation and Supreme Court rulings which broad­
ened the base of the electorate and reapportioned electoral 
districts,- a period of political flux was precipitated in Vir­
ginia. The political uncertainties caused by a new pool of 
black voters led to greater implementation of the Brown deci­
sion, although it was not accompanied by a conversion regard­
ing the wisdom of public school integration. Thus, the period 
after 1964 demonstrated that the most successful formula for 
undermining segregated schools depended on co-operation between
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the federal courts, Congress, and the Administration. This 
combined effort broke down in 19 70 when black plaintiffs asked 
the courts to order school boards to adopt busing plans as 
a technique for eliminating racially isolated schools in Vir­
ginia. Although the Supreme Court accepted busing as a deseg­
regation tool in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Edu­
cation , the decision met national criticism as busing plans 
were ordered throughout the United States. Presidential and 
congressional attacks on transportation plans designed to in­
crease integration signaled the erosion of federal teamwork 
on the school issue.
When Judge Robert R. Mehrige ignored political bound­
aries to merge the Richmond, Henrico and Chesterfield school 
districts, the struggle to desegregate public schools approached 
another watershed. If upheld by the Supreme Court, the Rich­
mond case offered a method of desegrating schools in large 
metropolitan areas, where residential housing patterns led 
to racially isolated schools. However, as the issues raised 
in the consolidation case approached the Supreme Court, Vir­
ginia's outcry against busing and involuntary metropolitan 
co-operation was matched in all sections of the nation.
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